From: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>, Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
"Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
luto@kernel.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, david@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/13] mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:11:28 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220412131128.GE8013@chaop.bj.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220411151023.4nx34pxyg5amj44m@box.shutemov.name>
On Mon, Apr 11, 2022 at 06:10:23PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 10:08:59PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote:
> > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> >
> > Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the
> > created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU
> > access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be
> > accessed via a different mechanism (e.g. KVM MMU) indirectly.
> >
> > It provides semantics required for KVM guest private memory support
> > that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as the
> > source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such
> > as Intel TDX/AMD SEV but may not be accessible from host userspace.
> >
> > Since page migration/swapping is not yet supported for such usages
> > so these pages are currently marked as UNMOVABLE and UNEVICTABLE
> > which makes them behave like long-term pinned pages.
> >
> > The flag can not coexist with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, future sealing is
> > also impossible for a memfd created with this flag.
> >
> > At this time only shmem implements this flag.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 7 +++++
> > include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 +
> > mm/memfd.c | 26 +++++++++++++++--
> > mm/shmem.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
> > index e65b80ed09e7..2dde843f28ef 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
> > @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
> >
> > /* inode in-kernel data */
> >
> > +/* shmem extended flags */
> > +#define SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE 0x0001 /* prevent ordinary MMU access (e.g. read/write/mmap) to file content */
> > +
> > struct shmem_inode_info {
> > spinlock_t lock;
> > unsigned int seals; /* shmem seals */
> > @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ struct shmem_inode_info {
> > struct shared_policy policy; /* NUMA memory alloc policy */
> > struct simple_xattrs xattrs; /* list of xattrs */
> > atomic_t stop_eviction; /* hold when working on inode */
> > + unsigned int xflags; /* shmem extended flags */
> > struct inode vfs_inode;
> > };
> >
>
> AFAICS, only two bits of 'flags' are used. And that's very strange that
> VM_ flags are used for the purpose. My guess that someone was lazy to
> introduce new constants for this.
>
> I think we should fix this: introduce SHM_F_LOCKED and SHM_F_NORESERVE
> alongside with SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE and stuff them all into info->flags.
> It also makes shmem_file_setup_xflags() go away.
Did a quick search and sounds we only use SHM_F_LOCKED/SHM_F_NORESERVE and
that definitely don't have to be VM_ flags.
Chao
>
> --
> Kirill A. Shutemov
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
jun.nakajima@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, david@redhat.com,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, "J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
ak@linux.intel.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
luto@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
dave.hansen@intel.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/13] mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:11:28 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220412131128.GE8013@chaop.bj.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220411151023.4nx34pxyg5amj44m@box.shutemov.name>
On Mon, Apr 11, 2022 at 06:10:23PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 10:08:59PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote:
> > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> >
> > Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the
> > created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU
> > access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be
> > accessed via a different mechanism (e.g. KVM MMU) indirectly.
> >
> > It provides semantics required for KVM guest private memory support
> > that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as the
> > source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such
> > as Intel TDX/AMD SEV but may not be accessible from host userspace.
> >
> > Since page migration/swapping is not yet supported for such usages
> > so these pages are currently marked as UNMOVABLE and UNEVICTABLE
> > which makes them behave like long-term pinned pages.
> >
> > The flag can not coexist with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, future sealing is
> > also impossible for a memfd created with this flag.
> >
> > At this time only shmem implements this flag.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/shmem_fs.h | 7 +++++
> > include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 +
> > mm/memfd.c | 26 +++++++++++++++--
> > mm/shmem.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
> > index e65b80ed09e7..2dde843f28ef 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
> > @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
> >
> > /* inode in-kernel data */
> >
> > +/* shmem extended flags */
> > +#define SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE 0x0001 /* prevent ordinary MMU access (e.g. read/write/mmap) to file content */
> > +
> > struct shmem_inode_info {
> > spinlock_t lock;
> > unsigned int seals; /* shmem seals */
> > @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ struct shmem_inode_info {
> > struct shared_policy policy; /* NUMA memory alloc policy */
> > struct simple_xattrs xattrs; /* list of xattrs */
> > atomic_t stop_eviction; /* hold when working on inode */
> > + unsigned int xflags; /* shmem extended flags */
> > struct inode vfs_inode;
> > };
> >
>
> AFAICS, only two bits of 'flags' are used. And that's very strange that
> VM_ flags are used for the purpose. My guess that someone was lazy to
> introduce new constants for this.
>
> I think we should fix this: introduce SHM_F_LOCKED and SHM_F_NORESERVE
> alongside with SHM_F_INACCESSIBLE and stuff them all into info->flags.
> It also makes shmem_file_setup_xflags() go away.
Did a quick search and sounds we only use SHM_F_LOCKED/SHM_F_NORESERVE and
that definitely don't have to be VM_ flags.
