* [PATCH v4] x86: add failure injection to get/put/clear_user
@ 2020-10-23 8:16 Alexander Potapenko
2020-10-23 8:19 ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-10-23 11:01 ` kernel test robot
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Potapenko @ 2020-10-23 8:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm, bp, mingo, corbet, tglx, arnd
Cc: akinobu.mita, hpa, viro, glider, andreyknvl, dvyukov, elver,
linux-doc, linux-kernel, linux-arch, x86, albert.linde,
Albert van der Linde
From: Albert van der Linde <alinde@google.com>
To test fault-tolerance of user memory acceses in x86, add support for
fault injection.
Make both put_user() and get_user() fail with -EFAULT, and clear_user()
fail by not clearing any bytes.
Reviewed-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Albert van der Linde <alinde@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
v2:
- no significant changes
v3:
- no changes
v4:
- instrument the new out-of-line implementations of get_user()/put_user()
- fix a minor checkpatch warning in the inline assembly
---
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index f13659523108..7041ebc48b75 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
* User space memory access functions
*/
#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
@@ -126,11 +127,16 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void);
int __ret_gu; \
register __inttype(*(ptr)) __val_gu asm("%"_ASM_DX); \
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
- asm volatile("call __" #fn "_%P4" \
- : "=a" (__ret_gu), "=r" (__val_gu), \
- ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT \
- : "0" (ptr), "i" (sizeof(*(ptr)))); \
- (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr))) __val_gu; \
+ if (should_fail_usercopy()) { \
+ (x) = 0; \
+ __ret_gu = -EFAULT; \
+ } else { \
+ asm volatile("call __" #fn "_%P4" \
+ : "=a" (__ret_gu), "=r" (__val_gu), \
+ ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT \
+ : "0" (ptr), "i" (sizeof(*(ptr)))); \
+ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr))) __val_gu; \
+ } \
__builtin_expect(__ret_gu, 0); \
})
@@ -213,14 +219,18 @@ extern void __put_user_nocheck_8(void);
int __ret_pu; \
register __typeof__(*(ptr)) __val_pu asm("%"_ASM_AX); \
__chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
- __val_pu = (x); \
- asm volatile("call __" #fn "_%P[size]" \
- : "=c" (__ret_pu), \
- ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT \
- : "0" (ptr), \
- "r" (__val_pu), \
- [size] "i" (sizeof(*(ptr))) \
- :"ebx"); \
+ if (unlikely(should_fail_usercopy())) { \
+ __ret_pu = -EFAULT; \
+ } else { \
+ __val_pu = (x); \
+ asm volatile("call __" #fn "_%P[size]" \
+ : "=c" (__ret_pu), \
+ ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT \
+ : "0" (ptr), \
+ "r" (__val_pu), \
+ [size] "i" (sizeof(*(ptr))) \
+ : "ebx"); \
+ } \
__builtin_expect(__ret_pu, 0); \
})
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c
index 508c81e97ab1..5617b3864586 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
* Copyright 2002 Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
@@ -50,6 +51,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user);
unsigned long clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
{
+ if (should_fail_usercopy())
+ return n;
if (access_ok(to, n))
return __clear_user(to, n);
return n;
--
2.29.0.rc2.309.g374f81d7ae-goog
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] x86: add failure injection to get/put/clear_user
2020-10-23 8:16 [PATCH v4] x86: add failure injection to get/put/clear_user Alexander Potapenko
@ 2020-10-23 8:19 ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-10-23 11:01 ` kernel test robot
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Potapenko @ 2020-10-23 8:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton, Borislav Petkov, Ingo Molnar, Jonathan Corbet,
Thomas Gleixner, Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Akinobu Mita, H. Peter Anvin, Al Viro, Andrey Konovalov,
Dmitriy Vyukov, Marco Elver, open list:DOCUMENTATION, LKML,
Linux-Arch, the arch/x86 maintainers, Albert Linde
(Albert's @google.com address is gone, removing it from CC list)
On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 10:16 AM Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> wrote:
>
> From: Albert van der Linde <alinde@google.com>
>
> To test fault-tolerance of user memory acceses in x86, add support for
> fault injection.
