* [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
2026-11-20 11:13 [PATCH v4 0/9] nvme-auth: switch to use the kernel keyring Hannes Reinecke
@ 2026-11-20 11:14 ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:32 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2026-11-20 11:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Keith Busch, Jens Axboe, Christoph Hellwig, Sagi Grimberg,
Hannes Reinecke, Chaitanya Kulkarni
Cc: linux-nvme, linux-kernel, Hannes Reinecke
We really should parse the dhchap keys during option parsing to avoid
having to pass around the plain dhchap secret. During options parsing
we will create a 'dhchap' key with a random UUID as description, and
store the key serial in the 'opts' structure.
This simplifies key handling as on every access the key needs to be
looked up and checked for validity before accessing the key data.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nvme/host/auth.c | 118 +++++++++++++++++++---------
drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c | 84 +++++++++++++-------
drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h | 8 +-
drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c | 186 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 276 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
index 0ddf3834f4ea2bfedaf08b901db282b79df32879..c189096f825eab4e3053021d7437423ecb049c79 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
@@ -940,11 +940,6 @@ int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid)
return -ENOKEY;
}
- if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret && !ctrl->ctrl_key) {
- dev_warn(ctrl->device, "qid %d: invalid ctrl key\n", qid);
- return -ENOKEY;
- }
-
chap = &ctrl->dhchap_ctxs[qid];
cancel_work_sync(&chap->auth_work);
queue_work(nvme_auth_wq, &chap->auth_work);
@@ -1029,6 +1024,29 @@ static void nvme_ctrl_auth_work(struct work_struct *work)
}
}
+static void nvme_auth_clear_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, bool is_ctrl)
+{
+ struct key *key;
+
+ if (is_ctrl) {
+ key = ctrl->ctrl_key;
+ ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
+ } else {
+ key = ctrl->host_key;
+ ctrl->host_key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (key) {
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: revoke dhchap%s key %08x\n",
+ __func__, is_ctrl ? " ctrl" : " host",
+ key_serial(key));
+ key_revoke(key);
+ key_put(key);
+ }
+}
+
+#define nvme_auth_clear_host_key(c) nvme_auth_clear_key(c, false)
+#define nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(c) nvme_auth_clear_key(c, true)
+
int nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
{
struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap;
@@ -1038,31 +1056,68 @@ int nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
INIT_WORK(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work, nvme_ctrl_auth_work);
if (!ctrl->opts)
return 0;
- ctrl->host_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(ctrl->opts->keyring,
- ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret,
- strlen(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret));
- if (IS_ERR(ctrl->host_key)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->host_key);
- ctrl->host_key = NULL;
- return ret;
+ if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_key) {
+ nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
+ nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
+ return 0;
}
+ if (!ctrl->host_key)
+ nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
- ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(ctrl->opts->keyring,
- ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret,
- strlen(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret));
- if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
- ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
- goto err_free_dhchap_secret;
+ ctrl->host_key = key_get(ctrl->opts->dhchap_key);
+ if (!ctrl->host_key) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "dhchap host key %08x not present\n",
+ key_serial(ctrl->opts->dhchap_key));
+ return -ENOKEY;
}
+ down_read(&ctrl->host_key->sem);
+ ret = key_validate(ctrl->host_key);
+ up_read(&ctrl->host_key->sem);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "dhchap host key %08x invalidated\n",
+ key_serial(ctrl->host_key));
+ key_put(ctrl->host_key);
+ ctrl->host_key = NULL;
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: using dhchap host key %08x\n",
+ __func__, key_serial(ctrl->host_key));
- if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret && !ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
- return 0;
+ if (ctrl->ctrl_key)
+ nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
+
+ if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key) {
+ ctrl->ctrl_key = key_get(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key);
+ if (!ctrl->ctrl_key) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "dhchap ctrl key %08x not present\n",
+ key_serial(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key));
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
+ down_read(&ctrl->ctrl_key->sem);
+ ret = key_validate(ctrl->ctrl_key);
+ up_read(&ctrl->ctrl_key->sem);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "dhchap ctrl key %08x invalidated\n",
+ key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
+ key_put(ctrl->ctrl_key);
+ ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
+ return -EKEYREVOKED;
+ }
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: using dhchap ctrl key %08x\n",
+ __func__, key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
+ }
ctrl->dhchap_ctxs = kvzalloc_objs(*chap, ctrl_max_dhchaps(ctrl));
if (!ctrl->dhchap_ctxs) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto err_free_dhchap_ctrl_secret;
+ nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
+ nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
for (i = 0; i < ctrl_max_dhchaps(ctrl); i++) {
@@ -1074,13 +1129,6 @@ int nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
}
return 0;
-err_free_dhchap_ctrl_secret:
- key_put(ctrl->ctrl_key);
- ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
-err_free_dhchap_secret:
- key_put(ctrl->host_key);
- ctrl->host_key = NULL;
- return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_init_ctrl);
@@ -1099,14 +1147,8 @@ void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
nvme_auth_free_dhchap(&ctrl->dhchap_ctxs[i]);
kvfree(ctrl->dhchap_ctxs);
}
- if (ctrl->host_key) {
- key_put(ctrl->host_key);
- ctrl->host_key = NULL;
- }
- if (ctrl->ctrl_key) {
- key_put(ctrl->ctrl_key);
- ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
- }
+ nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
+ nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_free);
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
index 5ed91557f07065a284e664950a9c71d771614ec2..7ed8618257ca9fadc65202261a86b7ead209df7c 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include "nvme.h"
#include "fabrics.h"
+#include <linux/nvme-auth.h>
#include <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
static DECLARE_RWSEM(nvmf_transports_rwsem);
@@ -717,6 +718,7 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
char *options, *o, *p;
+ char *host_secret = NULL, *ctrl_secret = NULL;
int token, ret = 0;
size_t nqnlen = 0;
int ctrl_loss_tmo = NVMF_DEF_CTRL_LOSS_TMO, key_id;
@@ -738,6 +740,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
opts->tls_key = NULL;
opts->keyring = NULL;
opts->concat = false;
+ opts->dhchap_key = NULL;
+ opts->dhchap_ctrl_key = NULL;
options = o = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!options)
@@ -1020,14 +1024,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
- if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
- pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
- kfree_sensitive(p);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
- opts->dhchap_secret = p;
+ kfree_sensitive(host_secret);
+ host_secret = p;
break;
case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_CTRL_SECRET:
p = match_strdup(args);
@@ -1035,14 +1033,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
- if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
- pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
- kfree_sensitive(p);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
- opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret = p;
+ kfree_sensitive(ctrl_secret);
+ ctrl_secret = p;
break;
case NVMF_OPT_TLS:
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_TCP_TLS)) {
@@ -1086,6 +1078,41 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
pr_warn("failfast tmo (%d) larger than controller loss tmo (%d)\n",
opts->fast_io_fail_tmo, ctrl_loss_tmo);
}
+
+ opts->host = nvmf_host_add(hostnqn, &hostid);
+ if (IS_ERR(opts->host)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(opts->host);
+ opts->host = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (host_secret) {
+ pr_debug("lookup host identity '%s'\n", host_secret);
+ key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, host_secret,
+ strlen(host_secret));
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(key);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pr_debug("using dhchap host key %08x\n", key_serial(key));
+ opts->dhchap_key = key;
+ }
+ if (ctrl_secret) {
+ if (!opts->dhchap_key) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pr_debug("lookup ctrl identity '%s'\n", ctrl_secret);
+ key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, ctrl_secret,
+ strlen(ctrl_secret));
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(key);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pr_debug("using dhchap ctrl key %08x\n", key_serial(key));
+ opts->dhchap_ctrl_key = key;
+ }
+
if (opts->concat) {
if (opts->tls) {
pr_err("Secure concatenation over TLS is not supported\n");
@@ -1097,21 +1124,16 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- if (!opts->dhchap_secret) {
+ if (!opts->dhchap_key) {
pr_err("Need to enable DH-CHAP for secure concatenation\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
- opts->host = nvmf_host_add(hostnqn, &hostid);
- if (IS_ERR(opts->host)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(opts->host);
- opts->host = NULL;
- goto out;
- }
-
out:
+ kfree_sensitive(ctrl_secret);
+ kfree_sensitive(host_secret);
kfree(options);
return ret;
}
@@ -1304,8 +1326,18 @@ void nvmf_free_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts)
kfree(opts->subsysnqn);
kfree(opts->host_traddr);
kfree(opts->host_iface);
- kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
- kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
+ if (opts->dhchap_key) {
+ pr_debug("revoke dhchap host key %08x\n",
+ key_serial(opts->dhchap_key));
+ key_revoke(opts->dhchap_key);
+ key_put(opts->dhchap_key);
+ }
+ if (opts->dhchap_ctrl_key) {
+ pr_debug("revoke dhchap ctrl key %08x\n",
+ key_serial(opts->dhchap_ctrl_key));
+ key_revoke(opts->dhchap_key);
+ key_put(opts->dhchap_ctrl_key);
+ }
kfree(opts);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_free_options);
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h
index caf5503d0833296aa03c028c0199cf92cc409edc..786f1b4819f076ac1f133070523be1780ec4d8b7 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ enum {
* @discovery_nqn: indicates if the subsysnqn is the well-known discovery NQN.
