[PATCH 4.19 054/313] x86/resctrl: Fixup the user-visible strings

[PATCH 4.19 054/313] x86/resctrl: Fixup the user-visible strings

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 723f1a0dd8e26a7523ba068204bee11c95ded38d ]

Fix the messages in rdt_last_cmd_printf() and rdt_last_cmd_puts() to
make them more meaningful and consistent.

 [ bp: s/cpu/CPU/; s/mem\W/memory ]

Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
Cc: <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Rian Hunter <rian@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121202811.4492-11-babu.moger@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_ctrlmondata.c | 22 ++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c | 34 +++++++++----------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c    | 36 ++++++++++-----------
 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_ctrlmondata.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_ctrlmondata.c
index 627e5c809b33..79d099538f2e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_ctrlmondata.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_ctrlmondata.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int parse_bw(struct rdt_parse_data *data, struct rdt_resource *r,
 	unsigned long bw_val;
 
 	if (d->have_new_ctrl) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("duplicate domain %d\n", d->id);
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Duplicate domain %d\n", d->id);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -97,12 +97,12 @@ static bool cbm_validate(char *buf, u32 *data, struct rdt_resource *r)
 
 	ret = kstrtoul(buf, 16, &val);
 	if (ret) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("non-hex character in mask %s\n", buf);
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Non-hex character in the mask %s\n", buf);
 		return false;
 	}
 
 	if (val == 0 || val > r->default_ctrl) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("mask out of range\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Mask out of range\n");
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -110,12 +110,12 @@ static bool cbm_validate(char *buf, u32 *data, struct rdt_resource *r)
 	zero_bit = find_next_zero_bit(&val, cbm_len, first_bit);
 
 	if (find_next_bit(&val, cbm_len, zero_bit) < cbm_len) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("mask %lx has non-consecutive 1-bits\n", val);
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("The mask %lx has non-consecutive 1-bits\n", val);
 		return false;
 	}
 
 	if ((zero_bit - first_bit) < r->cache.min_cbm_bits) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Need at least %d bits in mask\n",
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Need at least %d bits in the mask\n",
 				    r->cache.min_cbm_bits);
 		return false;
 	}
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int parse_cbm(struct rdt_parse_data *data, struct rdt_resource *r,
 	u32 cbm_val;
 
 	if (d->have_new_ctrl) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("duplicate domain %d\n", d->id);
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Duplicate domain %d\n", d->id);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ int parse_cbm(struct rdt_parse_data *data, struct rdt_resource *r,
 	 */
 	if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP &&
 	    rdtgroup_pseudo_locked_in_hierarchy(d)) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("pseudo-locked region in hierarchy\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Pseudo-locked region in hierarchy\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -164,14 +164,14 @@ int parse_cbm(struct rdt_parse_data *data, struct rdt_resource *r,
 	 * either is exclusive.
 	 */
 	if (rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(r, d, cbm_val, rdtgrp->closid, true)) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("overlaps with exclusive group\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Overlaps with exclusive group\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(r, d, cbm_val, rdtgrp->closid, false)) {
 		if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE ||
 		    rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
-			rdt_last_cmd_printf("overlaps with other group\n");
+			rdt_last_cmd_printf("0verlaps with other group\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int rdtgroup_parse_resource(char *resname, char *tok,
 		if (!strcmp(resname, r->name) && rdtgrp->closid < r->num_closid)
 			return parse_line(tok, r, rdtgrp);
 	}
-	rdt_last_cmd_printf("unknown/unsupported resource name '%s'\n", resname);
+	rdt_last_cmd_printf("Unknown or unsupported resource name '%s'\n", resname);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ ssize_t rdtgroup_schemata_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 	 */
 	if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("resource group is pseudo-locked\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Resource group is pseudo-locked\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c
index f8c260d522ca..caa680fb5680 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_pseudo_lock.c
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static int pseudo_lock_cstates_constrain(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
 	for_each_cpu(cpu, &plr->d->cpu_mask) {
 		pm_req = kzalloc(sizeof(*pm_req), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!pm_req) {
-			rdt_last_cmd_puts("fail allocating mem for PM QoS\n");
+			rdt_last_cmd_puts("Failure to allocate memory for PM QoS\n");
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
 			goto out_err;
 		}
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static int pseudo_lock_cstates_constrain(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
 					     DEV_PM_QOS_RESUME_LATENCY,
 					     30);
 		if (ret < 0) {
-			rdt_last_cmd_printf("fail to add latency req cpu%d\n",
+			rdt_last_cmd_printf("Failed to add latency req CPU%d\n",
 					    cpu);
 			kfree(pm_req);
 			ret = -1;
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static int pseudo_lock_region_init(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
 	plr->cpu = cpumask_first(&plr->d->cpu_mask);
 
 	if (!cpu_online(plr->cpu)) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("cpu %u associated with cache not online\n",
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("CPU %u associated with cache not online\n",
 				    plr->cpu);
 		ret = -ENODEV;
 		goto out_region;
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static int pseudo_lock_region_init(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
 	}
 
 	ret = -1;
-	rdt_last_cmd_puts("unable to determine cache line size\n");
+	rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unable to determine cache line size\n");
 out_region:
 	pseudo_lock_region_clear(plr);
 	return ret;
@@ -369,14 +369,14 @@ static int pseudo_lock_region_alloc(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
 	 * KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE.
 	 */
 	if (plr->size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("requested region exceeds maximum size\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Requested region exceeds maximum size\n");
 		ret = -E2BIG;
 		goto out_region;
 	}
 