>
> Make both put_user() and get_user() fail with -EFAULT, and clear_user()
> fail by not clearing any bytes.
>
> Reviewed-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albert van der Linde <alinde@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
>
> ---
> v2:
> - no significant changes
>
> v3:
> - no changes
>
> v4:
> - instrument the new out-of-line implementations of get_user()/put_user()
> - fix a minor checkpatch warning in the inline assembly
>
> ---
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
> arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c | 3 +++
> 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index f13659523108..7041ebc48b75 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
> * User space memory access functions
> */
> #include <linux/compiler.h>
> +#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
> #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
> #include <linux/string.h>
> #include <asm/asm.h>
> @@ -126,11 +127,16 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void);
> int __ret_gu; \
> register __inttype(*(ptr)) __val_gu asm("%"_ASM_DX); \
> __chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
> - asm volatile("call __" #fn "_%P4" \
> - : "=a" (__ret_gu), "=r" (__val_gu), \
> - ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT \
> - : "0" (ptr), "i" (sizeof(*(ptr)))); \
> - (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr))) __val_gu; \
> + if (should_fail_usercopy()) { \
> + (x) = 0; \
> + __ret_gu = -EFAULT; \
> + } else { \
> + asm volatile("call __" #fn "_%P4" \
> + : "=a" (__ret_gu), "=r" (__val_gu), \
> + ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT \
> + : "0" (ptr), "i" (sizeof(*(ptr)))); \
> + (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr))) __val_gu; \
> + } \
> __builtin_expect(__ret_gu, 0); \
> })
>
> @@ -213,14 +219,18 @@ extern void __put_user_nocheck_8(void);
> int __ret_pu; \
> register __typeof__(*(ptr)) __val_pu asm("%"_ASM_AX); \
> __chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
> - __val_pu = (x); \
> - asm volatile("call __" #fn "_%P[size]" \
> - : "=c" (__ret_pu), \
> - ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT \
> - : "0" (ptr), \
> - "r" (__val_pu), \
> - [size] "i" (sizeof(*(ptr))) \
> - :"ebx"); \
> + if (unlikely(should_fail_usercopy())) { \
> + __ret_pu = -EFAULT; \
> + } else { \
> + __val_pu = (x); \
> + asm volatile("call __" #fn "_%P[size]" \
> + : "=c" (__ret_pu), \
> + ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT \
> + : "0" (ptr), \
> + "r" (__val_pu), \
> + [size] "i" (sizeof(*(ptr))) \
> + : "ebx"); \
> + } \
> __builtin_expect(__ret_pu, 0); \
> })
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c
> index 508c81e97ab1..5617b3864586 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
> * Copyright 2002 Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
> */
> #include <linux/export.h>
> +#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <linux/highmem.h>
>
> @@ -50,6 +51,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user);
>
> unsigned long clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
> {
> + if (should_fail_usercopy())
> + return n;
> if (access_ok(to, n))
> return __clear_user(to, n);
> return n;
> --
> 2.29.0.rc2.309.g374f81d7ae-goog
>
--
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer
Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München
Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] x86: add failure injection to get/put/clear_user
2020-10-23 8:16 [PATCH v4] x86: add failure injection to get/put/clear_user Alexander Potapenko
2020-10-23 8:19 ` Alexander Potapenko
@ 2020-10-23 11:01 ` kernel test robot
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2020-10-23 11:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kbuild-all
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6935 bytes --]
Hi Alexander,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on tip/master]
[also build test WARNING on next-20201023]
[cannot apply to tip/x86/core hnaz-linux-mm/master v5.9]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Alexander-Potapenko/x86-add-failure-injection-to-get-put-clear_user/20201023-161920
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git 95d591cca3b1851eaf66af066149183f18ff5ab3
config: i386-randconfig-s002-20201023 (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-15) 9.3.0
reproduce:
# apt-get install sparse
# sparse version: v0.6.3-17-g2d3af347-dirty
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/fde54c64ea35d06708ec79201776bedb1533cb91
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Alexander-Potapenko/x86-add-failure-injection-to-get-put-clear_user/20201023-161920
git checkout fde54c64ea35d06708ec79201776bedb1533cb91
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' ARCH=i386
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
"sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)"
>> arch/x86/events/core.c:2668:21: sparse: sparse: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
--
>> arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:104:13: sparse: sparse: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
vim +2668 arch/x86/events/core.c
