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From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>,
	Maya Gokhale <gokhale2@llnl.gov>,
	Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>,
	Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
	peterx@redhat.com, Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org>,
	Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Marty McFadden <mcfadden8@llnl.gov>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Dr
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/1] userfaultfd/sysctl: add vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 11:07:22 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190319030722.12441-2-peterx@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190319030722.12441-1-peterx@redhat.com>

Add a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to control
whether userfaultfd is allowed by unprivileged users.  When this is
set to zero, only privileged users (root user, or users with the
CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) will be able to use the userfaultfd
syscalls.

Suggested-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt   | 12 ++++++++++++
 fs/userfaultfd.c              |  5 +++++
 include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h |  2 ++
 kernel/sysctl.c               | 12 ++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
index 187ce4f599a2..f146712f67bb 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/vm:
 - stat_refresh
 - numa_stat
 - swappiness
+- unprivileged_userfaultfd
 - user_reserve_kbytes
 - vfs_cache_pressure
 - watermark_boost_factor
@@ -818,6 +819,17 @@ The default value is 60.
 
 ==============================================================
 
+unprivileged_userfaultfd
+
+This flag controls whether unprivileged users can use the userfaultfd
+syscalls.  Set this to 1 to allow unprivileged users to use the
+userfaultfd syscalls, or set this to 0 to restrict userfaultfd to only
+privileged users (with SYS_CAP_PTRACE capability).
+
+The default value is 1.
+
+==============================================================
+
 - user_reserve_kbytes
 
 When overcommit_memory is set to 2, "never overcommit" mode, reserve
diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index 89800fc7dc9d..7e856a25cc2f 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 
+int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd __read_mostly = 1;
+
 static struct kmem_cache *userfaultfd_ctx_cachep __read_mostly;
 
 enum userfaultfd_state {
@@ -1921,6 +1923,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
 	struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
 	int fd;
 
+	if (!sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	BUG_ON(!current->mm);
 
 	/* Check the UFFD_* constants for consistency.  */
diff --git a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
index 37c9eba75c98..ac9d71e24b81 100644
--- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
+++ b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #define UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS (O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK)
 #define UFFD_FLAGS_SET (EFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS)
 
+extern int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd;
+
 extern vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason);
 
 extern ssize_t mcopy_atomic(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start,
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 7578e21a711b..9b8ff1881df9 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -1704,6 +1705,17 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
 		.extra1		= (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min,
 		.extra2		= (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max,
 	},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_USERFAULTFD
+	{
+		.procname	= "unprivileged_userfaultfd",
+		.data		= &sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
 #endif
 	{ }
 };
-- 
2.17.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>,
	Maya Gokhale <gokhale2@llnl.gov>,
	Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>,
	Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
	peterx@redhat.com, Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org>,
	Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Marty McFadden <mcfadden8@llnl.gov>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/1] userfaultfd/sysctl: add vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 11:07:22 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190319030722.12441-2-peterx@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190319030722.12441-1-peterx@redhat.com>

Add a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to control
whether userfaultfd is allowed by unprivileged users.  When this is
set to zero, only privileged users (root user, or users with the
CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability) will be able to use the userfaultfd
syscalls.

Suggested-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt   | 12 ++++++++++++
 fs/userfaultfd.c              |  5 +++++
 include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h |  2 ++
 kernel/sysctl.c               | 12 ++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
index 187ce4f599a2..f146712f67bb 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/vm:
 - stat_refresh
 - numa_stat
 - swappiness
+- unprivileged_userfaultfd
 - user_reserve_kbytes
 - vfs_cache_pressure
 - watermark_boost_factor
@@ -818,6 +819,17 @@ The default value is 60.
 
 ==============================================================
 
+unprivileged_userfaultfd
+
+This flag controls whether unprivileged users can use the userfaultfd
+syscalls.  Set this to 1 to allow unprivileged users to use the
+userfaultfd syscalls, or set this to 0 to restrict userfaultfd to only
+privileged users (with SYS_CAP_PTRACE capability).
+
+The default value is 1.
+
+==============================================================
+
 - user_reserve_kbytes
 
 When overcommit_memory is set to 2, "never overcommit" mode, reserve
diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index 89800fc7dc9d..7e856a25cc2f 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 
+int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd __read_mostly = 1;
+
 static struct kmem_cache *userfaultfd_ctx_cachep __read_mostly;
 
 enum userfaultfd_state {
@@ -1921,6 +1923,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
 	struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
 	int fd;
 
+	if (!sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	BUG_ON(!current->mm);
 
 	/* Check the UFFD_* constants for consistency.  */
diff --git a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
index 37c9eba75c98..ac9d71e24b81 100644
--- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
+++ b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #define UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS (O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK)
 #define UFFD_FLAGS_SET (EFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS)
 
+extern int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd;
+
 extern vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason);
 
 extern ssize_t mcopy_atomic(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, unsigned long dst_start,
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 7578e21a711b..9b8ff1881df9 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -1704,6 +1705,17 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
 		.extra1		= (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min,
 		.extra2		= (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max,
 	},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_USERFAULTFD
+	{
+		.procname	= "unprivileged_userfaultfd",
+		.data		= &sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
 #endif
 	{ }
 };
-- 
2.17.1


  reply	other threads:[~2019-03-19  3:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-03-19  3:07 [PATCH v2 0/1] userfaultfd: allow to forbid unprivileged users Peter Xu
2019-03-19  3:07 ` Peter Xu
2019-03-19  3:07 ` Peter Xu [this message]
2019-03-19  3:07   ` [PATCH v2 1/1] userfaultfd/sysctl: add vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd Peter Xu
2019-03-19  7:11   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-03-19  7:11     ` Mike Rapoport
2019-03-19 18:07     ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-19 18:07       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-19 18:02   ` Andrew Morton
2019-03-19 18:02     ` Andrew Morton
2019-03-19 18:28     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-03-19 18:28       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2019-03-20  0:20       ` Peter Xu
2019-03-20  0:20         ` Peter Xu
2019-03-20 19:01       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-20 19:01         ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-21 13:43         ` Luis Chamberlain
2019-03-21 13:43           ` Luis Chamberlain
2019-03-21 21:06           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-03-21 21:06             ` Andrea Arcangeli
2019-04-23 22:19     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-23 22:19       ` Kees Cook
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-05-27  6:54 Xiaoming Ni
2020-05-27 14:21 ` Peter Xu
2020-05-28  8:50   ` Xiaoming Ni
2020-05-28 12:49     ` Peter Xu

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