Chao
>
> --
> Kirill A. Shutemov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-12 13:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 183+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-10 14:08 [PATCH v5 00/13] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:08 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:08 ` [PATCH v5 01/13] mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:08 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-11 15:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-11 15:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-12 13:11 ` Chao Peng [this message]
2022-04-12 13:11 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-23 5:43 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-04-24 8:15 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-24 8:15 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 02/13] mm: Introduce memfile_notifier Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-29 18:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08 12:54 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-08 12:54 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-12 14:36 ` Hillf Danton
2022-04-13 6:47 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 03/13] mm/shmem: Support memfile_notifier Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 23:08 ` Dave Chinner
2022-03-10 23:08 ` Dave Chinner
2022-03-11 8:42 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-11 8:42 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-11 15:26 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-11 15:26 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-12 13:12 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-12 13:12 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-19 22:40 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-04-20 3:24 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-20 3:24 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 04/13] mm/shmem: Restrict MFD_INACCESSIBLE memory against RLIMIT_MEMLOCK Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-07 16:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-07 17:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-07 17:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-08 17:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08 18:54 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-04-08 18:54 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-04-12 14:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-04-12 14:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-04-12 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-12 21:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-13 16:30 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-04-13 16:30 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-04-13 16:24 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-04-13 16:24 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-04-13 17:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-04-13 17:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-04-25 14:07 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-04-25 14:07 ` David Hildenbrand
2022-04-08 13:02 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-08 13:02 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-11 15:34 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-11 15:34 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-12 5:14 ` Hugh Dickins
2022-04-11 15:32 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-11 15:32 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-12 13:39 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-12 13:39 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-12 19:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-12 19:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-13 9:15 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-13 9:15 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 05/13] KVM: Extend the memslot to support fd-based private memory Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-28 21:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08 13:21 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-08 13:21 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-28 21:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08 13:46 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-08 13:46 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-08 17:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 06/13] KVM: Use kvm_userspace_memory_region_ext Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-28 22:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08 13:58 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-08 13:58 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 07/13] KVM: Add KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_ERROR exit Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-28 22:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08 13:59 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-08 13:59 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 08/13] KVM: Use memfile_pfn_ops to obtain pfn for private pages Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-28 23:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08 14:07 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-08 14:07 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-28 12:37 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-28 12:37 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 09/13] KVM: Handle page fault for private memory Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-29 1:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-12 12:10 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-12 12:10 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 10/13] KVM: Register private memslot to memory backing store Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-29 19:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-12 12:40 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-12 12:40 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 11/13] KVM: Zap existing KVM mappings when pages changed in the private fd Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-29 19:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-12 12:43 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-12 12:43 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-05 23:45 ` Michael Roth
2022-04-08 3:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-19 22:43 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-04-20 3:17 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-20 3:17 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 12/13] KVM: Expose KVM_MEM_PRIVATE Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-29 19:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-12 12:56 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-12 12:56 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH v5 13/13] memfd_create.2: Describe MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag Chao Peng
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Chao Peng
2022-03-24 15:51 ` [PATCH v5 00/13] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory Quentin Perret
2022-03-28 17:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-03-28 18:00 ` Quentin Perret
2022-03-28 18:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-03-29 17:01 ` Quentin Perret
2022-03-30 8:58 ` Steven Price
2022-03-30 8:58 ` Steven Price
2022-03-30 10:39 ` Quentin Perret
2022-03-30 17:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-03-31 16:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-31 16:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-01 14:59 ` Quentin Perret
2022-04-01 17:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-01 18:03 ` Quentin Perret
2022-04-01 18:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-01 19:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-01 19:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-04 15:01 ` Quentin Perret
2022-04-04 17:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-04 22:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-04 22:04 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-05 10:36 ` Quentin Perret
2022-04-05 17:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-05 17:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-05 18:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-06 18:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-06 18:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-06 13:05 ` Quentin Perret
2022-04-05 18:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-06 10:34 ` Quentin Perret
2022-04-22 10:56 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-22 10:56 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-22 11:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-04-22 11:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-04-24 8:07 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-24 8:07 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-24 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-24 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-25 13:40 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-25 13:40 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-25 14:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-25 14:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-04-25 20:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-06-10 19:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-06-10 19:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-28 12:29 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-28 12:29 ` Chao Peng
2022-05-03 11:12 ` Quentin Perret
2022-05-09 22:30 ` Michael Roth
2022-05-09 23:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-21 20:05 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-21 21:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-07-21 21:36 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-07-23 3:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-07-25 9:19 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-03-30 16:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-03-28 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-28 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-28 22:48 ` Nakajima, Jun
2022-03-28 22:48 ` Nakajima, Jun
2022-03-29 0:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-04-08 21:35 ` Vishal Annapurve
2022-04-12 13:00 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-12 13:00 ` Chao Peng
2022-04-12 19:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-04-12 19:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
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