From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] capability: bound ptrace and cred subset checks by userns ceilings
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 10:51:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-222988@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261119104208.782900-3-halg@google.com>
> Same-namespace ptrace checks only compare cap_permitted (or
> cap_effective), ignoring the userns capability ceiling. As a result, a
> task with a lowered ceiling could trace a less-restricted same-UID task
> in the same user namespace and use it to create a wider child user
> namespace.
>
> Require the tracee's cred_userns_bset() to be a subset of the tracer's
> in the same-namespace check in cap_ptrace_access_check() and
> cap_ptrace_traceme(). Cross-namespace implicit CAP_SYS_PTRACE via user
> namespace ownership is already bounded by cap_capable_helper(), while
> tracers holding explicit CAP_SYS_PTRACE retain access.
>
> Also update cred_cap_issubset() so commit_creds() resets mm->dumpable
> and pdeath_signal whenever a credential transition widens the effective
> userns capability ceiling.
>
> Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson <halg@google.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261119104208.782900-1-halg@google.com?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 10:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-19 10:42 [PATCH v2 0/4] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 11:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:35 ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 15:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:19 ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 20:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-20 17:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] capability: bound ptrace and cred subset checks by userns ceilings Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:51 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] proc: expose userns capability mask as CapUns in /proc/<pid>/status Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] selftests/capabilities: add userns capability bounding set tests Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:47 ` sashiko-bot
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