From: "Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" <halg@google.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Jonathan Calmels" <jcalmels@3xx0.net>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
containers@lists.linux.dev, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" <halg@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/4] capability: bound ptrace and cred subset checks by userns ceilings
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 10:42:06 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261119104208.782900-3-halg@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261119104208.782900-1-halg@google.com>
Same-namespace ptrace checks only compare cap_permitted (or
cap_effective), ignoring the userns capability ceiling. As a result, a
task with a lowered ceiling could trace a less-restricted same-UID task
in the same user namespace and use it to create a wider child user
namespace.
Require the tracee's cred_userns_bset() to be a subset of the tracer's
in the same-namespace check in cap_ptrace_access_check() and
cap_ptrace_traceme(). Cross-namespace implicit CAP_SYS_PTRACE via user
namespace ownership is already bounded by cap_capable_helper(), while
tracers holding explicit CAP_SYS_PTRACE retain access.
Also update cred_cap_issubset() so commit_creds() resets mm->dumpable
and pdeath_signal whenever a credential transition widens the effective
userns capability ceiling.
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson <halg@google.com>
---
kernel/cred.c | 13 +++++++++----
security/commoncap.c | 12 ++++++++----
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index d01df40a9a38..968122cdbf07 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -335,17 +335,22 @@ static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset)
* the capabilities of subset are a subset of set.
*/
if (set_ns == subset_ns)
- return cap_issubset(subset->cap_permitted, set->cap_permitted);
+ return cap_issubset(subset->cap_permitted,
+ set->cap_permitted) &&
+ cap_issubset(cred_userns_bset(subset),
+ cred_userns_bset(set));
/* The credentials are in a different user namespaces
* therefore one is a subset of the other only if a set is an
* ancestor of subset and set->euid is owner of subset or one
- * of subsets ancestors.
+ * of subsets ancestors, and set's userns capability ceiling
+ * covers subset's capabilities.
*/
for (;subset_ns != &init_user_ns; subset_ns = subset_ns->parent) {
- if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent) &&
+ if (set_ns == subset_ns->parent &&
uid_eq(subset_ns->owner, set->euid))
- return true;
+ return cap_issubset(subset_ns->cap_bset,
+ cred_userns_bset(set));
}
return false;
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ddac8e917680..786f99eb6838 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
* @mode: The mode of attachment.
*
* If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target
- * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
+ * task's capabilities (including its userns capability ceiling), then
+ * ptrace access is allowed.
* If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace
* access is allowed.
* Else denied.
@@ -179,7 +180,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
else
caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
- cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
+ cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps) &&
+ cap_issubset(cred_userns_bset(child_cred), cred_userns_bset(cred)))
goto out;
if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
@@ -194,7 +196,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
* @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
*
* If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's
- * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
+ * capabilities (including its userns capability ceiling), then ptrace
+ * access is allowed.
* If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace
* access is allowed.
* Else denied.
@@ -211,7 +214,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
cred = __task_cred(parent);
child_cred = current_cred();
if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
- cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+ cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted) &&
+ cap_issubset(cred_userns_bset(child_cred), cred_userns_bset(cred)))
goto out;
if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
--
2.56.1.708.g77570a6a1d-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 10:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-19 10:42 [PATCH v2 0/4] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 11:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:35 ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 15:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:19 ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 20:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-20 17:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-19 10:42 ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson [this message]
2026-11-19 10:51 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] capability: bound ptrace and cred subset checks by userns ceilings sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] proc: expose userns capability mask as CapUns in /proc/<pid>/status Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] selftests/capabilities: add userns capability bounding set tests Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:47 ` sashiko-bot
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