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From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, sgrubb@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: rgb@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 14:10:12 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200618211012.2823-2-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200618211012.2823-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com>

process_buffer_measurement() and ima_alloc_key_entry() functions need to
log an audit message for auditing integrity measurement failures.

Add audit message in these two functions. Remove "pr_devel" log message
in process_buffer_measurement().

Sample audit messages:

[    6.303048] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506281.627:2): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op=measuring_key cause=ENOMEM comm="swapper/0" name=".builtin_trusted_keys" res=0 errno=-12

[    8.019432] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506283.344:10): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=measuring_kexec_cmdline cause=hashing_error comm="systemd" name="kexec-cmdline" res=0 errno=-22

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h            | 48 ++++++++++++++++---------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c       | 18 +++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c     |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c |  5 +++
 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index df93ac258e01..c3a32e181b48 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -186,27 +186,43 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
 	return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE;
 }
 
-#define __ima_hooks(hook)		\
-	hook(NONE)			\
-	hook(FILE_CHECK)		\
-	hook(MMAP_CHECK)		\
-	hook(BPRM_CHECK)		\
-	hook(CREDS_CHECK)		\
-	hook(POST_SETATTR)		\
-	hook(MODULE_CHECK)		\
-	hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK)		\
-	hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)	\
-	hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK)	\
-	hook(POLICY_CHECK)		\
-	hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE)		\
-	hook(KEY_CHECK)			\
-	hook(MAX_CHECK)
-#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM)	ENUM,
+#define __ima_hooks(hook)				\
+	hook(NONE, none)				\
+	hook(FILE_CHECK, file)				\
+	hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap)				\
+	hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm)				\
+	hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds)			\
+	hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr)		\
+	hook(MODULE_CHECK, module)			\
+	hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware)			\
+	hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel)		\
+	hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs)	\
+	hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy)			\
+	hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline)		\
+	hook(KEY_CHECK, key)				\
+	hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
+
+#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str)	ENUM,
+#define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg)
+#define __ima_hook_measuring_stringify(ENUM, str) \
+		(__ima_stringify(measuring_ ##str)),
 
 enum ima_hooks {
 	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
 };
 
+static const char * const ima_hooks_measure_str[] = {
+	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_measuring_stringify)
+};
+
+static inline const char *func_measure_str(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	if (func >= MAX_CHECK)
+		return ima_hooks_measure_str[NONE];
+
+	return ima_hooks_measure_str[func];
+}
+
 extern const char *const func_tokens[];
 
 struct modsig;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c1583d98c5e5..8351b2fd48e0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -740,6 +740,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
 				int pcr, const char *keyring)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
 	struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
@@ -794,21 +795,28 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
 	iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
 
 	ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
-
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "store_entry";
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+	}
 
 out:
 	if (ret < 0)
-		pr_devel("%s: failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret);
+		integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
+					func_measure_str(func),
+					audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
 
 	return;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e493063a3c34..66aa3e17a888 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1414,7 +1414,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void)
 	}
 }
 
-#define __ima_hook_stringify(str)	(#str),
+#define __ima_hook_stringify(func, str)	(#func),
 
 const char *const func_tokens[] = {
 	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
index cb3e3f501593..56ce24a18b66 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
 						 size_t payload_len)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_key_entry *entry;
 
 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -88,6 +89,10 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
 
 out:
 	if (rc) {
+		integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL,
+					keyring->description,
+					func_measure_str(KEY_CHECK),
+					audit_cause, rc, 0, rc);
 		ima_free_key_entry(entry);
 		entry = NULL;
 	}
-- 
2.27.0


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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, sgrubb@redhat.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: rgb@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 14:10:12 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200618211012.2823-2-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200618211012.2823-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com>

process_buffer_measurement() and ima_alloc_key_entry() functions need to
log an audit message for auditing integrity measurement failures.

Add audit message in these two functions. Remove "pr_devel" log message
in process_buffer_measurement().

