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* Reference policy status page update
@ 2005-09-13 22:30 Christopher J. PeBenito
  2005-09-20 19:56 ` Daniel J Walsh
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Christopher J. PeBenito @ 2005-09-13 22:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: SELinux Mail List

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I have updated the reference policy status page with a listing of the
remaining modules that need to be converted, and note which modules are
in the Fedora strict and targeted policies.

http://serefpolicy.sourceforge.net/index.php?page=status

For those looking to contribute, we ask that priority be given to the
modules in the targeted policy, and then strict policy.  I've attached
my notes on converting the old macros.  The big caveat is that not all
macros are expanded completely, for example the network macros, since
some are very complex because of the different expansions because of
different/optional parameters.  There is also no guarantee that there
are no errors, since its just my notes.  So to get from an old macro to
the end reference policy rules/interfaces, it may take a couple
expansions (especially in the network macros).

If you're looking to contribute, please let us know what you're working
on, so we can update the status page, and then work won't be duplicated.

-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150


[-- Attachment #2: macro_conversion_guide --]
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#
# This is the guide for converting old macros to local policy
# and new interfaces.
#
# $1, $2, etc. are replaced with and the first and second, etc.
# parameters to the old macro.
#

########################################
#
# Attributes
#
# $1 is the type this attribute is on

#
# auth: complete
#
auth_read_shadow($1)

#
# auth_chkpwd: complete
#
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1)

#
# file_type: complete
#
files_type($1)

#
# fs_domain: complete
#
# handled by appropriate interfaces

#
# mta_delivery_agent:
#
mta_mailserver_delivery($1)
# for piping mail to a command
kernel_read_system_state($1)
corecmd_exec_shell($1)
files_read_etc_runtime_files($1)
mta_append_spool($1)
ifdef(`TODO',`
optional_policy(`arpwatch.te',`
	# why is mail delivered to a directory of type arpwatch_data_t?
	allow mta_delivery_agent arpwatch_data_t:dir search;
')
') dnl end TODO

#
# mta_user_agent:
#
mta_mailserver_user_agent($1)
domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1)
userdom_sigchld_all_users($1)
userdom_use_all_user_fd($1)
userdom_use_sysadm_terms($1)
allow mta_user_agent privmail:fd use;
allow mta_user_agent privmail:process sigchld;
allow mta_user_agent privmail:fifo_file { read write };
allow mta_user_agent sysadm_t:fifo_file { read write };
optional_policy(`arpwatch.te',`
	# why is mail delivered to a directory of type arpwatch_data_t?
	allow mta_user_agent arpwatch_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
	ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
		dontaudit mta_user_agent arpwatch_t:packet_socket { read write };
	')
')
optional_policy(`cron.te',`
	cron_sigchld($1)
	cron_read_system_job_tmp_files($1)
')
optional_policy(`logrotate.te',`
	logrotate_read_tmp_files($1)
')

#
# nscd_client_domain: complete
#
optional_policy(`nscd.te',`
	nscd_use_socket($1)
')

#
# privfd: complete
#
domain_wide_inherit_fd($1)

#
# privlog: complete
#
logging_send_syslog_msg($1)

#
# privmail: complete
#
mta_send_mail($1)

#
# privmodule: complete
#
modutils_domtrans_insmod($1)

#
# privowner: complete
#
domain_obj_id_change_exempt($1)

#
# privrole: complete
#
domain_role_change_exempt($1)

#
# privuser: complete
#
domain_subj_id_change_exempt($1)

#
# sysadmfile: complete
#
files_type($1)

#
# userspace_objmgr: complete
#
allow $1 self:process getattr;
# Receive notifications of policy reloads and enforcing status changes.
allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket { create bind read };
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
selinux_validate_context($1)
selinux_compute_access_vector($1)
selinux_compute_create_context($1)
selinux_compute_relabel_context($1)
selinux_compute_user_contexts($1)
seutil_read_config($1)
seutil_read_default_contexts($1)

#
# web_client_domain:
#
optional_policy(`squid.te',`
	squid_use($1)
')

########################################
#
# Access macros
#

#
# access_terminal():
#
allow $1 $2_tty_device_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
allow $1 devtty_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
allow $1 devpts_t:dir { read search getattr };
allow $1 $2_devpts_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };

#
# append_log_domain():
#
type $1_log_t;
logging_log_file($1_log_t)
allow $1_t var_log_t:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_log_t:file  { create ra_file_perms };
type_transition $1_t var_log_t:file $1_log_t;

#
# append_logdir_domain():
#
type $1_log_t;
logging_log_file($1_log_t)
allow $1_t var_log_t:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_log_t:dir { setattr ra_dir_perms };
allow $1_t $1_log_t:file  { create ra_file_perms };
type_transition $1_t var_log_t:file $1_log_t;

#
# application_domain():
#
type $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
domain_type($1_t)
domain_entry_file($1_t,$1_exec_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
# a "run" interface needs to be
# added, and have sysadm_t use it
# in a optional_policy block.

