From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev, oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 16/34] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation
Date: Sun, 15 Sep 2024 17:28:45 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202409151724.plotIQDU-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240912190857.235849-17-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Hi David,
[This is a private test report for your RFC patch.]
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on tip/master]
[also build test WARNING on next-20240913]
[cannot apply to tip/x86/core tip/smp/core tip/auto-latest linus/master v6.11-rc7]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/David-Kaplan/x86-bugs-Relocate-mds-taa-mmio-rfds-defines/20240913-031908
base: tip/master
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240912190857.235849-17-david.kaplan%40amd.com
patch subject: [RFC PATCH 16/34] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation
config: x86_64-rhel-8.3-rust (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240915/202409151724.plotIQDU-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 18.1.8 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 3b5b5c1ec4a3095ab096dd780e84d7ab81f3d7ff)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240915/202409151724.plotIQDU-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202409151724.plotIQDU-lkp@intel.com/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:270:11: warning: enumeration value 'L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO' not handled in switch [-Wswitch]
270 | switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7626:11: warning: enumeration value 'L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO' not handled in switch [-Wswitch]
7626 | switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
2 warnings generated.
vim +/L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO +270 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 247
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 248 static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
a399477e52c17e arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-07-02 249 {
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 250 struct page *page;
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 251 unsigned int i;
a399477e52c17e arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-07-02 252
19a36d329f5b1e arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c Waiman Long 2019-08-26 253 if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
19a36d329f5b1e arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c Waiman Long 2019-08-26 254 l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
19a36d329f5b1e arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c Waiman Long 2019-08-26 255 return 0;
19a36d329f5b1e arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c Waiman Long 2019-08-26 256 }
19a36d329f5b1e arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c Waiman Long 2019-08-26 257
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 258 if (!enable_ept) {
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 259 l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED;
a399477e52c17e arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-07-02 260 return 0;
a399477e52c17e arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-07-02 261 }
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 262
7974c0643ee3b4 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c Sean Christopherson 2024-04-23 263 if (kvm_host.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
8e0b2b916662e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Paolo Bonzini 2018-08-05 264 l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
8e0b2b916662e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Paolo Bonzini 2018-08-05 265 return 0;
8e0b2b916662e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Paolo Bonzini 2018-08-05 266 }
8e0b2b916662e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Paolo Bonzini 2018-08-05 267
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 268 /* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 269 if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 @270 switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 271 case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 272 l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER;
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 273 break;
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 274 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 275 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 276 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 277 l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 278 break;
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 279 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 280 case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 281 l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 282 break;
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 283 }
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 284 } else if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE) {
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 285 l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 286 }
d90a7a0ec83fb8 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Jiri Kosina 2018-07-13 287
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 288 if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && !vmx_l1d_flush_pages &&
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 289 !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
4183683918efc3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c Ben Gardon 2019-02-11 290 /*
4183683918efc3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c Ben Gardon 2019-02-11 291 * This allocation for vmx_l1d_flush_pages is not tied to a VM
4183683918efc3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c Ben Gardon 2019-02-11 292 * lifetime and so should not be charged to a memcg.
4183683918efc3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c Ben Gardon 2019-02-11 293 */
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 294 page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 295 if (!page)
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 296 return -ENOMEM;
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 297 vmx_l1d_flush_pages = page_address(page);
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 298
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 299 /*
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 300 * Initialize each page with a different pattern in
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 301 * order to protect against KSM in the nested
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 302 * virtualization case.
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 303 */
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 304 for (i = 0; i < 1u << L1D_CACHE_ORDER; ++i) {
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 305 memset(vmx_l1d_flush_pages + i * PAGE_SIZE, i + 1,
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 306 PAGE_SIZE);
288d152c23dcf3 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-18 307 }
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 308 }
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 309
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 310 l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 311
895ae47f991883 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 312 if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 313 static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
895ae47f991883 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 314 else
895ae47f991883 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 315 static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
895ae47f991883 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 316
427362a142441f arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-21 317 if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
427362a142441f arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-21 318 static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
895ae47f991883 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 319 else
427362a142441f arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Nicolai Stange 2018-07-21 320 static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
7db92e165ac814 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Thomas Gleixner 2018-07-13 321 return 0;
a399477e52c17e arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-07-02 322 }
a399477e52c17e arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 2018-07-02 323
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-15 9:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-12 19:08 [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/34] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-10-24 13:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/34] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/34] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/34] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/34] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-10-08 8:40 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/34] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/34] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 8:32 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:28 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/34] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 12:41 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:25 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 14/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 15/34] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 15:21 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 16/34] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-15 9:28 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 17/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 18/34] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-10-01 0:43 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:53 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:21 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 19/34] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 20/34] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 21/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-10-01 0:50 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:58 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:37 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 14:28 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 20:11 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 20:26 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 15:50 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-10-02 19:40 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 22/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 23/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 24/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 25/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 26/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:37 ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 19:57 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 20:16 ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 21:15 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 0:39 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:46 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:18 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-13 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 28/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 29/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 30/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 31/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 32/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 33/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 34/34] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2024-09-17 17:04 ` [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2024-09-18 6:29 ` Kaplan, David
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=202409151724.plotIQDU-lkp@intel.com \
--to=lkp@intel.com \
--cc=david.kaplan@amd.com \
--cc=llvm@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.