From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
kevin.tian@intel.com, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
ashok.raj@intel.com,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
alan.cox@intel.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
pengfei.xu@intel.com, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
jacob.jun.pan@intel.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v4 9/9] iommu/vt-d: Use bounce buffer for untrusted devices
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 09:16:20 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190603011620.31999-10-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190603011620.31999-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
The Intel VT-d hardware uses paging for DMA remapping.
The minimum mapped window is a page size. The device
drivers may map buffers not filling the whole IOMMU
window. This allows the device to access to possibly
unrelated memory and a malicious device could exploit
this to perform DMA attacks. To address this, the
Intel IOMMU driver will use bounce pages for those
buffers which don't fill whole IOMMU pages.
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Xu Pengfei <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@intel.com>
---
drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 117 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
index 2f54734d1c43..4bf744a1c239 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
+#include <trace/events/intel_iommu.h>
#include "irq_remapping.h"
#include "intel-pasid.h"
@@ -3537,6 +3538,19 @@ __intel_map_single(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t paddr, size_t size,
if (!iova_pfn)
goto error;
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev)) {
+ dma_addr_t ret_addr;
+
+ ret_addr = iommu_bounce_map(dev, iova_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ paddr, size, dir, attrs);
+ if (ret_addr == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR)
+ goto error;
+ trace_bounce_map_single(dev, iova_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ paddr, size);
+
+ return ret_addr;
+ }
+
/*
* Check if DMAR supports zero-length reads on write only
* mappings..
@@ -3620,14 +3634,28 @@ static void intel_unmap(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t dev_addr, size_t size,
start_pfn = mm_to_dma_pfn(iova_pfn);
last_pfn = start_pfn + nrpages - 1;
- freelist = domain_unmap(domain, start_pfn, last_pfn);
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev))
+ for_each_sg(sglist, sg, nelems, i) {
+ iommu_bounce_unmap(dev, sg_dma_address(sg),
+ sg->length, dir, attrs);
+ trace_bounce_unmap_sg(dev, i, nelems,
+ sg_dma_address(sg),
+ sg_phys(sg), sg->length);
+ }
+ else
+ freelist = domain_unmap(domain, start_pfn, last_pfn);
} else {
iova_pfn = IOVA_PFN(dev_addr);
nrpages = aligned_nrpages(dev_addr, size);
start_pfn = mm_to_dma_pfn(iova_pfn);
last_pfn = start_pfn + nrpages - 1;
- freelist = domain_unmap(domain, start_pfn, last_pfn);
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev)) {
+ iommu_bounce_unmap(dev, dev_addr, size, dir, attrs);
+ trace_bounce_unmap_single(dev, dev_addr, size);
+ } else {
+ freelist = domain_unmap(domain, start_pfn, last_pfn);
+ }
}
if (dev_is_pci(dev))
@@ -3774,6 +3802,26 @@ static int intel_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sglist, int nele
prot |= DMA_PTE_WRITE;
start_vpfn = mm_to_dma_pfn(iova_pfn);
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev)) {
+ for_each_sg(sglist, sg, nelems, i) {
+ dma_addr_t ret_addr;
+
+ ret_addr = iommu_bounce_map(dev,
+ start_vpfn << VTD_PAGE_SHIFT,
+ sg_phys(sg), sg->length, dir, attrs);
+ if (ret_addr == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR)
+ break;
+
+ trace_bounce_map_sg(dev, i, nelems, ret_addr,
+ sg_phys(sg), sg->length);
+
+ sg->dma_address = ret_addr;
+ sg->dma_length = sg->length;
+ start_vpfn += aligned_nrpages(sg->offset, sg->length);
+ }
+
+ return i;
+ }
ret = domain_sg_mapping(domain, start_vpfn, sglist, size, prot);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
@@ -3787,16 +3835,74 @@ static int intel_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sglist, int nele
return nelems;
}
+static void
+intel_sync_single_for_cpu(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t addr,
+ size_t size, enum dma_data_direction dir)
+{
+ if (!iommu_need_mapping(dev))
+ dma_direct_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, addr, size, dir);
+
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev))
+ iommu_bounce_sync(dev, addr, size, dir, SYNC_FOR_CPU);
+}
+
+static void
+intel_sync_single_for_device(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t addr,
+ size_t size, enum dma_data_direction dir)
+{
+ if (!iommu_need_mapping(dev))
+ dma_direct_sync_single_for_device(dev, addr, size, dir);
+
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev))
+ iommu_bounce_sync(dev, addr, size, dir, SYNC_FOR_DEVICE);
+}
+
+static void
+intel_sync_sg_for_cpu(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sglist,
+ int nelems, enum dma_data_direction dir)
+{
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!iommu_need_mapping(dev))
+ dma_direct_sync_sg_for_cpu(dev, sglist, nelems, dir);
+
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev))
+ for_each_sg(sglist, sg, nelems, i)
+ iommu_bounce_sync(dev, sg_dma_address(sg),
+ sg_dma_len(sg), dir, SYNC_FOR_CPU);
+}
+
+static void
+intel_sync_sg_for_device(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sglist,
+ int nelems, enum dma_data_direction dir)
+{
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!iommu_need_mapping(dev))
+ dma_direct_sync_sg_for_device(dev, sglist, nelems, dir);
+
