From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
hpa@zytor.com, xin@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, x86@kernel.org, sohil.mehta@intel.com,
jon.grimm@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/cpu: Disable CR pinning during CPU bringup
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 08:02:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <41851f3e-4372-4bd2-ac48-65aee3dcafe0@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a078ceb4-6e31-4e8a-89d8-023b95f56054@amd.com>
On 3/12/26 07:53, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
>> The simplest fix is to disable FRED on those kernels, fwiw.
> That would work, but disabling FRED means LTS users will not be able to use
> FRED with confidential computing—that's not really a fix.
Why not?
Is there something out there that *NEEDS* FRED to function?
> This isn't just SEV-SNP. Xin Li confirmed Intel TDX has the same issue: FRED
> is enabled before exception handling is ready, and #VC/#VE can't be handled on
> secondary CPUs.
>
> The initialization order is wrong for both SEV-SNP and TDX. The fixes are small
> and targeted—just ensuring FRED state is set up before it's needed.
Sure, it's a theoretical problem for TDX and a practical, demonstrable
one for SEV-SNP.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-12 15:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-26 9:23 [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/fred: Fix SEV-ES/SNP guest boot failures Nikunj A Dadhania
2026-02-26 9:23 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/cpu: Disable CR pinning during CPU bringup Nikunj A Dadhania
2026-03-09 13:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-09 15:38 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-09 16:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-09 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-09 18:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-03-09 19:27 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-11 10:41 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-11 14:07 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-11 15:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-11 17:28 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-12 7:21 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-12 7:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-12 14:08 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-12 14:20 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-12 14:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-12 15:02 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2026-03-12 19:06 ` David Laight
2026-03-16 20:27 ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-16 21:43 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-17 4:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-17 14:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-17 15:31 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-17 16:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-18 8:19 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-17 17:04 ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-17 17:51 ` Chang S. Bae
2026-03-12 18:09 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-03-13 8:35 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2026-03-13 18:05 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-03-13 19:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-17 17:06 ` Chang S. Bae
2026-02-26 9:23 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/fred: Fix early boot failures on SEV-ES/SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2026-02-26 14:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-02-27 4:14 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
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