#
# base_can_network($1,$2,$3):
#
allow $1 self:$2_socket connected_socket_perms;
corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_$2_bind_all_nodes($1)
sysnet_read_config($1)
# if $3 is specified (remove _port_t from $3):
corenet_$2_sendrecv_$3_port($1)
# else:
corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_ports($1)

#
# base_file_read_access(): complete
#
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1)
corecmd_list_bin($1)
corecmd_read_bin_symlink($1)
corecmd_read_bin_file($1)
corecmd_read_bin_pipe($1)
corecmd_read_bin_socket($1)
corecmd_list_sbin($1)
corecmd_read_sbin_symlink($1)
corecmd_read_sbin_file($1)
corecmd_read_sbin_pipe($1)
corecmd_read_sbin_socket($1)
files_list_home($1)
files_read_usr_files($1)
seutil_read_config($1)
tunable_policy(`read_default_t',`
	files_list_default($1)
	files_read_default_files($1)
	files_read_default_symlinks($1)
	files_read_default_sockets($1)
	files_read_default_pipes($1)
')

#
# base_pty_perms():
#
allow $1_t ptmx_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_t devpts_t:filesystem getattr;
allow $1_t devpts_t:dir { getattr read search };
dontaudit $1_t bsdpty_device_t:chr_file { getattr read write };

#
# can_create($1,$2,$3): complete
#
# for each object class in $3:
# if dir:
allow $1 $2:dir create_dir_perms;
# else if lnk_file:
allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
# else:
allow $1 $2:$3 create_file_perms;

#
# can_create_other_pty(): complete
#
allow $1_t $2_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr };
term_create_pty($1_t,$2_devpts_t)

#
# can_create_pty(): complete
#
# $2 may require more conversion
type $1_devpts_t $2;
term_pty($1_devpts_t)
allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr };
term_create_pty($1_t,$1_devpts_t)

#
# can_exec_any(): complete
#
corecmd_exec_bin($1)
corecmd_exec_sbin($1)
domain_exec_all_entry_files($1)
files_exec_etc_files($1)
libs_use_ld_so($1)
libs_use_shared_libs($1)
libs_exec_ld_so($1)
libs_exec_lib_files($1)

#
# can_getcon(): complete
#
allow $1 self:process getattr;
kernel_read_system_state($1)

#
# can_getsecurity(): complete
#
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
selinux_validate_context($1)
selinux_compute_access_vector($1)
selinux_compute_create_context($1)
selinux_compute_relabel_context($1)
selinux_compute_user_contexts($1)

#
# can_kerberos(): complete
#
optional_policy(`kerberos.te',`
	kerberos_use($1)
')

#
# can_ldap(): complete
#
optional_policy(`ldap.te',`
	allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1)
	corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
	sysnet_read_config($1)
')

#
# can_loadpol(): complete
#
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
selinux_load_policy($1)

#
# can_network($1):
#
allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1)
sysnet_read_config($1)
optional_policy(`mount.te',`
	mount_send_nfs_client_request($1)
')

#
# can_network($1,$2):
#
can_network_tcp($1, `$2')
can_network_udp($1, `$2')
optional_policy(`mount.te',`
	mount_send_nfs_client_request($1)
')

#
# can_network_client():
#
can_network_client_tcp($1, `$2')
can_network_udp($1, `$2')

#
# can_network_client_tcp($1): complete
#
allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
sysnet_read_config($1)

#
# can_network_client_tcp($1,$2):
#
# remove _port_t from $2
allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_$2_port($1)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
sysnet_read_config($1)

#
# can_network_server():
#
allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
base_can_network($1, tcp, `$2')

#
# can_network_server_tcp():
#
allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
base_can_network($1, tcp, `$2')

#
# can_network_tcp():
#
can_network_server_tcp($1, `$2')
can_network_client_tcp($1, `$2')

#
# can_network_udp(): complete
#
base_can_network($1, udp, `$2')
allow $1 self:udp_socket { connect };

#
# can_ps():
#
allow $1 $2:dir { search getattr read };
allow $1 $2:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
allow $1 $2:process getattr;
# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
# running in a privileged domain.
dontaudit $1 $2:process ptrace;

#
# can_ptrace():
#
allow $1 $2:process ptrace;
allow $2 $1:process sigchld;

#
# can_resolve(): complete
#
tunable_policy(`use_dns',`
	allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_dns_port($1)
	corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1)
	sysnet_read_config($1)
')

#
# can_setbool(): complete
#
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
selinux_set_boolean($1)

#
# can_setcon(): complete
#
# get mount point is due to libselinux init
#
allow $1 self:process setcurrent;
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)

#
# can_setenforce(): complete
#
# get mount point is due to libselinux init
#
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
selinux_set_enforce_mode($1)

#
# can_setexec(): complete
#
# get mount point is due to libselinux init
#
allow $1 self:process setexec;
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)

#
# can_setfscreate(): complete
#
# get mount point is due to libselinux init
#
allow $1 self:process setfscreate;
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)

#
# can_setsecparam(): complete
#
# get mount point is due to libselinux init
#
selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
kernel_setsecparam($1)

#
# can_sysctl(): complete
#
kernel_rw_all_sysctl($1)

#
# can_tcp_connect():
#
allow $1 $2:tcp_socket { connectto recvfrom };
allow $2 $1:tcp_socket { acceptfrom recvfrom };
allow $2 kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom;
allow $1 kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom;

#
# can_udp_send():
#
allow $1 $2:udp_socket sendto;
allow $2 $1:udp_socket recvfrom;

#
# can_unix_connect():
#
allow $1 $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;

#
# can_unix_send():
#
allow $1 $2:unix_dgram_socket sendto;

#
# can_ypbind(): complete
#
optional_policy(`nis.te',`
	nis_use_ypbind($1)
')

#
# create_append_log_file():
#
allow $1 $2:dir { read getattr search add_name write };
allow $1 $2:file { create ioctl getattr setattr append link };

#
# create_dir_file():
#
allow $1 $2:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1 $2:file create_file_perms;
allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

