From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [patch V7 13/15] SBB 13
Date: Sun, 29 Apr 2018 21:30:58 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180429193938.557096663@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20180429193045.711908246@linutronix.de
Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations.
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:
PR_SPEC_PRCTL: PRCTL per task control of the mitigation is enabled
PR_SPEC_ENABLE: The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is disabled
PR_SPEC_DISABLE:The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is enabled
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. If
bit0 is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is enabled. If not
set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will
fail.
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in either
PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
The common return values are:
-EINVAL: prctl is not implemented by the architecture
-ENODEV: arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
-ERANGE: arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
-ENXIO: prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled
The first supported controllable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.
TODO: Tidy up spec_ctrl.rst and write a man prctl(2) patch.
Based on an intial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1
Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/nospec.h | 5 ++
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 11 +++++
kernel/sys.c | 18 ++++++++
5 files changed, 100 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ place where this information is gathered
no_new_privs
seccomp_filter
unshare
+ spec_ctrl
.. only:: subproject and html
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+===================
+Speculation Control
+===================
+
+Quite some CPUs have speculation related misfeatures which are in fact
+vulnerabilites causing data leaks in various forms even accross privilege
+domains.
+
+The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
+forms. Some of these mitigations are compile time configurable and some on
+the kernel command line.
+
+There is also a class of mitigations which is very expensive, but they can
+be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled
+environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via ``prctl(2)``.
+
+There are two prctl options which are related to this:
+
+ - PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+ - PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
+which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
+the following meaning:
+
+PR_SPEC_PRCTL: PRCTL per task control of the mitigation is enabled
+PR_SPEC_ENABLE: The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is disabled
+PR_SPEC_DISABLE:The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is enabled
+
+If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. If
+bit0 is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is enabled. If not
+set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will
+fail.
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
+is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in either
+PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
+
+The common return values are:
+
+-EINVAL: prctl is not implemented by the architecture
+-ENODEV: arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
+
+-ERANGE: arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
+-ENXIO: prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled
+
+The following supported controllable speculation misfeatures are implemented:
+
+- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass
+
+ To control it the following prctl() invocations are used:
+
+ prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+
+ and
+
+ prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE);
+
+ or
+
+ prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE);
+
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -55,4 +55,9 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
\
(typeof(_i)) (_i & _mask); \
})
+
+/* Speculation control prctl */
+int arch_prctl_set_spec_ctrl(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl);
+int arch_prctl_get_spec_ctrl(unsigned long which);
+
#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -207,4 +207,15 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
# define PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK 0xffff
# define PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT (1 << 17) /* inherit across exec */
+/* Per task speculation control */
+#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 52
+#define PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53
+/* Speculation control variants */
+# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0
+/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
+# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0
+# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0)
+# define PR_SPEC_ENABLE (1UL << 1)
+# define PR_SPEC_DISABLE (1UL << 2)
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
/* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */
#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
@@ -2242,6 +2244,16 @@ static int propagate_has_child_subreaper
return 1;
}
+int __weak arch_prctl_set_spec_ctrl(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int __weak arch_prctl_get_spec_ctrl(unsigned long which)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
{
@@ -2450,6 +2462,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsi
case PR_SVE_GET_VL:
error = SVE_GET_VL();
break;
+ case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
+ error = arch_prctl_set_spec_ctrl(arg2, arg3);
+ break;
+ case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
+ error = arch_prctl_get_spec_ctrl(arg2);
+ break;
default:
error = -EINVAL;
break;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-29 20:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-29 19:30 [patch V7 00/15] SBB 0 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 01/15] SBB 1 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 02/15] SBB 2 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 03/15] SBB 3 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 23:31 ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2018-04-30 2:50 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-30 7:09 ` David Woodhouse
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 04/15] SBB 4 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 05/15] SBB 5 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 06/15] SBB 6 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 07/15] SBB 7 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 08/15] SBB 8 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 09/15] SBB 9 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 10/15] SBB 10 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-30 0:16 ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-30 7:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 11/15] SBB 11 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 12/15] SBB 12 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-30 1:33 ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-29 19:30 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-04-30 1:48 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V7 13/15] SBB 13 Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-30 2:39 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-30 3:17 ` Jon Masters
2018-04-30 8:35 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-30 2:20 ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-30 2:36 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-30 17:28 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-29 19:30 ` [patch V7 14/15] SBB 14 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-30 2:14 ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-30 5:57 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-30 15:49 ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-29 19:31 ` [patch V7 15/15] SBB 15 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-30 2:32 ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-30 15:56 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-30 16:07 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-30 19:30 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-30 19:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-30 20:12 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-04-30 20:20 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-30 20:44 ` Tim Chen
2018-04-30 20:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-30 20:09 ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-29 20:14 ` [patch V7 00/15] SBB 0 Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 20:35 ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2018-04-29 20:46 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-29 20:57 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 21:40 ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2018-04-29 20:55 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 22:05 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-30 0:06 ` [MODERATED] " Jon Masters
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