* @kato: Keep-alive timeout.
* @host: Virtual NVMe host, contains the NQN and Host ID.
- * @dhchap_secret: DH-HMAC-CHAP secret
- * @dhchap_ctrl_secret: DH-HMAC-CHAP controller secret for bi-directional
+ * @dhchap_key: DH-HMAC-CHAP pre-shared key
+ * @dhchap_ctrl_key: DH-HMAC-CHAP controller pre-shared key for bi-directional
* authentication
* @keyring: Keyring to use for key lookups
* @tls_key: TLS key for encrypted connections (TCP)
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ struct nvmf_ctrl_options {
bool duplicate_connect;
unsigned int kato;
struct nvmf_host *host;
- char *dhchap_secret;
- char *dhchap_ctrl_secret;
+ struct key *dhchap_key;
+ struct key *dhchap_ctrl_key;
struct key *keyring;
struct key *tls_key;
bool tls;
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
index a5c1511e49ac275e75a70ff89958ed8f0cb2c633..1311f5e29b004436e39a723242748a150e36dc68 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
*/
#include <linux/nvme-auth.h>
+#include <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include "nvme.h"
@@ -818,11 +820,23 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_secret_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
+ struct key *key = ctrl->host_key;
+ ssize_t count;
- if (!opts->dhchap_secret)
+ if (!key)
return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
- return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_secret);
+ down_read(&key->sem);
+ if (key_validate(key))
+ count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>\n");
+ else {
+ count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (count > 0) {
+ buf[count] = '\n';
+ count++;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&key->sem);
+ return count;
}
static ssize_t dhchap_secret_store(struct device *dev,
@@ -830,36 +844,47 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_secret_store(struct device *dev,
{
struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
+ struct key *key, *old_key;
char *dhchap_secret;
+ size_t len;
+ int ret;
- if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (count < 7)
+ if (!ctrl->host_key || !count)
return -EINVAL;
- dhchap_secret = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ len = strcspn(buf, "\n");
+ dhchap_secret = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dhchap_secret)
return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(dhchap_secret, buf, count);
+ memcpy(dhchap_secret, buf, len);
nvme_auth_stop(ctrl);
- if (strcmp(dhchap_secret, opts->dhchap_secret)) {
- struct key *key, *host_key;
-
- key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, dhchap_secret,
- count);
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- kfree_sensitive(dhchap_secret);
- return PTR_ERR(key);
- }
- kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
- opts->dhchap_secret = dhchap_secret;
- host_key = ctrl->host_key;
- mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
- ctrl->host_key = key;
- mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
- key_put(host_key);
- } else
+
+ key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, dhchap_secret, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
kfree_sensitive(dhchap_secret);
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+ }
+ down_read(&key->sem);
+ ret = key_validate(key);
+ up_read(&key->sem);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->dev, "key %08x invalidated\n", key_serial(key));
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->dev, "revoke host key %08x\n", key_serial(key));
+ key_revoke(key);
+ key_put(key);
+ kfree_sensitive(dhchap_secret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ old_key = ctrl->host_key;
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->dev, "revoke host key %08x\n",
+ key_serial(old_key));
+ key_revoke(old_key);
+
+ ctrl->host_key = key;
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ key_put(old_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(dhchap_secret);
/* Start re-authentication */
dev_info(ctrl->device, "re-authenticating controller\n");
queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_work);
@@ -873,11 +898,23 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
+ struct key *key = ctrl->ctrl_key;
+ size_t count;
- if (!opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
+ if (!key)
return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
- return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
+ down_read(&key->sem);
+ if (key_validate(key))
+ count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>");
+ else {
+ count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (count > 0) {
+ buf[count] = '\n';
+ count++;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&key->sem);
+ return count;
}
static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_store(struct device *dev,
@@ -885,38 +922,46 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_store(struct device *dev,
{
struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
+ struct key *key, *old_key;
char *dhchap_secret;
+ size_t len;
+ int ret;
- if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (count < 7)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (memcmp(buf, "DHHC-1:", 7))
+ if (!ctrl->ctrl_key || !count)
return -EINVAL;
- dhchap_secret = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ len = strcspn(buf, "\n");
+ dhchap_secret = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dhchap_secret)
return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(dhchap_secret, buf, count);
+ memcpy(dhchap_secret, buf, len);
nvme_auth_stop(ctrl);
- if (strcmp(dhchap_secret, opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)) {
- struct key *key, *ctrl_key;
-
- key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, dhchap_secret,
- count);
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- kfree_sensitive(dhchap_secret);
- return PTR_ERR(key);
- }
- kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
- opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret = dhchap_secret;
- ctrl_key = ctrl->ctrl_key;
- mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
- ctrl->ctrl_key = key;
- mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
- key_put(ctrl_key);
- } else
+ key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, dhchap_secret, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
kfree_sensitive(dhchap_secret);
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+ }
+ down_read(&key->sem);
+ ret = key_validate(key);
+ up_read(&key->sem);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->dev, "key %08x invalidated\n", key_serial(key));
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->dev, "revoke ctrl key %08x\n", key_serial(key));
+ key_revoke(key);
+ key_put(key);
+ kfree_sensitive(dhchap_secret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ old_key = ctrl->ctrl_key;
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->dev, "revoke ctrl key %08x\n",
+ key_serial(old_key));
+ key_revoke(old_key);
+
+ ctrl->ctrl_key = key;
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ key_put(old_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(dhchap_secret);
/* Start re-authentication */
dev_info(ctrl->device, "re-authenticating controller\n");
queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_work);
@@ -925,6 +970,41 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_store(struct device *dev,
}
static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RW(dhchap_ctrl_secret);
+
+static ssize_t dhchap_key_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ struct key *key = ctrl->host_key;
+ size_t count;
+
+ if (!key)
+ return 0;
+ down_read(&key->sem);
+ if (key_validate(key))
+ count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>\n");
+ else {
+ count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (count > 0) {
+ buf[count] = '\n';
+ count++;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&key->sem);
+ return count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(dhchap_key);
+
+static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_key_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+ if (!ctrl->ctrl_key)
+ return 0;
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%08x\n", key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(dhchap_ctrl_key);
#endif
static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
@@ -956,6 +1036,8 @@ static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH
&dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr,
&dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_secret.attr,
+ &dev_attr_dhchap_key.attr,
+ &dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_key.attr,
#endif
&dev_attr_adm_passthru_err_log_enabled.attr,
NULL
--
2.51.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing Hannes Reinecke
@ 2026-11-20 11:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 13:55 ` Hannes Reinecke
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-20 11:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Hannes Reinecke; +Cc: linux-nvme
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 7 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] nvme-fabrics: wrong key revoked in nvmf_free_options() for
dhchap_ctrl_key
- [High] nvme: build failure in nvmf_parse_options() and sysfs.c without
auth/keyring
- [High] nvme: removing secret length checks exposes underflows in key
preparsing
- [Medium] nvme: out-of-bounds write on read error in
dhchap_ctrl_secret_show()
- [Medium] nvme-auth: host_key ref leak and inverted check in
nvme_auth_init_ctrl()
- [Medium] nvme: unlocked host_key and ctrl_key access in dhchap sysfs
show callbacks
- [Low] nvme: check !ctrl->opts for dhchap_key attrs in
nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible()
--
commit ddf0d4926edd9ec44ea25839b02c0ba20380f64e
Author: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
This commit parses DH-HMAC-CHAP secrets into struct key pointers during
fabric option parsing instead of storing raw secret strings in
nvmf_ctrl_options, and adds sysfs attributes to expose the host and
controller key serials.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
> index 0ddf3834f4ea2..c189096f825ea 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1038,31 +1056,68 @@ int nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
