From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, keescook@chromium.org,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
christoffer.dall@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
labbott@fedoraproject.org,
Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation
Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2018 14:55:31 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7529eedf-af56-2e94-261e-bc5c86abadaa@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180802132133.23999-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On 02/08/18 14:21, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> This is a proof of concept I cooked up, primarily to trigger a discussion
> about whether there is a point to doing anything like this, and if there
> is, what the pitfalls are. Also, while I am not aware of any similar
> implementations, the idea is so simple that I would be surprised if nobody
> else thought of the same thing way before I did.
So, "TTBR0 PAN: Pointer Auth edition"? :P
> The idea is that we can significantly limit the kernel's attack surface
> for ROP based attacks by clearing the stack pointer's sign bit before
> returning from a function, and setting it again right after proceeding
> from the [expected] return address. This should make it much more difficult
> to return to arbitrary gadgets, given that they rely on being chained to
> the next via a return address popped off the stack, and this is difficult
> when the stack pointer is invalid.
>
> Of course, 4 additional instructions per function return is not exactly
> for free, but they are just movs and adds, and leaf functions are
> disregarded unless they allocate a stack frame (this comes for free
> because simple_return insns are disregarded by the plugin)
>
> Please shoot, preferably with better ideas ...
Actually, on the subject of PAN, shouldn't this at least have a very
hard dependency on that? AFAICS without PAN clearing bit 55 of SP is
effectively giving userspace direct control of the kernel stack (thanks
to TBI). Ouch.
I wonder if there's a little more mileage in using "{add,sub} sp, sp,
#1" sequences to rely on stack alignment exceptions instead, with the
added bonus that that's about as low as the instruction-level overhead
can get.
Robin.
>
> Ard Biesheuvel (3):
> arm64: use wrapper macro for bl/blx instructions from asm code
> gcc: plugins: add ROP shield plugin for arm64
> arm64: enable ROP protection by clearing SP bit #55 across function
> returns
>
> arch/Kconfig | 4 +
> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 10 ++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 21 +++-
> arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S | 6 +-
> arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 104 +++++++++-------
> arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 4 +-
> arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes_trampoline.S | 2 +-
> arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 6 +-
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +-
> scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 7 ++
> scripts/gcc-plugins/arm64_rop_shield_plugin.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++
> 11 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 scripts/gcc-plugins/arm64_rop_shield_plugin.c
>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: robin.murphy@arm.com (Robin Murphy)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation
Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2018 14:55:31 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7529eedf-af56-2e94-261e-bc5c86abadaa@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180802132133.23999-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On 02/08/18 14:21, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> This is a proof of concept I cooked up, primarily to trigger a discussion
> about whether there is a point to doing anything like this, and if there
> is, what the pitfalls are. Also, while I am not aware of any similar
> implementations, the idea is so simple that I would be surprised if nobody
> else thought of the same thing way before I did.
So, "TTBR0 PAN: Pointer Auth edition"? :P
> The idea is that we can significantly limit the kernel's attack surface
> for ROP based attacks by clearing the stack pointer's sign bit before
> returning from a function, and setting it again right after proceeding
> from the [expected] return address. This should make it much more difficult
> to return to arbitrary gadgets, given that they rely on being chained to
> the next via a return address popped off the stack, and this is difficult
> when the stack pointer is invalid.
>
> Of course, 4 additional instructions per function return is not exactly
> for free, but they are just movs and adds, and leaf functions are
> disregarded unless they allocate a stack frame (this comes for free
> because simple_return insns are disregarded by the plugin)
>
> Please shoot, preferably with better ideas ...
Actually, on the subject of PAN, shouldn't this at least have a very
hard dependency on that? AFAICS without PAN clearing bit 55 of SP is
effectively giving userspace direct control of the kernel stack (thanks
to TBI). Ouch.
I wonder if there's a little more mileage in using "{add,sub} sp, sp,
#1" sequences to rely on stack alignment exceptions instead, with the
added bonus that that's about as low as the instruction-level overhead
can get.
Robin.
>
> Ard Biesheuvel (3):
> arm64: use wrapper macro for bl/blx instructions from asm code
> gcc: plugins: add ROP shield plugin for arm64
> arm64: enable ROP protection by clearing SP bit #55 across function
> returns
>
> arch/Kconfig | 4 +
> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 10 ++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 21 +++-
> arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S | 6 +-
> arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 104 +++++++++-------
> arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 4 +-
> arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes_trampoline.S | 2 +-
> arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 6 +-
> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +-
> scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 7 ++
> scripts/gcc-plugins/arm64_rop_shield_plugin.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++
> 11 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 scripts/gcc-plugins/arm64_rop_shield_plugin.c
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-06 13:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-02 13:21 [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 1/3] arm64: use wrapper macro for bl/blx instructions from asm code Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 2/3] gcc: plugins: add ROP shield plugin for arm64 Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 3/3] arm64: enable ROP protection by clearing SP bit #55 across function returns Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 10:07 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation Florian Weimer
2018-08-06 10:07 ` Florian Weimer
2018-08-06 10:31 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 10:31 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 13:55 ` Robin Murphy [this message]
2018-08-06 13:55 ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 14:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 14:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 15:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 15:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 15:38 ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 15:38 ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 15:50 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 15:50 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 16:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 16:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 17:45 ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 17:45 ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 18:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-06 18:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-06 19:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 19:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-06 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-06 19:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 19:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07 3:05 ` Mark Brand
2018-08-07 9:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07 9:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-08 16:09 ` Mark Brand
2018-08-08 16:09 ` Mark Brand
2018-08-08 22:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-08 22:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-13 7:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-18 1:27 ` Laura Abbott
2018-08-18 1:27 ` Laura Abbott
2018-08-20 6:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-20 6:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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