 	plr->kmem = kzalloc(plr->size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!plr->kmem) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("unable to allocate memory\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unable to allocate memory\n");
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out_region;
 	}
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ int rdtgroup_locksetup_enter(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
 	 * default closid associated with it.
 	 */
 	if (rdtgrp == &rdtgroup_default) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("cannot pseudo-lock default group\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Cannot pseudo-lock default group\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -715,17 +715,17 @@ int rdtgroup_locksetup_enter(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
 	 */
 	prefetch_disable_bits = get_prefetch_disable_bits();
 	if (prefetch_disable_bits == 0) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("pseudo-locking not supported\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Pseudo-locking not supported\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (rdtgroup_monitor_in_progress(rdtgrp)) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("monitoring in progress\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Monitoring in progress\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (rdtgroup_tasks_assigned(rdtgrp)) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("tasks assigned to resource group\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Tasks assigned to resource group\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -735,13 +735,13 @@ int rdtgroup_locksetup_enter(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
 	}
 
 	if (rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restrict(rdtgrp)) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("unable to modify resctrl permissions\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unable to modify resctrl permissions\n");
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
 	ret = pseudo_lock_init(rdtgrp);
 	if (ret) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("unable to init pseudo-lock region\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unable to init pseudo-lock region\n");
 		goto out_release;
 	}
 
@@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ int rdtgroup_locksetup_exit(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
 	if (rdt_mon_capable) {
 		ret = alloc_rmid();
 		if (ret < 0) {
-			rdt_last_cmd_puts("out of RMIDs\n");
+			rdt_last_cmd_puts("Out of RMIDs\n");
 			return ret;
 		}
 		rdtgrp->mon.rmid = ret;
@@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ int rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
 					"pseudo_lock/%u", plr->cpu);
 	if (IS_ERR(thread)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(thread);
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("locking thread returned error %d\n", ret);
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Locking thread returned error %d\n", ret);
 		goto out_cstates;
 	}
 
@@ -1252,13 +1252,13 @@ int rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
 		 * the cleared, but not freed, plr struct resulting in an
 		 * empty pseudo-locking loop.
 		 */
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("locking thread interrupted\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Locking thread interrupted\n");
 		goto out_cstates;
 	}
 
 	ret = pseudo_lock_minor_get(&new_minor);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("unable to obtain a new minor number\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unable to obtain a new minor number\n");
 		goto out_cstates;
 	}
 
@@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@ int rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
 
 	if (IS_ERR(dev)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(dev);
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("failed to create character device: %d\n",
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Failed to create character device: %d\n",
 				    ret);
 		goto out_debugfs;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c
index 643670fb8943..49ebefde9349 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_rdtgroup.c
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static int cpus_mon_write(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, cpumask_var_t newmask,
 	/* Check whether cpus belong to parent ctrl group */
 	cpumask_andnot(tmpmask, newmask, &prgrp->cpu_mask);
 	if (cpumask_weight(tmpmask)) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("can only add CPUs to mongroup that belong to parent\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Can only add CPUs to mongroup that belong to parent\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -460,14 +460,14 @@ static ssize_t rdtgroup_cpus_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 	rdt_last_cmd_clear();
 	if (!rdtgrp) {
 		ret = -ENOENT;
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("directory was removed\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Directory was removed\n");
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
 	if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED ||
 	    rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("pseudo-locking in progress\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Pseudo-locking in progress\n");
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ static ssize_t rdtgroup_cpus_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 		ret = cpumask_parse(buf, newmask);
 
