From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support
Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2018 07:37:58 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180607143807.3611-2-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180607143807.3611-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK
flag set and read-only protection. The shadow stack is
allocated to a fixed size and that can be changed by the system
admin.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 32 ++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 14 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 ++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +
9 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9d5bc1efc9b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
+#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct task_struct;
+/*
+ * Per-thread CET status
+ */
+struct cet_stat {
+ unsigned long shstk_base;
+ unsigned long shstk_size;
+ unsigned int shstk_enabled:1;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void);
+int cet_setup_shstk(void);
+void cet_disable_shstk(void);
+void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
+#else
+static inline unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
+static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 33833d1909af..3624a11e5ba6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
+#endif
+
/*
* Make sure to add features to the correct mask
*/
@@ -75,7 +81,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK13 0
#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
#define DISABLED_MASK15 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
+#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index fda2114197b3..428d13828ba9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -770,4 +770,18 @@
#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115
#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117
+/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */
+#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0
+#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2
+#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4
+#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7
+#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8
+
+/* MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_S_CET bits */
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN 0x0000000000000001
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_WRSS_EN 0x0000000000000002
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN 0x0000000000000004
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN 0x0000000000000008
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN 0x0000000000000010
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 21a114914ba4..e632dd7adaac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct vm86;
#include <asm/special_insns.h>
#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -507,6 +508,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
unsigned int uaccess_err:1; /* uaccess failed */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+ struct cet_stat cet;
+#endif
+
/* Floating point and extended processor state */
struct fpu fpu;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 02d6f5cf4e70..7ea5e099d558 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o
+
###
# 64 bit specific files
ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8abbfd44322a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * cet.c - Control Flow Enforcement (CET)
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation.
+ * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/user.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+#define SHSTK_SIZE (0x8000 * (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 4 : 8))
+
+static inline int cet_set_shstk_ptr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ u64 r;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return -1;
+
+ if ((addr >= TASK_SIZE) || (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, 4)))
+ return -1;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r | MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void)
+{
+ unsigned long ptr;
+
+ if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ptr);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+static unsigned long shstk_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
+{
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ unsigned long populate;
+
+ down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK,
+ 0, &populate, NULL);
+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ if (populate)
+ mm_populate(addr, populate);
+
+ return addr;
+}
+
+int cet_setup_shstk(void)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, size;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ size = SHSTK_SIZE;
+ addr = shstk_mmap(0, size);
+
+ if (addr >= TASK_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cet_set_shstk_ptr(addr + size - sizeof(void *));
+ current->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
+ current->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
+ current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void cet_disable_shstk(void)
+{
+ u64 r;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+ r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+ current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+}
+
+void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+ !tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ if (tsk == current)
+ cet_disable_shstk();
+
+ /*
+ * Free only when tsk is current or shares mm
+ * with current but has its own shstk.
+ */
+ if (tsk->mm && (tsk->mm == current->mm) &&
+ (tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base)) {
+ vm_munmap(tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base,
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size);
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0;
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0;
+ }
+
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 38276f58d3bf..f54fabdaef60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -401,6 +401,29 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
__setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s)
+{
+ /* require an exact match without trailing characters */
+ if (strlen(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return 1;
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+ pr_info("x86: 'noshstk' specified, disabling Shadow Stack\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("noshstk", setup_disable_shstk);
+#endif
+
/*
* Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
* be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -1313,6 +1336,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
x86_init_rdrand(c);
x86_init_cache_qos(c);
setup_pku(c);
+ setup_cet(c);
/*
* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 30ca2d1a9231..b3b0b482983a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/prctl.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
/*
* per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ void flush_thread(void)
flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(tsk);
memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array));
+ cet_disable_shstk();
fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu);
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index c486ad4b43f0..6aca93ecec0e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -679,6 +679,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT1)] = "",
[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT2)] = "",
[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT3)] = "",
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+ [ilog2(VM_SHSTK)] = "ss"
#endif
};
size_t i;
--
2.15.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support
Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2018 07:37:58 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180607143807.3611-2-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180607143807.3611-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK
flag set and read-only protection. The shadow stack is
allocated to a fixed size and that can be changed by the system
admin.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 32 ++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 14 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 ++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +
9 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9d5bc1efc9b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
+#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct task_struct;
+/*
+ * Per-thread CET status
+ */
+struct cet_stat {
+ unsigned long shstk_base;
+ unsigned long shstk_size;
+ unsigned int shstk_enabled:1;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void);
+int cet_setup_shstk(void);
+void cet_disable_shstk(void);
+void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
+#else
+static inline unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
+static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 33833d1909af..3624a11e5ba6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -56,6 +56,12 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
+#endif
+
/*
* Make sure to add features to the correct mask
*/
@@ -75,7 +81,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK13 0
#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
#define DISABLED_MASK15 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
+#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index fda2114197b3..428d13828ba9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -770,4 +770,18 @@
#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115
#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117
+/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */
+#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0
+#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2
+#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4
+#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7
+#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8
+
+/* MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_S_CET bits */
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN 0x0000000000000001
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_WRSS_EN 0x0000000000000002
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN 0x0000000000000004
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN 0x0000000000000008
+#define MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN 0x0000000000000010
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 21a114914ba4..e632dd7adaac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct vm86;
#include <asm/special_insns.h>
#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -507,6 +508,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
unsigned int uaccess_err:1; /* uaccess failed */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
+ struct cet_stat cet;
+#endif
+
/* Floating point and extended processor state */
struct fpu fpu;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 02d6f5cf4e70..7ea5e099d558 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += unwind_orc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET) += cet.o
+
###
# 64 bit specific files
ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8abbfd44322a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * cet.c - Control Flow Enforcement (CET)
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation.
+ * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/user.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+#define SHSTK_SIZE (0x8000 * (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 4 : 8))
+
+static inline int cet_set_shstk_ptr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ u64 r;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return -1;
+
+ if ((addr >= TASK_SIZE) || (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, 4)))
+ return -1;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r | MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void)
+{
+ unsigned long ptr;
+
+ if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ptr);
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+static unsigned long shstk_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
+{
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ unsigned long populate;
+
+ down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK,
+ 0, &populate, NULL);
+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ if (populate)
+ mm_populate(addr, populate);
+
+ return addr;
+}
+
+int cet_setup_shstk(void)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, size;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ size = SHSTK_SIZE;
+ addr = shstk_mmap(0, size);
+
+ if (addr >= TASK_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cet_set_shstk_ptr(addr + size - sizeof(void *));
+ current->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
+ current->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
+ current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void cet_disable_shstk(void)
+{
+ u64 r;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+ r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+ current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+}
+
+void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+ !tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ if (tsk == current)
+ cet_disable_shstk();
+
+ /*
+ * Free only when tsk is current or shares mm
+ * with current but has its own shstk.
+ */
+ if (tsk->mm && (tsk->mm == current->mm) &&
+ (tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base)) {
+ vm_munmap(tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base,
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size);
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0;
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0;
+ }
+
+ tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 38276f58d3bf..f54fabdaef60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -401,6 +401,29 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
__setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s)
+{
+ /* require an exact match without trailing characters */
+ if (strlen(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return 1;
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+ pr_info("x86: 'noshstk' specified, disabling Shadow Stack\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("noshstk", setup_disable_shstk);
+#endif
+
/*
* Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
* be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -1313,6 +1336,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
x86_init_rdrand(c);
x86_init_cache_qos(c);
setup_pku(c);
+ setup_cet(c);
/*
* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 30ca2d1a9231..b3b0b482983a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/prctl.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
/*
* per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ void flush_thread(void)
flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(tsk);
memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array));
+ cet_disable_shstk();
fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu);
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index c486ad4b43f0..6aca93ecec0e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -679,6 +679,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT1)] = "",
[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT2)] = "",
[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT3)] = "",
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+ [ilog2(VM_SHSTK)] = "ss"
#endif
};
size_t i;
--
2.15.1
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-07 14:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 205+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-07 14:37 [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 17:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 17:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 17:55 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 17:55 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 18:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 11:56 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 11:56 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 02/10] x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-07 18:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-07 20:31 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:31 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-11 8:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-11 8:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-11 15:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-11 15:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14 1:30 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 1:30 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 14:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14 14:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 03/10] x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:58 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 18:58 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 19:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 19:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:07 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-07 20:07 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-07 20:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:07 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-08 12:07 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-07 20:12 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:12 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:17 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 20:17 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 04/10] x86/cet: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 19:47 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 19:47 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 19:47 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 14:53 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 14:53 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 14:53 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 15:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 15:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 15:50 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08 15:50 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08 15:50 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 05/10] x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 06/10] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 21:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 21:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 22:02 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-07 22:02 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-07 23:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 23:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 4:09 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 4:09 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:24 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 12:24 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 15:52 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-08 15:52 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-08 4:22 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 4:22 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 4:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 4:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:17 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 12:17 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 10:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 10:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 11:43 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 11:43 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:05 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:05 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:51 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:51 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 18:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 18:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 19:34 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 19:34 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-18 22:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-18 22:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 0:52 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 0:52 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 6:40 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-19 6:40 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-19 14:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 14:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 16:44 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 16:44 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 16:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 16:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 16:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 17:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 17:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 20:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 20:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 22:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 22:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 22:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-20 0:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-20 0:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-21 23:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-21 23:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-21 23:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 07/10] mm: Prevent mprotect from changing " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 08/10] mm: Prevent mremap of " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 09/10] mm: Prevent madvise from changing " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 21:09 ` Nadav Amit
2018-06-07 21:09 ` Nadav Amit
2018-06-07 21:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 21:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 21:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 10/10] mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 10:56 ` [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 10:56 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 16:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 16:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 16:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 17:24 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 17:24 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 20:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 20:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14 1:07 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 1:07 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-17 3:16 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-17 3:16 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-18 21:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-18 21:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 8:52 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-19 8:52 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-26 2:46 ` Jann Horn
2018-06-26 2:46 ` Jann Horn
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26 5:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-26 5:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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