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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwi@linutronix.de>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>,
	WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>,
	loongarch@lists.linux.dev,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>,
	Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	"James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Subject: [patch 13/17] init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init()
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:41 +0200 (CEST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230613224545.670360645@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20230613223827.532680283@linutronix.de

Invoke the X86ism mem_encrypt_init() from X86 arch_cpu_finalize_init() and
remove the weak fallback from the core code.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    7 ++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |   11 +++++++++++
 init/main.c                        |   13 -------------
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_m
 
 void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
 
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
+
 #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
 
 #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
@@ -83,13 +85,12 @@ early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned
 
 static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
 
+static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
+
 #define __bss_decrypted
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
-/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
-void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
-
 void add_encrypt_protection_map(void);
 
 /*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <linux/kgdb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
@@ -2417,4 +2418,14 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
 	} else {
 		fpu__init_check_bugs();
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
+	 * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
+	 * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
+	 * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
+	 * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
+	 * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
+	 */
+	mem_encrypt_init();
 }
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -95,7 +95,6 @@
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <linux/rodata_test.h>
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <linux/kcsan.h>
 #include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
@@ -786,8 +785,6 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_in
 }
 #endif
 
-void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
-
 void __init __weak poking_init(void) { }
 
 void __init __weak pgtable_cache_init(void) { }
@@ -1043,16 +1040,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sa
 
 	arch_cpu_finalize_init();
 
-	/*
-	 * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
-	 * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
-	 * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
-	 * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
-	 * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
-	 * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
-	 */
-	mem_encrypt_init();
-
 	pid_idr_init();
 	anon_vma_init();
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwi@linutronix.de>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>,
	WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>,
	loongarch@lists.linux.dev,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>,
	Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	"James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Subject: [patch 13/17] init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init()
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:41 +0200 (CEST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230613224545.670360645@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20230613223827.532680283@linutronix.de

Invoke the X86ism mem_encrypt_init() from X86 arch_cpu_finalize_init() and
remove the weak fallback from the core code.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    7 ++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |   11 +++++++++++
 init/main.c                        |   13 -------------
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_m
 
 void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
 
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
+
 #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
 
 #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
@@ -83,13 +85,12 @@ early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned
 
 static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
 
+static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
+
 #define __bss_decrypted
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
-/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
-void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
-
 void add_encrypt_protection_map(void);
 
 /*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <linux/kgdb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
@@ -2417,4 +2418,14 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
 	} else {
 		fpu__init_check_bugs();
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
+	 * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
+	 * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
+	 * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
+	 * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
+	 * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
+	 */
+	mem_encrypt_init();
 }
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -95,7 +95,6 @@
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <linux/rodata_test.h>
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <linux/kcsan.h>
 #include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
@@ -786,8 +785,6 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_in
 }
 #endif
 
-void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
-
 void __init __weak poking_init(void) { }
 
 void __init __weak pgtable_cache_init(void) { }
@@ -1043,16 +1040,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sa
 
 	arch_cpu_finalize_init();
 
-	/*
-	 * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
-	 * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
-	 * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
-	 * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
-	 * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
-	 * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
-	 */
-	mem_encrypt_init();
-
 	pid_idr_init();
 	anon_vma_init();
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86


_______________________________________________
linux-um mailing list
linux-um@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-um

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwi@linutronix.de>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>,
	WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>,
	loongarch@lists.linux.dev,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>,
	Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	"James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Subject: [patch 13/17] init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init()
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:41 +0200 (CEST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230613224545.670360645@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20230613223827.532680283@linutronix.de

Invoke the X86ism mem_encrypt_init() from X86 arch_cpu_finalize_init() and
remove the weak fallback from the core code.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    7 ++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |   11 +++++++++++
 init/main.c                        |   13 -------------
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_m
 
 void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
 
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
+
 #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
 
 #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
@@ -83,13 +85,12 @@ early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned
 
 static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
 
+static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
+
 #define __bss_decrypted
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
-/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
-void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
-
 void add_encrypt_protection_map(void);
 