> INIT_WORK(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work, nvme_ctrl_auth_work);
> if (!ctrl->opts)
> return 0;
> - ctrl->host_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(ctrl->opts->keyring,
> - ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret,
> - strlen(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret));
> - if (IS_ERR(ctrl->host_key)) {
> - ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->host_key);
> - ctrl->host_key = NULL;
> - return ret;
> + if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_key) {
> + nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
> + nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
> + return 0;
> }
> + if (!ctrl->host_key)
> + nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
>
> - ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(ctrl->opts->keyring,
> - ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret,
> - strlen(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret));
> - if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
> - ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
> - ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
> - goto err_free_dhchap_secret;
> + ctrl->host_key = key_get(ctrl->opts->dhchap_key);
> + if (!ctrl->host_key) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap host key %08x not present\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->opts->dhchap_key));
> + return -ENOKEY;
> }
> + down_read(&ctrl->host_key->sem);
> + ret = key_validate(ctrl->host_key);
> + up_read(&ctrl->host_key->sem);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap host key %08x invalidated\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->host_key));
> + key_put(ctrl->host_key);
> + ctrl->host_key = NULL;
> + return -ENOKEY;
> + }
> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
> + "%s: using dhchap host key %08x\n",
> + __func__, key_serial(ctrl->host_key));
>
> - if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret && !ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
> - return 0;
> + if (ctrl->ctrl_key)
> + nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
> +
> + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key) {
> + ctrl->ctrl_key = key_get(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key);
> + if (!ctrl->ctrl_key) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap ctrl key %08x not present\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key));
> + return -ENOKEY;
> + }
> + down_read(&ctrl->ctrl_key->sem);
> + ret = key_validate(ctrl->ctrl_key);
> + up_read(&ctrl->ctrl_key->sem);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
> + "dhchap ctrl key %08x invalidated\n",
> + key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
> + key_put(ctrl->ctrl_key);
> + ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
> + return -EKEYREVOKED;
> + }
[Severity: Medium]
Do the error returns in the ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key block leak the
ctrl->host_key reference taken earlier in nvme_auth_init_ctrl()?
When nvme_auth_init_ctrl() fails, nvme_init_ctrl() jumps to
out_release_instance before initializing ctrl->ctrl_device, so
nvme_auth_free() is never called on that error path.
Also, the check before nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl) is inverted
(!ctrl->host_key instead of ctrl->host_key), and nvme_init_ctrl() calls
nvme_auth_init_ctrl() before assigning ctrl->device = &ctrl->ctrl_device,
so the dev_warn() and dev_dbg() calls here pass a NULL ctrl->device.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
> index 5ed91557f0706..7ed8618257ca9 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1020,14 +1024,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> }
> - if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
> - pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
> - kfree_sensitive(p);
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
> - opts->dhchap_secret = p;
> + kfree_sensitive(host_secret);
> + host_secret = p;
> break;
> case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_CTRL_SECRET:
> p = match_strdup(args);
> @@ -1035,14 +1033,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> }
> - if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
> - pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
> - kfree_sensitive(p);
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> - opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret = p;
> + kfree_sensitive(ctrl_secret);
> + ctrl_secret = p;
> break;
[Severity: High]
Does removing the minimum length checks here and in dhchap_secret_store() /
dhchap_ctrl_secret_store() allow short secret strings to underflow datalen
and ret in nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse()?
drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c:nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse() {
...
if (sscanf(prep->data, "DHHC-%01hhu:%02hhu:%*s",
&version, &hmac) != 2) {
...
}
/* skip header and final ':' character */
datalen -= 11;
}
Because %*s is assignment-suppressed and %02hhu matches one or two digits,
sscanf() returns 2 for 8- to 10-byte strings such as "DHHC-1:0:a", causing
unsigned datalen -= 11 to wrap around and wrap the kzalloc() size
calculation sizeof(*upayload) + datalen. For 11- to 15-byte inputs such as
"DHHC-1:00:a" where base64_decode() returns 0..3, ret -= 4 in
nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse() becomes negative and is passed as an unsigned
length to crc32(~0, upayload->data, ret), reading out-of-bounds across
kernel memory.
[ ... ]
> @@ -1086,6 +1078,41 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
> pr_warn("failfast tmo (%d) larger than controller loss tmo (%d)\n",
> opts->fast_io_fail_tmo, ctrl_loss_tmo);
> }
> +
> + opts->host = nvmf_host_add(hostnqn, &hostid);
> + if (IS_ERR(opts->host)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(opts->host);
> + opts->host = NULL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (host_secret) {
> + pr_debug("lookup host identity '%s'\n", host_secret);
> + key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, host_secret,
> + strlen(host_secret));
> + if (IS_ERR(key)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(key);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + pr_debug("using dhchap host key %08x\n", key_serial(key));
> + opts->dhchap_key = key;
> + }
> + if (ctrl_secret) {
> + if (!opts->dhchap_key) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + pr_debug("lookup ctrl identity '%s'\n", ctrl_secret);
> + key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, ctrl_secret,
> + strlen(ctrl_secret));
[Severity: High]
Does calling nvme_auth_extract_key() unconditionally here break the build
when CONFIG_NVME_FABRICS is enabled without CONFIG_NVME_AUTH (or when
CONFIG_NVME_FABRICS=y and CONFIG_NVME_AUTH=m)?
include/linux/nvme-auth.h declares nvme_auth_extract_key() without a
!CONFIG_NVME_AUTH stub, and match_token() is an external call so the
compiler cannot dead-code-eliminate the host_secret and ctrl_secret
branches when CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH is disabled.
In addition, drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c now includes <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
unconditionally, which fails to compile when CONFIG_NVME_KEYRING is
disabled due to a stray semicolon and a non-inline function definition in
the fallback block:
include/linux/nvme-keyring.h:
static inline struct key *nvme_dhchap_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn, u8 hmac);
{
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
u8 nvme_dhchap_psk_hash(struct key *key)
{
return 0;
}
[ ... ]
> @@ -1304,8 +1326,18 @@ void nvmf_free_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts)
> kfree(opts->subsysnqn);
> kfree(opts->host_traddr);
> kfree(opts->host_iface);
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> + if (opts->dhchap_key) {
> + pr_debug("revoke dhchap host key %08x\n",
> + key_serial(opts->dhchap_key));
> + key_revoke(opts->dhchap_key);
> + key_put(opts->dhchap_key);
> + }
> + if (opts->dhchap_ctrl_key) {
> + pr_debug("revoke dhchap ctrl key %08x\n",
> + key_serial(opts->dhchap_ctrl_key));
> + key_revoke(opts->dhchap_key);
> + key_put(opts->dhchap_ctrl_key);
> + }
[Severity: High]
In the opts->dhchap_ctrl_key block, should key_revoke() be passed
opts->dhchap_ctrl_key instead of opts->dhchap_key? Passing
opts->dhchap_key dereferences the host key after key_put(opts->dhchap_key)
has already dropped its reference, and leaves opts->dhchap_ctrl_key
unrevoked.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
> index a5c1511e49ac2..1311f5e29b004 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -818,11 +820,23 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_secret_show(struct device *dev,
> struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> {
> struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> - struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
> + struct key *key = ctrl->host_key;
> + ssize_t count;
>
> - if (!opts->dhchap_secret)
> + if (!key)
> return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
> - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_secret);
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + if (key_validate(key))
> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>\n");
> + else {
> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (count > 0) {
> + buf[count] = '\n';
> + count++;
> + }
> + }
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return count;
> }
[ ... ]
> @@ -830,36 +844,47 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_secret_store(struct device *dev,
[ ... ]
> + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
> + old_key = ctrl->host_key;
> + dev_dbg(ctrl->dev, "revoke host key %08x\n",
> + key_serial(old_key));
> + key_revoke(old_key);
> +
> + ctrl->host_key = key;
> + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
> + key_put(old_key);
[Severity: Medium]
Can a concurrent read of dhchap_secret (or dhchap_ctrl_secret, dhchap_key,
or dhchap_ctrl_key) race with dhchap_secret_store() or
dhchap_ctrl_secret_store() and trigger a use-after-free on the old key?
