From: Ali Saidi <alisaidi@amazon.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ali Saidi <alisaidi@amazon.com>,
Anthony Liguori <aliguori@amazon.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] handle worst-case heap randomization in mmap_base
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:32:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190312173248.13490-1-alisaidi@amazon.com> (raw)
Increase mmap_base by the worst-case brk randomization so that the stack and
heap remain apart.
In Linux 4.13 a change was committed that special cased the kernel ELF
loader when the loader is invoked directly (eab09532d400; binfmt_elf: use
ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE). Generally, the loader isn’t invoked
directly and this issue is limited to cases where it is, (e.g to set a
non-inheritable LD_LIBRARY_PATH, testing new versions of the loader). In
those rare cases, the loader doesn't take into account the amount of brk
randomization that will be applied by arch_randomize_brk(). This can
lead to the stack and heap being arbitrarily close to each other.
Ali Saidi (2):
arm64/mmap: handle worst-case heap randomization in mmap_base
x86/mmap: handle worst-case heap randomization in mmap_base
arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--
2.15.3.AMZN
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ali Saidi <alisaidi@amazon.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Ali Saidi <alisaidi@amazon.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Anthony Liguori <aliguori@amazon.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] handle worst-case heap randomization in mmap_base
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:32:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190312173248.13490-1-alisaidi@amazon.com> (raw)
Increase mmap_base by the worst-case brk randomization so that the stack and
heap remain apart.
In Linux 4.13 a change was committed that special cased the kernel ELF
loader when the loader is invoked directly (eab09532d400; binfmt_elf: use
ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE). Generally, the loader isn’t invoked
directly and this issue is limited to cases where it is, (e.g to set a
non-inheritable LD_LIBRARY_PATH, testing new versions of the loader). In
those rare cases, the loader doesn't take into account the amount of brk
randomization that will be applied by arch_randomize_brk(). This can
lead to the stack and heap being arbitrarily close to each other.
Ali Saidi (2):
arm64/mmap: handle worst-case heap randomization in mmap_base
x86/mmap: handle worst-case heap randomization in mmap_base
arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
--
2.15.3.AMZN
next reply other threads:[~2019-03-12 17:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-12 17:32 Ali Saidi [this message]
2019-03-12 17:32 ` [PATCH 0/2] handle worst-case heap randomization in mmap_base Ali Saidi
2019-03-12 17:32 ` [PATCH 1/2] arm64/mmap: " Ali Saidi
2019-03-12 17:32 ` Ali Saidi
2019-03-12 17:32 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/mmap: " Ali Saidi
2019-03-12 17:32 ` Ali Saidi
2019-03-13 16:25 ` Dave Hansen
2019-03-13 16:25 ` Dave Hansen
2019-03-17 15:52 ` Saidi, Ali
2019-03-17 15:52 ` Saidi, Ali
2019-03-13 22:58 ` Kees Cook
2019-03-13 22:58 ` Kees Cook
2019-03-27 19:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-03-27 19:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-15 16:03 ` Saidi, Ali
2019-04-15 16:03 ` Saidi, Ali
2019-04-19 8:51 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-19 8:51 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-19 15:00 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-19 15:00 ` Kees Cook
2019-03-21 14:09 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-21 14:09 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-26 2:13 ` Saidi, Ali
2019-03-26 2:13 ` Saidi, Ali
2019-03-26 8:43 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-03-26 8:43 ` Thomas Gleixner
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20190312173248.13490-1-alisaidi@amazon.com \
--to=alisaidi@amazon.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=aliguori@amazon.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.