 	if (ret) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("bad cpu list/mask\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Bad CPU list/mask\n");
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static ssize_t rdtgroup_cpus_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 	cpumask_andnot(tmpmask, newmask, cpu_online_mask);
 	if (cpumask_weight(tmpmask)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("can only assign online cpus\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Can only assign online CPUs\n");
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static int __rdtgroup_move_task(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		 */
 		atomic_dec(&rdtgrp->waitcount);
 		kfree(callback);
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("task exited\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Task exited\n");
 	} else {
 		/*
 		 * For ctrl_mon groups move both closid and rmid.
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static ssize_t rdtgroup_tasks_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 	if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED ||
 	    rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("pseudo-locking in progress\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Pseudo-locking in progress\n");
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -1042,14 +1042,14 @@ static bool rdtgroup_mode_test_exclusive(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
 		list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
 			if (rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(r, d, d->ctrl_val[closid],
 						  rdtgrp->closid, false)) {
-				rdt_last_cmd_puts("schemata overlaps\n");
+				rdt_last_cmd_puts("Schemata overlaps\n");
 				return false;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (!has_cache) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("cannot be exclusive without CAT/CDP\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Cannot be exclusive without CAT/CDP\n");
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@ static ssize_t rdtgroup_mode_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("cannot change pseudo-locked group\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Cannot change pseudo-locked group\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -1119,7 +1119,7 @@ static ssize_t rdtgroup_mode_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 			goto out;
 		rdtgrp->mode = RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP;
 	} else {
-		rdt_last_cmd_printf("unknown/unsupported mode\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_printf("Unknown orunsupported mode\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -2403,7 +2403,7 @@ static int rdtgroup_init_alloc(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
 			tmp_cbm = d->new_ctrl;
 			if (bitmap_weight(&tmp_cbm, r->cache.cbm_len) <
 			    r->cache.min_cbm_bits) {
-				rdt_last_cmd_printf("no space on %s:%d\n",
+				rdt_last_cmd_printf("No space on %s:%d\n",
 						    r->name, d->id);
 				return -ENOSPC;
 			}
@@ -2420,7 +2420,7 @@ static int rdtgroup_init_alloc(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
 			continue;
 		ret = update_domains(r, rdtgrp->closid);
 		if (ret < 0) {
-			rdt_last_cmd_puts("failed to initialize allocations\n");
+			rdt_last_cmd_puts("Failed to initialize allocations\n");
 			return ret;
 		}
 		rdtgrp->mode = RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE;
@@ -2443,7 +2443,7 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
 	rdt_last_cmd_clear();
 	if (!prdtgrp) {
 		ret = -ENODEV;
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("directory was removed\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Directory was removed\n");
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -2451,7 +2451,7 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
 	    (prdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP ||
 	     prdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("pseudo-locking in progress\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Pseudo-locking in progress\n");
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -2459,7 +2459,7 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
 	rdtgrp = kzalloc(sizeof(*rdtgrp), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!rdtgrp) {
 		ret = -ENOSPC;
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("kernel out of memory\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Kernel out of memory\n");
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 	*r = rdtgrp;
@@ -2500,7 +2500,7 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
 	if (rdt_mon_capable) {
 		ret = alloc_rmid();
 		if (ret < 0) {
-			rdt_last_cmd_puts("out of RMIDs\n");
+			rdt_last_cmd_puts("Out of RMIDs\n");
 			goto out_destroy;
 		}
 		rdtgrp->mon.rmid = ret;
@@ -2588,7 +2588,7 @@ static int rdtgroup_mkdir_ctrl_mon(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
 	kn = rdtgrp->kn;
 	ret = closid_alloc();
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("out of CLOSIDs\n");
+		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Out of CLOSIDs\n");
 		goto out_common_fail;
 	}
 	closid = ret;
-- 
2.19.1

Re: [PATCH 4.19 054/313] x86/resctrl: Fixup the user-visible strings

[Reinette Chatre]

Hi Greg,

On 2/11/2019 6:15 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> 
> ------------------
> 
> [ Upstream commit 723f1a0dd8e26a7523ba068204bee11c95ded38d ]
> 
> Fix the messages in rdt_last_cmd_printf() and rdt_last_cmd_puts() to
> make them more meaningful and consistent.
> 
>  [ bp: s/cpu/CPU/; s/mem\W/memory ]
> 
> Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
> Cc: <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
> Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
> Cc: Rian Hunter <rian@alum.mit.edu>
> Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> Cc: <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121202811.4492-11-babu.moger@amd.com
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Could you please drop this patch from consideration for stable?

Sasha already confirmed that it should not have been included:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190202193050.GA3973@sasha-vm

Thank you

Reinette

Re: [PATCH 4.19 054/313] x86/resctrl: Fixup the user-visible strings

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 10:12:46AM -0800, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> Hi Greg,
> 
> On 2/11/2019 6:15 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > 4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> > 
> > ------------------
> > 
> > [ Upstream commit 723f1a0dd8e26a7523ba068204bee11c95ded38d ]
> > 
> > Fix the messages in rdt_last_cmd_printf() and rdt_last_cmd_puts() to
> > make them more meaningful and consistent.
> > 
> >  [ bp: s/cpu/CPU/; s/mem\W/memory ]
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> > Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> > Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
> > Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> > Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
> > Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
> > Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
> > Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
> > Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> > Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
> > Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> > Cc: <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
> > Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> > Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
> > Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
> > Cc: <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
> > Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
> > Cc: Rian Hunter <rian@alum.mit.edu>
> > Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
> > Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> > Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
> > Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
> > Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> > Cc: <xiaochen.shen@intel.com>
> > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121202811.4492-11-babu.moger@amd.com
> > Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
> 
> Could you please drop this patch from consideration for stable?
> 
> Sasha already confirmed that it should not have been included:
> http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190202193050.GA3973@sasha-vm

Now dropped, thanks.

greg k-h

[PATCH 4.19 082/313] firmware/efi: Add NULL pointer checks in efivars API functions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit ab2180a15ce54739fed381efb4cb12e78dfb1561 ]

Since commit:

   ce2e6db554fa ("brcmfmac: Add support for getting nvram contents from EFI variables")

we have a device driver accessing the efivars API. Several functions in
the efivars API assume __efivars is set, i.e., that they will be accessed
only after efivars_register() has been called. However, the following NULL
pointer access was reported calling efivar_entry_size() from the brcmfmac
device driver:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000008
  pgd = 60bfa5f1
  [00000008] *pgd=00000000
  Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM
  ...
  Hardware name: NVIDIA Tegra SoC (Flattened Device Tree)
  Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func
  PC is at efivar_entry_size+0x28/0x90
  LR is at brcmf_fw_complete_request+0x3f8/0x8d4 [brcmfmac]
  pc : [<c0c40718>]    lr : [<bf2a3ef4>]    psr: a00d0113
  sp : ede7fe28  ip : ee983410  fp : c1787f30
  r10: 00000000  r9 : 00000000  r8 : bf2b2258
  r7 : ee983000  r6 : c1604c48  r5 : ede7fe88  r4 : edf337c0
  r3 : 00000000  r2 : 00000000  r1 : ede7fe88  r0 : c17712c8
  Flags: NzCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
  Control: 10c5387d  Table: ad16804a  DAC: 00000051

Disassembly showed that the local static variable __efivars is NULL,
which is not entirely unexpected given that it is a non-EFI platform.