Sample audit messages:

[    6.303048] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506281.627:2): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op=measuring_key cause=ENOMEM comm="swapper/0" name=".builtin_trusted_keys" res=0 errno=-12

[    8.019432] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506283.344:10): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=measuring_kexec_cmdline cause=hashing_error comm="systemd" name="kexec-cmdline" res=0 errno=-22

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h            | 48 ++++++++++++++++---------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c       | 18 +++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c     |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c |  5 +++
 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index df93ac258e01..c3a32e181b48 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -186,27 +186,43 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
 	return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE;
 }
 
-#define __ima_hooks(hook)		\
-	hook(NONE)			\
-	hook(FILE_CHECK)		\
-	hook(MMAP_CHECK)		\
-	hook(BPRM_CHECK)		\
-	hook(CREDS_CHECK)		\
-	hook(POST_SETATTR)		\
-	hook(MODULE_CHECK)		\
-	hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK)		\
-	hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)	\
-	hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK)	\
-	hook(POLICY_CHECK)		\
-	hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE)		\
-	hook(KEY_CHECK)			\
-	hook(MAX_CHECK)
-#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM)	ENUM,
+#define __ima_hooks(hook)				\
+	hook(NONE, none)				\
+	hook(FILE_CHECK, file)				\
+	hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap)				\
+	hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm)				\
+	hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds)			\
+	hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr)		\
+	hook(MODULE_CHECK, module)			\
+	hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware)			\
+	hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel)		\
+	hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs)	\
+	hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy)			\
+	hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline)		\
+	hook(KEY_CHECK, key)				\
+	hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
+
+#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str)	ENUM,
+#define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg)
+#define __ima_hook_measuring_stringify(ENUM, str) \
+		(__ima_stringify(measuring_ ##str)),
 
 enum ima_hooks {
 	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
 };
 
+static const char * const ima_hooks_measure_str[] = {
+	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_measuring_stringify)
+};
+
+static inline const char *func_measure_str(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+	if (func >= MAX_CHECK)
+		return ima_hooks_measure_str[NONE];
+
+	return ima_hooks_measure_str[func];
+}
+
 extern const char *const func_tokens[];
 
 struct modsig;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c1583d98c5e5..8351b2fd48e0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -740,6 +740,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
 				int pcr, const char *keyring)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
 	struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
@@ -794,21 +795,28 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
 	iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
 
 	ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "hashing_error";
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
-
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		audit_cause = "store_entry";
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+	}
 
 out:
 	if (ret < 0)
-		pr_devel("%s: failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret);
+		integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
+					func_measure_str(func),
+					audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
 
 	return;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e493063a3c34..66aa3e17a888 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1414,7 +1414,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void)
 	}
 }
 
-#define __ima_hook_stringify(str)	(#str),
+#define __ima_hook_stringify(func, str)	(#func),
 
 const char *const func_tokens[] = {
 	__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
index cb3e3f501593..56ce24a18b66 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
 						 size_t payload_len)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_key_entry *entry;
 
 	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -88,6 +89,10 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
 
 out:
 	if (rc) {
+		integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL,
+					keyring->description,
+					func_measure_str(KEY_CHECK),
+					audit_cause, rc, 0, rc);
 		ima_free_key_entry(entry);
 		entry = NULL;
 	}
-- 
2.27.0


  reply	other threads:[~2020-06-23  2:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-18 21:10 [PATCH v3 1/2] integrity: Add errno field in audit message Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-06-18 21:10 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-06-18 21:10 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian [this message]
2020-06-18 21:10   ` [PATCH v3 2/2] IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-06-23 19:58   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-23 19:58     ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-24 17:25     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-06-24 17:25       ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-06-25 19:14       ` Paul Moore
2020-06-25 19:14         ` Paul Moore
2020-06-29 16:57         ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-29 16:57           ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-22 22:27 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] integrity: Add errno field in audit message Mimi Zohar
2020-06-22 22:27   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-24  0:07 ` Paul Moore
2020-06-24  0:07   ` Paul Moore

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