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From: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
To: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Cc: maz@kernel.org, oupton@kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	will@kernel.org, joey.gouly@arm.com, seiden@linux.ibm.com,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, yuzenghui@huawei.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, steven.price@arm.com, qperret@google.com,
	tabba@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 10/18] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs at EL2
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2026 18:07:00 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <arK1tHUEJsCQEKzn@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260914113338.159227-11-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>

On Mon, Sep 14, 2026 at 12:33:30PM +0100, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> EL2 implements PSCI 1.1 for protected VMs: CPU_ON, CPU_OFF,
> PSCI_VERSION and PSCI_FEATURES are decided at EL2 (CPU_ON and CPU_OFF
> still exit to the host, which only schedules or parks the target),
> AFFINITY_INFO, CPU_SUSPEND and the platform power operations are
> forwarded to the host, and anything else returns NOT_SUPPORTED,
> including the TRNG calls and the functions above 1.1, SYSTEM_OFF2
> among them, that the host handled for a protected guest until now.
> TRNG for protected guests is a follow-up. AFFINITY_INFO stays
> with the host, which returns OFF only once it has parked the target:
> the host is what a guest polls to see a CPU_OFF complete before it
> issues the next CPU_ON, as Linux does on hotplug.
> 
> Three consequences follow:
> 
>   - A protected VM has one primary vCPU, the first whose hyp vCPU is
>     created with mp_state RUNNABLE. A second one, or an mp_state other
>     than RUNNABLE or STOPPED, fails that vCPU's first KVM_RUN with
>     -EINVAL.
> 
>   - CPU_ON finds its target among the hyp vCPUs, which exist from the
>     target's first KVM_RUN; before that the guest gets
>     INVALID_PARAMETERS.
> 
>   - A vCPU EL2 holds powered off doesn't run: handle___kvm_vcpu_run()
>     returns ARM_EXCEPTION_IL, reported as KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY. Its
>     existing bail-outs return the same code instead of an -EINVAL that
>     handle_exit() didn't recognise, for every hyp vCPU.
> 
> Non-protected VMs keep power_state ON and accept any mp_state.
> 
> Each protected vCPU is OFF, ON_PENDING or ON. CPU_ON moves the target
> to ON_PENDING, and the target's next run resets it and moves it to ON.
> The racing transitions are cmpxchg, and the reset state is published
> with a release/acquire pair, documented at each site. CPU_OFF publishes
> OFF with a release, so the target's clear of reset_state.reset is
> ordered before it and a CPU_ON that then wins on OFF republishes after
> the clear. Rolling a CPU_ON the host failed back to OFF needs the
> host's return value, which the per-EC marshalling patch delivers along
> with the rollback. Until then such a target stays ON_PENDING, and the
> reset has no observable effect: flush_hyp_vcpu() copies the host's
> context in on every entry until that patch removes the copy, so the
> target enters on the host's values rather than the ones EL2 reset.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/pkvm.h |  14 ++
>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c     |  25 ++-
>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c         | 283 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  3 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 

[...]

