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From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 13:51:02 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <550AC636.9030406@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrU8SeOTSexLOi36sX7Smwfv0baraK=A3hq8twoyBN7NBg@mail.gmail.com>

On 03/17/2015 02:21 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 16, 2015 at 5:49 PM, Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org> wrote:
>> On 16 March 2015 at 14:11, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote:
>>
>>> Can we do anything about that? Disabling cache flushes from userland
>>> should make it no longer exploitable.
>>
>> Unfortunately there's no way to disable userland code's use of
>> CLFLUSH, as far as I know.
>>
>> Maybe Intel or AMD could disable CLFLUSH via a microcode update, but
>> they have not said whether that would be possible.
> 
> The Intel people I asked last week weren't confident.  For one thing,
> I fully expect that rowhammer can be exploited using only reads and
> writes with some clever tricks involving cache associativity.  I don't
> think there are any fully-associative caches, although the cache
> replacement algorithm could make the attacks interesting.

I've been thinking the same. But maybe having to evict e.g. 16-way cache would
mean accessing 16x more lines which could reduce the frequency for a single line
below dangerous levels. Worth trying, though :)

BTW, by using clever access patterns and measurement of access latencies one
could also possibly determine which cache lines alias/colide, without needing to
read pagemap. It would just take longer. Hugepages make that simpler as well.

I just hope we are not going to disable lots of stuff including clflush and e.g.
transparent hugepages just because some part of the currently sold hardware is
vulnerable...

Vlastimil

> --Andy
> 
> --
> To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
> the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
> see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
> Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
> 

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 13:51:02 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <550AC636.9030406@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrU8SeOTSexLOi36sX7Smwfv0baraK=A3hq8twoyBN7NBg@mail.gmail.com>

On 03/17/2015 02:21 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 16, 2015 at 5:49 PM, Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org> wrote:
>> On 16 March 2015 at 14:11, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> wrote:
>>
>>> Can we do anything about that? Disabling cache flushes from userland
>>> should make it no longer exploitable.
>>
>> Unfortunately there's no way to disable userland code's use of
>> CLFLUSH, as far as I know.
>>
>> Maybe Intel or AMD could disable CLFLUSH via a microcode update, but
>> they have not said whether that would be possible.
> 
> The Intel people I asked last week weren't confident.  For one thing,
> I fully expect that rowhammer can be exploited using only reads and
> writes with some clever tricks involving cache associativity.  I don't
> think there are any fully-associative caches, although the cache
> replacement algorithm could make the attacks interesting.

I've been thinking the same. But maybe having to evict e.g. 16-way cache would
mean accessing 16x more lines which could reduce the frequency for a single line
below dangerous levels. Worth trying, though :)

BTW, by using clever access patterns and measurement of access latencies one
could also possibly determine which cache lines alias/colide, without needing to
read pagemap. It would just take longer. Hugepages make that simpler as well.

I just hope we are not going to disable lots of stuff including clflush and e.g.
transparent hugepages just because some part of the currently sold hardware is
vulnerable...

Vlastimil

> --Andy
> 
> --
> To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
> the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
> see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
> Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-03-19 12:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-03-09 21:11 [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace Kirill A. Shutemov
2015-03-09 21:11 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2015-03-09 21:20 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2015-03-09 21:20   ` Pavel Emelyanov
2015-03-09 22:09 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-09 22:09   ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2015-03-10  0:11 ` Kees Cook
2015-03-10  0:11   ` Kees Cook
2015-03-10  0:19   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-03-10  0:19     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-03-10  2:36     ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-10  2:36       ` Dave Hansen
2015-03-16 21:11 ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-16 21:11   ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-17  0:49   ` Mark Seaborn
2015-03-17  0:49     ` Mark Seaborn
2015-03-17  1:21     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-03-17  1:21       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-03-17 11:16       ` rowhammer and pagemap (was Re: [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace) Pavel Machek
2015-03-17 11:16         ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-17 17:58         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-17 17:58           ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-23 21:26           ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-23 21:26             ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-19 12:51       ` Vlastimil Babka [this message]
2015-03-19 12:51         ` [RFC, PATCH] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace Vlastimil Babka
2015-03-23 21:26         ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-23 21:26           ` Pavel Machek
2015-03-23 22:36           ` Vlastimil Babka
2015-03-23 22:36             ` Vlastimil Babka

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