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev))
+ for_each_sg(sglist, sg, nelems, i)
+ iommu_bounce_sync(dev, sg_dma_address(sg),
+ sg_dma_len(sg), dir, SYNC_FOR_DEVICE);
+}
+
static const struct dma_map_ops intel_dma_ops = {
- .alloc = intel_alloc_coherent,
- .free = intel_free_coherent,
- .map_sg = intel_map_sg,
- .unmap_sg = intel_unmap_sg,
- .map_page = intel_map_page,
- .unmap_page = intel_unmap_page,
- .map_resource = intel_map_resource,
- .unmap_resource = intel_unmap_resource,
- .dma_supported = dma_direct_supported,
+ .alloc = intel_alloc_coherent,
+ .free = intel_free_coherent,
+ .map_sg = intel_map_sg,
+ .unmap_sg = intel_unmap_sg,
+ .map_page = intel_map_page,
+ .unmap_page = intel_unmap_page,
+ .sync_single_for_cpu = intel_sync_single_for_cpu,
+ .sync_single_for_device = intel_sync_single_for_device,
+ .sync_sg_for_cpu = intel_sync_sg_for_cpu,
+ .sync_sg_for_device = intel_sync_sg_for_device,
+ .map_resource = intel_map_resource,
+ .unmap_resource = intel_unmap_resource,
+ .dma_supported = dma_direct_supported,
};
static inline int iommu_domain_cache_init(void)
--
2.17.1
_______________________________________________
iommu mailing list
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com, jacob.jun.pan@intel.com, alan.cox@intel.com,
kevin.tian@intel.com, mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
pengfei.xu@intel.com,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 9/9] iommu/vt-d: Use bounce buffer for untrusted devices
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 09:16:20 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190603011620.31999-10-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190603011620.31999-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
The Intel VT-d hardware uses paging for DMA remapping.
The minimum mapped window is a page size. The device
drivers may map buffers not filling the whole IOMMU
window. This allows the device to access to possibly
unrelated memory and a malicious device could exploit
this to perform DMA attacks. To address this, the
Intel IOMMU driver will use bounce pages for those
buffers which don't fill whole IOMMU pages.
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Xu Pengfei <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@intel.com>
---
drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 117 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
index 2f54734d1c43..4bf744a1c239 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
+#include <trace/events/intel_iommu.h>
#include "irq_remapping.h"
#include "intel-pasid.h"
@@ -3537,6 +3538,19 @@ __intel_map_single(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t paddr, size_t size,
if (!iova_pfn)
goto error;
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev)) {
+ dma_addr_t ret_addr;
+
+ ret_addr = iommu_bounce_map(dev, iova_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ paddr, size, dir, attrs);
+ if (ret_addr == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR)
+ goto error;
+ trace_bounce_map_single(dev, iova_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ paddr, size);
+
+ return ret_addr;
+ }
+
/*
* Check if DMAR supports zero-length reads on write only
* mappings..
@@ -3620,14 +3634,28 @@ static void intel_unmap(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t dev_addr, size_t size,
start_pfn = mm_to_dma_pfn(iova_pfn);
last_pfn = start_pfn + nrpages - 1;
- freelist = domain_unmap(domain, start_pfn, last_pfn);
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev))
+ for_each_sg(sglist, sg, nelems, i) {
+ iommu_bounce_unmap(dev, sg_dma_address(sg),
+ sg->length, dir, attrs);
+ trace_bounce_unmap_sg(dev, i, nelems,
+ sg_dma_address(sg),
+ sg_phys(sg), sg->length);
+ }
+ else
+ freelist = domain_unmap(domain, start_pfn, last_pfn);
} else {
iova_pfn = IOVA_PFN(dev_addr);
nrpages = aligned_nrpages(dev_addr, size);
start_pfn = mm_to_dma_pfn(iova_pfn);
last_pfn = start_pfn + nrpages - 1;
- freelist = domain_unmap(domain, start_pfn, last_pfn);
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev)) {
+ iommu_bounce_unmap(dev, dev_addr, size, dir, attrs);
+ trace_bounce_unmap_single(dev, dev_addr, size);
+ } else {
+ freelist = domain_unmap(domain, start_pfn, last_pfn);
+ }
}
if (dev_is_pci(dev))
@@ -3774,6 +3802,26 @@ static int intel_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sglist, int nele
prot |= DMA_PTE_WRITE;
start_vpfn = mm_to_dma_pfn(iova_pfn);
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev)) {
+ for_each_sg(sglist, sg, nelems, i) {
+ dma_addr_t ret_addr;
+
+ ret_addr = iommu_bounce_map(dev,
+ start_vpfn << VTD_PAGE_SHIFT,
+ sg_phys(sg), sg->length, dir, attrs);
+ if (ret_addr == DMA_MAPPING_ERROR)
+ break;
+
+ trace_bounce_map_sg(dev, i, nelems, ret_addr,
+ sg_phys(sg), sg->length);
+
+ sg->dma_address = ret_addr;
+ sg->dma_length = sg->length;
+ start_vpfn += aligned_nrpages(sg->offset, sg->length);
+ }
+
+ return i;
+ }
ret = domain_sg_mapping(domain, start_vpfn, sglist, size, prot);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
@@ -3787,16 +3835,74 @@ static int intel_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sglist, int nele
return nelems;
}
+static void
+intel_sync_single_for_cpu(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t addr,
+ size_t size, enum dma_data_direction dir)
+{
+ if (!iommu_need_mapping(dev))
+ dma_direct_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, addr, size, dir);
+
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev))
+ iommu_bounce_sync(dev, addr, size, dir, SYNC_FOR_CPU);
+}
+
+static void
+intel_sync_single_for_device(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t addr,
+ size_t size, enum dma_data_direction dir)
