All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
	paul.moore@hp.com
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] secid reconciliation-v03: Enforcement for SELinux
Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2006 21:33:24 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <451C85F4.7000406@trustedcs.com> (raw)

This defines SELinux enforcement of the 2 new LSM hooks as well
as related changes elsewhere in the SELinux code.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c        |  129 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h |    5 +
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c       |    2 
 security/selinux/ss/services.c  |    2 
 security/selinux/xfrm.c         |   28 ++++++
 5 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5a66c4c..143b4b8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3449,8 +3449,12 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(s
 
 		err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
 				   sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 	}
 
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, ad);
+
 out:
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3489,10 +3493,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(s
 		goto out;
 
 	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
 out:	
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3626,13 +3626,16 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
-	BUG_ON(err);
+	if (selinux_compat_net) {
+		err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
+		BUG_ON(err);
 
-	if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
-		req->secid = sksec->sid;
-		return 0;
-	}
+		if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			req->secid = sksec->sid;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	} else
+		peersid = skb->secmark;
 
 	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
 	if (err)
@@ -3662,6 +3665,69 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(co
 	fl->secid = req->secid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
+{
+	u32 xfrm_sid, trans_sid;
+	int err;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* xfrm/cipso inapplicable for loopback traffic */
+	if (skb->dev == &loopback_dev)
+		return 1;
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
+	BUG_ON(err);
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (xfrm_sid) {
+		err = security_transition_sid(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark,
+						SECCLASS_PACKET, &trans_sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+
+		skb->secmark = trans_sid;
+	}
+
+	/* See if CIPSO can flow in thru the current secmark here */
+
+out:
+	return err ? 0 : 1;
+};
+
+static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 nf_secid)
+{
+	u32 trans_sid;
+	int err;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!skb->secmark) {
+		u32 xfrm_sid;
+
+		selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+
+		if (xfrm_sid)
+			skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
+		else if (skb->sk) {
+			struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+			skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
+		}
+	}
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, nf_secid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				PACKET__FLOW_OUT, NULL);
+
+out:
+	return err ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err = 0;
@@ -3700,7 +3766,8 @@ out:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
 
-static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
+static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					    struct net_device *dev,
 					    struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 					    u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
 {
@@ -3710,6 +3777,9 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_com
 	struct inode *inode;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
+	if (!sk)
+		goto out;
+
 	sock = sk->sk_socket;
 	if (!sock)
 		goto out;
@@ -3768,7 +3838,11 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_com
 
 		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
 				   send_perm, ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 	}
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb, ad);
 out:
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3782,17 +3856,9 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 {
 	char *addrp;
 	int len, err = 0;
-	struct sock *sk;
 	struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
-	sk = skb->sk;
-	if (!sk)
-		goto out;
-
-	sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
@@ -3803,16 +3869,25 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 		goto out;
 
 	if (selinux_compat_net)
-		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
+		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(skb->sk, skb, dev, &ad,
 						       family, addrp, len);
-	else
-		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
-				   PACKET__SEND, &ad);
+	else {
+		if (!skb->secmark) {
+			u32 xfrm_sid;
 
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
+			selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+			if (xfrm_sid)
+				skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
+			else if (skb->sk) {
+				struct sk_security_struct *sksec =
+						skb->sk->sk_security;
+				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
+			}
+		}
+		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
+	}
 out:
 	return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
 }
@@ -4719,6 +4794,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinu
 	.inet_conn_request =		selinux_inet_conn_request,
 	.inet_csk_clone =		selinux_inet_csk_clone,
 	.req_classify_flow =		selinux_req_classify_flow,
+	.skb_flow_in =			selinux_skb_flow_in,
+	.skb_flow_out =			selinux_skb_flow_out,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 81eb598..ed07f92 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec
 u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
 u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
 #else
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			struct avc_audit_data *ad)
@@ -68,6 +69,10 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_se
 	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	return 0;
 }
+static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 119bd60..c551def 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -548,6 +548,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scon
 				}
 			}
 		}
+		else if (tclass == SECCLASS_PACKET)
+			return mls_copy_context(newcontext, scontext);
 		/* Fallthrough */
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
 		if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 22ed17c..26176c2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -832,6 +832,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid
 