So add a NULL pointer check to efivar_entry_size(), and to related
functions while at it. In efivars_register() a couple of sanity checks
are added as well.

Reported-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Cc: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181129171230.18699-9-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 78 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c
index 9336ffdf6e2c..fceaafd67ec6 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c
@@ -318,7 +318,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_variable_is_removable);
 static efi_status_t
 check_var_size(u32 attributes, unsigned long size)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *fops = __efivars->ops;
+	const struct efivar_operations *fops;
+
+	if (!__efivars)
+		return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+	fops = __efivars->ops;
 
 	if (!fops->query_variable_store)
 		return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
@@ -329,7 +334,12 @@ check_var_size(u32 attributes, unsigned long size)
 static efi_status_t
 check_var_size_nonblocking(u32 attributes, unsigned long size)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *fops = __efivars->ops;
+	const struct efivar_operations *fops;
+
+	if (!__efivars)
+		return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+	fops = __efivars->ops;
 
 	if (!fops->query_variable_store)
 		return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
@@ -429,13 +439,18 @@ static void dup_variable_bug(efi_char16_t *str16, efi_guid_t *vendor_guid,
 int efivar_init(int (*func)(efi_char16_t *, efi_guid_t, unsigned long, void *),
 		void *data, bool duplicates, struct list_head *head)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *ops = __efivars->ops;
+	const struct efivar_operations *ops;
 	unsigned long variable_name_size = 1024;
 	efi_char16_t *variable_name;
 	efi_status_t status;
 	efi_guid_t vendor_guid;
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (!__efivars)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	ops = __efivars->ops;
+
 	variable_name = kzalloc(variable_name_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!variable_name) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "efivars: Memory allocation failed.\n");
@@ -583,12 +598,14 @@ static void efivar_entry_list_del_unlock(struct efivar_entry *entry)
  */
 int __efivar_entry_delete(struct efivar_entry *entry)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *ops = __efivars->ops;
 	efi_status_t status;
 
-	status = ops->set_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
-				   &entry->var.VendorGuid,
-				   0, 0, NULL);
+	if (!__efivars)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	status = __efivars->ops->set_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
+					      &entry->var.VendorGuid,
+					      0, 0, NULL);
 
 	return efi_status_to_err(status);
 }
@@ -607,12 +624,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__efivar_entry_delete);
  */
 int efivar_entry_delete(struct efivar_entry *entry)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *ops = __efivars->ops;
+	const struct efivar_operations *ops;
 	efi_status_t status;
 
 	if (down_interruptible(&efivars_lock))
 		return -EINTR;
 
+	if (!__efivars) {
+		up(&efivars_lock);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	ops = __efivars->ops;
 	status = ops->set_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
 				   &entry->var.VendorGuid,
 				   0, 0, NULL);
@@ -650,13 +672,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_delete);
 int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,
 		     unsigned long size, void *data, struct list_head *head)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *ops = __efivars->ops;
+	const struct efivar_operations *ops;
 	efi_status_t status;
 	efi_char16_t *name = entry->var.VariableName;
 	efi_guid_t vendor = entry->var.VendorGuid;
 
 	if (down_interruptible(&efivars_lock))
 		return -EINTR;
+
+	if (!__efivars) {
+		up(&efivars_lock);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	ops = __efivars->ops;
 	if (head && efivar_entry_find(name, vendor, head, false)) {
 		up(&efivars_lock);
 		return -EEXIST;
@@ -687,12 +715,17 @@ static int
 efivar_entry_set_nonblocking(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t vendor,
 			     u32 attributes, unsigned long size, void *data)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *ops = __efivars->ops;
+	const struct efivar_operations *ops;
 	efi_status_t status;
 
 	if (down_trylock(&efivars_lock))
 		return -EBUSY;
 
+	if (!__efivars) {
+		up(&efivars_lock);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	status = check_var_size_nonblocking(attributes,
 					    size + ucs2_strsize(name, 1024));
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
@@ -700,6 +733,7 @@ efivar_entry_set_nonblocking(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t vendor,
 		return -ENOSPC;
 	}
 
+	ops = __efivars->ops;
 	status = ops->set_variable_nonblocking(name, &vendor, attributes,
 					       size, data);
 
@@ -727,9 +761,13 @@ efivar_entry_set_nonblocking(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t vendor,
 int efivar_entry_set_safe(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t vendor, u32 attributes,
 			  bool block, unsigned long size, void *data)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *ops = __efivars->ops;
+	const struct efivar_operations *ops;
 	efi_status_t status;
 
+	if (!__efivars)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ops = __efivars->ops;
 	if (!ops->query_variable_store)
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
@@ -829,13 +867,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_find);
  */
 int efivar_entry_size(struct efivar_entry *entry, unsigned long *size)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *ops = __efivars->ops;
+	const struct efivar_operations *ops;
 	efi_status_t status;
 
 	*size = 0;
 
 	if (down_interruptible(&efivars_lock))
 		return -EINTR;
+	if (!__efivars) {
+		up(&efivars_lock);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	ops = __efivars->ops;
 	status = ops->get_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
 				   &entry->var.VendorGuid, NULL, size, NULL);
 	up(&efivars_lock);
@@ -861,12 +904,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_size);
 int __efivar_entry_get(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 *attributes,
 		       unsigned long *size, void *data)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *ops = __efivars->ops;
 	efi_status_t status;
 
