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From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, christoffer.dall@arm.com,
	will.deacon@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, labbott@fedoraproject.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation
Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2018 12:07:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fef98ede-efe4-eaf2-f314-07b623e9800e@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180802132133.23999-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

On 08/02/2018 03:21 PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> The idea is that we can significantly limit the kernel's attack surface
> for ROP based attacks by clearing the stack pointer's sign bit before
> returning from a function, and setting it again right after proceeding
> from the [expected] return address. This should make it much more difficult
> to return to arbitrary gadgets, given that they rely on being chained to
> the next via a return address popped off the stack, and this is difficult
> when the stack pointer is invalid.

Doesn't this break stack unwinding?

Thanks,
Florian

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: fweimer@redhat.com (Florian Weimer)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation
Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2018 12:07:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fef98ede-efe4-eaf2-f314-07b623e9800e@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180802132133.23999-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

On 08/02/2018 03:21 PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> The idea is that we can significantly limit the kernel's attack surface
> for ROP based attacks by clearing the stack pointer's sign bit before
> returning from a function, and setting it again right after proceeding
> from the [expected] return address. This should make it much more difficult
> to return to arbitrary gadgets, given that they rely on being chained to
> the next via a return address popped off the stack, and this is difficult
> when the stack pointer is invalid.

Doesn't this break stack unwinding?

Thanks,
Florian

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-06 10:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-02 13:21 [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 1/3] arm64: use wrapper macro for bl/blx instructions from asm code Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 2/3] gcc: plugins: add ROP shield plugin for arm64 Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21 ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 3/3] arm64: enable ROP protection by clearing SP bit #55 across function returns Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-02 13:21   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 10:07 ` Florian Weimer [this message]
2018-08-06 10:07   ` [RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation Florian Weimer
2018-08-06 10:31   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 10:31     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 13:55 ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 13:55   ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 14:04   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 14:04     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 15:20     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 15:20       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 15:38     ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 15:38       ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 15:50       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 15:50         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 16:04         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 16:04           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 17:45           ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 17:45             ` Robin Murphy
2018-08-06 18:49             ` Kees Cook
2018-08-06 18:49               ` Kees Cook
2018-08-06 19:35               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 19:35                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 19:50                 ` Kees Cook
2018-08-06 19:50                   ` Kees Cook
2018-08-06 19:54                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-06 19:54                     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07  3:05                     ` Mark Brand
2018-08-07  9:21                       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-07  9:21                         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-08 16:09                         ` Mark Brand
2018-08-08 16:09                           ` Mark Brand
2018-08-08 22:02                           ` Kees Cook
2018-08-08 22:02                             ` Kees Cook
2018-08-13  7:39                           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-18  1:27 ` Laura Abbott
2018-08-18  1:27   ` Laura Abbott
2018-08-20  6:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-08-20  6:30     ` Ard Biesheuvel

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