#
# create_dir_notdevfile():
#
allow $1 $2:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1 $2:{ file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms;
allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

#
# daemon_base_domain():
#
type $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
init_daemon_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow $1_t self:process signal_perms;
kernel_list_proc($1_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_t)
init_use_fd($1_t)
init_use_script_pty($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t)
ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
	term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
	files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`selinuxutil.te',`
	seutil_sigchld_newrole($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`udev.te', `
	udev_read_db($1_t)
')
ifdef(`TODO',`
optional_policy(`rhgb.te',`
	rhgb_domain($1_t)
')
') dnl end TODO

#
# daemon_domain():
#
type $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
init_daemon_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
type $1_var_run_t;
files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
kernel_list_proc($1_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t)
dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs($1_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_t)
init_use_fd($1_t)
init_use_script_pty($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_sysadm_home_dir($1_t)
ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
	term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
	files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`selinuxutil.te',`
	seutil_sigchld_newrole($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`udev.te', `
	udev_read_db($1_t)
')
ifdef(`TODO',`
optional_policy(`rhgb.te',`
	rhgb_domain($1_t)
')
') dnl end TODO

#
# daemon_sub_domain():
#
# $3 may need more work
type $2_t; #, daemon $3;
domain_type($2_t)
type $2_exec_t;
domain_entry_file($2_t,$2_exec_t)
role system_r types $2_t;
allow $2_t self:process signal_perms;
domain_auto_trans($1, $2_exec_t, $2_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($2_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($2_t)
kernel_list_proc($1_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t)

#
# etc_domain(): complete
#
type $1_etc_t; #, usercanread;
files_type($1_etc_t)
allow $1_t $1_etc_t:file { getattr read };
files_search_etc($1_t)

#
# etcdir_domain(): complete
#
type $1_etc_t; #, usercanread;
files_file_type($1_etc_t)
allow $1_t $1_etc_t:file r_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
files_search_etc($1_t)

#
# file_type_auto_trans($1,$2,$3): complete
#
allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow $1 $3:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1 $3:file create_file_perms;
allow $1 $3:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
allow $1 $3:sock_file create_file_perms;
allow $1 $3:fifo_file create_file_perms;
type_transition $1 $2:{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } $3;

#
# file_type_auto_trans($1,$2,$3,$4): complete
#
allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms;
# for each i in $4:
can_create_internal($1,$3,$i)
type_transition $1 $2:$i $3;

#
# general_domain_access(): complete
#
allow $1 self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
allow $1 self:fd use;
allow $1 self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow $1 self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow $1 self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow $1 self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow $1 self:msg { send receive };
fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1)
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fd($1)
optional_policy(`nis.te',`
	nis_use_ypbind($1)
')

#
# general_proc_read_access(): complete
#
kernel_read_system_state($1)
kernel_read_network_state($1)
kernel_read_software_raid_state($1)
kernel_getattr_core($1)
kernel_getattr_message_if($1)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1)

#
# in_user_role():
#
# this is replaced by run interfaces

#
# init_service_domain(): complete
#
type $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
init_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
allow self:process signal_perms;
kernel_list_proc($1_t)
kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t)
dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t)
ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
	term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
	files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`udev.te',`
	udev_read_db($1_t)
')

#
# inetd_child_domain():
#
type $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
inetd_(udp_|tcp_)?service_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
role system_r types $1_t;
type $1_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
type $1_var_run_t;
files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
allow $1_t self:process signal_perms;
allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_t self:tcp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms;
# for identd
# cjp: this should probably only be inetd_child rules?
allow $1_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
allow $1_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
allow $1_t self:dir search;
allow $1_t self:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read };
files_search_home($1_t)
optional_policy(`kerberos.te',`
	kerberos_use($1_t)
')
#end for identd
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir })
allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
kernel_read_network_state($1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_t)
dev_read_urand($1_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_t)
files_read_etc_files($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
sysnet_read_config($1_t)
optional_policy(`nis.te',`
	nis_use_ypbind($1_t)
')
optional_policy(`nscd.te',`
	nscd_use_socket($1_t)
')

#
# legacy_domain(): complete
#
allow $1_t self:process execmem;
libs_legacy_use_shared_libs($1_t)
libs_legacy_use_ld_so($1_t)

#
# lock_domain(): complete
#
type $1_lock_t;
files_lock_file($1_lock_t)
allow $1_t $1_lock_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_lock($1_t,$1_lock_t)

#
# log_domain(): complete
#
type $1_log_t;
logging_log_file($1_log_t)
allow $1_t $1_log_t:file create_file_perms;
logging_create_log($1_t,$1_log_t)

#
# logdir_domain(): complete
#
type $1_log_t;
logging_log_file($1_log_t)
allow $1_t $1_log_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
logging_create_log($1_t,$1_log_t,{ file dir })

#
# network_home_dir():
#
create_dir_file($1, $2)
can_exec($1, $2)
allow $1 $2:{ sock_file fifo_file } { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };

#
# pty_slave_label():
#
type $1_devpts_t, file_type, sysadmfile, ptyfile $2;
allow $1_devpts_t devpts_t:filesystem associate;
type_transition $1_t devpts_t:chr_file $1_devpts_t;
allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };

#
# r_dir_file(): complete
#
allow $1 $2:dir { getattr read search };
allow $1 $2:file { read getattr };
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read };

#
# ra_dir_create_file(): complete
#
allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow $1 $2:file { create ra_file_perms };
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { create read getattr };

