* [PATCH v7 1/7] xen/events: fix race with set_global_virq_handler()
2025-01-09 10:59 [PATCH v7 0/7] remove libxenctrl usage from xenstored Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-09 10:59 ` Juergen Gross
2025-01-09 15:46 ` Jan Beulich
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 2/7] xen/events: don't allow binding a global virq from any domain Juergen Gross
` (5 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2025-01-09 10:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Andrew Cooper, Anthony PERARD, Michal Orzel,
Jan Beulich, Julien Grall, Roger Pau Monné,
Stefano Stabellini
There is a possible race scenario between set_global_virq_handler()
and clear_global_virq_handlers() targeting the same domain, which
might result in that domain ending as a zombie domain.
In case set_global_virq_handler() is being called for a domain which
is just dying, it might happen that clear_global_virq_handlers() is
running first, resulting in set_global_virq_handler() taking a new
reference for that domain and entering in the global_virq_handlers[]
array afterwards. The reference will never be dropped, thus the domain
will never be freed completely.
This can be fixed by checking the is_dying state of the domain inside
the region guarded by global_virq_handlers_lock. In case the domain is
dying, handle it as if the domain wouldn't exist, which will be the
case in near future anyway.
Fixes: 87521589aa6a ("xen: allow global VIRQ handlers to be delegated to other domains")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
V6:
- new patch
V7:
- add comment (Jan Beulich)
---
xen/common/event_channel.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/event_channel.c b/xen/common/event_channel.c
index 8db2ca4ba2..46281b16ce 100644
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
@@ -979,6 +979,7 @@ void send_global_virq(uint32_t virq)
int set_global_virq_handler(struct domain *d, uint32_t virq)
{
struct domain *old;
+ int rc = 0;
if (virq >= NR_VIRQS)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -992,14 +993,32 @@ int set_global_virq_handler(struct domain *d, uint32_t virq)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock(&global_virq_handlers_lock);
- old = global_virq_handlers[virq];
- global_virq_handlers[virq] = d;
+
+ /*
+ * Note that this check won't guarantee that a domain just going down can't
+ * be set as the handling domain of a virq, as the is_dying indicator might
+ * change just after testing it.
+ * This isn't going to be a major problem, as clear_global_virq_handlers()
+ * is guaranteed to run afterwards and it will reset the handling domain
+ * for the virq to the hardware domain.
+ */
+ if ( d->is_dying != DOMDYING_alive )
+ {
+ old = d;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ old = global_virq_handlers[virq];
+ global_virq_handlers[virq] = d;
+ }
+
spin_unlock(&global_virq_handlers_lock);
if (old != NULL)
put_domain(old);
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}
static void clear_global_virq_handlers(struct domain *d)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v7 1/7] xen/events: fix race with set_global_virq_handler()
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] xen/events: fix race with set_global_virq_handler() Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-09 15:46 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2025-01-09 15:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross
Cc: Andrew Cooper, Anthony PERARD, Michal Orzel, Julien Grall,
Roger Pau Monné, Stefano Stabellini, xen-devel
On 09.01.2025 11:59, Juergen Gross wrote:
> There is a possible race scenario between set_global_virq_handler()
> and clear_global_virq_handlers() targeting the same domain, which
> might result in that domain ending as a zombie domain.
>
> In case set_global_virq_handler() is being called for a domain which
> is just dying, it might happen that clear_global_virq_handlers() is
> running first, resulting in set_global_virq_handler() taking a new
> reference for that domain and entering in the global_virq_handlers[]
> array afterwards. The reference will never be dropped, thus the domain
> will never be freed completely.
>
> This can be fixed by checking the is_dying state of the domain inside
> the region guarded by global_virq_handlers_lock. In case the domain is
> dying, handle it as if the domain wouldn't exist, which will be the
> case in near future anyway.
>
> Fixes: 87521589aa6a ("xen: allow global VIRQ handlers to be delegated to other domains")
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 2/7] xen/events: don't allow binding a global virq from any domain
2025-01-09 10:59 [PATCH v7 0/7] remove libxenctrl usage from xenstored Juergen Gross
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] xen/events: fix race with set_global_virq_handler() Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-09 10:59 ` Juergen Gross
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 3/7] xen/events: allow setting of global virq handler only for unbound virqs Juergen Gross
` (4 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2025-01-09 10:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Andrew Cooper, Anthony PERARD, Michal Orzel,
Jan Beulich, Julien Grall, Roger Pau Monné,
Stefano Stabellini
Today Xen will happily allow binding a global virq by a domain which
isn't configured to receive it. This won't result in any bad actions,
but the bind will appear to have succeeded with no event ever being
received by that event channel.
Instead of allowing the bind, error out if the domain isn't set to
handle that virq. Note that this check is inside the write_lock() on
purpose, as a future patch will put a related check into
set_global_virq_handler() with the addition of using the same lock.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
V6:
- new patch
V7:
- move handling domain check inside locked region (Jan Beulich)
- style fix (Jan Beulich)
---
xen/common/event_channel.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/event_channel.c b/xen/common/event_channel.c
index 46281b16ce..cd6f5a1211 100644
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
@@ -120,6 +120,13 @@ static uint8_t get_xen_consumer(xen_event_channel_notification_t fn)
/* Get the notification function for a given Xen-bound event channel. */
#define xen_notification_fn(e) (xen_consumers[(e)->xen_consumer-1])
+static struct domain *__read_mostly global_virq_handlers[NR_VIRQS];
+
+static struct domain *get_global_virq_handler(unsigned int virq)
+{
+ return global_virq_handlers[virq] ?: hardware_domain;
+}
+
static bool virq_is_global(unsigned int virq)
{
switch ( virq )
@@ -469,6 +476,7 @@ int evtchn_bind_virq(evtchn_bind_virq_t *bind, evtchn_port_t port)
struct domain *d = current->domain;
int virq = bind->virq, vcpu = bind->vcpu;
int rc = 0;
+ bool is_global;
if ( (virq < 0) || (virq >= ARRAY_SIZE(v->virq_to_evtchn)) )
return -EINVAL;
@@ -478,8 +486,9 @@ int evtchn_bind_virq(evtchn_bind_virq_t *bind, evtchn_port_t port)
* speculative execution.
