Re: [RFC 0/4] NetLabel

["Mikel L. Matthews" <mikel@argus-systems.com>]

Paul Moore wrote:
> James Morris wrote:
>> On Thu, 25 May 2006, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> This patch introduces a new kernel feature designed to support labeled
>>> networking protocols such as RIPSO and CIPSO.  These protocols are required to
>>> interoperate with existing "trusted" operating systems such as Trusted
>>> Solaris.
>> A few initial comments.
>>
>> - Did you decide that you definitely need to verify labels on fragments?  
>>
>> I can see the code's been added to do that, but wonder about a comment 
>> made during earlier discussion that mislabeled fragments could only come 
>> from a misbehaving trusted system.  What is the threat model here?
>>
> 
> This is one part of the patch that I really don't have a strong feeling
> for either way.  There was some concern on the LSM list that not
> checking the fragment options might be an issue so I added some code to
> check the fragment options.  Personally I think we are probably okay
> without it as the un-autenticated/un-verified nature of these labeling
> protocols more or less requires either a trusted network/hosts.
> 
> If the community decides that this check is not required then I can
> simply drop all of the changes in ip_fragment.c.

If you state you are labeling session packets (tcp or udp), that would 
lead one to believe all packets are labeled (including fragments). Based 
on our past evaluations I don't think non-labeled fragments would make 
it through an evaluation if CIPSO/RIPSO  were part of the TOE/security 
Target.

> 
>> - Can you explain how module loading and module refcounting for these 
>> modules work?  (e.g. what causes netlabel_cipso_v4 to be loaded, is it 
>> always safe to unload if the refcount is zero?)
> 


-- 
Thanks,
Mike

Mikel L. Matthews
Chief Technology Officer
Innovative Security Systems, Inc.
(dba Argus Systems Group)
1809 Woodfield Dr.
Savoy IL 61874
+1-217-355-6308
www.argus-systems.com

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