From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 02/34] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 14:08:25 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240912190857.235849-3-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240912190857.235849-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds to create consistent
vulnerability handling. These AUTO mitigations will be turned into the
appropriate default mitigations in the <vuln>_select_mitigation()
functions. In a later patch, these will be used with the new attack
vector controls to help select appropriate mitigations.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 399f7d1c4c61..187805f7db3f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -739,6 +739,7 @@ extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;
enum mds_mitigations {
MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ee89e6676107..1cf5a8edec53 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_FULL : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
enum taa_mitigations {
TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO,
TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
@@ -252,27 +253,29 @@ enum taa_mitigations {
/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
enum mmio_mitigations {
MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_AUTO,
MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
};
/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_AUTO : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
enum rfds_mitigations {
RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
};
/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
{
@@ -281,6 +284,9 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
return;
}
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
@@ -1965,6 +1971,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
update_mds_branch_idle();
break;
case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO:
break;
}
@@ -1976,6 +1983,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
break;
case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ case TAA_MITIGATION_AUTO:
break;
}
@@ -1986,6 +1994,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
break;
case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_AUTO:
break;
}
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-12 19:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-12 19:08 [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/34] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-10-24 13:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/34] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/34] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/34] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-10-08 8:40 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/34] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/34] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 8:32 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:28 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/34] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 12:41 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:25 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 14/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 15/34] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 15:21 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 16/34] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-15 9:28 ` kernel test robot
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 17/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 18/34] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-10-01 0:43 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:53 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:21 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 19/34] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 20/34] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 21/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-10-01 0:50 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:58 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:37 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 14:28 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 20:11 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 20:26 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 15:50 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-10-02 19:40 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 22/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 23/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 24/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 25/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 26/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:37 ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 19:57 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 20:16 ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 21:15 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 0:39 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:46 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:18 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-13 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 28/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 29/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 30/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 31/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 32/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 33/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 34/34] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2024-09-17 17:04 ` [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2024-09-18 6:29 ` Kaplan, David
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