*/
virq = array_index_nospec(virq, ARRAY_SIZE(v->virq_to_evtchn));
+ is_global = virq_is_global(virq);
- if ( virq_is_global(virq) && (vcpu != 0) )
+ if ( is_global && vcpu != 0 )
return -EINVAL;
if ( (v = domain_vcpu(d, vcpu)) == NULL )
@@ -487,6 +496,12 @@ int evtchn_bind_virq(evtchn_bind_virq_t *bind, evtchn_port_t port)
write_lock(&d->event_lock);
+ if ( is_global && get_global_virq_handler(virq) != d )
+ {
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if ( read_atomic(&v->virq_to_evtchn[virq]) )
{
rc = -EEXIST;
@@ -965,15 +980,13 @@ void send_guest_pirq(struct domain *d, const struct pirq *pirq)
}
}
-static struct domain *global_virq_handlers[NR_VIRQS] __read_mostly;
-
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(global_virq_handlers_lock);
void send_global_virq(uint32_t virq)
{
ASSERT(virq_is_global(virq));
- send_guest_global_virq(global_virq_handlers[virq] ?: hardware_domain, virq);
+ send_guest_global_virq(get_global_virq_handler(virq), virq);
}
int set_global_virq_handler(struct domain *d, uint32_t virq)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 3/7] xen/events: allow setting of global virq handler only for unbound virqs
2025-01-09 10:59 [PATCH v7 0/7] remove libxenctrl usage from xenstored Juergen Gross
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 1/7] xen/events: fix race with set_global_virq_handler() Juergen Gross
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 2/7] xen/events: don't allow binding a global virq from any domain Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-09 10:59 ` Juergen Gross
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] xen: add bitmap to indicate per-domain state changes Juergen Gross
` (3 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2025-01-09 10:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Andrew Cooper, Anthony PERARD, Michal Orzel,
Jan Beulich, Julien Grall, Roger Pau Monné,
Stefano Stabellini
XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler will happily steal a global virq from the
current domain having bound it and assign it to another domain. The
former domain will just never receive any further events for that
virq without knowing what happened.
Change the behavior to allow XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler only if the
virq in question is not bound by the current domain allowed to use it.
Currently the only user of XEN_DOMCTL_set_virq_handler in the Xen code
base is init-xenstore-domain, so changing the behavior like above will
not cause any problems.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
V6:
- new patch
---
xen/common/event_channel.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/event_channel.c b/xen/common/event_channel.c
index cd6f5a1211..4dba59efa2 100644
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
@@ -991,7 +991,8 @@ void send_global_virq(uint32_t virq)
int set_global_virq_handler(struct domain *d, uint32_t virq)
{
- struct domain *old;
+ struct domain *old, *hdl;
+ const struct vcpu *v;
int rc = 0;
if (virq >= NR_VIRQS)
@@ -1023,7 +1024,22 @@ int set_global_virq_handler(struct domain *d, uint32_t virq)
else
{
old = global_virq_handlers[virq];
- global_virq_handlers[virq] = d;
+ hdl = get_global_virq_handler(virq);
+ if ( hdl != d )
+ {
+ read_lock(&hdl->event_lock);
+
+ v = hdl->vcpu[0];
+ if ( v && read_atomic(&v->virq_to_evtchn[virq]) )
+ {
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ old = d;
+ }
+ else
+ global_virq_handlers[virq] = d;
+
+ read_unlock(&hdl->event_lock);
+ }
}
spin_unlock(&global_virq_handlers_lock);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 4/7] xen: add bitmap to indicate per-domain state changes
2025-01-09 10:59 [PATCH v7 0/7] remove libxenctrl usage from xenstored Juergen Gross
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 3/7] xen/events: allow setting of global virq handler only for unbound virqs Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-09 10:59 ` Juergen Gross
2025-01-09 15:49 ` Jan Beulich
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] xen: add new domctl get_changed_domain Juergen Gross
` (2 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2025-01-09 10:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Andrew Cooper, Anthony PERARD, Michal Orzel,
Jan Beulich, Julien Grall, Roger Pau Monné,
Stefano Stabellini
Add a bitmap with one bit per possible domid indicating the respective
domain has changed its state (created, deleted, dying, crashed,
shutdown).
Registering the VIRQ_DOM_EXC event will result in setting the bits for
all existing domains and resetting all other bits.
As the usage of this bitmap is tightly coupled with the VIRQ_DOM_EXC
event, it is meant to be used only by a single consumer in the system,
just like the VIRQ_DOM_EXC event.
Resetting a bit will be done in a future patch.
This information is needed for Xenstore to keep track of all domains.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
V2:
- use DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED instead of DOMID_MASK + 1 (Jan Beulich)
- use const (Jan Beulich)
- move call of domain_reset_states() into evtchn_bind_virq() (Jan Beulich)
- dynamically allocate dom_state_changed bitmap (Jan Beulich)
V3:
- use xvzalloc_array() (Jan Beulich)
- don't rename existing label (Jan Beulich)
V4:
- add __read_mostly (Jan Beulich)
- use __set_bit() (Jan Beulich)
- fix error handling in evtchn_bind_virq() (Jan Beulich)
V5:
- domain_init_states() may be called only if evtchn_bind_virq() has been
called validly (Jan Beulich)
V6:
- guard dom_state_changed bitmap with d->event_lock (Jan Beulich)
V7:
- still use __set_bit() at one place (Jan Beulich)
- use rw_is_write_locked_by_me() (Jan Beulich)
---
xen/common/domain.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/common/event_channel.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/xen/event.h | 4 +++
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 3 +++
4 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index 0c4cc77111..1c1d6da885 100644
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <xen/irq.h>
#include <xen/argo.h>
#include <xen/llc-coloring.h>
+#include <xen/xvmalloc.h>
#include <asm/p2m.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <public/sched.h>
@@ -139,6 +140,51 @@ bool __read_mostly vmtrace_available;
bool __read_mostly vpmu_is_available;
+static unsigned long *__read_mostly dom_state_changed;
+
+int domain_init_states(void)
+{
+ const struct domain *d;
+
+ ASSERT(!dom_state_changed);
+ ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked_by_me(¤t->domain->event_lock));
+
+ dom_state_changed = xvzalloc_array(unsigned long,
+ BITS_TO_LONGS(DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED));
+ if ( !dom_state_changed )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rcu_read_lock(&domlist_read_lock);
+
+ for_each_domain ( d )
+ __set_bit(d->domain_id, dom_state_changed);
+
+ rcu_read_unlock(&domlist_read_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void domain_deinit_states(const struct domain *d)
+{
+ ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked_by_me(&d->event_lock));
+
+ XVFREE(dom_state_changed);
+}
+
+static void domain_changed_state(const struct domain *d)
+{
+ struct domain *hdl;
+
+ hdl = lock_dom_exc_handler();
+ if ( unlikely(!hdl) )
+ return;
+
+ if ( dom_state_changed )
+ set_bit(d->domain_id, dom_state_changed);
+
+ unlock_dom_exc_handler(hdl);
+}
+
static void __domain_finalise_shutdown(struct domain *d)
{
struct vcpu *v;
@@ -153,6 +199,7 @@ static void __domain_finalise_shutdown(struct domain *d)
return;
d->is_shut_down = 1;
+ domain_changed_state(d);
if ( (d->shutdown_code == SHUTDOWN_suspend) && d->suspend_evtchn )
evtchn_send(d, d->suspend_evtchn);
else
@@ -840,6 +887,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid,
*/
domlist_insert(d);
+ domain_changed_state(d);
memcpy(d->handle, config->handle, sizeof(d->handle));
return d;
@@ -1105,6 +1153,7 @@ int domain_kill(struct domain *d)
/* Mem event cleanup has to go here because the rings
* have to be put before we call put_domain. */
vm_event_cleanup(d);
+ domain_changed_state(d);
put_domain(d);
send_global_virq(VIRQ_DOM_EXC);
/* fallthrough */
@@ -1294,6 +1343,8 @@ static void cf_check complete_domain_destroy(struct rcu_head *head)
xfree(d->vcpu);
+ domain_changed_state(d);
+
_domain_destroy(d);
send_global_virq(VIRQ_DOM_EXC);
diff --git a/xen/common/event_channel.c b/xen/common/event_channel.c
index 4dba59efa2..4ee6b6b4ce 100644
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
@@ -509,10 +509,18 @@ int evtchn_bind_virq(evtchn_bind_virq_t *bind, evtchn_port_t port)
goto out;
}
+ if ( virq == VIRQ_DOM_EXC )
+ {
+ rc = domain_init_states();
+ if ( rc )
+ goto out;
+ }
+
port = rc = evtchn_get_port(d, port);
if ( rc < 0 )
{
gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "EVTCHNOP failure: error %d\n", rc);
+ domain_deinit_states(d);
goto out;
}
@@ -745,6 +753,9 @@ int evtchn_close(struct domain *d1, int port1, bool guest)
struct vcpu *v;
unsigned long flags;
+ if ( chn1->u.virq == VIRQ_DOM_EXC )
+ domain_deinit_states(d1);
+
v = d1->vcpu[virq_is_global(chn1->u.virq) ? 0 : chn1->notify_vcpu_id];
write_lock_irqsave(&v->virq_lock, flags);
@@ -1075,6 +1086,26 @@ static void clear_global_virq_handlers(struct domain *d)
}
}
+struct domain *lock_dom_exc_handler(void)
+{
+ struct domain *d;
+
+ d = get_global_virq_handler(VIRQ_DOM_EXC);
+ if ( unlikely(!get_domain(d)) )
+ return NULL;
+
+ read_lock(&d->event_lock);
+
+ return d;
+}
+
+void unlock_dom_exc_handler(struct domain *d)
+{
+ read_unlock(&d->event_lock);
+
+ put_domain(d);
+}
+
int evtchn_status(evtchn_status_t *status)
{
struct domain *d;
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/event.h b/xen/include/xen/event.h
index 48b79f3d62..5c0ba90c9f 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/event.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/event.h
@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ bool evtchn_virq_enabled(const struct vcpu *v, unsigned int virq);
/* Notify remote end of a Xen-attached event channel.*/
void notify_via_xen_event_channel(struct domain *ld, int lport);
+/* Lock/unlock of VIRQ_DOM_EXC associated data (read_lock(d->event_lock)). */
+struct domain *lock_dom_exc_handler(void);
+void unlock_dom_exc_handler(struct domain *d);
+
/*
* Internal event channel object storage.
*
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index 037c83fda2..9d9b89ec27 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -805,6 +805,9 @@ void domain_resume(struct domain *d);
int domain_soft_reset(struct domain *d, bool resuming);
+int domain_init_states(void);
+void domain_deinit_states(const struct domain *d);
+
int vcpu_start_shutdown_deferral(struct vcpu *v);
void vcpu_end_shutdown_deferral(struct vcpu *v);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v7 4/7] xen: add bitmap to indicate per-domain state changes
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] xen: add bitmap to indicate per-domain state changes Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-09 15:49 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2025-01-09 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross
Cc: Andrew Cooper, Anthony PERARD, Michal Orzel, Julien Grall,
Roger Pau Monné, Stefano Stabellini, xen-devel
On 09.01.2025 11:59, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Add a bitmap with one bit per possible domid indicating the respective
> domain has changed its state (created, deleted, dying, crashed,
> shutdown).
>
> Registering the VIRQ_DOM_EXC event will result in setting the bits for
> all existing domains and resetting all other bits.
>
> As the usage of this bitmap is tightly coupled with the VIRQ_DOM_EXC
> event, it is meant to be used only by a single consumer in the system,
> just like the VIRQ_DOM_EXC event.
>
> Resetting a bit will be done in a future patch.
>
> This information is needed for Xenstore to keep track of all domains.
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 5/7] xen: add new domctl get_changed_domain
2025-01-09 10:59 [PATCH v7 0/7] remove libxenctrl usage from xenstored Juergen Gross
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 4/7] xen: add bitmap to indicate per-domain state changes Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-09 10:59 ` Juergen Gross
2025-01-09 15:50 ` Jan Beulich
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] tools/libs: add a new libxenmanage library Juergen Gross
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] tools/xenstored: use new stable interface instead of libxenctrl Juergen Gross
6 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2025-01-09 10:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Juergen Gross, Daniel P. Smith, Anthony PERARD, Andrew Cooper,
Michal Orzel, Jan Beulich, Julien Grall, Roger Pau Monné,
Stefano Stabellini
Add a new domctl sub-function to get data of a domain having changed
state (this is needed by Xenstore).
The returned state just contains the domid, the domain unique id,
and some flags (existing, shutdown, dying).
