Re: [PATCH v4 1/8] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm

["Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>]

On 3/18/2025 8:31 AM, Chao Gao wrote:
> 
> When granting userspace or a KVM guest access to an xfeature, preserve the
> entity's existing supervisor and software-defined permissions as tracked
> by __state_perm, i.e. use __state_perm to track *all* permissions even
> though all supported supervisor xfeatures are granted to all FPUs and
> FPU_GUEST_PERM_LOCKED disallows changing permissions.
> 
> Effectively clobbering supervisor permissions results in inconsistent
> behavior, as xstate_get_group_perm() will report supervisor features for
> process that do NOT request access to dynamic user xfeatures, whereas any
> and all supervisor features will be absent from the set of permissions for
> any process that is granted access to one or more dynamic xfeatures (which
> right now means AMX).
> 
> The inconsistency isn't problematic because fpu_xstate_prctl() already
> strips out everything except user xfeatures:
> 
>          case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM:
>                  /*
>                   * Lockless snapshot as it can also change right after the
>                   * dropping the lock.
>                   */
>                  permitted = xstate_get_host_group_perm();
>                  permitted &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED;
>                  return put_user(permitted, uptr);
> 
>          case ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM:
>                  permitted = xstate_get_guest_group_perm();
>                  permitted &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED;
>                  return put_user(permitted, uptr);
> 
> and similarly KVM doesn't apply the __state_perm to supervisor states
> (kvm_get_filtered_xcr0() incorporates xstate_get_guest_group_perm()):
> 
>          case 0xd: {
>                  u64 permitted_xcr0 = kvm_get_filtered_xcr0();
>                  u64 permitted_xss = kvm_caps.supported_xss;
> 
> But if KVM in particular were to ever change, dropping supervisor
> permissions would result in subtle bugs in KVM's reporting of supported
> CPUID settings.  And the above behavior also means that having supervisor
> xfeatures in __state_perm is correctly handled by all users.
> 
> Dropping supervisor permissions also creates another landmine for KVM.  If
> more dynamic user xfeatures are ever added, requesting access to multiple
> xfeatures in separate ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM calls will result in the
> second invocation of __xstate_request_perm() computing the wrong ksize, as
> as the mask passed to xstate_calculate_size() would not contain *any*
> supervisor features.
> 
> Commit 781c64bfcb73 ("x86/fpu/xstate: Handle supervisor states in XSTATE
> permissions") fudged around the size issue for userspace FPUs, but for
> reasons unknown skipped guest FPUs.  Lack of a fix for KVM "works" only
> because KVM doesn't yet support virtualizing features that have supervisor
> xfeatures, i.e. as of today, KVM guest FPUs will never need the relevant
> xfeatures.
> 
> Simply extending the hack-a-fix for guests would temporarily solve the
> ksize issue, but wouldn't address the inconsistency issue and would leave
> another lurking pitfall for KVM.  KVM support for virtualizing CET will
> likely add CET_KERNEL as a guest-only xfeature, i.e. CET_KERNEL will not
> be set in xfeatures_mask_supervisor() and would again be dropped when
> granting access to dynamic xfeatures.
> 
> Note, the existing clobbering behavior is rather subtle.  The @permitted
> parameter to __xstate_request_perm() comes from:
> 
> 	permitted = xstate_get_group_perm(guest);
> 
> which is either fpu->guest_perm.__state_perm or fpu->perm.__state_perm,
> where __state_perm is initialized to:
> 
>          fpu->perm.__state_perm          = fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features;
> 
> and copied to the guest side of things:
> 
> 	/* Same defaults for guests */
> 	fpu->guest_perm = fpu->perm;
> 
> fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features contains everything except the dynamic
> xfeatures, i.e. everything except XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA:
> 
>          fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features = fpu_kernel_cfg.max_features;
>          fpu_kernel_cfg.default_features &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC;
> 
> When __xstate_request_perm() restricts the local "mask" variable to
> compute the user state size:
> 
> 	mask &= XFEATURE_MASK_USER_SUPPORTED;
> 	usize = xstate_calculate_size(mask, false);
> 
> it subtly overwrites the target __state_perm with "mask" containing only
> user xfeatures:
> 
> 	perm = guest ? &fpu->guest_perm : &fpu->perm;
> 	/* Pairs with the READ_ONCE() in xstate_get_group_perm() */
> 	WRITE_ONCE(perm->__state_perm, mask);

This changelog appears to be largely derived from Sean’s previous email. 
I think it can be significantly shortened to focus on the key
points, such as:

x86/fpu/xstate: Preserve non-user bits in permission handling

When granting userspace or a KVM guest access to an xfeature, the task
leader’s perm->__state_perm (host or guest) is overwritten, 
unintentionally discarding non-user bits. Additionally, supervisor state 
permissions are always granted.

The current behavior presents the following issues:

  *  Inconsistencies in permission handling – Supervisor permissions are
     universally granted, and the FPU_GUEST_PERM_LOCKED bit is explicitly
     set to prevent permission changes.

  *  Redundant permission setting – Since supervisor state permissions
     are always granted, the permitted mask already includes them, making
     it unnecessary to set them again.

Ensure that __xstate_request_perm() does not inadvertently drop
supervisor and software-defined permissions. Also, avoid redundantly
granting supervisor state permissions, and document this behavior in the
code comments.

Clarify the presence of non-user feature and flag bits in the field
description.