-	status = ops->get_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
-				   &entry->var.VendorGuid,
-				   attributes, size, data);
+	if (!__efivars)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	status = __efivars->ops->get_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
+					      &entry->var.VendorGuid,
+					      attributes, size, data);
 
 	return efi_status_to_err(status);
 }
@@ -882,14 +927,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__efivar_entry_get);
 int efivar_entry_get(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 *attributes,
 		     unsigned long *size, void *data)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *ops = __efivars->ops;
 	efi_status_t status;
 
 	if (down_interruptible(&efivars_lock))
 		return -EINTR;
-	status = ops->get_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
-				   &entry->var.VendorGuid,
-				   attributes, size, data);
+
+	if (!__efivars) {
+		up(&efivars_lock);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	status = __efivars->ops->get_variable(entry->var.VariableName,
+					      &entry->var.VendorGuid,
+					      attributes, size, data);
 	up(&efivars_lock);
 
 	return efi_status_to_err(status);
@@ -921,7 +971,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_get);
 int efivar_entry_set_get_size(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,
 			      unsigned long *size, void *data, bool *set)
 {
-	const struct efivar_operations *ops = __efivars->ops;
+	const struct efivar_operations *ops;
 	efi_char16_t *name = entry->var.VariableName;
 	efi_guid_t *vendor = &entry->var.VendorGuid;
 	efi_status_t status;
@@ -940,6 +990,11 @@ int efivar_entry_set_get_size(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,
 	if (down_interruptible(&efivars_lock))
 		return -EINTR;
 
+	if (!__efivars) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Ensure that the available space hasn't shrunk below the safe level
 	 */
@@ -956,6 +1011,8 @@ int efivar_entry_set_get_size(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,
 		}
 	}
 
+	ops = __efivars->ops;
+
 	status = ops->set_variable(name, vendor, attributes, *size, data);
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
 		err = efi_status_to_err(status);
-- 
2.19.1

[PATCH 4.19 089/313] ARM: dts: aspeed: add missing memory unit-address

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 8ef86955fe59f7912a40d57ae4c6d511f0187b4d ]

The base aspeed-g5.dtsi already defines a '/memory at 80000000' node, so
'/memory' in the board files create a duplicate node. We're probably
getting lucky that the bootloader fixes up the memory node that the
kernel ends up using. Add the unit-address so it's merged with the base
node.

Found with DT json-schema checks.

Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Cc: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@aj.id.au>
Cc: devicetree at vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel at lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-aspeed at lists.ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts | 2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts       | 2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts         | 3 +--
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts    | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts
index df1227613d48..c2ece0b91885 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 		bootargs = "console=ttyS4,115200 earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory at 80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x40000000>;
 	};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts
index 7a291de02543..22dade6393d0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 		bootargs = "earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory at 80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x20000000>;
 	};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts
index d598b6391362..024e52a6cd0f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 		bootargs = "console=ttyS4,115200 earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory at 80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x40000000>;
 	};
 
@@ -322,4 +322,3 @@
 &adc {
 	status = "okay";
 };
-
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts
index 43ed13963d35..33d704541de6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 		bootargs = "console=ttyS4,115200 earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory at 80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x20000000>;
 	};
 
-- 
2.19.1

[PATCH 4.19 089/313] ARM: dts: aspeed: add missing memory unit-address

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 8ef86955fe59f7912a40d57ae4c6d511f0187b4d ]

The base aspeed-g5.dtsi already defines a '/memory@80000000' node, so
'/memory' in the board files create a duplicate node. We're probably
getting lucky that the bootloader fixes up the memory node that the
kernel ends up using. Add the unit-address so it's merged with the base
node.

Found with DT json-schema checks.

Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Cc: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@aj.id.au>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-aspeed@lists.ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts | 2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts       | 2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts         | 3 +--
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts    | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts
index df1227613d48..c2ece0b91885 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 		bootargs = "console=ttyS4,115200 earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory@80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x40000000>;
 	};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts
index 7a291de02543..22dade6393d0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 		bootargs = "earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory@80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x20000000>;
 	};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts
index d598b6391362..024e52a6cd0f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 		bootargs = "console=ttyS4,115200 earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory@80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x40000000>;
 	};
 
@@ -322,4 +322,3 @@
 &adc {
 	status = "okay";
 };
-
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts
index 43ed13963d35..33d704541de6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 		bootargs = "console=ttyS4,115200 earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory@80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x20000000>;
 	};
 
-- 
2.19.1

[PATCH 4.19 089/313] ARM: dts: aspeed: add missing memory unit-address

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 8ef86955fe59f7912a40d57ae4c6d511f0187b4d ]

The base aspeed-g5.dtsi already defines a '/memory@80000000' node, so
'/memory' in the board files create a duplicate node. We're probably
getting lucky that the bootloader fixes up the memory node that the
kernel ends up using. Add the unit-address so it's merged with the base
node.

Found with DT json-schema checks.

Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Cc: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@aj.id.au>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-aspeed@lists.ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts | 2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts       | 2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts         | 3 +--
 arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts    | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts
index df1227613d48..c2ece0b91885 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-arm-centriq2400-rep.dts
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 		bootargs = "console=ttyS4,115200 earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory@80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x40000000>;
 	};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts
index 7a291de02543..22dade6393d0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-intel-s2600wf.dts
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 		bootargs = "earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory@80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x20000000>;
 	};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts
index d598b6391362..024e52a6cd0f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-opp-lanyang.dts
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 		bootargs = "console=ttyS4,115200 earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory@80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x40000000>;
 	};
 
@@ -322,4 +322,3 @@
 &adc {
 	status = "okay";
 };
-
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts
index 43ed13963d35..33d704541de6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/aspeed-bmc-portwell-neptune.dts
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 		bootargs = "console=ttyS4,115200 earlyprintk";
 	};
 
-	memory {
+	memory@80000000 {
 		reg = <0x80000000 0x20000000>;
 	};
 
-- 
2.19.1




_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

[PATCH 4.19 090/313] x86/fpu: Add might_fault() to user_insn()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 6637401c35b2f327a35d27f44bda05e327f2f017 ]

Every user of user_insn() passes an user memory pointer to this macro.

Add might_fault() to user_insn() so we can spot users which are using
this macro in sections where page faulting is not allowed.

 [ bp: Space it out to make it more visible. ]

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181128222035.2996-6-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
index 69dcdf195b61..fa2c93cb42a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ extern void fpstate_sanitize_xstate(struct fpu *fpu);
 #define user_insn(insn, output, input...)				\
 ({									\
 	int err;							\
+									\
+	might_fault();							\
+									\
 	asm volatile(ASM_STAC "\n"					\
 		     "1:" #insn "\n\t"					\
 		     "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n"				\
-- 
2.19.1

[PATCH 4.19 113/313] mips: bpf: fix encoding bug for mm_srlv32_op

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 17f6c83fb5ebf7db4fcc94a5be4c22d5a7bfe428 ]

For micro-mips, srlv inside POOL32A encoding space should use 0x50
sub-opcode, NOT 0x90.

Some early version ISA doc describes the encoding as 0x90 for both srlv and
srav, this looks to me was a typo. I checked Binutils libopcode
implementation which is using 0x50 for srlv and 0x90 for srav.

v1->v2:
  - Keep mm_srlv32_op sorted by value.

Fixes: f31318fdf324 ("MIPS: uasm: Add srlv uasm instruction")
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/inst.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/inst.h b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/inst.h
index c05dcf5ab414..273ef58f4d43 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/inst.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/inst.h
@@ -369,8 +369,8 @@ enum mm_32a_minor_op {
 	mm_ext_op = 0x02c,
 	mm_pool32axf_op = 0x03c,
 	mm_srl32_op = 0x040,
+	mm_srlv32_op = 0x050,
 	mm_sra_op = 0x080,
-	mm_srlv32_op = 0x090,
 	mm_rotr_op = 0x0c0,
 	mm_lwxs_op = 0x118,
 	mm_addu32_op = 0x150,
-- 
2.19.1

[PATCH 4.19 233/313] block/swim3: Fix -EBUSY error when re-opening device after unmount

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 296dcc40f2f2e402facf7cd26cf3f2c8f4b17d47 ]

When the block device is opened with FMODE_EXCL, ref_count is set to -1.
This value doesn't get reset when the device is closed which means the
device cannot be opened again. Fix this by checking for refcount <= 0
in the release method.

Reported-and-tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57@yahoo.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/block/swim3.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/block/swim3.c b/drivers/block/swim3.c
index 469541c1e51e..20907a0a043b 100644
--- a/drivers/block/swim3.c
+++ b/drivers/block/swim3.c
@@ -1026,7 +1026,11 @@ static void floppy_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
 	struct swim3 __iomem *sw = fs->swim3;
 
 	mutex_lock(&swim3_mutex);
-	if (fs->ref_count > 0 && --fs->ref_count == 0) {
+	if (fs->ref_count > 0)
+		--fs->ref_count;
+	else if (fs->ref_count == -1)
+		fs->ref_count = 0;
+	if (fs->ref_count == 0) {
 		swim3_action(fs, MOTOR_OFF);
 		out_8(&sw->control_bic, 0xff);
 		swim3_select(fs, RELAX);
-- 
2.19.1

[PATCH 4.19 291/313] futex: Handle early deadlock return correctly

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 1a1fb985f2e2b85ec0d3dc2e519ee48389ec2434 upstream.

commit 56222b212e8e ("futex: Drop hb->lock before enqueueing on the
rtmutex") changed the locking rules in the futex code so that the hash
bucket lock is not longer held while the waiter is enqueued into the
rtmutex wait list. This made the lock and the unlock path symmetric, but
unfortunately the possible early exit from __rt_mutex_proxy_start() due to
a detected deadlock was not updated accordingly. That allows a concurrent
unlocker to observe inconsitent state which triggers the warning in the
unlock path.

futex_lock_pi()                         futex_unlock_pi()
  lock(hb->lock)
  queue(hb_waiter)				lock(hb->lock)
  lock(rtmutex->wait_lock)
  unlock(hb->lock)
                                        // acquired hb->lock
                                        hb_waiter = futex_top_waiter()
                                        lock(rtmutex->wait_lock)
  __rt_mutex_proxy_start()
     ---> fail
          remove(rtmutex_waiter);
     ---> returns -EDEADLOCK
  unlock(rtmutex->wait_lock)
                                        // acquired wait_lock
                                        wake_futex_pi()
                                        rt_mutex_next_owner()
					  --> returns NULL
                                          --> WARN

  lock(hb->lock)
  unqueue(hb_waiter)

The problem is caused by the remove(rtmutex_waiter) in the failure case of
__rt_mutex_proxy_start() as this lets the unlocker observe a waiter in the
hash bucket but no waiter on the rtmutex, i.e. inconsistent state.

