From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] X.509: fix NULL dereference when restricting key with unsupported_sig
Date: Wed, 07 Feb 2018 01:10:08 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180207011012.5928-6-ebiggers3@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180207011012.5928-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com>
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The asymmetric key type allows an X.509 certificate to be added even if
its signature's hash algorithm is not available in the crypto API. In
that case 'payload.data[asym_auth]' will be NULL. But the key
restriction code failed to check for this case before trying to use the
signature, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference in
key_or_keyring_common() or in restrict_link_by_signature().
Fix this by returning -ENOPKG when the signature is unsupported.
Reproducer when all the CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512* options are disabled and
keyctl has support for the 'restrict_keyring' command:
keyctl new_session
keyctl restrict_keyring @s asymmetric builtin_trusted
openssl req -new -sha512 -x509 -batch -nodes -outform der \
| keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s
Fixes: a511e1af8b12 ("KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 21 +++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index 86fb68508952..7c93c7728454 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -67,8 +67,9 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
*
* Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a
* matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the
- * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if
- * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
+ * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted, -ENOPKG if the signature
+ * uses unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching
+ * certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
*/
int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
@@ -88,6 +89,8 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+ if (!sig)
+ return -ENOPKG;
if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
return -ENOKEY;
@@ -139,6 +142,8 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+ if (!sig)
+ return -ENOPKG;
if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
return -ENOKEY;
@@ -222,9 +227,9 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
*
* Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
* couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
- * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if
- * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be
- * performed.
+ * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses
+ * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate
+ * but the signature check cannot be performed.
*/
int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
@@ -249,9 +254,9 @@ int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring,
*
* Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
* couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
- * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if
- * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be
- * performed.
+ * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses
+ * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate
+ * but the signature check cannot be performed.
*/
int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *dest_keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
--
2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] X.509: fix NULL dereference when restricting key with unsupported_sig
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 17:10:08 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180207011012.5928-6-ebiggers3@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180207011012.5928-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com>
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The asymmetric key type allows an X.509 certificate to be added even if
its signature's hash algorithm is not available in the crypto API. In
that case 'payload.data[asym_auth]' will be NULL. But the key
restriction code failed to check for this case before trying to use the
signature, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference in
key_or_keyring_common() or in restrict_link_by_signature().
Fix this by returning -ENOPKG when the signature is unsupported.
Reproducer when all the CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512* options are disabled and
keyctl has support for the 'restrict_keyring' command:
keyctl new_session
keyctl restrict_keyring @s asymmetric builtin_trusted
openssl req -new -sha512 -x509 -batch -nodes -outform der \
| keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s
Fixes: a511e1af8b12 ("KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 21 +++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index 86fb68508952..7c93c7728454 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -67,8 +67,9 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
*
* Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a
* matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the
- * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if
- * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
+ * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted, -ENOPKG if the signature
+ * uses unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching
+ * certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
*/
int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
@@ -88,6 +89,8 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+ if (!sig)
+ return -ENOPKG;
if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
return -ENOKEY;
@@ -139,6 +142,8 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+ if (!sig)
+ return -ENOPKG;
if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
return -ENOKEY;
@@ -222,9 +227,9 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring,
*
* Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
* couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
- * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if
- * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be
- * performed.
+ * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses
+ * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate
+ * but the signature check cannot be performed.
*/
int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
@@ -249,9 +254,9 @@ int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring,
*
* Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
* couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
- * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if
- * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be
- * performed.
+ * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses
+ * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate
+ * but the signature check cannot be performed.
*/
int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *dest_keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
--
2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-07 1:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-07 1:10 [PATCH 0/9] PKCS#7 / X.509 fixes and cleanups Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` [PATCH 1/9] PKCS#7: fix certificate chain verification Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` [PATCH 2/9] PKCS#7: fix certificate blacklisting Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: fix direct verification of SignerInfo signature Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` [PATCH 4/9] X.509: fix BUG_ON() when hash algorithm is unsupported Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-08 15:07 ` David Howells
2018-02-20 22:34 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-20 22:34 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2018-02-07 1:10 ` [PATCH 5/9] X.509: fix NULL dereference when restricting key with unsupported_sig Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` [PATCH 6/9] PKCS#7: remove unnecessary check for NULL sinfo->sig->hash_algo Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-08 15:13 ` David Howells
2018-02-07 1:10 ` [PATCH 7/9] X.509: remove never-set ->unsupported_key flag Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` [PATCH 8/9] X.509: remove dead code that set ->unsupported_sig Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-08 15:27 ` David Howells
2018-02-07 1:10 ` [PATCH 9/9] X.509: self_signed implies !unsupported_sig Eric Biggers
2018-02-07 1:10 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-08 14:28 ` [PATCH 0/9] PKCS#7 / X.509 fixes and cleanups David Howells
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