CPU0 CPU1
dhchap_secret_show()
key = ctrl->host_key;
dhchap_secret_store()
mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
old_key = ctrl->host_key;
key_revoke(old_key);
ctrl->host_key = key;
mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
key_put(old_key); <-- frees old_key
down_read(&key->sem); <-- use-after-free
None of dhchap_secret_show(), dhchap_ctrl_secret_show(), dhchap_key_show(),
or dhchap_ctrl_key_show() hold ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex or take a key_get()
reference before dereferencing ctrl->host_key or ctrl->ctrl_key. Once a
key has been replaced via sysfs store (so opts->dhchap_key no longer holds
a reference), ctrl->host_key holds the only reference, and key_put(old_key)
frees it while a concurrent show callback is using it.
> @@ -873,11 +898,23 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_show(struct device *dev,
> struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> {
> struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> - struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
> + struct key *key = ctrl->ctrl_key;
> + size_t count;
>
> - if (!opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
> + if (!key)
> return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
> - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + if (key_validate(key))
> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>");
> + else {
> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (count > 0) {
> + buf[count] = '\n';
> + count++;
> + }
> + }
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return count;
> }
[Severity: Medium]
Can a negative error return from key->type->read() cause an out-of-bounds
write before buf in dhchap_ctrl_secret_show() and dhchap_key_show()?
Unlike dhchap_secret_show(), which declares ssize_t count, both
dhchap_ctrl_secret_show() and dhchap_key_show() declare count as unsigned
size_t. If key->type->read() returns a negative error code (such as
-EINVAL), count wraps to a large positive value, passes count > 0, and
writes '\n' to buf[count] out-of-bounds. Commit "nvme: allow to pass in
key description as dhchap secret" later in this series replaces
key->type->read() in dhchap_key_show(), but dhchap_ctrl_secret_show()
retains the unsigned size_t count and also omits the trailing newline on
"<invalidated>".
[ ... ]
> @@ -925,6 +970,41 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_store(struct device *dev,
> }
>
> static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RW(dhchap_ctrl_secret);
> +
> +static ssize_t dhchap_key_show(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> + struct key *key = ctrl->host_key;
> + size_t count;
> +
> + if (!key)
> + return 0;
> + down_read(&key->sem);
> + if (key_validate(key))
> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>\n");
> + else {
> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (count > 0) {
> + buf[count] = '\n';
> + count++;
> + }
> + }
> + up_read(&key->sem);
> + return count;
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(dhchap_key);
> +
> +static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_key_show(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> +
> + if (!ctrl->ctrl_key)
> + return 0;
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%08x\n", key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(dhchap_ctrl_key);
> #endif
>
> static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
> @@ -956,6 +1036,8 @@ static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
> #ifdef CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH
> &dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr,
> &dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_secret.attr,
> + &dev_attr_dhchap_key.attr,
> + &dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_key.attr,
> #endif
[Severity: Low]
Should nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible() hide dev_attr_dhchap_key.attr and
dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_key.attr when !ctrl->opts, the same way it hides
dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr and dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_secret.attr? Without
that check, both attributes appear on non-Fabrics controllers (such as PCIe
controllers) when CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH is enabled.
Also, in this patch dhchap_key_show() outputs the key payload via
key->type->read() instead of key_serial(key) as dhchap_ctrl_key_show() does
(though commit "nvme: allow to pass in key description as dhchap secret"
later in the series updates dhchap_key_show() to emit key_serial()).
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-0-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org?part=4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
2026-11-20 11:32 ` sashiko-bot
@ 2026-11-20 13:55 ` Hannes Reinecke
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Hannes Reinecke @ 2026-11-20 13:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: sashiko-reviews, Hannes Reinecke; +Cc: linux-nvme
On 11/20/26 12:32 PM, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 7 potential
> issues to consider:
> - [High] nvme-fabrics: wrong key revoked in nvmf_free_options() for
> dhchap_ctrl_key
> - [High] nvme: build failure in nvmf_parse_options() and sysfs.c without
> auth/keyring
> - [High] nvme: removing secret length checks exposes underflows in key
> preparsing
> - [Medium] nvme: out-of-bounds write on read error in
> dhchap_ctrl_secret_show()
> - [Medium] nvme-auth: host_key ref leak and inverted check in
> nvme_auth_init_ctrl()
> - [Medium] nvme: unlocked host_key and ctrl_key access in dhchap sysfs
> show callbacks
> - [Low] nvme: check !ctrl->opts for dhchap_key attrs in
> nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible()
> --
>
> commit ddf0d4926edd9ec44ea25839b02c0ba20380f64e
> Author: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
>
> nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
>
> This commit parses DH-HMAC-CHAP secrets into struct key pointers during
> fabric option parsing instead of storing raw secret strings in
> nvmf_ctrl_options, and adds sysfs attributes to expose the host and
> controller key serials.
>
>> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
>> index 0ddf3834f4ea2..c189096f825ea 100644
>> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
>> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
> [ ... ]
>> @@ -1038,31 +1056,68 @@ int nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
>> INIT_WORK(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work, nvme_ctrl_auth_work);
>> if (!ctrl->opts)
>> return 0;
>> - ctrl->host_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(ctrl->opts->keyring,
>> - ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret,
>> - strlen(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret));
>> - if (IS_ERR(ctrl->host_key)) {
>> - ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->host_key);
>> - ctrl->host_key = NULL;
>> - return ret;
>> + if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_key) {
>> + nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
>> + nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
>> + return 0;
>> }
>> + if (!ctrl->host_key)
>> + nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl);
>>
>> - ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(ctrl->opts->keyring,
>> - ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret,
>> - strlen(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret));
>> - if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
>> - ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
>> - ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
>> - goto err_free_dhchap_secret;
>> + ctrl->host_key = key_get(ctrl->opts->dhchap_key);
>> + if (!ctrl->host_key) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "dhchap host key %08x not present\n",
>> + key_serial(ctrl->opts->dhchap_key));
>> + return -ENOKEY;
>> }
>> + down_read(&ctrl->host_key->sem);
>> + ret = key_validate(ctrl->host_key);
>> + up_read(&ctrl->host_key->sem);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "dhchap host key %08x invalidated\n",
>> + key_serial(ctrl->host_key));
>> + key_put(ctrl->host_key);
>> + ctrl->host_key = NULL;
>> + return -ENOKEY;
>> + }
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
>> + "%s: using dhchap host key %08x\n",
>> + __func__, key_serial(ctrl->host_key));
>>
>> - if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret && !ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
>> - return 0;
>> + if (ctrl->ctrl_key)
>> + nvme_auth_clear_ctrl_key(ctrl);
>> +
>> + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key) {
>> + ctrl->ctrl_key = key_get(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key);
>> + if (!ctrl->ctrl_key) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "dhchap ctrl key %08x not present\n",
>> + key_serial(ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key));
>> + return -ENOKEY;
>> + }
>> + down_read(&ctrl->ctrl_key->sem);
>> + ret = key_validate(ctrl->ctrl_key);
>> + up_read(&ctrl->ctrl_key->sem);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "dhchap ctrl key %08x invalidated\n",
>> + key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
>> + key_put(ctrl->ctrl_key);
>> + ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
>> + return -EKEYREVOKED;
>> + }
>
> [Severity: Medium]
> Do the error returns in the ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_key block leak the
> ctrl->host_key reference taken earlier in nvme_auth_init_ctrl()?
>
> When nvme_auth_init_ctrl() fails, nvme_init_ctrl() jumps to
> out_release_instance before initializing ctrl->ctrl_device, so
> nvme_auth_free() is never called on that error path.
>
> Also, the check before nvme_auth_clear_host_key(ctrl) is inverted
> (!ctrl->host_key instead of ctrl->host_key), and nvme_init_ctrl() calls
> nvme_auth_init_ctrl() before assigning ctrl->device = &ctrl->ctrl_device,
> so the dev_warn() and dev_dbg() calls here pass a NULL ctrl->device.
