From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 03/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 14:08:26 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240912190857.235849-4-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240912190857.235849-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Restructure mds mitigation selection to use select/update/apply
functions to create consistent vulnerability handling.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1cf5a8edec53..0bdd4e5b8fc1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -34,6 +34,25 @@
#include "cpu.h"
+/*
+ * Speculation Vulnerability Handling
+ *
+ * Each vulnerability is handled with the following functions:
+ * <vuln>_select_mitigation() -- Selects a mitigation to use. This should
+ * take into account all relevant command line
+ * options.
+ * <vuln>_update_mitigation() -- This is called after all vulnerabilities have
+ * selected a mitigation, in case the selection
+ * may want to change based on other choices
+ * made. This function is optional.
+ * <vuln>_apply_mitigation() -- Enable the selected mitigation.
+ *
+ * The compile-time mitigation in all cases should be AUTO. An explicit
+ * command-line option can override AUTO. If no such option is
+ * provided, <vuln>_select_mitigation() will override AUTO to the best
+ * mitigation option.
+ */
+
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -41,6 +60,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -165,6 +186,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
+ mds_select_mitigation();
md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
@@ -175,6 +197,14 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
*/
srso_select_mitigation();
gds_select_mitigation();
+
+ /*
+ * After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
+ * choices.
+ */
+ mds_update_mitigation();
+
+ mds_apply_mitigation();
}
/*
@@ -229,9 +259,6 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
}
-#undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MDS: " fmt
-
/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
@@ -290,9 +317,31 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ return;
+
+ /* If TAA, MMIO, or RFDS are being mitigated, MDS gets mitigated too. */
+ if (taa_mitigation != TAA_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ mmio_mitigation != MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ rfds_mitigation != RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ else
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+ }
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+ pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+}
+static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
(mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -592,7 +641,6 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
{
- mds_select_mitigation();
taa_select_mitigation();
mmio_select_mitigation();
rfds_select_mitigation();
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-12 19:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-12 19:08 [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/34] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-10-24 13:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/34] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/34] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/34] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/34] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-10-08 8:40 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/34] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/34] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 8:32 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:28 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/34] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 12:41 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:25 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 14/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 15/34] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 15:21 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 16/34] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-15 9:28 ` kernel test robot
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 17/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 18/34] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-10-01 0:43 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:53 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:21 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 19/34] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 20/34] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 21/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-10-01 0:50 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:58 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:37 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 14:28 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 20:11 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 20:26 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 15:50 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-10-02 19:40 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 22/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 23/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 24/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 25/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 26/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:37 ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 19:57 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 20:16 ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 21:15 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 0:39 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:46 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:18 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-13 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 28/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 29/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 30/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 31/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 32/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 33/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 34/34] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2024-09-17 17:04 ` [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2024-09-18 6:29 ` Kaplan, David
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