From: "Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" <halg@google.com>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Jonathan Calmels" <jcalmels@3xx0.net>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:35:04 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <awAwaJugal622uZf@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <sashiko-outbox-223014@kernel.org>
On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 11:11:50AM +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> [Severity: Medium]
> Does bounding implicit owner capabilities by userns_has_cap(ns, cap) break
> cap_ptrace_access_check() and cap_ptrace_traceme() for a parent namespace
> owner when CAP_SYS_PTRACE is excluded from the child namespace's cap_bset?
This is working as intended. Implicit parent-owner capabilities in
cap_capable_helper() are uniformly bounded by the owned namespace's
cap_bset.
Concretely, this only prevents an unprivileged parent task from
getting implicit CAP_SYS_PTRACE via ownership of a child userns
where CAP_SYS_PTRACE was explicitly stripped. Holding explicit
CAP_SYS_PTRACE in an ancestor userns (or owning an ancestor userns
that still includes CAP_SYS_PTRACE) still allows tracing.
This is also unlikely to come up in practice, since typical denylist
configurations would only strip high-risk capabilities like
CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW.
If we wanted to make an exception for ptrace() to still allow
same-UID owner tracing when CAP_SYS_PTRACE is stripped,
cap_ptrace_access_check() and cap_ptrace_traceme() already allow
same-userns tracing without CAP_SYS_PTRACE when the target's
capabilities (and userns ceiling) are a subset of the tracer's.
Extending that check across owned namespaces (similar to
cred_cap_issubset()) would be straightforward, though I'd prefer
to keep the stricter, uniform behavior in v2 unless there are
objections.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 11:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-19 10:42 [PATCH v2 0/4] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 11:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:35 ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson [this message]
2026-11-19 15:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 19:19 ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 20:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-20 17:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] capability: bound ptrace and cred subset checks by userns ceilings Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:51 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] proc: expose userns capability mask as CapUns in /proc/<pid>/status Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 10:42 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] selftests/capabilities: add userns capability bounding set tests Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-19 10:47 ` sashiko-bot
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