#
# ra_dir_file(): complete
#
allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow $1 $2:file ra_file_perms;
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read };

#
# read_locale(): complete
#
miscfiles_read_localization($1)

#
# read_sysctl($1): complete
#
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1)

#
# read_sysctl($1,full): complete
#
kernel_read_all_sysctl($1)

#
# rhgb_domain():
#

#
# rw_dir_create_file(): complete
#
allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow $1 $2:file create_file_perms;
allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;

#
# rw_dir_file(): complete
#
# cjp: rw_dir_perms here doesnt make sense
allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow $1 $2:file rw_file_perms;
allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read };

#
# system_domain(): complete
#
type $1_t;
type $1_exec_t;
init_system_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
files_list_etc($1_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)

#
# tmp_domain($1): complete
#
type $1_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir })

#
# tmp_domain($1,$2,$3): complete
#
# $2 may need more handling
#
type $1_tmp_t $2;
files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:$3 manage_obj_perms;
files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $3)

#
# tmpfs_domain(): complete
#
type $1_tmpfs_t;
files_tmpfs_file($1_tmpfs_t)
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
filesystem_create_private_tmpfs_data($1_t,$1_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

#
# unconfined_domain(): complete
#
unconfined_domain_template($1)

#
# user_application_domain(): complete
#
type $1_t $2;
domain_type($1_t)
type $1_exec_t;
domain_entry_file($1_t,$1_exec_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
# a "run" interface needs to be
# added, and use it in the base user domain
# template, in a optional_policy block.

#
# uses_authbind():
#
domain_auto_trans($1, authbind_exec_t, authbind_t)
allow authbind_t $1:process sigchld;
allow authbind_t $1:fd use;
allow authbind_t $1:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } rw_socket_perms;

#
# uses_shlib(): complete
#
libs_use_ld_so($1)
libs_use_shared_libs($1)

#
# var_lib_domain(): complete
#
type $1_var_lib_t;
files_type($1_var_lib_t)
allow $1_t $1_var_lib_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_var_lib_t:dir create_dir_perms;
files_create_var_lib($1_t,$1_var_lib_t)

#
# var_run_domain($1): complete
#
type $1_var_run_t;
files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms;
files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t)

#
# var_run_domain($1,$2): complete
#
type $1_var_run_t;
files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t,$2)
# for each object class in $2:
# if dir:
allow $1 $1_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms;
# else if lnk_file:
allow $1 $1_var_run_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
# else:
allow $1 $1_var_run_t:$2 create_file_perms;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: Reference policy status page update
  2005-09-13 22:30 Reference policy status page update Christopher J. PeBenito
@ 2005-09-20 19:56 ` Daniel J Walsh
  2005-09-20 20:41   ` Christopher J. PeBenito
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Daniel J Walsh @ 2005-09-20 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Christopher J. PeBenito; +Cc: SELinux Mail List

Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:

>I have updated the reference policy status page with a listing of the
>remaining modules that need to be converted, and note which modules are
>in the Fedora strict and targeted policies.
>
>http://serefpolicy.sourceforge.net/index.php?page=status
>
>For those looking to contribute, we ask that priority be given to the
>modules in the targeted policy, and then strict policy.  I've attached
>my notes on converting the old macros.  The big caveat is that not all
>macros are expanded completely, for example the network macros, since
>some are very complex because of the different expansions because of
>different/optional parameters.  There is also no guarantee that there
>are no errors, since its just my notes.  So to get from an old macro to
>the end reference policy rules/interfaces, it may take a couple
>expansions (especially in the network macros).
>
>If you're looking to contribute, please let us know what you're working
>on, so we can update the status page, and then work won't be duplicated.
>
>  
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>#
># This is the guide for converting old macros to local policy
># and new interfaces.
>#
># $1, $2, etc. are replaced with and the first and second, etc.
># parameters to the old macro.
>#
>
>########################################
>#
># Attributes
>#
># $1 is the type this attribute is on
>
>#
># auth: complete
>#
>auth_read_shadow($1)
>
>#
># auth_chkpwd: complete
>#
>auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1)
>
>#
># file_type: complete
>#
>files_type($1)
>
>#
># fs_domain: complete
>#
># handled by appropriate interfaces
>
>#
># mta_delivery_agent:
>#
>mta_mailserver_delivery($1)
># for piping mail to a command
>kernel_read_system_state($1)
>corecmd_exec_shell($1)
>files_read_etc_runtime_files($1)
>mta_append_spool($1)
>ifdef(`TODO',`
>optional_policy(`arpwatch.te',`
>	# why is mail delivered to a directory of type arpwatch_data_t?
>	allow mta_delivery_agent arpwatch_data_t:dir search;
>')
>') dnl end TODO
>
>#
># mta_user_agent:
>#
>mta_mailserver_user_agent($1)
>domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1)
>userdom_sigchld_all_users($1)
>userdom_use_all_user_fd($1)
>userdom_use_sysadm_terms($1)
>allow mta_user_agent privmail:fd use;
>allow mta_user_agent privmail:process sigchld;
>allow mta_user_agent privmail:fifo_file { read write };
>allow mta_user_agent sysadm_t:fifo_file { read write };
>optional_policy(`arpwatch.te',`
>	# why is mail delivered to a directory of type arpwatch_data_t?
>	allow mta_user_agent arpwatch_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
>	ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
>		dontaudit mta_user_agent arpwatch_t:packet_socket { read write };
>	')
>')
>optional_policy(`cron.te',`
>	cron_sigchld($1)
>	cron_read_system_job_tmp_files($1)
>')
>optional_policy(`logrotate.te',`
>	logrotate_read_tmp_files($1)
>')
>
>#
># nscd_client_domain: complete
>#
>optional_policy(`nscd.te',`
>	nscd_use_socket($1)
>')
>
>#
># privfd: complete
>#
>domain_wide_inherit_fd($1)
>
>#
># privlog: complete
>#
>logging_send_syslog_msg($1)
>
>#
># privmail: complete
>#
>mta_send_mail($1)
>
>#
># privmodule: complete
>#
>modutils_domtrans_insmod($1)
>
>#
># privowner: complete
>#
>domain_obj_id_change_exempt($1)
>
>#
># privrole: complete
>#
>domain_role_change_exempt($1)
>
>#
># privuser: complete
>#
>domain_subj_id_change_exempt($1)
>
>#
># sysadmfile: complete
>#
>files_type($1)
>
>#
># userspace_objmgr: complete
>#
>allow $1 self:process getattr;
># Receive notifications of policy reloads and enforcing status changes.
>allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket { create bind read };
>selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
>selinux_validate_context($1)
>selinux_compute_access_vector($1)
>selinux_compute_create_context($1)
>selinux_compute_relabel_context($1)
>selinux_compute_user_contexts($1)
>seutil_read_config($1)
>seutil_read_default_contexts($1)
>
>#
># web_client_domain:
>#
>optional_policy(`squid.te',`
>	squid_use($1)
>')
>
>########################################
>#
># Access macros
>#
>
>#
># access_terminal():
>#
>allow $1 $2_tty_device_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
>allow $1 devtty_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
>allow $1 devpts_t:dir { read search getattr };
>allow $1 $2_devpts_t:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
>
>#
># append_log_domain():
>#
>type $1_log_t;
>logging_log_file($1_log_t)
>allow $1_t var_log_t:dir ra_dir_perms;
>allow $1_t $1_log_t:file  { create ra_file_perms };
>type_transition $1_t var_log_t:file $1_log_t;
>
>#
># append_logdir_domain():
>#
>type $1_log_t;
>logging_log_file($1_log_t)
>allow $1_t var_log_t:dir ra_dir_perms;
>allow $1_t $1_log_t:dir { setattr ra_dir_perms };
>allow $1_t $1_log_t:file  { create ra_file_perms };
>type_transition $1_t var_log_t:file $1_log_t;
>
>#
># application_domain():
>#
>type $1_t;
>type $1_exec_t;
>domain_type($1_t)
>domain_entry_file($1_t,$1_exec_t)
>libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
>libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
># a "run" interface needs to be
># added, and have sysadm_t use it
># in a optional_policy block.
>
>#
># base_can_network($1,$2,$3):
>#
>allow $1 self:$2_socket connected_socket_perms;
>corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>corenet_$2_bind_all_nodes($1)
>sysnet_read_config($1)
># if $3 is specified (remove _port_t from $3):
>corenet_$2_sendrecv_$3_port($1)
># else:
>corenet_$2_sendrecv_all_ports($1)
>
>#
># base_file_read_access(): complete
>#
>kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1)
>corecmd_list_bin($1)
>corecmd_read_bin_symlink($1)
>corecmd_read_bin_file($1)
>corecmd_read_bin_pipe($1)
>corecmd_read_bin_socket($1)
>corecmd_list_sbin($1)
>corecmd_read_sbin_symlink($1)
>corecmd_read_sbin_file($1)
>corecmd_read_sbin_pipe($1)
>corecmd_read_sbin_socket($1)
>files_list_home($1)
>files_read_usr_files($1)
>seutil_read_config($1)
>tunable_policy(`read_default_t',`
>	files_list_default($1)
>	files_read_default_files($1)
>	files_read_default_symlinks($1)
>	files_read_default_sockets($1)
>	files_read_default_pipes($1)
>')
>
>#
># base_pty_perms():
>#
>allow $1_t ptmx_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
>allow $1_t devpts_t:filesystem getattr;
>allow $1_t devpts_t:dir { getattr read search };
>dontaudit $1_t bsdpty_device_t:chr_file { getattr read write };
>
>#
># can_create($1,$2,$3): complete
>#
># for each object class in $3:
># if dir:
>allow $1 $2:dir create_dir_perms;
># else if lnk_file:
>allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
># else:
>allow $1 $2:$3 create_file_perms;
>
>#
># can_create_other_pty(): complete
>#
>allow $1_t $2_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr };
>term_create_pty($1_t,$2_devpts_t)
>
>#
># can_create_pty(): complete
>#
># $2 may require more conversion
>type $1_devpts_t $2;
>term_pty($1_devpts_t)
>allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr };
>term_create_pty($1_t,$1_devpts_t)
>
>#
># can_exec_any(): complete
>#
>corecmd_exec_bin($1)
>corecmd_exec_sbin($1)