> +
> +/*
> + * Returns true when handled at EL2, false when the host must wake the target
> + * vCPU.
> + */
> +static bool pvm_psci_vcpu_on(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
> +{
> +	struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm = pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(hyp_vcpu);
> +	struct vcpu_reset_state *reset_state;
> +	struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *target;
> +	unsigned long cpu_id, ret;
> +	int power_state;
> +
> +	cpu_id = smccc_get_arg1(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
> +	if (!kvm_psci_valid_affinity(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu, cpu_id)) {
> +		ret = PSCI_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
> +		goto error;
> +	}
> +
> +	target = pkvm_mpidr_to_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vm, cpu_id);
> +	if (!target) {
> +		ret = PSCI_RET_INVALID_PARAMS;
> +		goto error;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * vCPUs race to power on the same target. Relaxed: reset_state
> +	 * is published by the release on reset_state.reset below.
> +	 */
> +	power_state = cmpxchg_relaxed(&target->power_state,
> +				      PSCI_0_2_AFFINITY_LEVEL_OFF,
> +				      PSCI_0_2_AFFINITY_LEVEL_ON_PENDING);
> +	switch (power_state) {
> +	case PSCI_0_2_AFFINITY_LEVEL_ON_PENDING:
> +		ret = PSCI_RET_ON_PENDING;
> +		goto error;
> +	case PSCI_0_2_AFFINITY_LEVEL_ON:
> +		ret = PSCI_RET_ALREADY_ON;
> +		goto error;
> +	case PSCI_0_2_AFFINITY_LEVEL_OFF:
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		ret = PSCI_RET_INTERNAL_FAILURE;
> +		goto error;
> +	}
> +
> +	reset_state = &target->vcpu.arch.reset_state;
> +	reset_state->pc = smccc_get_arg2(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
> +	reset_state->r0 = smccc_get_arg3(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
> +	reset_state->be = kvm_vcpu_is_be(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
> +	/*
> +	 * Publish reset_state.{pc, r0, be} to the target vCPU. Pairs with
> +	 * smp_load_acquire(&reset_state->reset) in pkvm_reset_vcpu().
> +	 */
> +	smp_store_release(&reset_state->reset, true);
> +
> +	/* The host requests KVM_REQ_VCPU_RESET and wakes the target. */
> +	return false;
> +
> +error:
> +	smccc_set_retval(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu, ret, 0, 0, 0);
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Returns true when handled at EL2, false when the host must stop scheduling
> + * the vCPU.
> + */
> +static bool pvm_psci_vcpu_off(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
> +{
> +	/* No other writer runs while this vCPU is ON and executing. */
> +	WARN_ON(READ_ONCE(hyp_vcpu->power_state) != PSCI_0_2_AFFINITY_LEVEL_ON);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Orders pkvm_reset_vcpu()'s clear of reset_state.reset before OFF, so
> +	 * a CPU_ON that wins on OFF republishes after it. Pairs with the
> +	 * cmpxchg in pvm_psci_vcpu_on().
> +	 */
> +	smp_store_release(&hyp_vcpu->power_state, PSCI_0_2_AFFINITY_LEVEL_OFF);

Is there an issue either with the comment or with pvm_psci_vcpu_on()? the
cmpxchg is relaxed. I would have expected cmpxchg_acquire().

> +
> +	/* Return to the host so that it can finish powering off the vcpu. */
> +	return false;
> +}
> +

[...]

-- 
Vincent

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-22 17:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-14 11:33 [PATCH v3 00/18] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 01/18] KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 02/18] KVM: arm64: Validate the host vCPU's VM before reading it " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 03/18] KVM: arm64: Pin the host vCPU before adjusting its PC " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 13:01   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-14 14:00     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 04/18] KVM: arm64: Disable steal time for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-22 14:34   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 05/18] KVM: arm64: Introduce per-EC entry handlers for pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 06/18] KVM: arm64: Skip fixed-feature state flush for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 13:42   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-14 14:27     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 07/18] KVM: arm64: Add {flush,sync}_hyp_timer_state() primitives Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 08/18] KVM: arm64: Add system register reset framework for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 09/18] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC handling for protected guests at EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 10/18] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-22 16:35   ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-22 16:37     ` Vincent Donnefort
2026-09-22 17:07   ` Vincent Donnefort [this message]
2026-09-23  9:51     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-24  8:30       ` Will Deacon
2026-09-24 11:26         ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-24 12:14           ` Will Deacon
2026-09-24 15:21             ` Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 12:58               ` Will Deacon
2026-10-01 13:11                 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-10-01 12:59   ` Will Deacon
2026-10-01 13:11     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 11/18] KVM: arm64: Restrict KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT and PSCI version for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 12/18] KVM: arm64: Prevent host PC adjustments for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 13:42   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-14 14:43     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-15 11:02       ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-15 11:19         ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 13/18] KVM: arm64: Inject an UNDEF at EL2 for unhandled protected guest exits Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 14/18] KVM: arm64: Add per-EC entry/exit state marshalling for protected guests Fuad Tabba
2026-09-16 16:27   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-16 19:05     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 15/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host access to protected VM private state Fuad Tabba
2026-09-16 16:30   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-16 19:07     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-17  8:06       ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-17 18:42         ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-18 13:21         ` Will Deacon
2026-09-18 13:24           ` Will Deacon
2026-09-27  8:20           ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-27 12:37             ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-28 19:00             ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 16/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host power-on of a vCPU that EL2 holds powered off Fuad Tabba
2026-09-16 16:43   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-16 19:08     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 17/18] KVM: arm64: Advertise the capabilities that protected VMs support Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 16:23   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-14 18:01     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 18/18] KVM: arm64: Document the protected VM userspace API Fuad Tabba

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