From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Cc: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
palmer@dabbelt.com, Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
andy.chiu@sifive.com, greentime.hu@sifive.com, guoren@kernel.org,
bjorn@rivosinc.com, heiko@sntech.de, ardb@kernel.org,
phoebe.chen@sifive.com, hongrong.hsu@sifive.com,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/12] RISC-V: crypto: add Zvkb accelerated ChaCha20 implementation
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 15:37:43 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231121233743.GD2172@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231121-knelt-resource-5d71c9246015@wendy>
On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 01:14:47PM +0000, Conor Dooley wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 06:55:07PM +0800, Jerry Shih wrote:
> > On Nov 21, 2023, at 03:18, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > First, I can see your updated patchset at branch
> > > "dev/jerrys/vector-crypto-upstream-v2" of https://github.com/JerryShih/linux,
> > > but I haven't seen it on the mailing list yet. Are you planning to send it out?
> >
> > I will send it out soon.
> >
> > > Second, with your updated patchset, I'm not seeing any of the RISC-V optimized
> > > algorithms be registered when I boot the kernel in QEMU. This is caused by the
> > > new check 'riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, ZICCLSM)' not passing. Is
> > > checking for "Zicclsm" the correct way to determine whether unaligned memory
> > > accesses are supported?
> > >
> > > I'm using 'qemu-system-riscv64 -cpu max -machine virt', with the very latest
> > > QEMU commit (af9264da80073435), so it should have all the CPU features.
> > >
> > > - Eric
> >
> > Sorry, I just use my `internal` qemu with vector-crypto and rva22 patches.
> >
> > The public qemu haven't supported rva22 profiles. Here is the qemu patch[1] for
> > that. But here is the discussion why the qemu doesn't export these
> > `named extensions`(e.g. Zicclsm).
> > I try to add Zicclsm in DT in the v2 patch set. Maybe we will have more discussion
> > about the rva22 profiles in kernel DT.
>
> Please do, that'll be fun! Please take some time to read what the
> profiles spec actually defines Zicclsm fore before you send those patches
> though. I think you might come to find you have misunderstood what it
> means - certainly I did the first time I saw it!
>
> > [1]
> > LINK: https://lore.kernel.org/all/d1d6f2dc-55b2-4dce-a48a-4afbbf6df526@ventanamicro.com/#t
> >
> > I don't know whether it's a good practice to check unaligned access using
> > `Zicclsm`.
> >
> > Here is another related cpu feature for unaligned access:
> > RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_*
> > But it looks like it always be initialized with `RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_SLOW`[2].
> > It implies that linux kernel always supports unaligned access. But we have the
> > actual HW which doesn't support unaligned access for vector unit.
>
> https://docs.kernel.org/arch/riscv/uabi.html#misaligned-accesses
>
> Misaligned accesses are part of the user ABI & the hwprobe stuff for
> that allows userspace to figure out whether they're fast (likely
> implemented in hardware), slow (likely emulated in firmware) or emulated
> in the kernel.
>
> Cheers,
> Conor.
>
> >
> > [2]
> > LINK: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/98b1cc82c4affc16f5598d4fa14b1858671b2263/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c#L575
> >
> > I will still use `Zicclsm` checking in this stage for reviewing. And I will create qemu
> > branch with Zicclsm enabled feature for testing.
> >
According to https://github.com/riscv/riscv-profiles/blob/main/profiles.adoc,
Zicclsm means that "main memory supports misaligned loads/stores", but they
"might execute extremely slowly."
In general, the vector crypto routines that Jerry is adding assume that
misaligned vector loads/stores are supported *and* are fast. I think the kernel
mustn't register those algorithms if that isn't the case. Zicclsm sounds like
the wrong thing to check. Maybe RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_FAST is the right
thing to check?
BTW, something else I was wondering about is endianness. Most of the vector
crypto routines also assume little endian byte order, but I don't see that being
explicitly checked for anywhere. Should it be?