+{
+ if (!iommu_need_mapping(dev))
+ dma_direct_sync_single_for_device(dev, addr, size, dir);
+
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev))
+ iommu_bounce_sync(dev, addr, size, dir, SYNC_FOR_DEVICE);
+}
+
+static void
+intel_sync_sg_for_cpu(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sglist,
+ int nelems, enum dma_data_direction dir)
+{
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!iommu_need_mapping(dev))
+ dma_direct_sync_sg_for_cpu(dev, sglist, nelems, dir);
+
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev))
+ for_each_sg(sglist, sg, nelems, i)
+ iommu_bounce_sync(dev, sg_dma_address(sg),
+ sg_dma_len(sg), dir, SYNC_FOR_CPU);
+}
+
+static void
+intel_sync_sg_for_device(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sglist,
+ int nelems, enum dma_data_direction dir)
+{
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!iommu_need_mapping(dev))
+ dma_direct_sync_sg_for_device(dev, sglist, nelems, dir);
+
+ if (device_needs_bounce(dev))
+ for_each_sg(sglist, sg, nelems, i)
+ iommu_bounce_sync(dev, sg_dma_address(sg),
+ sg_dma_len(sg), dir, SYNC_FOR_DEVICE);
+}
+
static const struct dma_map_ops intel_dma_ops = {
- .alloc = intel_alloc_coherent,
- .free = intel_free_coherent,
- .map_sg = intel_map_sg,
- .unmap_sg = intel_unmap_sg,
- .map_page = intel_map_page,
- .unmap_page = intel_unmap_page,
- .map_resource = intel_map_resource,
- .unmap_resource = intel_unmap_resource,
- .dma_supported = dma_direct_supported,
+ .alloc = intel_alloc_coherent,
+ .free = intel_free_coherent,
+ .map_sg = intel_map_sg,
+ .unmap_sg = intel_unmap_sg,
+ .map_page = intel_map_page,
+ .unmap_page = intel_unmap_page,
+ .sync_single_for_cpu = intel_sync_single_for_cpu,
+ .sync_single_for_device = intel_sync_single_for_device,
+ .sync_sg_for_cpu = intel_sync_sg_for_cpu,
+ .sync_sg_for_device = intel_sync_sg_for_device,
+ .map_resource = intel_map_resource,
+ .unmap_resource = intel_unmap_resource,
+ .dma_supported = dma_direct_supported,
};
static inline int iommu_domain_cache_init(void)
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-03 1:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-03 1:16 [PATCH v4 0/9] iommu: Bounce page for untrusted devices Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] PCI: Add dev_is_untrusted helper Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] swiotlb: Split size parameter to map/unmap APIs Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] swiotlb: Zero out bounce buffer for untrusted device Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 15:45 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-10 15:45 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 0:43 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 0:43 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 1:05 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 1:05 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 3:08 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 3:08 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] iommu: Add bounce page APIs Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 15:56 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-10 15:56 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 0:45 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 0:45 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-11 12:10 ` Pavel Begunkov
2019-06-11 12:10 ` Pavel Begunkov
2019-06-12 0:52 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 0:52 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] iommu/vt-d: Don't switch off swiotlb if use direct dma Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 15:54 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-10 15:54 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 2:03 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 2:03 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] iommu/vt-d: Check whether device requires bounce buffer Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 16:08 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-10 16:08 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 2:22 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 2:22 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] iommu/vt-d: Add trace events for domain map/unmap Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-04 9:01 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-06-04 9:01 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-06-05 6:48 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-05 6:48 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 16:08 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-10 16:08 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 2:31 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 2:31 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] iommu/vt-d: Code refactoring for bounce map and unmap Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` Lu Baolu [this message]
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] iommu/vt-d: Use bounce buffer for untrusted devices Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v4 0/9] iommu: Bounce page " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-10 15:42 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 3:00 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 3:00 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 6:22 ` Mika Westerberg
2019-06-12 6:22 ` Mika Westerberg
2019-06-10 16:10 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-10 16:10 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 3:04 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 3:04 ` Lu Baolu
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