>
Restructured the function to only update the ->host_key and ->ctrl_key
values once the keys are validated.
>> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
>> index 5ed91557f0706..7ed8618257ca9 100644
>> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
>> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
> [ ... ]
>> @@ -1020,14 +1024,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
>> ret = -ENOMEM;
>> goto out;
>> }
>> - if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
>> - pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
>> - kfree_sensitive(p);
>> - ret = -EINVAL;
>> - goto out;
>> - }
>> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
>> - opts->dhchap_secret = p;
>> + kfree_sensitive(host_secret);
>> + host_secret = p;
>> break;
>> case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_CTRL_SECRET:
>> p = match_strdup(args);
>> @@ -1035,14 +1033,8 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
>> ret = -ENOMEM;
>> goto out;
>> }
>> - if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
>> - pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
>> - kfree_sensitive(p);
>> - ret = -EINVAL;
>> - goto out;
>> - }
>> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
>> - opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret = p;
>> + kfree_sensitive(ctrl_secret);
>> + ctrl_secret = p;
>> break;
>
> [Severity: High]
> Does removing the minimum length checks here and in dhchap_secret_store() /
> dhchap_ctrl_secret_store() allow short secret strings to underflow datalen
> and ret in nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse()?
>
> drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c:nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse() {
> ...
> if (sscanf(prep->data, "DHHC-%01hhu:%02hhu:%*s",
> &version, &hmac) != 2) {
> ...
> }
>
> /* skip header and final ':' character */
> datalen -= 11;
> }
>
> Because %*s is assignment-suppressed and %02hhu matches one or two digits,
> sscanf() returns 2 for 8- to 10-byte strings such as "DHHC-1:0:a", causing
> unsigned datalen -= 11 to wrap around and wrap the kzalloc() size
> calculation sizeof(*upayload) + datalen. For 11- to 15-byte inputs such as
> "DHHC-1:00:a" where base64_decode() returns 0..3, ret -= 4 in
> nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse() becomes negative and is passed as an unsigned
> length to crc32(~0, upayload->data, ret), reading out-of-bounds across
> kernel memory.
>
The parsing routines have been fixed with reworks of the previous patches.
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -1086,6 +1078,41 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
>> pr_warn("failfast tmo (%d) larger than controller loss tmo (%d)\n",
>> opts->fast_io_fail_tmo, ctrl_loss_tmo);
>> }
>> +
>> + opts->host = nvmf_host_add(hostnqn, &hostid);
>> + if (IS_ERR(opts->host)) {
>> + ret = PTR_ERR(opts->host);
>> + opts->host = NULL;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (host_secret) {
>> + pr_debug("lookup host identity '%s'\n", host_secret);
>> + key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, host_secret,
>> + strlen(host_secret));
>> + if (IS_ERR(key)) {
>> + ret = PTR_ERR(key);
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + pr_debug("using dhchap host key %08x\n", key_serial(key));
>> + opts->dhchap_key = key;
>> + }
>> + if (ctrl_secret) {
>> + if (!opts->dhchap_key) {
>> + ret = -EINVAL;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + pr_debug("lookup ctrl identity '%s'\n", ctrl_secret);
>> + key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, ctrl_secret,
>> + strlen(ctrl_secret));
>
> [Severity: High]
> Does calling nvme_auth_extract_key() unconditionally here break the build
> when CONFIG_NVME_FABRICS is enabled without CONFIG_NVME_AUTH (or when
> CONFIG_NVME_FABRICS=y and CONFIG_NVME_AUTH=m)?
>
> include/linux/nvme-auth.h declares nvme_auth_extract_key() without a
> !CONFIG_NVME_AUTH stub, and match_token() is an external call so the
> compiler cannot dead-code-eliminate the host_secret and ctrl_secret
> branches when CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH is disabled.
>
> In addition, drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c now includes <linux/nvme-keyring.h>
> unconditionally, which fails to compile when CONFIG_NVME_KEYRING is
> disabled due to a stray semicolon and a non-inline function definition in
> the fallback block:
>
> include/linux/nvme-keyring.h:
> static inline struct key *nvme_dhchap_psk_lookup(struct key *keyring,
> const char *hostnqn, const char *subnqn, u8 hmac);
> {
> return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
> }
> u8 nvme_dhchap_psk_hash(struct key *key)
> {
> return 0;
> }
>
Fixed up with the next version.
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -1304,8 +1326,18 @@ void nvmf_free_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts)
>> kfree(opts->subsysnqn);
>> kfree(opts->host_traddr);
>> kfree(opts->host_iface);
>> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_secret);
>> - kfree_sensitive(opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
>> + if (opts->dhchap_key) {
>> + pr_debug("revoke dhchap host key %08x\n",
>> + key_serial(opts->dhchap_key));
>> + key_revoke(opts->dhchap_key);
>> + key_put(opts->dhchap_key);
>> + }
>> + if (opts->dhchap_ctrl_key) {
>> + pr_debug("revoke dhchap ctrl key %08x\n",
>> + key_serial(opts->dhchap_ctrl_key));
>> + key_revoke(opts->dhchap_key);
>> + key_put(opts->dhchap_ctrl_key);
>> + }
>
> [Severity: High]
> In the opts->dhchap_ctrl_key block, should key_revoke() be passed
> opts->dhchap_ctrl_key instead of opts->dhchap_key? Passing
> opts->dhchap_key dereferences the host key after key_put(opts->dhchap_key)
> has already dropped its reference, and leaves opts->dhchap_ctrl_key
> unrevoked.
>
Of course. Fixed up with the next version.
>> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
>> index a5c1511e49ac2..1311f5e29b004 100644
>> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
>> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/sysfs.c
> [ ... ]
>> @@ -818,11 +820,23 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_secret_show(struct device *dev,
>> struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
>> {
>> struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
>> - struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
>> + struct key *key = ctrl->host_key;
>> + ssize_t count;
>>
>> - if (!opts->dhchap_secret)
>> + if (!key)
>> return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
>> - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_secret);
>> + down_read(&key->sem);
>> + if (key_validate(key))
>> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>\n");
>> + else {
>> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
>> + if (count > 0) {
>> + buf[count] = '\n';
>> + count++;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + up_read(&key->sem);
>> + return count;
>> }
> [ ... ]
>> @@ -830,36 +844,47 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_secret_store(struct device *dev,
> [ ... ]
>> + mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
>> + old_key = ctrl->host_key;
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->dev, "revoke host key %08x\n",
>> + key_serial(old_key));
>> + key_revoke(old_key);
>> +
>> + ctrl->host_key = key;
>> + mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
>> + key_put(old_key);
>
> [Severity: Medium]
> Can a concurrent read of dhchap_secret (or dhchap_ctrl_secret, dhchap_key,
> or dhchap_ctrl_key) race with dhchap_secret_store() or
> dhchap_ctrl_secret_store() and trigger a use-after-free on the old key?
>
> CPU0 CPU1
> dhchap_secret_show()
> key = ctrl->host_key;
> dhchap_secret_store()
> mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
> old_key = ctrl->host_key;
> key_revoke(old_key);
> ctrl->host_key = key;
> mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
> key_put(old_key); <-- frees old_key
> down_read(&key->sem); <-- use-after-free
>
> None of dhchap_secret_show(), dhchap_ctrl_secret_show(), dhchap_key_show(),
> or dhchap_ctrl_key_show() hold ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex or take a key_get()
> reference before dereferencing ctrl->host_key or ctrl->ctrl_key. Once a
> key has been replaced via sysfs store (so opts->dhchap_key no longer holds
> a reference), ctrl->host_key holds the only reference, and key_put(old_key)
> frees it while a concurrent show callback is using it.
>
Updated the _show functions to take the dhchap_auth_mutex.
>> @@ -873,11 +898,23 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_show(struct device *dev,
>> struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
>> {
>> struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
>> - struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
>> + struct key *key = ctrl->ctrl_key;
>> + size_t count;
>>
>> - if (!opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
>> + if (!key)
>> return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
>> - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret);
>> + down_read(&key->sem);
>> + if (key_validate(key))
>> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>");
>> + else {
>> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
>> + if (count > 0) {
>> + buf[count] = '\n';
>> + count++;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + up_read(&key->sem);
>> + return count;
>> }
>
> [Severity: Medium]
> Can a negative error return from key->type->read() cause an out-of-bounds
> write before buf in dhchap_ctrl_secret_show() and dhchap_key_show()?