>domain_exec_all_entry_files($1)
>files_exec_etc_files($1)
>libs_use_ld_so($1)
>libs_use_shared_libs($1)
>libs_exec_ld_so($1)
>libs_exec_lib_files($1)
>
>#
># can_getcon(): complete
>#
>allow $1 self:process getattr;
>kernel_read_system_state($1)
>
>#
># can_getsecurity(): complete
>#
>selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
>selinux_validate_context($1)
>selinux_compute_access_vector($1)
>selinux_compute_create_context($1)
>selinux_compute_relabel_context($1)
>selinux_compute_user_contexts($1)
>
>#
># can_kerberos(): complete
>#
>optional_policy(`kerberos.te',`
>	kerberos_use($1)
>')
>
>#
># can_ldap(): complete
>#
>optional_policy(`ldap.te',`
>	allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
>	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ldap_port($1)
>	corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
>	sysnet_read_config($1)
>')
>
>#
># can_loadpol(): complete
>#
>selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
>selinux_load_policy($1)
>
>#
># can_network($1):
>#
>allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
>allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1)
>corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1)
>corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
>corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1)
>sysnet_read_config($1)
>optional_policy(`mount.te',`
>	mount_send_nfs_client_request($1)
>')
>
>#
># can_network($1,$2):
>#
>can_network_tcp($1, `$2')
>can_network_udp($1, `$2')
>optional_policy(`mount.te',`
>	mount_send_nfs_client_request($1)
>')
>
>#
># can_network_client():
>#
>can_network_client_tcp($1, `$2')
>can_network_udp($1, `$2')
>
>#
># can_network_client_tcp($1): complete
>#
>allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1)
>corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
>sysnet_read_config($1)
>
>#
># can_network_client_tcp($1,$2):
>#
># remove _port_t from $2
>allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms;
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_$2_port($1)
>corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1)
>sysnet_read_config($1)
>
>#
># can_network_server():
>#
>allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
>base_can_network($1, tcp, `$2')
>
>#
># can_network_server_tcp():
>#
>allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
>base_can_network($1, tcp, `$2')
>
>#
># can_network_tcp():
>#
>can_network_server_tcp($1, `$2')
>can_network_client_tcp($1, `$2')
>
>#
># can_network_udp(): complete
>#
>base_can_network($1, udp, `$2')
>allow $1 self:udp_socket { connect };
>
>#
># can_ps():
>#
>allow $1 $2:dir { search getattr read };
>allow $1 $2:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
>allow $1 $2:process getattr;
># We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
># /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
># (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
># running in a privileged domain.
>dontaudit $1 $2:process ptrace;
>
>#
># can_ptrace():
>#
>allow $1 $2:process ptrace;
>allow $2 $1:process sigchld;
>
>#
># can_resolve(): complete
>#
>tunable_policy(`use_dns',`
>	allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
>	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1)
>	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1)
>	corenet_udp_sendrecv_dns_port($1)
>	corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1)
>	sysnet_read_config($1)
>')
>
>#
># can_setbool(): complete
>#
>selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
>selinux_set_boolean($1)
>
>#
># can_setcon(): complete
>#
># get mount point is due to libselinux init
>#
>allow $1 self:process setcurrent;
>selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
>
>#
># can_setenforce(): complete
>#
># get mount point is due to libselinux init
>#
>selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
>selinux_set_enforce_mode($1)
>
>#
># can_setexec(): complete
>#
># get mount point is due to libselinux init
>#
>allow $1 self:process setexec;
>selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
>
>#
># can_setfscreate(): complete
>#
># get mount point is due to libselinux init
>#
>allow $1 self:process setfscreate;
>selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
>
>#
># can_setsecparam(): complete
>#
># get mount point is due to libselinux init
>#
>selinux_get_fs_mount($1)
>kernel_setsecparam($1)
>
>#
># can_sysctl(): complete
>#
>kernel_rw_all_sysctl($1)
>
>#
># can_tcp_connect():
>#
>allow $1 $2:tcp_socket { connectto recvfrom };
>allow $2 $1:tcp_socket { acceptfrom recvfrom };
>allow $2 kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom;
>allow $1 kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom;
>
>#
># can_udp_send():
>#
>allow $1 $2:udp_socket sendto;
>allow $2 $1:udp_socket recvfrom;
>
>#
># can_unix_connect():
>#
>allow $1 $2:unix_stream_socket connectto;
>
>#
># can_unix_send():
>#
>allow $1 $2:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
>
>#
># can_ypbind(): complete
>#
>optional_policy(`nis.te',`
>	nis_use_ypbind($1)
>')
>
>#
># create_append_log_file():
>#
>allow $1 $2:dir { read getattr search add_name write };
>allow $1 $2:file { create ioctl getattr setattr append link };
>
>#
># create_dir_file():
>#
>allow $1 $2:dir create_dir_perms;
>allow $1 $2:file create_file_perms;
>allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
>
>#
># create_dir_notdevfile():
>#
>allow $1 $2:dir create_dir_perms;
>allow $1 $2:{ file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms;
>allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
>
>#
># daemon_base_domain():
>#
>type $1_t;
>type $1_exec_t;
>init_daemon_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
>dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
>allow $1_t self:process signal_perms;
>kernel_list_proc($1_t)
>kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t)
>kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
>dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
>fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t)
>term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
>domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_t)
>init_use_fd($1_t)
>init_use_script_pty($1_t)
>libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
>libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
>logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
>userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t)
>ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
>	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
>	term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
>	files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t)
>')
>optional_policy(`selinuxutil.te',`
>	seutil_sigchld_newrole($1_t)
>')
>optional_policy(`udev.te', `
>	udev_read_db($1_t)
>')
>ifdef(`TODO',`
>optional_policy(`rhgb.te',`
>	rhgb_domain($1_t)
>')
>') dnl end TODO
>
>#
># daemon_domain():
>#
>type $1_t;
>type $1_exec_t;
>init_daemon_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
>type $1_var_run_t;
>files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
>dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
>allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
>allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
>files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t)
>kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
>kernel_list_proc($1_t)
>kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t)
>dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
>fs_getattr_all_fs($1_t)
>fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t)
>term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
>domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_t)
>init_use_fd($1_t)
>init_use_script_pty($1_t)
>libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
>libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
>logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
>miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
>userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t)
>userdom_dontaudit_search_sysadm_home_dir($1_t)
>ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
>	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
>	term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
>	files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t)
>')
>optional_policy(`selinuxutil.te',`
>	seutil_sigchld_newrole($1_t)
>')
>optional_policy(`udev.te', `
>	udev_read_db($1_t)
>')
>ifdef(`TODO',`
>optional_policy(`rhgb.te',`
>	rhgb_domain($1_t)
>')
>') dnl end TODO
>
>#
># daemon_sub_domain():
>#
># $3 may need more work
>type $2_t; #, daemon $3;
>domain_type($2_t)
>type $2_exec_t;
>domain_entry_file($2_t,$2_exec_t)
>role system_r types $2_t;
>allow $2_t self:process signal_perms;
>domain_auto_trans($1, $2_exec_t, $2_t)
>logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
>libs_use_ld_so($2_t)
>libs_use_shared_libs($2_t)
>kernel_list_proc($1_t)
>kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t)
>
>#
># etc_domain(): complete
>#
>type $1_etc_t; #, usercanread;
>files_type($1_etc_t)
>allow $1_t $1_etc_t:file { getattr read };
>files_search_etc($1_t)
>
>#
># etcdir_domain(): complete
>#
>type $1_etc_t; #, usercanread;
>files_file_type($1_etc_t)
>allow $1_t $1_etc_t:file r_file_perms;
>allow $1_t $1_etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
>allow $1_t $1_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
>files_search_etc($1_t)
>
>#
># file_type_auto_trans($1,$2,$3): complete
>#
>allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms;
>allow $1 $3:dir create_dir_perms;
>allow $1 $3:file create_file_perms;
>allow $1 $3:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
>allow $1 $3:sock_file create_file_perms;
>allow $1 $3:fifo_file create_file_perms;
>type_transition $1 $2:{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } $3;
>
>#
># file_type_auto_trans($1,$2,$3,$4): complete
>#
>allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms;
># for each i in $4:
>can_create_internal($1,$3,$i)
>type_transition $1 $2:$i $3;
>
>#
># general_domain_access(): complete
>#
>allow $1 self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
>allow $1 self:fd use;
>allow $1 self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
>allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
>allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
>allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
>allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
>allow $1 self:shm create_shm_perms;
>allow $1 self:sem create_sem_perms;
>allow $1 self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
>allow $1 self:msg { send receive };
>fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1)
>userdom_use_unpriv_users_fd($1)
>optional_policy(`nis.te',`
>	nis_use_ypbind($1)
>')
>
>#
># general_proc_read_access(): complete
>#
>kernel_read_system_state($1)
>kernel_read_network_state($1)
>kernel_read_software_raid_state($1)
>kernel_getattr_core($1)
>kernel_getattr_message_if($1)
>kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1)
>
>#
># in_user_role():
>#
># this is replaced by run interfaces
>
>#
># init_service_domain(): complete
>#
>type $1_t;
>type $1_exec_t;
>init_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
>dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
>allow self:process signal_perms;
>kernel_list_proc($1_t)
>kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t)
>dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
>term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
>libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
>libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
>logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
>userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fd($1_t)
>ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
>	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
>	term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
>	files_dontaudit_read_root_file($1_t)
>')
>optional_policy(`udev.te',`
>	udev_read_db($1_t)
>')
>
>#
># inetd_child_domain():
>#
>type $1_t;
>type $1_exec_t;
>inetd_(udp_|tcp_)?service_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
>role system_r types $1_t;
>type $1_tmp_t;
>files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
>type $1_var_run_t;
>files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
>allow $1_t self:process signal_perms;
>allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
>allow $1_t self:tcp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms;
># for identd
># cjp: this should probably only be inetd_child rules?
>allow $1_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
>allow $1_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
>allow $1_t self:dir search;
>allow $1_t self:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read };
>files_search_home($1_t)
>optional_policy(`kerberos.te',`
>	kerberos_use($1_t)
>')
>#end for identd
>allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
>allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
>files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir })
>allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
>files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t)
>kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
>kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
>kernel_read_network_state($1_t)
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if($1_t)
>corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if($1_t)
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t)
>corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_t)
>corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_t)
>corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_t)
>dev_read_urand($1_t)
>fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_t)
>files_read_etc_files($1_t)
>libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
>libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
>logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
>miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
>sysnet_read_config($1_t)
>optional_policy(`nis.te',`
>	nis_use_ypbind($1_t)
>')
>optional_policy(`nscd.te',`