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2635
56962b4449af34 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Frederic Weisbecker 2010-06-30 2636 void
cfbcf468454ab4 arch/x86/events/core.c Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2016-04-28 2637 perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs)
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2638 {
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2639 struct stack_frame frame;
c8e3dd86600a1a arch/x86/events/core.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 2640 const struct stack_frame __user *fp;
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2641
927c7a9e92c4f6 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Frederic Weisbecker 2010-07-01 2642 if (perf_guest_cbs && perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest()) {
927c7a9e92c4f6 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Frederic Weisbecker 2010-07-01 2643 /* TODO: We don't support guest os callchain now */
ed8052616680e7 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Peter Zijlstra 2010-08-20 2644 return;
927c7a9e92c4f6 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Frederic Weisbecker 2010-07-01 2645 }
5a6cec3abbdb74 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Ingo Molnar 2009-05-29 2646
d07bdfd322d307 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Peter Zijlstra 2012-07-10 2647 /*
d07bdfd322d307 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Peter Zijlstra 2012-07-10 2648 * We don't know what to do with VM86 stacks.. ignore them for now.
d07bdfd322d307 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Peter Zijlstra 2012-07-10 2649 */
d07bdfd322d307 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Peter Zijlstra 2012-07-10 2650 if (regs->flags & (X86_VM_MASK | PERF_EFLAGS_VM))
d07bdfd322d307 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Peter Zijlstra 2012-07-10 2651 return;
d07bdfd322d307 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Peter Zijlstra 2012-07-10 2652
c8e3dd86600a1a arch/x86/events/core.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 2653 fp = (void __user *)regs->bp;
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2654
70791ce9ba68a5 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Frederic Weisbecker 2010-06-29 2655 perf_callchain_store(entry, regs->ip);
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2656
4012e77a903d11 arch/x86/events/core.c Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-29 2657 if (!nmi_uaccess_okay())
20afc60f892d28 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Andrey Vagin 2011-08-30 2658 return;
20afc60f892d28 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Andrey Vagin 2011-08-30 2659
257ef9d21f1b00 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Torok Edwin 2010-03-17 2660 if (perf_callchain_user32(regs, entry))
257ef9d21f1b00 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Torok Edwin 2010-03-17 2661 return;
257ef9d21f1b00 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Torok Edwin 2010-03-17 2662
75925e1ad7f5a4 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Andi Kleen 2015-10-22 2663 pagefault_disable();
3b1fff08038bd0 arch/x86/events/core.c Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2016-05-10 2664 while (entry->nr < entry->max_stack) {
ae31fe51a3ccea arch/x86/events/core.c Johannes Weiner 2016-11-22 2665 if (!valid_user_frame(fp, sizeof(frame)))
75925e1ad7f5a4 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Andi Kleen 2015-10-22 2666 break;
75925e1ad7f5a4 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Andi Kleen 2015-10-22 2667
c8e3dd86600a1a arch/x86/events/core.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 @2668 if (__get_user(frame.next_frame, &fp->next_frame))
75925e1ad7f5a4 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Andi Kleen 2015-10-22 2669 break;
c8e3dd86600a1a arch/x86/events/core.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 2670 if (__get_user(frame.return_address, &fp->return_address))
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2671 break;
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2672
70791ce9ba68a5 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Frederic Weisbecker 2010-06-29 2673 perf_callchain_store(entry, frame.return_address);
75925e1ad7f5a4 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Andi Kleen 2015-10-22 2674 fp = (void __user *)frame.next_frame;
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2675 }
75925e1ad7f5a4 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c Andi Kleen 2015-10-22 2676 pagefault_enable();
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2677 }
d7d59fb3238336 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_counter.c Peter Zijlstra 2009-03-30 2678
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
[-- Attachment #2: config.gz --]
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2020-10-23 8:16 [PATCH v4] x86: add failure injection to get/put/clear_user Alexander Potapenko
2020-10-23 8:19 ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-10-23 11:01 ` kernel test robot
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