The original commit handles this correctly for the other early return cases
(timeout, signal) by delaying the removal of the rtmutex waiter until the
returning task reacquired the hash bucket lock.

Treat the failure case of __rt_mutex_proxy_start() in the same way and let
the existing cleanup code handle the eventual handover of the rtmutex
gracefully. The regular rt_mutex_proxy_start() gains the rtmutex waiter
removal for the failure case, so that the other callsites are still
operating correctly.

Add proper comments to the code so all these details are fully documented.

Thanks to Peter for helping with the analysis and writing the really
valuable code comments.

Fixes: 56222b212e8e ("futex: Drop hb->lock before enqueueing on the rtmutex")
Reported-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Stefan Liebler <stli@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1901292311410.1950@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/futex.c           |   28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c |   37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2850,35 +2850,39 @@ retry_private:
 	 * and BUG when futex_unlock_pi() interleaves with this.
 	 *
 	 * Therefore acquire wait_lock while holding hb->lock, but drop the
-	 * latter before calling rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(). This still fully
-	 * serializes against futex_unlock_pi() as that does the exact same
-	 * lock handoff sequence.
+	 * latter before calling __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(). This
+	 * interleaves with futex_unlock_pi() -- which does a similar lock
+	 * handoff -- such that the latter can observe the futex_q::pi_state
+	 * before __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() is done.
 	 */
 	raw_spin_lock_irq(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 	spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
+	/*
+	 * __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() unconditionally enqueues the @rt_waiter
+	 * such that futex_unlock_pi() is guaranteed to observe the waiter when
+	 * it sees the futex_q::pi_state.
+	 */
 	ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter, current);
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 
 	if (ret) {
 		if (ret == 1)
 			ret = 0;
-
-		spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
-		goto no_block;
+		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
-
 	if (unlikely(to))
 		hrtimer_start_expires(&to->timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
 
 	ret = rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter);
 
+cleanup:
 	spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
 	/*
-	 * If we failed to acquire the lock (signal/timeout), we must
+	 * If we failed to acquire the lock (deadlock/signal/timeout), we must
 	 * first acquire the hb->lock before removing the lock from the
-	 * rt_mutex waitqueue, such that we can keep the hb and rt_mutex
-	 * wait lists consistent.
+	 * rt_mutex waitqueue, such that we can keep the hb and rt_mutex wait
+	 * lists consistent.
 	 *
 	 * In particular; it is important that futex_unlock_pi() can not
 	 * observe this inconsistency.
@@ -3002,6 +3006,10 @@ retry:
 		 * there is no point where we hold neither; and therefore
 		 * wake_futex_pi() must observe a state consistent with what we
 		 * observed.
+		 *
+		 * In particular; this forces __rt_mutex_start_proxy() to
+		 * complete such that we're guaranteed to observe the
+		 * rt_waiter. Also see the WARN in wake_futex_pi().
 		 */
 		raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 		spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -1726,12 +1726,33 @@ void rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(struct rt_mut
 	rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, NULL);
 }
 
+/**
+ * __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() - Start lock acquisition for another task
+ * @lock:		the rt_mutex to take
+ * @waiter:		the pre-initialized rt_mutex_waiter
+ * @task:		the task to prepare
+ *
+ * Starts the rt_mutex acquire; it enqueues the @waiter and does deadlock
+ * detection. It does not wait, see rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock() for that.
+ *
+ * NOTE: does _NOT_ remove the @waiter on failure; must either call
+ * rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock() or rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock() after this.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  0 - task blocked on lock
+ *  1 - acquired the lock for task, caller should wake it up
+ * <0 - error
+ *
+ * Special API call for PI-futex support.
+ */
 int __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 			      struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter,
 			      struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	int ret;
 
+	lockdep_assert_held(&lock->wait_lock);
+
 	if (try_to_take_rt_mutex(lock, task, NULL))
 		return 1;
 
@@ -1749,9 +1770,6 @@ int __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct r
 		ret = 0;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(ret))
-		remove_waiter(lock, waiter);
-
 	debug_rt_mutex_print_deadlock(waiter);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1763,12 +1781,18 @@ int __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct r
  * @waiter:		the pre-initialized rt_mutex_waiter
  * @task:		the task to prepare
  *
+ * Starts the rt_mutex acquire; it enqueues the @waiter and does deadlock
+ * detection. It does not wait, see rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock() for that.
+ *
+ * NOTE: unlike __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock this _DOES_ remove the @waiter
+ * on failure.
+ *
  * Returns:
  *  0 - task blocked on lock
  *  1 - acquired the lock for task, caller should wake it up
  * <0 - error
  *
- * Special API call for FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI support.
+ * Special API call for PI-futex support.
  */
 int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 			      struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter,
@@ -1778,6 +1802,8 @@ int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_
 
 	raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
 	ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(lock, waiter, task);
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		remove_waiter(lock, waiter);
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1845,7 +1871,8 @@ int rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(struct rt_m
  * @lock:		the rt_mutex we were woken on
  * @waiter:		the pre-initialized rt_mutex_waiter
  *
- * Attempt to clean up after a failed rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock().
+ * Attempt to clean up after a failed __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() or
+ * rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock().
  *
  * Unless we acquired the lock; we're still enqueued on the wait-list and can
  * in fact still be granted ownership until we're removed. Therefore we can

[PATCH 4.19 303/313] cpu/hotplug: Fix "SMT disabled by BIOS" detection for KVM

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

commit b284909abad48b07d3071a9fc9b5692b3e64914b upstream.