- Eric
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Cc: Jerry Shih <jerry.shih@sifive.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
palmer@dabbelt.com, Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
andy.chiu@sifive.com, greentime.hu@sifive.com, guoren@kernel.org,
bjorn@rivosinc.com, heiko@sntech.de, ardb@kernel.org,
phoebe.chen@sifive.com, hongrong.hsu@sifive.com,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/12] RISC-V: crypto: add Zvkb accelerated ChaCha20 implementation
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 15:37:43 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231121233743.GD2172@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231121-knelt-resource-5d71c9246015@wendy>
On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 01:14:47PM +0000, Conor Dooley wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 06:55:07PM +0800, Jerry Shih wrote:
> > On Nov 21, 2023, at 03:18, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > First, I can see your updated patchset at branch
> > > "dev/jerrys/vector-crypto-upstream-v2" of https://github.com/JerryShih/linux,
> > > but I haven't seen it on the mailing list yet. Are you planning to send it out?
> >
> > I will send it out soon.
> >
> > > Second, with your updated patchset, I'm not seeing any of the RISC-V optimized
> > > algorithms be registered when I boot the kernel in QEMU. This is caused by the
> > > new check 'riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, ZICCLSM)' not passing. Is
> > > checking for "Zicclsm" the correct way to determine whether unaligned memory
> > > accesses are supported?
> > >
> > > I'm using 'qemu-system-riscv64 -cpu max -machine virt', with the very latest
> > > QEMU commit (af9264da80073435), so it should have all the CPU features.
> > >
> > > - Eric
> >
> > Sorry, I just use my `internal` qemu with vector-crypto and rva22 patches.
> >
> > The public qemu haven't supported rva22 profiles. Here is the qemu patch[1] for
> > that. But here is the discussion why the qemu doesn't export these
> > `named extensions`(e.g. Zicclsm).
> > I try to add Zicclsm in DT in the v2 patch set. Maybe we will have more discussion
> > about the rva22 profiles in kernel DT.
>
> Please do, that'll be fun! Please take some time to read what the
> profiles spec actually defines Zicclsm fore before you send those patches
> though. I think you might come to find you have misunderstood what it
> means - certainly I did the first time I saw it!
>
> > [1]
> > LINK: https://lore.kernel.org/all/d1d6f2dc-55b2-4dce-a48a-4afbbf6df526@ventanamicro.com/#t
> >
> > I don't know whether it's a good practice to check unaligned access using
> > `Zicclsm`.
> >
> > Here is another related cpu feature for unaligned access:
> > RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_*
> > But it looks like it always be initialized with `RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_SLOW`[2].
> > It implies that linux kernel always supports unaligned access. But we have the
> > actual HW which doesn't support unaligned access for vector unit.
>
> https://docs.kernel.org/arch/riscv/uabi.html#misaligned-accesses
>
> Misaligned accesses are part of the user ABI & the hwprobe stuff for
> that allows userspace to figure out whether they're fast (likely
> implemented in hardware), slow (likely emulated in firmware) or emulated
> in the kernel.
>
> Cheers,
> Conor.
>
> >
> > [2]
> > LINK: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/98b1cc82c4affc16f5598d4fa14b1858671b2263/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c#L575
> >
> > I will still use `Zicclsm` checking in this stage for reviewing. And I will create qemu
> > branch with Zicclsm enabled feature for testing.
> >
According to https://github.com/riscv/riscv-profiles/blob/main/profiles.adoc,
Zicclsm means that "main memory supports misaligned loads/stores", but they
"might execute extremely slowly."
In general, the vector crypto routines that Jerry is adding assume that
misaligned vector loads/stores are supported *and* are fast. I think the kernel
mustn't register those algorithms if that isn't the case. Zicclsm sounds like
the wrong thing to check. Maybe RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_FAST is the right
thing to check?