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		switch (tclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_PACKET:
 		case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
 			*out_sid = ssid;
 			break;
@@ -876,6 +877,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid
 
 	/* Set the role and type to default values. */
 	switch (tclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_PACKET:
 	case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
 		/* Use the current role and type of process. */
 		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 3e742b8..3a68723 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks/returns the xfrm sid for the incoming packet.
  */
 
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
@@ -193,6 +193,32 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct s
 }
 
 /*
+ * LSM hook implementation that returns the xfrm sid for the outgoing packet.
+ */
+
+void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
+
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	dst = skb->dst;
+	if (dst) {
+		struct dst_entry *dst_test;
+		for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+			dst_test = dst_test->child) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+
+			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+				*sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
  * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
  * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
  */

--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
	paul.moore@hp.com
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] secid reconciliation-v03: Enforcement for SELinux
Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2006 21:33:24 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <451C85F4.7000406@trustedcs.com> (raw)

This defines SELinux enforcement of the 2 new LSM hooks as well
as related changes elsewhere in the SELinux code.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c        |  129 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h |    5 +
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c       |    2 
 security/selinux/ss/services.c  |    2 
 security/selinux/xfrm.c         |   28 ++++++
 5 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5a66c4c..143b4b8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3449,8 +3449,12 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(s
 
 		err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
 				   sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 	}
 
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, ad);
+
 out:
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3489,10 +3493,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(s
 		goto out;
 
 	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
 out:	
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3626,13 +3626,16 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
-	BUG_ON(err);
+	if (selinux_compat_net) {
+		err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
+		BUG_ON(err);
 
-	if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
-		req->secid = sksec->sid;
-		return 0;
-	}
+		if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			req->secid = sksec->sid;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	} else
+		peersid = skb->secmark;
 
 	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
 	if (err)
@@ -3662,6 +3665,69 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(co
 	fl->secid = req->secid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
+{
+	u32 xfrm_sid, trans_sid;
+	int err;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* xfrm/cipso inapplicable for loopback traffic */
+	if (skb->dev == &loopback_dev)
+		return 1;
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
+	BUG_ON(err);
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (xfrm_sid) {
+		err = security_transition_sid(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark,
+						SECCLASS_PACKET, &trans_sid);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+
+		skb->secmark = trans_sid;
+	}
+
+	/* See if CIPSO can flow in thru the current secmark here */
+
+out:
+	return err ? 0 : 1;
+};
+
+static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 nf_secid)
+{
+	u32 trans_sid;
+	int err;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!skb->secmark) {
+		u32 xfrm_sid;
+
+		selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+
+		if (xfrm_sid)
+			skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
+		else if (skb->sk) {
+			struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+			skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
+		}
+	}
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, nf_secid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				PACKET__FLOW_OUT, NULL);
+
+out:
+	return err ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err = 0;
@@ -3700,7 +3766,8 @@ out:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
 
-static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
+static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					    struct net_device *dev,
 					    struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 					    u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
 {
@@ -3710,6 +3777,9 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_com
 	struct inode *inode;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
+	if (!sk)
+		goto out;
+
 	sock = sk->sk_socket;
 	if (!sock)
 		goto out;
@@ -3768,7 +3838,11 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_com
 
 		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
 				   send_perm, ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 	}
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb, ad);
 out:
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3782,17 +3856,9 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 {
 	char *addrp;
 	int len, err = 0;
-	struct sock *sk;
 	struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
-	sk = skb->sk;
-	if (!sk)
-		goto out;
-
-	sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
@@ -3803,16 +3869,25 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 		goto out;
 
 	if (selinux_compat_net)
-		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
+		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(skb->sk, skb, dev, &ad,
 						       family, addrp, len);
-	else
-		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
-				   PACKET__SEND, &ad);
+	else {
+		if (!skb->secmark) {
+			u32 xfrm_sid;
 