>
> Unlike dhchap_secret_show(), which declares ssize_t count, both
> dhchap_ctrl_secret_show() and dhchap_key_show() declare count as unsigned
> size_t. If key->type->read() returns a negative error code (such as
> -EINVAL), count wraps to a large positive value, passes count > 0, and
> writes '\n' to buf[count] out-of-bounds. Commit "nvme: allow to pass in
> key description as dhchap secret" later in this series replaces
> key->type->read() in dhchap_key_show(), but dhchap_ctrl_secret_show()
> retains the unsigned size_t count and also omits the trailing newline on
> "<invalidated>".
>
Used 'ssize_t' here, too.
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -925,6 +970,41 @@ static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_secret_store(struct device *dev,
>> }
>>
>> static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RW(dhchap_ctrl_secret);
>> +
>> +static ssize_t dhchap_key_show(struct device *dev,
>> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
>> +{
>> + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
>> + struct key *key = ctrl->host_key;
>> + size_t count;
>> +
>> + if (!key)
>> + return 0;
>> + down_read(&key->sem);
>> + if (key_validate(key))
>> + count = sysfs_emit(buf, "<invalidated>\n");
>> + else {
>> + count = key->type->read(key, buf, PAGE_SIZE);
>> + if (count > 0) {
>> + buf[count] = '\n';
>> + count++;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + up_read(&key->sem);
>> + return count;
>> +}
>> +static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(dhchap_key);
>> +
>> +static ssize_t dhchap_ctrl_key_show(struct device *dev,
>> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
>> +{
>> + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
>> +
>> + if (!ctrl->ctrl_key)
>> + return 0;
>> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%08x\n", key_serial(ctrl->ctrl_key));
>> +}
>> +static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(dhchap_ctrl_key);
>> #endif
>>
>> static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
>> @@ -956,6 +1036,8 @@ static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
>> #ifdef CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH
>> &dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr,
>> &dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_secret.attr,
>> + &dev_attr_dhchap_key.attr,
>> + &dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_key.attr,
>> #endif
>
> [Severity: Low]
> Should nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible() hide dev_attr_dhchap_key.attr and
> dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_key.attr when !ctrl->opts, the same way it hides
> dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr and dev_attr_dhchap_ctrl_secret.attr? Without
> that check, both attributes appear on non-Fabrics controllers (such as PCIe
> controllers) when CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH is enabled.
>
Yes, it should. Updated for the next version.
> Also, in this patch dhchap_key_show() outputs the key payload via
> key->type->read() instead of key_serial(key) as dhchap_ctrl_key_show() does
> (though commit "nvme: allow to pass in key description as dhchap secret"
> later in the series updates dhchap_key_show() to emit key_serial()).
>
Fixed up with the next version.
Cheers,
Hannes
--
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect
hare@suse.de +49 911 74053 688
SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg
HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
@ 2026-11-20 23:36 kernel test robot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2026-11-20 23:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: oe-kbuild; +Cc: lkp
::::::
:::::: Manual check reason: "same reports for this branch"
::::::
BCC: lkp@intel.com
CC: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev
In-Reply-To: <20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-4-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org>
References: <20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-4-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org>
TO: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
TO: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
TO: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
TO: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
TO: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
TO: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
TO: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
CC: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Hi Hannes,
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
[auto build test ERROR on 68099cf27253a8c89d703a282d3d811446d9453b]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Hannes-Reinecke/nvme-auth-modify-nvme_auth_transform_key-to-return-status/20261120-121400
base: 68099cf27253a8c89d703a282d3d811446d9453b
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-4-5f8c7d9926ee%40kernel.org
patch subject: [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing
:::::: branch date: 10 hours ago
:::::: commit date: 10 hours ago
config: i386-buildonly-randconfig-1001-20261121 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20261121/202611210754.yAo7gNGw-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-14 (Debian 14.2.0-19) 14.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20261121/202611210754.yAo7gNGw-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202611210754.yAo7gNGw-lkp@intel.com/
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
ld: drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.o: in function `nvmf_parse_options':
>> drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c:1091:(.text+0x1389): undefined reference to `nvme_auth_extract_key'
>> ld: drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c:1106:(.text+0x13cd): undefined reference to `nvme_auth_extract_key'
vim +1091 drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 715
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 716 static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 717 const char *buf)
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 718 {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 719 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 720 char *options, *o, *p;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 721 char *host_secret = NULL, *ctrl_secret = NULL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 722 int token, ret = 0;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 723 size_t nqnlen = 0;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 724 int ctrl_loss_tmo = NVMF_DEF_CTRL_LOSS_TMO, key_id;
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 725 uuid_t hostid;
ae8bd606e09bbd Max Gurtovoy 2023-05-12 726 char hostnqn[NVMF_NQN_SIZE];
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 727 struct key *key;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 728
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 729 /* Set defaults */
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 730 opts->queue_size = NVMF_DEF_QUEUE_SIZE;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 731 opts->nr_io_queues = num_online_cpus();
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 732 opts->reconnect_delay = NVMF_DEF_RECONNECT_DELAY;
32feb6de47242e Martin George 2021-02-11 733 opts->kato = 0;
3b3387620780fc James Smart 2017-10-20 734 opts->duplicate_connect = false;
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 735 opts->fast_io_fail_tmo = NVMF_DEF_FAIL_FAST_TMO;
3b49fa807284ec Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-03 736 opts->hdr_digest = false;
20d44e86321299 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-03 737 opts->data_digest = false;
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 738 opts->tos = -1; /* < 0 == use transport default */
be8e82caa68599 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 739 opts->tls = false;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 740 opts->tls_key = NULL;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 741 opts->keyring = NULL;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 742 opts->concat = false;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 743 opts->dhchap_key = NULL;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 744 opts->dhchap_ctrl_key = NULL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 745
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 746 options = o = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 747 if (!options)
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 748 return -ENOMEM;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 749
ae8bd606e09bbd Max Gurtovoy 2023-05-12 750 /* use default host if not given by user space */
ae8bd606e09bbd Max Gurtovoy 2023-05-12 751 uuid_copy(&hostid, &nvmf_default_host->id);
ae8bd606e09bbd Max Gurtovoy 2023-05-12 752 strscpy(hostnqn, nvmf_default_host->nqn, NVMF_NQN_SIZE);
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 753
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 754 while ((p = strsep(&o, ",\n")) != NULL) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 755 if (!*p)
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 756 continue;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 757
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 758 token = match_token(p, opt_tokens, args);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 759 opts->mask |= token;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 760 switch (token) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 761 case NVMF_OPT_TRANSPORT:
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 762 p = match_strdup(args);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 763 if (!p) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 764 ret = -ENOMEM;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 765 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 766 }
59a2f3f00fd744 Chengguang Xu 2018-04-14 767 kfree(opts->transport);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 768 opts->transport = p;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 769 break;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 770 case NVMF_OPT_NQN:
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 771 p = match_strdup(args);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 772 if (!p) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 773 ret = -ENOMEM;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 774 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 775 }
59a2f3f00fd744 Chengguang Xu 2018-04-14 776 kfree(opts->subsysnqn);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 777 opts->subsysnqn = p;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 778 nqnlen = strlen(opts->subsysnqn);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 779 if (nqnlen >= NVMF_NQN_SIZE) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 780 pr_err("%s needs to be < %d bytes\n",
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 781 opts->subsysnqn, NVMF_NQN_SIZE);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 782 ret = -EINVAL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 783 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 784 }
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 785 opts->discovery_nqn =
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 786 !(strcmp(opts->subsysnqn,
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 787 NVME_DISC_SUBSYS_NAME));
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 788 break;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 789 case NVMF_OPT_TRADDR:
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 790 p = match_strdup(args);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 791 if (!p) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 792 ret = -ENOMEM;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 793 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 794 }
59a2f3f00fd744 Chengguang Xu 2018-04-14 795 kfree(opts->traddr);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 796 opts->traddr = p;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 797 break;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 798 case NVMF_OPT_TRSVCID:
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 799 p = match_strdup(args);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 800 if (!p) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 801 ret = -ENOMEM;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 802 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 803 }