In order to enable Xenstore stubdom being built for multiple Xen
versions, make this domctl stable. For stable domctls the
interface_version is always 0.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
---
V1:
- use a domctl subop for the new interface (Jan Beulich)
V2:
- fix XSM hooks (Daniel P. Smith)
- remove versioning of stable sub-ops (Jan Beulich)
- use domctl.domain for retuning domid of a changed domain (Jan Beulich)
- simplify locking in get_domain_state() (Jan Beulich)
- undo stray change in event_channel.c (Jan Beulich)
V3:
- have disjunct states "dying" and "dead" (Jan Beulich)
- check padding fields to be 0 (Jan Beulich)
- drop memset() (Jan Beulich)
V4:
- add locking in get_domain_state() (Jan Beulich)
- only allow querying domain having changed state by domain receiving
VIRQ_DOM_EXC events (Jan Beulich)
V5:
- use memset() (Jan Beulich)
V7:
- modify test for domain handling VIRQ_DOM_EXC, allowing to drop
domain_handles_global_virq() (Jan Beulich)
---
tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te | 1 +
tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if | 5 +-
tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te | 1 +
xen/common/domain.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/common/domctl.c | 18 ++++++-
xen/include/public/domctl.h | 26 +++++++++
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 2 +
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 8 +++
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 +++
xen/xsm/dummy.c | 1 +
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 7 +++
xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors | 2 +
12 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te b/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te
index f148bfbf27..ccadbd6469 100644
--- a/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te
+++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ allow dom0_t dom0_t:domain {
allow dom0_t dom0_t:domain2 {
set_cpu_policy gettsc settsc setscheduler set_vnumainfo
get_vnumainfo psr_cmt_op psr_alloc get_cpu_policy dt_overlay
+ get_domain_state
};
allow dom0_t dom0_t:resource { add remove };
diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if
index f7cf7c43c8..cff51febbf 100644
--- a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if
+++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ define(`create_domain_common', `
allow $1 $2:domain2 { set_cpu_policy settsc setscheduler setclaim
set_vnumainfo get_vnumainfo cacheflush
psr_cmt_op psr_alloc soft_reset
- resource_map get_cpu_policy vuart_op set_llc_colors };
+ resource_map get_cpu_policy vuart_op set_llc_colors
+ get_domain_state };
allow $1 $2:security check_context;
allow $1 $2:shadow enable;
allow $1 $2:mmu { map_read map_write adjust memorymap physmap pinpage mmuext_op updatemp };
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ define(`manage_domain', `
getaddrsize pause unpause trigger shutdown destroy
setaffinity setdomainmaxmem getscheduler resume
setpodtarget getpodtarget getpagingmempool setpagingmempool };
- allow $1 $2:domain2 { set_vnumainfo dt_overlay };
+ allow $1 $2:domain2 { set_vnumainfo dt_overlay get_domain_state };
')
# migrate_domain_out(priv, target)
diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te
index 519566ab81..49de53ebe2 100644
--- a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te
+++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xenstore.te
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ allow dom0_t xenstore_t:domain set_virq_handler;
allow xenstore_t xen_t:xen writeconsole;
# Xenstore queries domaininfo on all domains
allow xenstore_t domain_type:domain getdomaininfo;
+allow xenstore_t domain_type:domain2 get_domain_state;
# As a shortcut, the following 3 rules are used instead of adding a domain_comms
# rule between xenstore_t and every domain type that talks to xenstore
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index 1c1d6da885..b887c60ecc 100644
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -185,6 +185,80 @@ static void domain_changed_state(const struct domain *d)
unlock_dom_exc_handler(hdl);
}
+static void set_domain_state_info(struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state *info,
+ const struct domain *d)
+{
+ info->state = XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_EXIST;
+ if ( d->is_shut_down )
+ info->state |= XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_SHUTDOWN;
+ if ( d->is_dying == DOMDYING_dying )
+ info->state |= XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DYING;
+ if ( d->is_dying == DOMDYING_dead )
+ info->state |= XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DEAD;
+ info->unique_id = d->unique_id;
+}
+
+int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state *info, struct domain *d,
+ domid_t *domid)
+{
+ unsigned int dom;
+ int rc = -ENOENT;
+ struct domain *hdl;
+
+ if ( info->pad0 || info->pad1 )
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ( d )
+ {
+ set_domain_state_info(info, d);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ hdl = lock_dom_exc_handler();
+
+ /*
+ * Only domain registered for VIRQ_DOM_EXC event is allowed to query
+ * domains having changed state.
+ */
+ if ( current->domain != hdl )
+ {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ while ( dom_state_changed )
+ {
+ dom = find_first_bit(dom_state_changed, DOMID_MASK + 1);
+ if ( dom >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+ break;
+ if ( test_and_clear_bit(dom, dom_state_changed) )
+ {
+ *domid = dom;
+
+ d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom);
+
+ if ( d )
+ {
+ set_domain_state_info(info, d);
+
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ }
+ else
+ memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
+
+ rc = 0;
+
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ out:
+ unlock_dom_exc_handler(hdl);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static void __domain_finalise_shutdown(struct domain *d)
{
struct vcpu *v;
diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c
index 05abb581a0..b897ca8723 100644
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -279,6 +279,11 @@ static struct vnuma_info *vnuma_init(const struct xen_domctl_vnuma *uinfo,
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
+static bool is_stable_domctl(uint32_t cmd)
+{
+ return cmd == XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state;
+}
+
long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
{
long ret = 0;
@@ -289,7 +294,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
if ( copy_from_guest(op, u_domctl, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
- if ( op->interface_version != XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION )
+ if ( op->interface_version !=
+ (is_stable_domctl(op->cmd) ? 0 : XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION) )
return -EACCES;
switch ( op->cmd )
@@ -310,6 +316,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
fallthrough;
case XEN_DOMCTL_test_assign_device:
case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
if ( op->domain == DOMID_INVALID )
{
d = NULL;
@@ -876,6 +883,15 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl)
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
+ case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
+ ret = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
+ if ( ret )
+ break;
+
+ copyback = 1;
+ ret = get_domain_state(&op->u.get_domain_state, d, &op->domain);
+ break;
+
default:
ret = arch_do_domctl(op, d, u_domctl);
break;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
index e2d392d1e5..5b2063eed9 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
* Pure additions (e.g. new sub-commands) or compatible interface changes
* (e.g. adding semantics to 0-checked input fields or data to zeroed output
* fields) don't require a change of the version.
+ * Stable ops are NOT covered by XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION!
*
* Last version bump: Xen 4.19
*/
@@ -1243,7 +1244,30 @@ struct xen_domctl_set_llc_colors {
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(uint32) llc_colors;
};
+/*
+ * XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state (stable interface)
+ *
+ * Get state information of a domain.
+ *
+ * In case domain is DOMID_INVALID, return information about a domain having
+ * changed state and reset the state change indicator for that domain. This
+ * function is usable only by a domain having registered the VIRQ_DOM_EXC
+ * event (normally Xenstore).
+ * NB. xen_domctl.domain is an IN/OUT parameter for this operation.
