From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [patch V11 14/16] SSB 14
Date: Wed, 02 May 2018 23:51:16 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180502215417.260586111@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20180502215102.192655950@linutronix.de
Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance
impacting mitigations.
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:
Bit Define Description
0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
disabled
2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
enabled
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the
control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
The common return values are:
EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl()
arguments are not 0
ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled
The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.
TODO: Write a man prctl(2) patch.
Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
V2: Reword documentation and add unsused argument check
V3: Use EINVAL for unused argument check
---
Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1
Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/nospec.h | 5 +
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 11 +++
kernel/sys.c | 22 +++++++
5 files changed, 125 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ place where this information is gathered
no_new_privs
seccomp_filter
unshare
+ spec_ctrl
.. only:: subproject and html
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+===================
+Speculation Control
+===================
+
+Quite some CPUs have speculation related misfeatures which are in fact
+vulnerabilites causing data leaks in various forms even accross privilege
+domains.
+
+The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
+forms. Some of these mitigations are compile time configurable and some on
+the kernel command line.
+
+There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can
+be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled
+environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via
+:manpage:`prctl(2)`.
+
+There are two prctl options which are related to this:
+
+ * PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+ * PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
+which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-2 with
+the following meaning:
+
+==== ================ ===================================================
+Bit Define Description
+==== ================ ===================================================
+0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
+ PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
+ disabled
+2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
+ enabled
+==== ================ ===================================================
+
+If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
+
+If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
+available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
+misfeature will fail.
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
+is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand
+in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
+
+Common error codes
+------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+EINVAL The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused
+ prctl(2) arguments are not 0
+
+ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
+======= =================================================================
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes
+-----------------------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+0 Success
+
+ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
+ PR_SPEC_DISABLE
+
+ENXIO Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible.
+ See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
+======= =================================================================
+
+Speculation misfeature controls
+-------------------------------
+- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass
+
+ Invocations:
+ * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);
+ * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+ * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -55,4 +55,9 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
\
(typeof(_i)) (_i & _mask); \
})
+
+/* Speculation control prctl */
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which);
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl);
+
#endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -207,4 +207,15 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
# define PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK 0xffff
# define PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT (1 << 17) /* inherit across exec */
+/* Per task speculation control */
+#define PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL 52
+#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53
+/* Speculation control variants */
+# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0
+/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
+# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0
+# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0)
+# define PR_SPEC_ENABLE (1UL << 1)
+# define PR_SPEC_DISABLE (1UL << 2)
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
/* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */
#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
@@ -2242,6 +2244,16 @@ static int propagate_has_child_subreaper
return 1;
}
+int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
{
@@ -2450,6 +2462,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsi
case PR_SVE_GET_VL:
error = SVE_GET_VL();
break;
+ case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
+ if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(arg2);
+ break;
+ case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
+ if (arg4 || arg5)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(arg2, arg3);
+ break;
default:
error = -EINVAL;
break;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-02 23:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-02 21:51 [patch V11 00/16] SSB 0 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 01/16] SSB 1 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 02/16] SSB 2 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 03/16] SSB 3 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 04/16] SSB 4 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 05/16] SSB 5 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-10 17:52 ` [MODERATED] " Andi Kleen
2018-05-10 18:30 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-10 19:08 ` Andi Kleen
2018-05-10 21:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-10 22:25 ` Andi Kleen
2018-05-10 23:50 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-11 16:11 ` Andi Kleen
2018-05-16 7:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-05-16 13:52 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 06/16] SSB 6 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 07/16] SSB 7 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 08/16] SSB 8 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 09/16] SSB 9 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 10/16] SSB 10 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 11/16] SSB 11 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-04 20:58 ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 12/16] SSB 12 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 13/16] SSB 13 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 21:51 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-05-03 7:19 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V11 14/16] SSB 14 Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-03 7:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-03 7:22 ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 15/16] SSB 15 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-03 7:21 ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-02 21:51 ` [patch V11 16/16] SSB 16 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02 23:21 ` [patch V11 00/16] SSB 0 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-03 4:27 ` [MODERATED] Encrypted Message Tim Chen
2018-05-03 6:10 ` [MODERATED] Re: [patch V11 00/16] SSB 0 Ingo Molnar
2018-05-03 6:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
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