>	nscd_use_socket($1_t)
>')
>
>#
># legacy_domain(): complete
>#
>allow $1_t self:process execmem;
>libs_legacy_use_shared_libs($1_t)
>libs_legacy_use_ld_so($1_t)
>
>#
># lock_domain(): complete
>#
>type $1_lock_t;
>files_lock_file($1_lock_t)
>allow $1_t $1_lock_t:file create_file_perms;
>files_create_lock($1_t,$1_lock_t)
>
>#
># log_domain(): complete
>#
>type $1_log_t;
>logging_log_file($1_log_t)
>allow $1_t $1_log_t:file create_file_perms;
>logging_create_log($1_t,$1_log_t)
>
>#
># logdir_domain(): complete
>#
>type $1_log_t;
>logging_log_file($1_log_t)
>allow $1_t $1_log_t:file create_file_perms;
>allow $1_t $1_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
>logging_create_log($1_t,$1_log_t,{ file dir })
>
>#
># network_home_dir():
>#
>create_dir_file($1, $2)
>can_exec($1, $2)
>allow $1 $2:{ sock_file fifo_file } { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
>
>#
># pty_slave_label():
>#
>type $1_devpts_t, file_type, sysadmfile, ptyfile $2;
>allow $1_devpts_t devpts_t:filesystem associate;
>type_transition $1_t devpts_t:chr_file $1_devpts_t;
>allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };
>
>#
># r_dir_file(): complete
>#
>allow $1 $2:dir { getattr read search };
>allow $1 $2:file { read getattr };
>allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read };
>
>#
># ra_dir_create_file(): complete
>#
>allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms;
>allow $1 $2:file { create ra_file_perms };
>allow $1 $2:lnk_file { create read getattr };
>
>#
># ra_dir_file(): complete
>#
>allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms;
>allow $1 $2:file ra_file_perms;
>allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read };
>
>#
># read_locale(): complete
>#
>miscfiles_read_localization($1)
>
>#
># read_sysctl($1): complete
>#
>kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1)
>
>#
># read_sysctl($1,full): complete
>#
>kernel_read_all_sysctl($1)
>
>#
># rhgb_domain():
>#
>
>#
># rw_dir_create_file(): complete
>#
>allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms;
>allow $1 $2:file create_file_perms;
>allow $1 $2:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
>
>#
># rw_dir_file(): complete
>#
># cjp: rw_dir_perms here doesnt make sense
>allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms;
>allow $1 $2:file rw_file_perms;
>allow $1 $2:lnk_file { getattr read };
>
>#
># system_domain(): complete
>#
>type $1_t;
>type $1_exec_t;
>init_system_domain($1_t,$1_exec_t)
>files_list_etc($1_t)
>libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
>libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
>logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
>
>#
># tmp_domain($1): complete
>#
>type $1_tmp_t;
>files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
>allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
>allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
>files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir })
>
>#
># tmp_domain($1,$2,$3): complete
>#
># $2 may need more handling
>#
>type $1_tmp_t $2;
>files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t)
>allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:$3 manage_obj_perms;
>files_create_tmp_files($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $3)
>
>#
># tmpfs_domain(): complete
>#
>type $1_tmpfs_t;
>files_tmpfs_file($1_tmpfs_t)
>allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
>allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
>allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
>allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
>allow $1_t $1_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
>filesystem_create_private_tmpfs_data($1_t,$1_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
>
>#
># unconfined_domain(): complete
>#
>unconfined_domain_template($1)
>
>#
># user_application_domain(): complete
>#
>type $1_t $2;
>domain_type($1_t)
>type $1_exec_t;
>domain_entry_file($1_t,$1_exec_t)
>libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
>libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
>logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
># a "run" interface needs to be
># added, and use it in the base user domain
># template, in a optional_policy block.
>
>#
># uses_authbind():
>#
>domain_auto_trans($1, authbind_exec_t, authbind_t)
>allow authbind_t $1:process sigchld;
>allow authbind_t $1:fd use;
>allow authbind_t $1:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } rw_socket_perms;
>
>#
># uses_shlib(): complete
>#
>libs_use_ld_so($1)
>libs_use_shared_libs($1)
>
>#
># var_lib_domain(): complete
>#
>type $1_var_lib_t;
>files_type($1_var_lib_t)
>allow $1_t $1_var_lib_t:file create_file_perms;
>allow $1_t $1_var_lib_t:dir create_dir_perms;
>files_create_var_lib($1_t,$1_var_lib_t)
>
>#
># var_run_domain($1): complete
>#
>type $1_var_run_t;
>files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
>allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
>allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms;
>files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t)
>
>#
># var_run_domain($1,$2): complete
>#
>type $1_var_run_t;
>files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
>files_create_pid($1_t,$1_var_run_t,$2)
># for each object class in $2:
># if dir:
>allow $1 $1_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms;
># else if lnk_file:
>allow $1 $1_var_run_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
># else:
>allow $1 $1_var_run_t:$2 create_file_perms;
>  
>
Ok, I have begun playing with the reference policy trying to build the 
modules version.  So far not much luck.

checkmodule does not like the syntax for "module devices 1.0;"



-- 



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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: Reference policy status page update
  2005-09-20 19:56 ` Daniel J Walsh
@ 2005-09-20 20:41   ` Christopher J. PeBenito
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Christopher J. PeBenito @ 2005-09-20 20:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Daniel J Walsh; +Cc: SELinux Mail List

On Tue, 2005-09-20 at 15:56 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> 
> >I have updated the reference policy status page with a listing of the
> >remaining modules that need to be converted, and note which modules are
> >in the Fedora strict and targeted policies.
> >
> >http://serefpolicy.sourceforge.net/index.php?page=status
> >
[cut]
> >
> Ok, I have begun playing with the reference policy trying to build the 
> modules version.  So far not much luck.
> 
> checkmodule does not like the syntax for "module devices 1.0;"

Can you be more specific about the error, and which module you're
compiling?  At least one other module had a typo calling it devices too.

-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2005-09-20 20:41 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2005-09-13 22:30 Reference policy status page update Christopher J. PeBenito
2005-09-20 19:56 ` Daniel J Walsh
2005-09-20 20:41   ` Christopher J. PeBenito

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