From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 09/20] KVM: nVMX: Propagate extended instruction information
Date: Wed, 02 Sep 2026 03:07:13 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260902030714.472A21F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260902021804.718676-10-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Missing Support for EVMCS Field / Reachable WARN_ON
--
commit 24f2192a997da0f16691df1c9b88d4d8d59b8258
Author: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
KVM: nVMX: Propagate extended instruction information
Define the new extended_instruction_info field in struct vmcs12 and
propagate it to nested VMX. Gate the propagation on the guest APX
enumeration, which aligns with bare metal behavior.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/aRvOSnaUt1E+%2FpkC@intel.com
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> index 7229934c38bb1..69302b806a98e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> @@ -4773,6 +4773,12 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
> vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info;
> vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len = exit_insn_len;
> vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
> + /*
> + * The APX enumeration guarantees the presence of the extended
> + * fields. This CPUID bit alone is sufficient to rely on it.
> + */
> + if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_APX))
> + vmcs12->extended_instruction_info = vmcs_read64(EXTENDED_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
[Severity: High]
Could this lead to a host-side Denial of Service when KVM is running as a
nested hypervisor on top of Hyper-V?
When EVMCS is active (kvm_is_using_evmcs() returns true) and the L2 guest
has the APX feature, prepare_vmcs12() will unconditionally execute
vmcs_read64(EXTENDED_INSTRUCTION_INFO).
Since EXTENDED_INSTRUCTION_INFO does not appear to be present in the EVMCS
mapping array (vmcs_field_to_evmcs_1), won't the subsequent call to
get_evmcs_offset() return -ENOENT and trigger a WARN_ONCE?
If panic_on_warn is enabled, an unprivileged L2 guest could potentially
trigger a host panic just by issuing a nested VM-exit.
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260902021804.718676-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com?part=9
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-02 3:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-02 2:17 [PATCH v7 00/20] KVM: x86: Enable APX for guests Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 01/20] KVM: x86: Extend VCPU registers for EGPRs Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 02/20] KVM: VMX: Save guest EGPRs in VCPU cache Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 03/20] KVM: x86: Support APX state for XSAVE ABI Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:08 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 04/20] KVM: VMX: Refactor VMX instruction information access Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 05/20] KVM: VMX: Refactor instruction information decoding Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 06/20] KVM: VMX: Remove unused control-register access defines Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 07/20] KVM: VMX: Refactor register index retrieval from exit qualification Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 08/20] KVM: VMX: Support instruction information extension Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 09/20] KVM: nVMX: Propagate extended instruction information Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:07 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 10/20] KVM: x86: Support EGPR accessing and tracking for emulator Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 11/20] KVM: x86: Handle EGPR index and REX2-incompatible opcodes Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:06 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 12/20] KVM: x86: Support REX2-prefixed opcode decode Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 13/20] KVM: x86: Reject EVEX-prefixed instructions Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:59 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 14/20] KVM: x86: Move KVM_SUPPORTED_{XCR0,XSS} into kvm_x86_vendor_init() Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 15/20] KVM: x86: Guard valid XCR0.APX settings Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:18 ` [PATCH v7 16/20] KVM: x86: Add APX to supported XCR0 Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:18 ` [PATCH v7 17/20] KVM: x86: Expose APX foundation feature to userspace Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:18 ` [PATCH v7 18/20] KVM: x86: Expose APX sub-features " Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:18 ` [PATCH v7 19/20] KVM: x86: selftests: Add APX state and ABI test Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:18 ` [PATCH v7 20/20] KVM: x86: selftests: Add APX state handling and XCR0 sanity checks Chang S. Bae
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