+ */
+struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state {
+ uint16_t state;
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_EXIST 0x0001 /* Domain is existing. */
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_SHUTDOWN 0x0002 /* Shutdown finished. */
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DYING 0x0004 /* Domain dying. */
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DEAD 0x0008 /* Domain dead. */
+ uint16_t pad0; /* Must be 0 on input, returned as 0. */
+ uint32_t pad1; /* Must be 0 on input, returned as 0. */
+ uint64_t unique_id; /* Unique domain identifier. */
+};
+
struct xen_domctl {
+/* Stable domctl ops: interface_version is required to be 0. */
uint32_t cmd;
#define XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain 1
#define XEN_DOMCTL_destroydomain 2
@@ -1333,6 +1357,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
#define XEN_DOMCTL_dt_overlay 87
#define XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission 88
#define XEN_DOMCTL_set_llc_colors 89
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state 90 /* stable interface */
#define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_guestmemio 1000
#define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_pausevcpu 1001
#define XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_unpausevcpu 1002
@@ -1400,6 +1425,7 @@ struct xen_domctl {
struct xen_domctl_dt_overlay dt_overlay;
#endif
struct xen_domctl_set_llc_colors set_llc_colors;
+ struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state get_domain_state;
uint8_t pad[128];
} u;
};
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index 9d9b89ec27..ea63ca1c79 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -807,6 +807,8 @@ int domain_soft_reset(struct domain *d, bool resuming);
int domain_init_states(void);
void domain_deinit_states(const struct domain *d);
+int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state *info,
+ struct domain *d, domid_t *domid);
int vcpu_start_shutdown_deferral(struct vcpu *v);
void vcpu_end_shutdown_deferral(struct vcpu *v);
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index 6a2fc33c3b..a8d06de6b0 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_domctl(
case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
return xsm_default_action(XSM_DM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo:
+ case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
return xsm_default_action(XSM_XS_PRIV, current->domain, d);
default:
return xsm_default_action(XSM_PRIV, current->domain, d);
@@ -815,6 +816,13 @@ static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_argo_send(
#endif /* CONFIG_ARGO */
+static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_get_domain_state(
+ XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
+{
+ XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_XS_PRIV);
+ return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+}
+
#include <public/version.h>
static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_xen_version(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG uint32_t op)
{
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index 4dbff9d866..0689bf5c9f 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ struct xsm_ops {
int (*argo_register_any_source)(const struct domain *d);
int (*argo_send)(const struct domain *d, const struct domain *t);
#endif
+ int (*get_domain_state)(struct domain *d);
};
#ifdef CONFIG_XSM
@@ -774,6 +775,11 @@ static inline int xsm_argo_send(const struct domain *d, const struct domain *t)
#endif /* CONFIG_ARGO */
+static inline int xsm_get_domain_state(struct domain *d)
+{
+ return alternative_call(xsm_ops.get_domain_state, d);
+}
+
#endif /* XSM_NO_WRAPPERS */
#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIBOOT
diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
index e6ffa948f7..ce6fbdc6c5 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber dummy_ops = {
.argo_register_any_source = xsm_argo_register_any_source,
.argo_send = xsm_argo_send,
#endif
+ .get_domain_state = xsm_get_domain_state,
};
void __init xsm_fixup_ops(struct xsm_ops *ops)
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 14d84df9ca..389707a164 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -688,6 +688,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domctl(struct domain *d, unsigned int cmd,
case XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping:
case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
case XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op:
+ case XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state:
/* These have individual XSM hooks (arch/../domctl.c) */
case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
@@ -1869,6 +1870,11 @@ static int cf_check flask_argo_send(
#endif
+static int cf_check flask_get_domain_state(struct domain *d)
+{
+ return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__GET_DOMAIN_STATE);
+}
+
static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber flask_ops = {
.set_system_active = flask_set_system_active,
.security_domaininfo = flask_security_domaininfo,
@@ -2005,6 +2011,7 @@ static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber flask_ops = {
.argo_register_any_source = flask_argo_register_any_source,
.argo_send = flask_argo_send,
#endif
+ .get_domain_state = flask_get_domain_state,
};
const struct xsm_ops *__init flask_init(
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
index 320d77706d..51a1577a66 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
@@ -257,6 +257,8 @@ class domain2
dt_overlay
# XEN_DOMCTL_set_llc_colors
set_llc_colors
+# XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state
+ get_domain_state
}
# Similar to class domain, but primarily contains domctls related to HVM domains
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v7 5/7] xen: add new domctl get_changed_domain
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] xen: add new domctl get_changed_domain Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-09 15:50 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2025-01-09 15:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross
Cc: Daniel P. Smith, Anthony PERARD, Andrew Cooper, Michal Orzel,
Julien Grall, Roger Pau Monné, Stefano Stabellini, xen-devel
On 09.01.2025 11:59, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Add a new domctl sub-function to get data of a domain having changed
> state (this is needed by Xenstore).
>
> The returned state just contains the domid, the domain unique id,
> and some flags (existing, shutdown, dying).
>
> In order to enable Xenstore stubdom being built for multiple Xen
> versions, make this domctl stable. For stable domctls the
> interface_version is always 0.
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
> Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> # non-XSM/Flask
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 6/7] tools/libs: add a new libxenmanage library
2025-01-09 10:59 [PATCH v7 0/7] remove libxenctrl usage from xenstored Juergen Gross
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 5/7] xen: add new domctl get_changed_domain Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-09 10:59 ` Juergen Gross
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] tools/xenstored: use new stable interface instead of libxenctrl Juergen Gross
6 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2025-01-09 10:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Juergen Gross, Anthony PERARD
In order to have a stable interface in user land for using stable
domctl and possibly later sysctl interfaces, add a new library
libxenmanage.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
---
V1:
- new patch
V2:
- define __XEN_TOOLS__ via Makefile (Anthony PERARD)
- use SPDX in header file (Anthony PERARD)
- change function name to xenmanage_poll_changed_domain() (Anthony PERARD)
- add short library description (Anthony PERARD)
- narrow scope of xen_domctl_get_domain_state pointer (Anthony PERARD)
V4:
- use LGPL-2.1-only SPDX identifier (Anthony PERARD)
---
tools/include/xenmanage.h | 92 ++++++++++++++++
tools/libs/Makefile | 1 +
tools/libs/manage/Makefile | 10 ++
tools/libs/manage/Makefile.common | 3 +
tools/libs/manage/core.c | 168 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/libs/manage/libxenmanage.map | 8 ++
tools/libs/uselibs.mk | 2 +
7 files changed, 284 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/include/xenmanage.h
create mode 100644 tools/libs/manage/Makefile
create mode 100644 tools/libs/manage/Makefile.common
create mode 100644 tools/libs/manage/core.c
create mode 100644 tools/libs/manage/libxenmanage.map
diff --git a/tools/include/xenmanage.h b/tools/include/xenmanage.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..956b7a0a44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/include/xenmanage.h
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2024 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
+ *
+ * Interfaces of libxenmanage.
+ *
+ * libxenmanage provides management functions for the host using stable
+ * hypercall interfaces.
+ */
+#ifndef XENMANAGE_H
+#define XENMANAGE_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/* Avoid the need to #include <xentoollog.h> */
+struct xentoollog_logger;
+
+typedef struct xenmanage_handle xenmanage_handle;
+
+/*
+ * Open libxenmanage.
+ *
+ * Get a handle of the xenmanage library. The handle is required for all
+ * further operations of the library.
