From: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com>
To: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
eldad@fogrefinery.com, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com,
Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 09:42:32 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5255DBD8.30005@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1381358030.2050.36.camel@joe-AO722>
On 10/10/13 09:33, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Thu, 2013-10-10 at 09:25 +1100, Ryan Mallon wrote:
>
>> if (kptr_restrict && (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() ||
>> in_nmi())) {
>>
>> Is making sure that you don't have kernel code doing something like this:
>>
>> irqreturn_t some_irq_handler(int irq, void *data)
>> {
>> struct seq_file *seq = to_seq(data);
>>
>> seq_printf(seq, "value = %pK\n");
>> return IRQ_HANDLED;
>> }
>>
>> Because that obviously won't work when kptr_restrict=1 (because the
>> CAP_SYSLOG check is meaningless). However, the code is broken regardless
>> of the kptr_restrict value.
>
> The only brokenness I see here is that the code doesn't pass
> a pointer along with %pK
>
> seq_printf(seq, "value of seq: %pK\n", seq);
>
>> Since the default value of kptr_restrict is
>> 0, this kind of bug can go over-looked because the seq file will print
>> the pointer value correctly when kptr_restrict=0, and it will correctly
>> print 0's when kptr_restrict=2, but it will print 'pK-error' when
>> kptr_restrict=1. Doing the check in all cases makes it more likely that
>> bugs like this get found. In fact, doing something like:
>>
>> if (WARN_ON(in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi())) {
>>
>> Might be better, since that will print a stack-trace showing where the
>> offending vsprintf is.
>
> WARN_ON would be potentially _very_ noisy.
> Maybe a long period (once a day?) ratelimited dump_stack();
If it was noisy, it would indicate a bunch of broken kernel code which
needs fixing :-). Anyway, this is really a separate issue to what I am
trying to fix, which is why I left the original code intact. If you want
to change it, post a follow-up patch.
~Ryan
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com>
To: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
eldad@fogrefinery.com, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com,
Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 09:42:32 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5255DBD8.30005@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1381358030.2050.36.camel@joe-AO722>
On 10/10/13 09:33, Joe Perches wrote:
> On Thu, 2013-10-10 at 09:25 +1100, Ryan Mallon wrote:
>
>> if (kptr_restrict && (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() ||
>> in_nmi())) {
>>
>> Is making sure that you don't have kernel code doing something like this:
>>
>> irqreturn_t some_irq_handler(int irq, void *data)
>> {
>> struct seq_file *seq = to_seq(data);
>>
>> seq_printf(seq, "value = %pK\n");
>> return IRQ_HANDLED;
>> }
>>
>> Because that obviously won't work when kptr_restrict=1 (because the
>> CAP_SYSLOG check is meaningless). However, the code is broken regardless
>> of the kptr_restrict value.
>
> The only brokenness I see here is that the code doesn't pass
> a pointer along with %pK
>
> seq_printf(seq, "value of seq: %pK\n", seq);
>
>> Since the default value of kptr_restrict is
>> 0, this kind of bug can go over-looked because the seq file will print
>> the pointer value correctly when kptr_restrict=0, and it will correctly
>> print 0's when kptr_restrict=2, but it will print 'pK-error' when
>> kptr_restrict=1. Doing the check in all cases makes it more likely that
>> bugs like this get found. In fact, doing something like:
>>
>> if (WARN_ON(in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi())) {
>>
>> Might be better, since that will print a stack-trace showing where the
>> offending vsprintf is.
>
> WARN_ON would be potentially _very_ noisy.
> Maybe a long period (once a day?) ratelimited dump_stack();
If it was noisy, it would indicate a bunch of broken kernel code which
needs fixing :-). Anyway, this is really a separate issue to what I am
trying to fix, which is why I left the original code intact. If you want
to change it, post a follow-up patch.
~Ryan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-10-09 22:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-10-09 21:52 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 21:52 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 22:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Joe Perches
2013-10-09 22:00 ` Joe Perches
2013-10-09 22:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 22:04 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 22:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Joe Perches
2013-10-09 22:14 ` Joe Perches
2013-10-09 22:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 22:25 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 22:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Joe Perches
2013-10-09 22:33 ` Joe Perches
2013-10-09 22:42 ` Ryan Mallon [this message]
2013-10-09 22:42 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 23:09 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3a] " Joe Perches
2013-10-09 23:09 ` Joe Perches
2013-10-09 23:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 23:18 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-09 23:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Joe Perches
2013-10-09 23:21 ` Joe Perches
2013-10-11 2:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-11 2:20 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-11 3:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11 3:19 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11 3:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-11 3:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-14 10:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-14 10:17 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-14 12:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-14 12:21 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-14 20:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-14 20:41 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11 4:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " George Spelvin
2013-10-11 4:42 ` George Spelvin
2013-10-11 5:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11 5:19 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11 5:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Joe Perches
2013-10-11 5:29 ` Joe Perches
2013-10-11 22:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11 22:04 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-10-11 22:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-11 22:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-14 9:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ryan Mallon
2013-10-14 9:18 ` Ryan Mallon
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