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
+			selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+			if (xfrm_sid)
+				skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
+			else if (skb->sk) {
+				struct sk_security_struct *sksec =
+						skb->sk->sk_security;
+				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
+			}
+		}
+		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
+	}
 out:
 	return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
 }
@@ -4719,6 +4794,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinu
 	.inet_conn_request =		selinux_inet_conn_request,
 	.inet_csk_clone =		selinux_inet_csk_clone,
 	.req_classify_flow =		selinux_req_classify_flow,
+	.skb_flow_in =			selinux_skb_flow_in,
+	.skb_flow_out =			selinux_skb_flow_out,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 81eb598..ed07f92 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec
 u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
 u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
 #else
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			struct avc_audit_data *ad)
@@ -68,6 +69,10 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_se
 	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	return 0;
 }
+static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 119bd60..c551def 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -548,6 +548,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scon
 				}
 			}
 		}
+		else if (tclass == SECCLASS_PACKET)
+			return mls_copy_context(newcontext, scontext);
 		/* Fallthrough */
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
 		if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 22ed17c..26176c2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -832,6 +832,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid
 
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		switch (tclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_PACKET:
 		case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
 			*out_sid = ssid;
 			break;
@@ -876,6 +877,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid
 
 	/* Set the role and type to default values. */
 	switch (tclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_PACKET:
 	case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
 		/* Use the current role and type of process. */
 		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 3e742b8..3a68723 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks/returns the xfrm sid for the incoming packet.
  */
 
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
@@ -193,6 +193,32 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct s
 }
 
 /*
+ * LSM hook implementation that returns the xfrm sid for the outgoing packet.
+ */
+
+void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
+
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	dst = skb->dst;
+	if (dst) {
+		struct dst_entry *dst_test;
+		for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+			dst_test = dst_test->child) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+
+			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+				*sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
  * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
  * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
  */

             reply	other threads:[~2006-09-29  2:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-09-29  2:33 Venkat Yekkirala [this message]
2006-09-29  2:33 ` [PATCH 7/7] secid reconciliation-v03: Enforcement for SELinux Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29  3:52 ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-29  3:52   ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-29 12:59   ` Stephen Smalley
2006-09-29 12:59     ` Stephen Smalley
2006-09-29 14:00     ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-29 14:00       ` Joshua Brindle
2006-09-29 14:28       ` Stephen Smalley
2006-09-29 14:28         ` Stephen Smalley
2006-09-29 14:33         ` James Morris
2006-09-29 14:33           ` James Morris
2006-09-29 14:39           ` Stephen Smalley
2006-09-29 14:39             ` Stephen Smalley
2006-09-29 16:06             ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 16:06               ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 16:10               ` James Morris
2006-09-29 16:10                 ` James Morris
2006-09-29 16:15                 ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 16:15                   ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 16:39 ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 16:39   ` Paul Moore
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2006-09-29 16:09 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 16:09 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 16:13 ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 16:13   ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 16:17 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 16:17 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 16:22 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 16:22 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 16:27 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 16:27 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 16:31 ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 16:31   ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 16:50   ` James Morris
2006-09-29 16:50     ` James Morris
2006-09-29 17:32     ` James Morris
2006-09-29 17:32       ` James Morris
2006-09-29 17:50       ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 17:50         ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 17:43     ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 17:43       ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 18:41       ` James Morris
2006-09-29 18:41         ` James Morris
2006-09-29 19:06         ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 19:06           ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 19:33           ` James Morris
2006-09-29 19:33             ` James Morris
2006-09-29 19:51             ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 19:51               ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 20:04               ` James Morris
2006-09-29 20:04                 ` James Morris
2006-09-29 20:09                 ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 20:09                   ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 17:27 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 17:27 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 17:38 ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 17:38   ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 18:50 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 18:50 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 19:13 ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 19:13   ` Paul Moore
2006-09-29 21:54 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 21:54 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 22:10 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-29 22:10 ` Venkat Yekkirala
2006-10-01 21:30 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-10-01 21:30 ` Venkat Yekkirala

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=451C85F4.7000406@trustedcs.com \
    --to=vyekkirala@trustedcs.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul.moore@hp.com \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.