+ * Parameters:
+ * logger: Logging function to use. If NULL logging is done to stderr.
+ * open_flags: Only 0 supported.
+ * Return value: Handle or NULL if error.
+ */
+xenmanage_handle *xenmanage_open(struct xentoollog_logger *logger,
+ unsigned int open_flags);
+
+/*
+ * Close libxenmanage.
+ *
+ * Return a handle of the xenmanage library.
+ * Parameters:
+ * hdl: Handle obtained by xenmanage_open().
+ * Return value: always 0.
+ */
+int xenmanage_close(xenmanage_handle *hdl);
+
+#define XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_EXIST 0x0001 /* Domain is existing. */
+#define XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_SHUTDOWN 0x0002 /* Shutdown finished. */
+#define XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DYING 0x0004 /* Domain dying. */
+#define XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DEAD 0x0008 /* Domain dead. */
+
+/*
+ * Return state information of an existing domain.
+ *
+ * Returns the domain state and unique id of the given domain.
+ * Parameters:
+ * hdl: handle returned by xenmanage_open()
+ * domid: domain id of the domain to get the information for
+ * state: where to store the state (XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_ flags,
+ * nothing stored if NULL)
+ * unique_id: where to store the unique id of the domain (nothing stored if
+ * NULL)
+ * Return value: 0 if information was stored, -1 else (errno is set)
+ */
+int xenmanage_get_domain_info(xenmanage_handle *hdl, unsigned int domid,
+ unsigned int *state, uint64_t *unique_id);
+
+/*
+ * Return information of a domain having changed state recently.
+ *
+ * Returns the domain id, state and unique id of a domain having changed
+ * state (any of the state bits was modified) since the last time information
+ * for that domain was returned by this function. Only usable by callers who
+ * have registered the VIRQ_DOM_EXC event (normally Xenstore).
+ * Parameters:
+ * hdl: handle returned by xenmanage_open()
+ * domid: where to store the domid of the domain (not NULL)
+ * state: where to store the state (XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_ flags,
+ * nothing stored if NULL)
+ * unique_id: where to store the unique id of the domain (nothing stored if
+ * NULL)
+ * Return value: 0 if information was stored, -1 else (errno is set)
+ */
+int xenmanage_poll_changed_domain(xenmanage_handle *hdl, unsigned int *domid,
+ unsigned int *state, uint64_t *unique_id);
+#endif /* XENMANAGE_H */
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/tools/libs/Makefile b/tools/libs/Makefile
index 1afcd12e2b..d39516c1b3 100644
--- a/tools/libs/Makefile
+++ b/tools/libs/Makefile
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SUBDIRS-y += devicemodel
SUBDIRS-y += ctrl
SUBDIRS-y += guest
SUBDIRS-y += hypfs
+SUBDIRS-y += manage
SUBDIRS-y += store
SUBDIRS-y += stat
SUBDIRS-$(CONFIG_Linux) += vchan
diff --git a/tools/libs/manage/Makefile b/tools/libs/manage/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbfe70d259
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/libs/manage/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+XEN_ROOT = $(CURDIR)/../../..
+include $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/Rules.mk
+
+MAJOR = 1
+MINOR = 0
+version-script := libxenmanage.map
+
+include Makefile.common
+
+include $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libs/libs.mk
diff --git a/tools/libs/manage/Makefile.common b/tools/libs/manage/Makefile.common
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..533ba30fba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/libs/manage/Makefile.common
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+CFLAGS += -D__XEN_TOOLS__
+
+OBJS-y += core.o
diff --git a/tools/libs/manage/core.c b/tools/libs/manage/core.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8fb421df41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/libs/manage/core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2024 SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation;
+ * version 2.1 of the License.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <xentoollog.h>
+#include <xenmanage.h>
+#include <xencall.h>
+#include <xentoolcore_internal.h>
+
+#include <xen/xen.h>
+#include <xen/domctl.h>
+
+struct xenmanage_handle {
+ xentoollog_logger *logger, *logger_tofree;
+ unsigned int flags;
+ xencall_handle *xcall;
+};
+
+xenmanage_handle *xenmanage_open(xentoollog_logger *logger,
+ unsigned int open_flags)
+{
+ xenmanage_handle *hdl = calloc(1, sizeof(*hdl));
+ int saved_errno;
+
+ if ( !hdl )
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ( open_flags )
+ {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ hdl->flags = open_flags;
+ hdl->logger = logger;
+ hdl->logger_tofree = NULL;
+
+ if ( !hdl->logger )
+ {
+ hdl->logger = hdl->logger_tofree =
+ (xentoollog_logger *)
+ xtl_createlogger_stdiostream(stderr, XTL_PROGRESS, 0);
+ if ( !hdl->logger )
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ hdl->xcall = xencall_open(hdl->logger, 0);
+ if ( !hdl->xcall )
+ goto err;
+
+ return hdl;
+
+err:
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ xenmanage_close(hdl);
+ errno = saved_errno;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int xenmanage_close(xenmanage_handle *hdl)
+{
+ if ( !hdl )
+ return 0;
+
+ xencall_close(hdl->xcall);
+ xtl_logger_destroy(hdl->logger_tofree);
+ free(hdl);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int xenmanage_do_domctl_get_domain_state(xenmanage_handle *hdl,
+ unsigned int domid_in,
+ unsigned int *domid_out,
+ unsigned int *state,
+ uint64_t *unique_id)
+{
+ struct xen_domctl *buf;
+ int saved_errno;
+ int ret;
+
+ buf = xencall_alloc_buffer(hdl->xcall, sizeof(*buf));
+ if ( !buf )
+ {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(*buf));
+
+ buf->cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state;
+ buf->domain = domid_in;
+
+ ret = xencall1(hdl->xcall, __HYPERVISOR_domctl, (unsigned long)buf);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ if ( !ret )
+ {
+ struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state *st = &buf->u.get_domain_state;
+
+ if ( domid_out )
+ *domid_out = buf->domain;
+ if ( state )
+ {
+ *state = 0;
+ if ( st->state & XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_EXIST )
+ *state |= XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_EXIST;
+ if ( st->state & XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_SHUTDOWN )