With the following commit:

  73d5e2b47264 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")

... the hotplug code attempted to detect when SMT was disabled by BIOS,
in which case it reported SMT as permanently disabled.  However, that
code broke a virt hotplug scenario, where the guest is booted with only
primary CPU threads, and a sibling is brought online later.

The problem is that there doesn't seem to be a way to reliably
distinguish between the HW "SMT disabled by BIOS" case and the virt
"sibling not yet brought online" case.  So the above-mentioned commit
was a bit misguided, as it permanently disabled SMT for both cases,
preventing future virt sibling hotplugs.

Going back and reviewing the original problems which were attempted to
be solved by that commit, when SMT was disabled in BIOS:

  1) /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control showed "on" instead of
     "notsupported"; and

  2) vmx_vm_init() was incorrectly showing the L1TF_MSG_SMT warning.

I'd propose that we instead consider #1 above to not actually be a
problem.  Because, at least in the virt case, it's possible that SMT
wasn't disabled by BIOS and a sibling thread could be brought online
later.  So it makes sense to just always default the smt control to "on"
to allow for that possibility (assuming cpuid indicates that the CPU
supports SMT).

The real problem is #2, which has a simple fix: change vmx_vm_init() to
query the actual current SMT state -- i.e., whether any siblings are
currently online -- instead of looking at the SMT "control" sysfs value.

So fix it by:

  a) reverting the original "fix" and its followup fix:

     73d5e2b47264 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
     bc2d8d262cba ("cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation")

     and

  b) changing vmx_vm_init() to query the actual current SMT state --
     instead of the sysfs control value -- to determine whether the L1TF
     warning is needed.  This also requires the 'sched_smt_present'
     variable to exported, instead of 'cpu_smt_control'.

Fixes: 73d5e2b47264 ("cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS")
Reported-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e3a85d585da28cc333ecbc1e78ee9216e6da9396.1548794349.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c         |    3 ++-
 include/linux/cpu.h        |    2 --
 kernel/cpu.c               |   33 ++++-----------------------------
 kernel/sched/fair.c        |    1 +
 kernel/smp.c               |    2 --
 6 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	 * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
 	 * core code know.
 	 */
-	cpu_smt_check_topology_early();
+	cpu_smt_check_topology();
 
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
 		pr_info("CPU: ");
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
@@ -11129,7 +11130,7 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
 			 * insecure environment.
 			 */
-			if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+			if (sched_smt_active())
 				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
 			if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
 				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -180,12 +180,10 @@ enum cpuhp_smt_control {
 #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT)
 extern enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control;
 extern void cpu_smt_disable(bool force);
-extern void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void);
 extern void cpu_smt_check_topology(void);
 #else
 # define cpu_smt_control		(CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
 static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
-static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -355,9 +355,6 @@ void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
 enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_control);
-
-static bool cpu_smt_available __read_mostly;
 
 void __init cpu_smt_disable(bool force)
 {
@@ -375,25 +372,11 @@ void __init cpu_smt_disable(bool force)
 
 /*
  * The decision whether SMT is supported can only be done after the full
- * CPU identification. Called from architecture code before non boot CPUs
- * are brought up.
- */
-void __init cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void)
-{
-	if (!topology_smt_supported())
-		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-}
-
-/*
- * If SMT was disabled by BIOS, detect it here, after the CPUs have been
- * brought online. This ensures the smt/l1tf sysfs entries are consistent
- * with reality. cpu_smt_available is set to true during the bringup of non
- * boot CPUs when a SMT sibling is detected. Note, this may overwrite
- * cpu_smt_control's previous setting.
+ * CPU identification. Called from architecture code.
  */
 void __init cpu_smt_check_topology(void)
 {
-	if (!cpu_smt_available)
+	if (!topology_smt_supported())
 		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
 }
 
@@ -406,18 +389,10 @@ early_param("nosmt", smt_cmdline_disable
 
 static inline bool cpu_smt_allowed(unsigned int cpu)
 {
-	if (topology_is_primary_thread(cpu))
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
 		return true;
 
-	/*
-	 * If the CPU is not a 'primary' thread and the booted_once bit is
-	 * set then the processor has SMT support. Store this information
-	 * for the late check of SMT support in cpu_smt_check_topology().
-	 */
-	if (per_cpu(cpuhp_state, cpu).booted_once)
-		cpu_smt_available = true;
-
-	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+	if (topology_is_primary_thread(cpu))
 		return true;
 
 	/*
--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -5932,6 +5932,7 @@ static inline int find_idlest_cpu(struct
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sched_smt_present);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sched_smt_present);
 
 static inline void set_idle_cores(int cpu, int val)
 {
--- a/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/kernel/smp.c
@@ -584,8 +584,6 @@ void __init smp_init(void)
 		num_nodes, (num_nodes > 1 ? "s" : ""),
 		num_cpus,  (num_cpus  > 1 ? "s" : ""));
 
-	/* Final decision about SMT support */
-	cpu_smt_check_topology();
 	/* Any cleanup work */
 	smp_cpus_done(setup_max_cpus);
 }