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From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Markus Gutschke <markus@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	davem@davemloft.net, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2012 13:34:38 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4F3D766E.7040205@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAE6n16kweRehdozft0tKOB1P5LtGFJDCLQP=2EXfm8P0enyH=A@mail.gmail.com>

On 02/16/2012 01:28 PM, Markus Gutschke wrote:
> 
> I think, the documentation said that as soon as prctl() is used to set
> a bpf filter for system calls, it automatically disallows system calls
> using an entry point other than the one used by this particular
> prctl().
> 
> I was trying to come up with scenarios where this particular approach
> causes problem, but I can't think of any off the top of my head. So,
> it might actually turn out to be a very elegant way to reduce the
> attack surface of the kernel. If we are really worried about userspace
> compatibility, we could make the kernel send a signal instead of
> terminating the program, if the wrong entry point was used; not sure
> if that is needed, though.
> 

Let's see... we're building an entire pattern-matching engine and then
randomly disallowing its use because we didn't build in the right bits?

Sorry, that's asinine.

Put the bloody bit in there and let the pattern program make that decision.

	-hpa

-- 
H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center
I work for Intel.  I don't speak on their behalf.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Markus Gutschke <markus@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	davem@davemloft.net, mingo@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
	mcgrathr@chromium.org, tglx@linutronix.de, luto@mit.edu,
	eparis@redhat.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, djm@mindrot.org,
	scarybeasts@gmail.com, indan@nul.nu, pmoore@redhat.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2012 13:34:38 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4F3D766E.7040205@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAE6n16kweRehdozft0tKOB1P5LtGFJDCLQP=2EXfm8P0enyH=A@mail.gmail.com>

On 02/16/2012 01:28 PM, Markus Gutschke wrote:
> 
> I think, the documentation said that as soon as prctl() is used to set
> a bpf filter for system calls, it automatically disallows system calls
> using an entry point other than the one used by this particular
> prctl().
> 
> I was trying to come up with scenarios where this particular approach
> causes problem, but I can't think of any off the top of my head. So,
> it might actually turn out to be a very elegant way to reduce the
> attack surface of the kernel. If we are really worried about userspace
> compatibility, we could make the kernel send a signal instead of
> terminating the program, if the wrong entry point was used; not sure
> if that is needed, though.
> 

Let's see... we're building an entire pattern-matching engine and then
randomly disallowing its use because we didn't build in the right bits?

Sorry, that's asinine.

Put the bloody bit in there and let the pattern program make that decision.

	-hpa

-- 
H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center
I work for Intel.  I don't speak on their behalf.

  reply	other threads:[~2012-02-16 21:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 98+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-02-16 20:02 [PATCH v8 1/8] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 2/8] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef Will Drewry
2012-02-20  2:55   ` James Morris
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 3/8] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:06   ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 20:25     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:25       ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:17       ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 21:17         ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 21:28         ` [kernel-hardening] " Markus Gutschke
2012-02-16 21:28           ` Markus Gutschke
2012-02-16 21:34           ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2012-02-16 21:34             ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 21:51             ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:51               ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 22:06               ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 22:06                 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 23:00                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-16 23:00                   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17  0:23                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-17  0:23                     ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-17  0:43                   ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  0:43                     ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  0:50                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Paris
2012-02-17  0:50                     ` Eric Paris
2012-02-17  2:24                     ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  2:24                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  3:53                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-17  3:53                       ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17  4:12                       ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  4:12                         ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  4:26                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-17  4:26                           ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17  4:32                           ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  4:32                             ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  4:40                             ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-17  4:40                               ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:31         ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:31           ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17  0:48         ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  0:48           ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  0:51           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-17  0:51             ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-17  1:10             ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  1:10               ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  1:25             ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  1:25               ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  1:33           ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  1:33             ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  2:00             ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  2:00               ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  2:16               ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-17  2:16                 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-02-17  2:22                 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  2:22                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  3:27                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  3:27                     ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  4:09                     ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  4:09                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-17  4:51                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  4:51                         ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  2:44   ` [kernel-hardening] " Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  2:44     ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  2:44     ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  2:44     ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  3:38     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 4/8] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 5/8] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP Will Drewry
     [not found]   ` <CAE6n16mCrJC=Sre+PT1H_VfSjW0MGyi0xtEcdcRvGMvvwXWzmA@mail.gmail.com>
2012-02-16 20:28     ` Markus Gutschke
2012-02-16 21:23       ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 20:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:42       ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:11       ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 " Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:11         ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:11         ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 8/8] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:11           ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:28       ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v8 5/8] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 21:28         ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-02-16 21:33         ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Drewry
2012-02-16 21:33           ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 6/8] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support Will Drewry
2012-02-17  5:08   ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  5:08     ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  5:08     ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17 16:23     ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17 22:55       ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-21 17:31         ` Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 7/8] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:02 ` [PATCH v8 8/8] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:08 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v8 1/8] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer Will Drewry
2012-02-16 20:08   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17  1:54 ` Joe Perches
2012-02-17  2:22   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17  3:04 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  3:04   ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  3:04   ` Indan Zupancic
2012-02-17  4:13   ` Will Drewry
2012-02-17  5:05     ` Indan Zupancic

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