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From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
To: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/12] [RFC] x86: Memory Protection Keys
Date: Thu, 07 May 2015 20:48:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <554BB36E.2080803@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <554BAA68.6000508@sr71.net>

On 05/07/2015 08:09 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 05/07/2015 10:57 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>>>> There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and
>>>> writing to the new register.  The feature is only available in
>>>> 64-bit mode, even though there is theoretically space in the PAE
>>>> PTEs.  These permissions are enforced on data access only and have
>>>> no effect on instruction fetches.
>> So I'm wondering what the primary usecases are for this feature?
>> Could you outline applications/workloads/libraries that would
>> benefit from this?
>
> There are lots of things that folks would _like_ to mprotect(), but end
> up not being feasible because of the overhead of going and mucking with
> thousands of PTEs and shooting down remote TLBs every time you want to
> change protections.
>
> Data structures like logs or journals that are only written to in very
> limited code paths, but that you want to protect from "stray" writes.
>
> Maybe even a database where a query operation will never need to write
> to memory, but an insert would.  You could keep the data R/O during the
> entire operation except when an insert is actually in progress.  It
> narrows the window where data might be corrupted.  This becomes even
> more valuable if a stray write to memory is guaranteed to hit storage...
> like with persistent memory.
>
> Someone mentioned to me that valgrind does lots of mprotect()s and might
> benefit from this.
>
> We could keep heap metadata as R/O and only make it R/W inside of
> malloc() itself to catch corruption more quickly.

But that metadata is typically within the same page as the data itself 
(for small objects at least), no?

> More crazy ideas welcome. :)

Since you asked :) I wonder if the usefulness could be extended by 
making it possible for a thread to revoke its access to WRPKRU (it's not 
privileged, right?). Then I could imagine some extra security for 
sandbox/bytecode/JIT code so it doesn't interfere with the runtime. But 
since it doesn't block instruction fetches, then maybe it wouldn't make 
much difference...

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  reply	other threads:[~2015-05-07 18:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-05-07 17:41 [PATCH 00/12] [RFC] x86: Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 02/12] x86, pku: define new CR4 bit Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 01/12] x86, pkeys: cpuid bit definition Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 05/12] x86, pkeys: new page fault error code bit: PF_PK Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86, pkeys: PTE bits Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 06/12] x86, pkeys: store protection in high VMA flags Dave Hansen
2015-05-15 21:10   ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-05-15 21:13     ` Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 03/12] x86, pkey: pkru xsave fields and data structure Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 07/12] mm: Pass the 4-bit protection key in via PROT_ bits to syscalls Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 19:11   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-05-07 19:19     ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-04 20:13       ` Florian Weimer
2015-09-04 20:18         ` Dave Hansen
2015-09-04 20:34           ` Florian Weimer
2015-09-04 20:41             ` Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 08/12] x86, pkeys: arch-specific protection bits Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 12/12] x86, pkeys: Documentation Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 09/12] x86, pkeys: notify userspace about protection key faults Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 11/12] x86, pkeys: actually enable Memory Protection Keys in CPU Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:41 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86, pkeys: differentiate Protection Key faults from normal Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 17:57 ` [PATCH 00/12] [RFC] x86: Memory Protection Keys Ingo Molnar
2015-05-07 18:09   ` Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 18:48     ` Vlastimil Babka [this message]
2015-05-07 21:45       ` Dave Hansen
2015-05-09 19:09       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2015-05-07 19:18     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-05-07 19:26       ` Ingo Molnar
2015-05-07 19:40         ` Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 20:11         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-05-08  4:51           ` Ingo Molnar
2015-05-08  6:09       ` Kevin Easton
2015-05-07 19:22     ` Christian Borntraeger
2015-05-07 19:29       ` Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 19:45         ` Christian Borntraeger
2015-05-07 19:49           ` Dave Hansen
2015-05-07 19:57             ` Christian Borntraeger

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