 /*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <linux/kgdb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
@@ -2417,4 +2418,14 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
 	} else {
 		fpu__init_check_bugs();
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
+	 * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
+	 * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
+	 * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
+	 * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
+	 * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
+	 */
+	mem_encrypt_init();
 }
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -95,7 +95,6 @@
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <linux/rodata_test.h>
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 #include <linux/kcsan.h>
 #include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
@@ -786,8 +785,6 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_in
 }
 #endif
 
-void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
-
 void __init __weak poking_init(void) { }
 
 void __init __weak pgtable_cache_init(void) { }
@@ -1043,16 +1040,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sa
 
 	arch_cpu_finalize_init();
 
-	/*
-	 * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
-	 * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
-	 * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
-	 * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
-	 * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
-	 * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
-	 */
-	mem_encrypt_init();
-
 	pid_idr_init();
 	anon_vma_init();
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-06-13 23:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 152+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-13 23:39 [patch 00/17] init, treewide, x86: Cleanup check_bugs() and start sanitizing the x86 boot process Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 01/17] init: Provide arch_cpu_finalize_init() Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14  9:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-14  9:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-14  9:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 02/17] x86/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14  9:53   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14  9:53     ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14  9:53     ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14 10:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-14 10:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-14 10:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 03/17] ARM: cpu: " Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-25 21:27   ` [patch 03/17] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:27     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:27     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 04/17] ia64/cpu: " Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-25 21:24   ` [patch 04/17] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:24     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:24     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 05/17] loongarch/cpu: " Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-25 21:24   ` [patch 05/17] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:24     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:24     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 06/17] m68k/cpu: " Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14  9:22   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2023-06-14  9:22     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2023-06-14  9:22     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 07/17] mips/cpu: " Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-25 21:25   ` [patch 07/17] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:25     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:25     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 08/17] sh/cpu: " Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-25 21:29   ` [patch 08/17] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:29     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:29     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:45   ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2023-06-25 21:45     ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2023-06-25 21:45     ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 09/17] sparc/cpu: " Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14 20:41   ` Sam Ravnborg
2023-06-14 20:41     ` Sam Ravnborg
2023-06-14 20:41     ` Sam Ravnborg
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-25 21:30   ` [patch 09/17] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:30     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:30     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 10/17] um/cpu: " Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14  6:51   ` Richard Weinberger
2023-06-14  6:51     ` Richard Weinberger
2023-06-14  6:51     ` Richard Weinberger
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-25 21:28   ` [patch 10/17] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:28     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:28     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 11/17] init: Remove check_bugs() leftovers Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14  6:14   ` Richard Henderson
2023-06-14  6:14     ` Richard Henderson
2023-06-14  6:14     ` Richard Henderson
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-25 21:31   ` [patch 11/17] " Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:31     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-25 21:31     ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 12/17] init: Invoke arch_cpu_finalize_init() earlier Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-15 21:44   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-06-15 21:44     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-06-15 21:44     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-06-15 22:03     ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-15 22:03       ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-15 22:03       ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2023-06-13 23:39   ` [patch 13/17] init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init() Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-21 17:12   ` [patch 13/17] " Tom Lendacky
2023-06-21 17:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-21 17:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 14/17] x86/init: Initialize signal frame size late Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 15/17] x86/fpu: Remove cpuinfo argument from init functions Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 16/17] x86/fpu: Mark init functions __init Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39 ` [patch 17/17] x86/fpu: Move FPU initialization into arch_cpu_finalize_init() Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-13 23:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14  5:03   ` Chang S. Bae
2023-06-14  5:03     ` Chang S. Bae
2023-06-14  5:03     ` Chang S. Bae
2023-06-14  9:52     ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14  9:52       ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-14  9:52       ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-06-16  9:24   ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2023-09-01 17:30   ` [patch 17/17] " Guenter Roeck
2023-09-01 17:30     ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-01 17:30     ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-01 18:00     ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-09-01 18:00       ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-09-01 18:00       ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-09-01 18:21       ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-01 18:21         ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-01 18:21         ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-01 18:02     ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-09-01 18:02       ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-09-01 18:02       ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-09-01 21:09       ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-01 21:09         ` Guenter Roeck
2023-09-01 21:09         ` Guenter Roeck
2023-06-28  3:38 ` [patch 00/17] init, treewide, x86: Cleanup check_bugs() and start sanitizing the x86 boot process Jan Engelhardt
2023-06-28  3:38   ` Jan Engelhardt
2023-06-28  3:38   ` Jan Engelhardt

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