From: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
To: maz@kernel.org, oupton@kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org, joey.gouly@arm.com,
seiden@linux.ibm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
yuzenghui@huawei.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, steven.price@arm.com,
vdonnefort@google.com, qperret@google.com, tabba@google.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 06/18] KVM: arm64: Skip fixed-feature state flush for protected vCPUs
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 12:33:26 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260914113338.159227-7-fuad.tabba@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260914113338.159227-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
flush_hyp_vcpu() copies the host's mdcr_el2, TWI/TWE and debug state
into the hyp vCPU on every entry, so for a protected vCPU the host's
trap configuration overrides the one pkvm_vcpu_init_traps() computed
at EL2. Move the mdcr_el2 and TWI/TWE copies into the non-protected
branch, and return early from flush_debug_state() and
sync_debug_state() for a protected vCPU: its debug registers are
hypervisor-owned, and it takes the host's TWI/TWE at vCPU load.
MDCR_EL2.TDA traps only the guest's own accesses; it doesn't stop the
world switch from loading host-supplied breakpoints and MDSCR_EL1.
EL2's mdcr_el2 starts from 0, and HPMN == 0 is reserved without
FEAT_HPMN0. Set HPMN at vCPU load to PMCR_EL0.N on a PE whose
ID_AA64DFR0_EL1 implements PMUv3, the value the host's copy carried,
read as kvm_init_host_debug_data() reads it: the PMUv3 cpucap is
system-wide and off without CONFIG_HW_PERF_EVENTS. A protected guest's
PMU accesses trap regardless.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
index ef65c3cd6f810..229a4877d14f5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
@@ -200,6 +200,9 @@ static void flush_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu;
+ if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
+ return;
+
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.debug_owner = host_vcpu->arch.debug_owner;
if (kvm_guest_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)) {
@@ -218,6 +221,9 @@ static void sync_debug_state(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu;
+ if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
+ return;
+
if (kvm_guest_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
host_vcpu->arch.vcpu_debug_state = hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vcpu_debug_state;
else if (kvm_host_owns_debug_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
@@ -241,6 +247,12 @@ static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
if (!pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu)) {
if (vcpu_get_flag(host_vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY))
flush_hyp_vcpu_state(hyp_vcpu);
+
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 &= ~(HCR_TWI | HCR_TWE);
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 |= READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2) &
+ (HCR_TWI | HCR_TWE);
+
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.iflags = host_vcpu->arch.iflags;
} else {
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt = host_vcpu->arch.ctxt;
@@ -249,17 +261,13 @@ static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
/* __hyp_running_vcpu must be NULL in a guest context. */
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.__hyp_running_vcpu = NULL;
- hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;
/*
- * HCR_EL2.VSE is host-owned (a pending virtual SError to inject), not a
- * trap-control bit, so it must flow to the hyp vCPU alongside TWI/TWE
- * for the vSError to be delivered. sync_hyp_vcpu() reflects it back.
+ * A host-injected vSError is masked by the guest's own PSTATE.A, so it
+ * applies to protected guests too.
*/
- hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 &= ~(HCR_TWI | HCR_TWE | HCR_VSE);
- hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 |= READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2) &
- (HCR_TWI | HCR_TWE | HCR_VSE);
-
- hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vsesr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.vsesr_el2;
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 &= ~HCR_VSE;
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 |= READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2) & HCR_VSE;
+ hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.vsesr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.vsesr_el2;
flush_hyp_vgic_state(hyp_vcpu);
@@ -326,9 +334,17 @@ static void handle___pkvm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
return;
if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu)) {
+ u64 dfr0 = read_sysreg(id_aa64dfr0_el1);
+
/* Propagate WFx trapping flags */
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 &= ~(HCR_TWE | HCR_TWI);
hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 |= hcr_el2 & (HCR_TWE | HCR_TWI);
+
+ /* HPMN == 0 is reserved without FEAT_HPMN0. */
+ if (pmuv3_implemented(FIELD_GET(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_MASK, dfr0)))
+ u64p_replace_bits(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2,
+ FIELD_GET(ARMV8_PMU_PMCR_N, read_sysreg(pmcr_el0)),
+ MDCR_EL2_HPMN);
} else {
memcpy(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.fgt, hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu->arch.fgt,
sizeof(hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.fgt));
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
index 9bdc7a9b84b8c..d52c26c0959a8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static void pvm_init_traps_mdcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!kvm_has_feat(kvm, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, PMUVer, IMP)) {
val |= MDCR_EL2_TPM | MDCR_EL2_TPMCR;
- val &= ~(MDCR_EL2_HPME | MDCR_EL2_MTPME | MDCR_EL2_HPMN_MASK);
+ val &= ~(MDCR_EL2_HPME | MDCR_EL2_MTPME);
}
if (!kvm_has_feat(kvm, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, DebugVer, IMP))
--
2.39.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-14 11:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-14 11:33 [PATCH v3 00/18] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 01/18] KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 02/18] KVM: arm64: Validate the host vCPU's VM before reading it " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 03/18] KVM: arm64: Pin the host vCPU before adjusting its PC " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 13:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-14 14:00 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 04/18] KVM: arm64: Disable steal time for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-22 14:34 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 05/18] KVM: arm64: Introduce per-EC entry handlers for pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2026-09-14 13:42 ` [PATCH v3 06/18] KVM: arm64: Skip fixed-feature state flush for protected vCPUs sashiko-bot
2026-09-14 14:27 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 07/18] KVM: arm64: Add {flush,sync}_hyp_timer_state() primitives Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 08/18] KVM: arm64: Add system register reset framework for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 09/18] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC handling for protected guests at EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 10/18] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-22 16:35 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-22 16:37 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-22 17:07 ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-23 9:51 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-24 8:30 ` Will Deacon
2026-09-24 11:26 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-24 12:14 ` Will Deacon
2026-09-24 15:21 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 12:58 ` Will Deacon
2026-10-01 13:11 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 12:59 ` Will Deacon
2026-10-01 13:11 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 11/18] KVM: arm64: Restrict KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT and PSCI version for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 12/18] KVM: arm64: Prevent host PC adjustments for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 13:42 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-14 14:43 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-15 11:02 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-15 11:19 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 13/18] KVM: arm64: Inject an UNDEF at EL2 for unhandled protected guest exits Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 14/18] KVM: arm64: Add per-EC entry/exit state marshalling for protected guests Fuad Tabba
2026-09-16 16:27 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-16 19:05 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 15/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host access to protected VM private state Fuad Tabba
2026-09-16 16:30 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-16 19:07 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-17 8:06 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-17 18:42 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-18 13:21 ` Will Deacon
2026-09-18 13:24 ` Will Deacon
2026-09-27 8:20 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-27 12:37 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-28 19:00 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 16/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host power-on of a vCPU that EL2 holds powered off Fuad Tabba
2026-09-16 16:43 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-16 19:08 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 17/18] KVM: arm64: Advertise the capabilities that protected VMs support Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 16:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-14 18:01 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 18/18] KVM: arm64: Document the protected VM userspace API Fuad Tabba
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260914113338.159227-7-fuad.tabba@linux.dev \
--to=fuad.tabba@linux.dev \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=joey.gouly@arm.com \
--cc=kvmarm@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=oupton@kernel.org \
--cc=qperret@google.com \
--cc=seiden@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=steven.price@arm.com \
--cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
--cc=tabba@google.com \
--cc=vdonnefort@google.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=yuzenghui@huawei.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.