59a2f3f00fd744 Chengguang Xu 2018-04-14 804 kfree(opts->trsvcid);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 805 opts->trsvcid = p;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 806 break;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 807 case NVMF_OPT_QUEUE_SIZE:
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 808 if (match_int(args, &token)) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 809 ret = -EINVAL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 810 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 811 }
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 812 if (token < NVMF_MIN_QUEUE_SIZE ||
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 813 token > NVMF_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 814 pr_err("Invalid queue_size %d\n", token);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 815 ret = -EINVAL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 816 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 817 }
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 818 opts->queue_size = token;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 819 break;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 820 case NVMF_OPT_NR_IO_QUEUES:
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 821 if (match_int(args, &token)) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 822 ret = -EINVAL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 823 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 824 }
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 825 if (token <= 0) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 826 pr_err("Invalid number of IOQs %d\n", token);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 827 ret = -EINVAL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 828 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 829 }
0475821e229cfd Roland Dreier 2018-03-05 830 if (opts->discovery_nqn) {
0475821e229cfd Roland Dreier 2018-03-05 831 pr_debug("Ignoring nr_io_queues value for discovery controller\n");
0475821e229cfd Roland Dreier 2018-03-05 832 break;
0475821e229cfd Roland Dreier 2018-03-05 833 }
0475821e229cfd Roland Dreier 2018-03-05 834
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 835 opts->nr_io_queues = min_t(unsigned int,
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 836 num_online_cpus(), token);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 837 break;
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 838 case NVMF_OPT_KATO:
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 839 if (match_int(args, &token)) {
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 840 ret = -EINVAL;
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 841 goto out;
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 842 }
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 843
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 844 if (token < 0) {
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 845 pr_err("Invalid keep_alive_tmo %d\n", token);
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 846 ret = -EINVAL;
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 847 goto out;
8edd11c9ad3a62 Guilherme G. Piccoli 2017-09-14 848 } else if (token == 0 && !opts->discovery_nqn) {
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 849 /* Allowed for debug */
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 850 pr_warn("keep_alive_tmo 0 won't execute keep alives!!!\n");
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 851 }
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 852 opts->kato = token;
038bd4cb6766c6 Sagi Grimberg 2016-06-13 853 break;
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 854 case NVMF_OPT_CTRL_LOSS_TMO:
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 855 if (match_int(args, &token)) {
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 856 ret = -EINVAL;
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 857 goto out;
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 858 }
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 859
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 860 if (token < 0)
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 861 pr_warn("ctrl_loss_tmo < 0 will reconnect forever\n");
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 862 ctrl_loss_tmo = token;
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 863 break;
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 864 case NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO:
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 865 if (match_int(args, &token)) {
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 866 ret = -EINVAL;
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 867 goto out;
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 868 }
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 869
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 870 if (token >= 0)
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 871 pr_warn("I/O fail on reconnect controller after %d sec\n",
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 872 token);
8e8aaf512a91ae Maurizio Lombardi 2021-11-12 873 else
8e8aaf512a91ae Maurizio Lombardi 2021-11-12 874 token = -1;
8e8aaf512a91ae Maurizio Lombardi 2021-11-12 875
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 876 opts->fast_io_fail_tmo = token;
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 877 break;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 878 case NVMF_OPT_HOSTNQN:
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 879 p = match_strdup(args);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 880 if (!p) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 881 ret = -ENOMEM;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 882 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 883 }
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 884 nqnlen = strlen(p);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 885 if (nqnlen >= NVMF_NQN_SIZE) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 886 pr_err("%s needs to be < %d bytes\n",
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 887 p, NVMF_NQN_SIZE);
8eadfcb1b63d7d Bart Van Assche 2016-10-18 888 kfree(p);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 889 ret = -EINVAL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 890 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 891 }
ae8bd606e09bbd Max Gurtovoy 2023-05-12 892 strscpy(hostnqn, p, NVMF_NQN_SIZE);
8eadfcb1b63d7d Bart Van Assche 2016-10-18 893 kfree(p);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 894 break;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 895 case NVMF_OPT_RECONNECT_DELAY:
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 896 if (match_int(args, &token)) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 897 ret = -EINVAL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 898 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 899 }
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 900 if (token <= 0) {
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 901 pr_err("Invalid reconnect_delay %d\n", token);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 902 ret = -EINVAL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 903 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 904 }
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 905 opts->reconnect_delay = token;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 906 break;
478bcb9388f2c3 James Smart 2016-08-02 907 case NVMF_OPT_HOST_TRADDR:
478bcb9388f2c3 James Smart 2016-08-02 908 p = match_strdup(args);
478bcb9388f2c3 James Smart 2016-08-02 909 if (!p) {
478bcb9388f2c3 James Smart 2016-08-02 910 ret = -ENOMEM;
478bcb9388f2c3 James Smart 2016-08-02 911 goto out;
478bcb9388f2c3 James Smart 2016-08-02 912 }
59a2f3f00fd744 Chengguang Xu 2018-04-14 913 kfree(opts->host_traddr);
478bcb9388f2c3 James Smart 2016-08-02 914 opts->host_traddr = p;
478bcb9388f2c3 James Smart 2016-08-02 915 break;
3ede8f72a9a282 Martin Belanger 2021-05-20 916 case NVMF_OPT_HOST_IFACE:
3ede8f72a9a282 Martin Belanger 2021-05-20 917 p = match_strdup(args);
3ede8f72a9a282 Martin Belanger 2021-05-20 918 if (!p) {
3ede8f72a9a282 Martin Belanger 2021-05-20 919 ret = -ENOMEM;
3ede8f72a9a282 Martin Belanger 2021-05-20 920 goto out;
3ede8f72a9a282 Martin Belanger 2021-05-20 921 }
3ede8f72a9a282 Martin Belanger 2021-05-20 922 kfree(opts->host_iface);
3ede8f72a9a282 Martin Belanger 2021-05-20 923 opts->host_iface = p;
3ede8f72a9a282 Martin Belanger 2021-05-20 924 break;
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 925 case NVMF_OPT_HOST_ID:
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 926 p = match_strdup(args);
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 927 if (!p) {
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 928 ret = -ENOMEM;
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 929 goto out;
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 930 }
df351ef7378934 Roland Dreier 2018-01-11 931 ret = uuid_parse(p, &hostid);
df351ef7378934 Roland Dreier 2018-01-11 932 if (ret) {
9b483da15dd0c9 Guan Junxiong 2017-08-03 933 pr_err("Invalid hostid %s\n", p);
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 934 ret = -EINVAL;
6e49412016f5f2 Johannes Thumshirn 2018-01-25 935 kfree(p);
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 936 goto out;
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 937 }
6e49412016f5f2 Johannes Thumshirn 2018-01-25 938 kfree(p);
6bfe04255d5ed5 Johannes Thumshirn 2017-06-20 939 break;
3b3387620780fc James Smart 2017-10-20 940 case NVMF_OPT_DUP_CONNECT:
3b3387620780fc James Smart 2017-10-20 941 opts->duplicate_connect = true;
3b3387620780fc James Smart 2017-10-20 942 break;
8154ed730bc64f Sagi Grimberg 2018-11-19 943 case NVMF_OPT_DISABLE_SQFLOW:
8154ed730bc64f Sagi Grimberg 2018-11-19 944 opts->disable_sqflow = true;
8154ed730bc64f Sagi Grimberg 2018-11-19 945 break;
3b49fa807284ec Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-03 946 case NVMF_OPT_HDR_DIGEST:
3b49fa807284ec Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-03 947 opts->hdr_digest = true;
3b49fa807284ec Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-03 948 break;
20d44e86321299 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-03 949 case NVMF_OPT_DATA_DIGEST:
20d44e86321299 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-03 950 opts->data_digest = true;
20d44e86321299 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-03 951 break;
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 952 case NVMF_OPT_NR_WRITE_QUEUES:
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 953 if (match_int(args, &token)) {
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 954 ret = -EINVAL;
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 955 goto out;
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 956 }
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 957 if (token <= 0) {
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 958 pr_err("Invalid nr_write_queues %d\n", token);
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 959 ret = -EINVAL;
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 960 goto out;
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 961 }
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 962 opts->nr_write_queues = token;
330f6b8a70771f Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-11 963 break;
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 964 case NVMF_OPT_NR_POLL_QUEUES:
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 965 if (match_int(args, &token)) {
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 966 ret = -EINVAL;
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 967 goto out;
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 968 }
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 969 if (token <= 0) {
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 970 pr_err("Invalid nr_poll_queues %d\n", token);
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 971 ret = -EINVAL;
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 972 goto out;
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 973 }
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 974 opts->nr_poll_queues = token;
89d43802b0e729 Sagi Grimberg 2018-12-14 975 break;
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 976 case NVMF_OPT_TOS:
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 977 if (match_int(args, &token)) {
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 978 ret = -EINVAL;
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 979 goto out;
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 980 }
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 981 if (token < 0) {