+ *state |= XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_SHUTDOWN;
+ if ( st->state & XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DYING )
+ *state |= XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DYING;
+ if ( st->state & XEN_DOMCTL_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DEAD )
+ *state |= XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DEAD;
+ }
+ if ( unique_id )
+ *unique_id = st->unique_id;
+ }
+
+ xencall_free_buffer(hdl->xcall, buf);
+
+ errno = saved_errno;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int xenmanage_get_domain_info(xenmanage_handle *hdl, unsigned int domid,
+ unsigned int *state, uint64_t *unique_id)
+{
+ if ( !hdl || domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+ {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return xenmanage_do_domctl_get_domain_state(hdl, domid, NULL, state,
+ unique_id);
+}
+
+int xenmanage_poll_changed_domain(xenmanage_handle *hdl, unsigned int *domid,
+ unsigned int *state, uint64_t *unique_id)
+{
+ if ( !hdl || !domid )
+ {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return xenmanage_do_domctl_get_domain_state(hdl, DOMID_INVALID, domid,
+ state, unique_id);
+}
diff --git a/tools/libs/manage/libxenmanage.map b/tools/libs/manage/libxenmanage.map
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..64c793e603
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/libs/manage/libxenmanage.map
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+VERS_1.0 {
+ global:
+ xenmanage_open;
+ xenmanage_close;
+ xenmanage_get_domain_info;
+ xenmanage_poll_changed_domain;
+ local: *; /* Do not expose anything by default */
+};
diff --git a/tools/libs/uselibs.mk b/tools/libs/uselibs.mk
index 7aa8d83e06..c0a234cfec 100644
--- a/tools/libs/uselibs.mk
+++ b/tools/libs/uselibs.mk
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ LIBS_LIBS += devicemodel
USELIBS_devicemodel := toollog toolcore call
LIBS_LIBS += hypfs
USELIBS_hypfs := toollog toolcore call
+LIBS_LIBS += manage
+USELIBS_manage := toollog toolcore call
LIBS_LIBS += ctrl
USELIBS_ctrl := toollog call evtchn gnttab foreignmemory devicemodel
LIBS_LIBS += guest
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 7/7] tools/xenstored: use new stable interface instead of libxenctrl
2025-01-09 10:59 [PATCH v7 0/7] remove libxenctrl usage from xenstored Juergen Gross
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 6/7] tools/libs: add a new libxenmanage library Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-09 10:59 ` Juergen Gross
2025-01-16 13:44 ` Anthony PERARD
6 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2025-01-09 10:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Juergen Gross, Anthony PERARD, Samuel Thibault, Julien Grall
Replace the current use of the unstable xc_domain_getinfo_single()
interface with the stable domctl XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state call
via the new libxenmanage library.
This will remove the last usage of libxenctrl by Xenstore, so update
the library dependencies accordingly.
For now only do a direct replacement without using the functionality
of obtaining information about domains having changed the state.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
---
V1:
- use library instead of direct hypercall, only replace current
libxenctrl use case
Please note that this patch can be committed only after the related
Mini-OS patch "config: add support for libxenmanage" has gone in AND
the Mini-OS commit-id has been updated in Config.mk accordingly!
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
stubdom/Makefile | 8 ++---
stubdom/mini-os.mk | 1 +
tools/xenstored/Makefile | 2 +-
tools/xenstored/Makefile.common | 2 +-
tools/xenstored/core.h | 1 -
tools/xenstored/domain.c | 52 ++++++++++++---------------------
tools/xenstored/lu.c | 1 +
tools/xenstored/lu_daemon.c | 1 +
8 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/stubdom/Makefile b/stubdom/Makefile
index 2a81af28a1..ca800b243c 100644
--- a/stubdom/Makefile
+++ b/stubdom/Makefile
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ endif
# libraries under tools/libs
#######
-STUB_LIBS := toolcore toollog evtchn gnttab call foreignmemory devicemodel ctrl guest
+STUB_LIBS := toolcore toollog evtchn gnttab call foreignmemory devicemodel ctrl guest manage
LIBDEP_guest := cross-zlib
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ grub: cross-polarssl grub-upstream $(CROSS_ROOT) grub-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-minios-
# xenstore
##########
-xenstore-minios.gen.cfg: APP_LIBS = gnttab evtchn toollog ctrl
+xenstore-minios.gen.cfg: APP_LIBS = gnttab evtchn toollog manage
xenstore-minios.gen.cfg: xenstore-minios.cfg Makefile
$(GEN_config) >$@
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ xenstore: $(CROSS_ROOT) xenstore-minios-config.mk
# xenstorepvh
#############
-xenstorepvh-minios.gen.cfg: APP_LIBS = gnttab evtchn toollog ctrl
+xenstorepvh-minios.gen.cfg: APP_LIBS = gnttab evtchn toollog manage
xenstorepvh-minios.gen.cfg: xenstorepvh-minios.cfg Makefile
$(GEN_config) >$@
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ else
pv-grub-if-enabled:
endif
-XENSTORE_DEPS := libxenevtchn libxengnttab libxenctrl
+XENSTORE_DEPS := libxenevtchn libxengnttab libxenmanage
.PHONY: xenstore-stubdom
xenstore-stubdom: mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore $(XENSTORE_DEPS) xenstore
diff --git a/stubdom/mini-os.mk b/stubdom/mini-os.mk
index 7e4968e026..be32302f9e 100644
--- a/stubdom/mini-os.mk
+++ b/stubdom/mini-os.mk
@@ -13,5 +13,6 @@ GNTTAB_PATH = $(XEN_ROOT)/stubdom/libs-$(MINIOS_TARGET_ARCH)/gnttab
CALL_PATH = $(XEN_ROOT)/stubdom/libs-$(MINIOS_TARGET_ARCH)/call
FOREIGNMEMORY_PATH = $(XEN_ROOT)/stubdom/libs-$(MINIOS_TARGET_ARCH)/foreignmemory
DEVICEMODEL_PATH = $(XEN_ROOT)/stubdom/libs-$(MINIOS_TARGET_ARCH)/devicemodel
+MANAGE_PATH = $(XEN_ROOT)/stubdom/libs-$(MINIOS_TARGET_ARCH)/manage
CTRL_PATH = $(XEN_ROOT)/stubdom/libs-$(MINIOS_TARGET_ARCH)/ctrl
GUEST_PATH = $(XEN_ROOT)/stubdom/libs-$(MINIOS_TARGET_ARCH)/guest
diff --git a/tools/xenstored/Makefile b/tools/xenstored/Makefile
index 09adfe1d50..81c42838e0 100644
--- a/tools/xenstored/Makefile
+++ b/tools/xenstored/Makefile
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ include Makefile.common
xenstored: LDLIBS += $(LDLIBS_libxenevtchn)
xenstored: LDLIBS += $(LDLIBS_libxengnttab)
-xenstored: LDLIBS += $(LDLIBS_libxenctrl)
+xenstored: LDLIBS += $(LDLIBS_libxenmanage)