BTW, something else I was wondering about is endianness. Most of the vector
crypto routines also assume little endian byte order, but I don't see that being
explicitly checked for anywhere. Should it be?
- Eric
_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-21 23:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-25 18:36 [PATCH 00/12] RISC-V: provide some accelerated cryptography implementations using vector extensions Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 01/12] RISC-V: add helper function to read the vector VLEN Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 02/12] RISC-V: hook new crypto subdir into build-system Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 03/12] RISC-V: crypto: add OpenSSL perl module for vector instructions Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 04/12] RISC-V: crypto: add Zvkned accelerated AES implementation Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-02 4:51 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-02 4:51 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-20 2:53 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-20 2:53 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 05/12] crypto: scatterwalk - Add scatterwalk_next() to get the next scatterlist in scatter_walk Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 06/12] RISC-V: crypto: add accelerated AES-CBC/CTR/ECB/XTS implementations Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-02 5:16 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-02 5:16 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-07 8:53 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-07 8:53 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-09 7:16 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-09 7:16 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-10 3:58 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-10 3:58 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-10 4:34 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-10 4:34 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-10 4:58 ` Andy Chiu
2023-11-10 4:58 ` Andy Chiu
2023-11-10 5:44 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-10 5:44 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-11 11:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-11-11 11:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-11-11 17:52 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-11 17:52 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-20 2:47 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-20 2:47 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-20 19:28 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-20 19:28 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-22 1:14 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-22 1:14 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-27 2:52 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-27 2:52 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-09 8:05 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-09 8:05 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-10 4:06 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-10 4:06 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-20 2:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-20 2:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 07/12] RISC-V: crypto: add Zvkg accelerated GCM GHASH implementation Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-22 1:42 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-22 1:42 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-27 2:49 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-27 2:49 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 08/12] RISC-V: crypto: add Zvknha/b accelerated SHA224/256 implementations Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 09/12] RISC-V: crypto: add Zvknhb accelerated SHA384/512 implementations Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-22 1:32 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-22 1:32 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-27 2:50 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-27 2:50 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 10/12] RISC-V: crypto: add Zvksed accelerated SM4 implementation Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-02 5:58 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-02 5:58 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-20 2:55 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-20 2:55 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 11/12] RISC-V: crypto: add Zvksh accelerated SM3 implementation Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` [PATCH 12/12] RISC-V: crypto: add Zvkb accelerated ChaCha20 implementation Jerry Shih
2023-10-25 18:36 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-02 5:43 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-02 5:43 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-20 2:55 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-20 2:55 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-20 19:18 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-20 19:18 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-21 10:55 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-21 10:55 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-21 13:14 ` Conor Dooley
2023-11-21 13:14 ` Conor Dooley
2023-11-21 23:37 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2023-11-21 23:37 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-22 0:39 ` Conor Dooley
2023-11-22 0:39 ` Conor Dooley
2023-11-22 17:37 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-22 17:37 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-22 18:05 ` Palmer Dabbelt
2023-11-22 18:05 ` Palmer Dabbelt
2023-11-22 18:20 ` Conor Dooley
2023-11-22 18:20 ` Conor Dooley
2023-11-22 19:05 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-22 19:05 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-22 1:29 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-22 1:29 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-27 2:14 ` Jerry Shih
2023-11-27 2:14 ` Jerry Shih
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20231121233743.GD2172@sol.localdomain \
--to=ebiggers@kernel.org \
--cc=andy.chiu@sifive.com \
--cc=aou@eecs.berkeley.edu \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=bjorn@rivosinc.com \
--cc=conor.dooley@microchip.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=greentime.hu@sifive.com \
--cc=guoren@kernel.org \
--cc=heiko@sntech.de \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=hongrong.hsu@sifive.com \
--cc=jerry.shih@sifive.com \
--cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=palmer@dabbelt.com \
--cc=paul.walmsley@sifive.com \
--cc=phoebe.chen@sifive.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.