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 982 pr_err("Invalid type of service %d\n", token);
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 983 ret = -EINVAL;
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 984 goto out;
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 985 }
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 986 if (token > 255) {
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 987 pr_warn("Clamping type of service to 255\n");
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 988 token = 255;
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 989 }
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 990 opts->tos = token;
52b4451a9e5ae1 Israel Rukshin 2019-08-18 991 break;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 992 case NVMF_OPT_KEYRING:
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 993 if (match_int(args, &key_id) || key_id <= 0) {
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 994 ret = -EINVAL;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 995 goto out;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 996 }
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 997 key = nvmf_parse_key(key_id);
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 998 if (IS_ERR(key)) {
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 999 ret = PTR_ERR(key);
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1000 goto out;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1001 }
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1002 key_put(opts->keyring);
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1003 opts->keyring = key;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1004 break;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1005 case NVMF_OPT_TLS_KEY:
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1006 if (match_int(args, &key_id) || key_id <= 0) {
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1007 ret = -EINVAL;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1008 goto out;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1009 }
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1010 key = nvmf_parse_key(key_id);
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1011 if (IS_ERR(key)) {
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1012 ret = PTR_ERR(key);
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1013 goto out;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1014 }
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1015 key_put(opts->tls_key);
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1016 opts->tls_key = key;
adf22c520b5ec4 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1017 break;
20e8b689c90880 Hannes Reinecke 2021-09-22 1018 case NVMF_OPT_DISCOVERY:
20e8b689c90880 Hannes Reinecke 2021-09-22 1019 opts->discovery_nqn = true;
20e8b689c90880 Hannes Reinecke 2021-09-22 1020 break;
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1021 case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET:
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1022 p = match_strdup(args);
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1023 if (!p) {
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1024 ret = -ENOMEM;
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1025 goto out;
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1026 }
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1027 kfree_sensitive(host_secret);
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1028 host_secret = p;
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1029 break;
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1030 case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_CTRL_SECRET:
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1031 p = match_strdup(args);
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1032 if (!p) {
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1033 ret = -ENOMEM;
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1034 goto out;
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1035 }
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1036 kfree_sensitive(ctrl_secret);
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1037 ctrl_secret = p;
f50fff73d620cd Hannes Reinecke 2022-06-27 1038 break;
be8e82caa68599 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1039 case NVMF_OPT_TLS:
be8e82caa68599 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1040 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_TCP_TLS)) {
be8e82caa68599 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1041 pr_err("TLS is not supported\n");
be8e82caa68599 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1042 ret = -EINVAL;
be8e82caa68599 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1043 goto out;
be8e82caa68599 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1044 }
be8e82caa68599 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1045 opts->tls = true;
be8e82caa68599 Hannes Reinecke 2023-08-24 1046 break;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1047 case NVMF_OPT_CONCAT:
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1048 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_TCP_TLS)) {
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1049 pr_err("TLS is not supported\n");
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1050 ret = -EINVAL;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1051 goto out;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1052 }
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1053 opts->concat = true;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1054 break;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1055 default:
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1056 pr_warn("unknown parameter or missing value '%s' in ctrl creation request\n",
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1057 p);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1058 ret = -EINVAL;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1059 goto out;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1060 }
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1061 }
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1062
461fbc8f0ed1ac Hannes Reinecke 2018-05-24 1063 if (opts->discovery_nqn) {
461fbc8f0ed1ac Hannes Reinecke 2018-05-24 1064 opts->nr_io_queues = 0;
9846ac0143fe98 Sagi Grimberg 2019-01-07 1065 opts->nr_write_queues = 0;
9846ac0143fe98 Sagi Grimberg 2019-01-07 1066 opts->nr_poll_queues = 0;
181303d03525ea Hannes Reinecke 2018-05-24 1067 opts->duplicate_connect = true;
32feb6de47242e Martin George 2021-02-11 1068 } else {
32feb6de47242e Martin George 2021-02-11 1069 if (!opts->kato)
32feb6de47242e Martin George 2021-02-11 1070 opts->kato = NVME_DEFAULT_KATO;
461fbc8f0ed1ac Hannes Reinecke 2018-05-24 1071 }
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 1072 if (ctrl_loss_tmo < 0) {
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 1073 opts->max_reconnects = -1;
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 1074 } else {
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 1075 opts->max_reconnects = DIV_ROUND_UP(ctrl_loss_tmo,
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 1076 opts->reconnect_delay);
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 1077 if (ctrl_loss_tmo < opts->fast_io_fail_tmo)
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 1078 pr_warn("failfast tmo (%d) larger than controller loss tmo (%d)\n",
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 1079 opts->fast_io_fail_tmo, ctrl_loss_tmo);
8c4dfea97f15b8 Victor Gladkov 2020-11-24 1080 }
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1081
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1082 opts->host = nvmf_host_add(hostnqn, &hostid);
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1083 if (IS_ERR(opts->host)) {
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1084 ret = PTR_ERR(opts->host);
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1085 opts->host = NULL;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1086 goto out;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1087 }
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1088
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1089 if (host_secret) {
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1090 pr_debug("lookup host identity '%s'\n", host_secret);
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 @1091 key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, host_secret,
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1092 strlen(host_secret));
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1093 if (IS_ERR(key)) {
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1094 ret = PTR_ERR(key);
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1095 goto out;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1096 }
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1097 pr_debug("using dhchap host key %08x\n", key_serial(key));
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1098 opts->dhchap_key = key;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1099 }
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1100 if (ctrl_secret) {
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1101 if (!opts->dhchap_key) {
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1102 ret = -EINVAL;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1103 goto out;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1104 }
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1105 pr_debug("lookup ctrl identity '%s'\n", ctrl_secret);
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 @1106 key = nvme_auth_extract_key(opts->keyring, ctrl_secret,
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1107 strlen(ctrl_secret));
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1108 if (IS_ERR(key)) {
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1109 ret = PTR_ERR(key);
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1110 goto out;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1111 }
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1112 pr_debug("using dhchap ctrl key %08x\n", key_serial(key));
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1113 opts->dhchap_ctrl_key = key;
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1114 }
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1115
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1116 if (opts->concat) {
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1117 if (opts->tls) {
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1118 pr_err("Secure concatenation over TLS is not supported\n");
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1119 ret = -EINVAL;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1120 goto out;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1121 }
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1122 if (opts->tls_key) {
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1123 pr_err("Cannot specify a TLS key for secure concatenation\n");
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1124 ret = -EINVAL;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1125 goto out;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1126 }
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1127 if (!opts->dhchap_key) {
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1128 pr_err("Need to enable DH-CHAP for secure concatenation\n");
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1129 ret = -EINVAL;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1130 goto out;
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1131 }
e88a7595b57f2a Hannes Reinecke 2025-02-24 1132 }
42a45274c22582 Sagi Grimberg 2017-03-18 1133
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1134 out:
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1135 kfree_sensitive(ctrl_secret);
7347ce3e720e2e Hannes Reinecke 2026-11-20 1136 kfree_sensitive(host_secret);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1137 kfree(options);
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1138 return ret;
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1139 }
07bfcd09a28855 Christoph Hellwig 2016-06-13 1140
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-20 23:37 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-11-20 23:36 [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing kernel test robot
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-11-20 11:13 [PATCH v4 0/9] nvme-auth: switch to use the kernel keyring Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 13:55 ` Hannes Reinecke
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