xenstored: LDLIBS += -lrt
xenstored: LDLIBS += $(SOCKET_LIBS)
diff --git a/tools/xenstored/Makefile.common b/tools/xenstored/Makefile.common
index 27fdb3b49e..271134fcc1 100644
--- a/tools/xenstored/Makefile.common
+++ b/tools/xenstored/Makefile.common
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ XENSTORED_OBJS-$(CONFIG_MiniOS) += minios.o lu_minios.o
# Include configure output (config.h)
CFLAGS += -include $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/config.h
CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenevtchn)
-CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenctrl)
+CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenmanage)
CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxentoolcore)
$(XENSTORED_OBJS-y): CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxengnttab)
diff --git a/tools/xenstored/core.h b/tools/xenstored/core.h
index e58779e88c..632886cecf 100644
--- a/tools/xenstored/core.h
+++ b/tools/xenstored/core.h
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
#ifndef _XENSTORED_CORE_H
#define _XENSTORED_CORE_H
-#include <xenctrl.h>
#include <xengnttab.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
diff --git a/tools/xenstored/domain.c b/tools/xenstored/domain.c
index 64c8fd0cc3..a6506a5bb2 100644
--- a/tools/xenstored/domain.c
+++ b/tools/xenstored/domain.c
@@ -34,14 +34,15 @@
#include "control.h"
#include <xenevtchn.h>
-#include <xenctrl.h>
+#include <xenmanage.h>
+#include <xen-barrier.h>
#include <xen/grant_table.h>
#ifdef __MINIOS__
#include <mini-os/xenbus.h>
#endif
-static xc_interface **xc_handle;
+static xenmanage_handle *xm_handle;
xengnttab_handle **xgt_handle;
static evtchn_port_t virq_port;
@@ -619,32 +620,28 @@ static int destroy_domain(void *_domain)
return 0;
}
-static bool get_domain_info(unsigned int domid, xc_domaininfo_t *dominfo)
-{
- return xc_domain_getinfo_single(*xc_handle, domid, dominfo) == 0;
-}
-
static int check_domain(const void *k, void *v, void *arg)
{
- xc_domaininfo_t dominfo;
+ unsigned int state;
struct connection *conn;
- bool dom_valid;
+ int dom_invalid;
struct domain *domain = v;
bool *notify = arg;
- dom_valid = get_domain_info(domain->domid, &dominfo);
+ dom_invalid = xenmanage_get_domain_info(xm_handle, domain->domid,
+ &state, NULL);
if (!domain->introduced) {
- if (!dom_valid)
+ if (dom_invalid)
talloc_free(domain);
return 0;
}
- if (dom_valid) {
- if ((dominfo.flags & XEN_DOMINF_shutdown)
+ if (!dom_invalid) {
+ if ((state & XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_SHUTDOWN)
&& !domain->shutdown) {
domain->shutdown = true;
*notify = true;
}
- if (!(dominfo.flags & XEN_DOMINF_dying))
+ if (!(state & XENMANAGE_GETDOMSTATE_STATE_DEAD))
return 0;
}
if (domain->conn) {
@@ -786,10 +783,9 @@ static struct domain *find_or_alloc_domain(const void *ctx, unsigned int domid)
static struct domain *find_or_alloc_existing_domain(unsigned int domid)
{
struct domain *domain;
- xc_domaininfo_t dominfo;
domain = find_domain_struct(domid);
- if (!domain && get_domain_info(domid, &dominfo))
+ if (!domain && !xenmanage_get_domain_info(xm_handle, domid, NULL, NULL))
domain = alloc_domain(NULL, domid);
return domain;
@@ -1187,12 +1183,6 @@ int do_reset_watches(const void *ctx, struct connection *conn,
return 0;
}
-static int close_xc_handle(void *_handle)
-{
- xc_interface_close(*(xc_interface**)_handle);
- return 0;
-}
-
static int close_xgt_handle(void *_handle)
{
xengnttab_close(*(xengnttab_handle **)_handle);
@@ -1258,15 +1248,9 @@ void domain_early_init(void)
if (!domhash)
barf_perror("Failed to allocate domain hashtable");
- xc_handle = talloc(talloc_autofree_context(), xc_interface*);
- if (!xc_handle)
- barf_perror("Failed to allocate domain handle");
-
- *xc_handle = xc_interface_open(0,0,0);
- if (!*xc_handle)
- barf_perror("Failed to open connection to hypervisor");
-
- talloc_set_destructor(xc_handle, close_xc_handle);
+ xm_handle = xenmanage_open(NULL, 0);
+ if (!xm_handle)
+ barf_perror("Failed to open connection to libxenmanage");
xgt_handle = talloc(talloc_autofree_context(), xengnttab_handle*);
if (!xgt_handle)
@@ -1306,6 +1290,8 @@ void domain_deinit(void)
{
if (virq_port)
xenevtchn_unbind(xce_handle, virq_port);
+
+ xenmanage_close(xm_handle);
}
/*
@@ -1335,13 +1321,13 @@ int domain_alloc_permrefs(struct node_perms *perms)
{
unsigned int i, domid;
struct domain *d;
- xc_domaininfo_t dominfo;
for (i = 0; i < perms->num; i++) {
domid = perms->p[i].id;
d = find_domain_struct(domid);
if (!d) {
- if (!get_domain_info(domid, &dominfo))
+ if (xenmanage_get_domain_info(xm_handle, domid,
+ NULL, NULL))
perms->p[i].perms |= XS_PERM_IGNORE;
else if (!alloc_domain(NULL, domid))
return ENOMEM;
diff --git a/tools/xenstored/lu.c b/tools/xenstored/lu.c
index bec2a84e10..4fccbbc195 100644
--- a/tools/xenstored/lu.c
+++ b/tools/xenstored/lu.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
diff --git a/tools/xenstored/lu_daemon.c b/tools/xenstored/lu_daemon.c
index 6df6c80a2a..88d8d9e1b3 100644
--- a/tools/xenstored/lu_daemon.c
+++ b/tools/xenstored/lu_daemon.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
*/
#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include "talloc.h"
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v7 7/7] tools/xenstored: use new stable interface instead of libxenctrl
2025-01-09 10:59 ` [PATCH v7 7/7] tools/xenstored: use new stable interface instead of libxenctrl Juergen Gross
@ 2025-01-16 13:44 ` Anthony PERARD
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Anthony PERARD @ 2025-01-16 13:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross; +Cc: xen-devel, Samuel Thibault, Julien Grall
On Thu, Jan 09, 2025 at 11:59:35AM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Replace the current use of the unstable xc_domain_getinfo_single()
> interface with the stable domctl XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state call
> via the new libxenmanage library.
>
> This will remove the last usage of libxenctrl by Xenstore, so update
> the library dependencies accordingly.
>
> For now only do a direct replacement without using the functionality
> of obtaining information about domains having changed the state.
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
> Reviewed-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
Thanks,
--
Anthony Perard | Vates XCP-ng Developer
XCP-ng & Xen Orchestra - Vates solutions
web: https://vates.tech
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread