[PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Michal Suchanek]

Hello,

This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.

This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
with appended signatures in the kernel.

powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.

For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
option should be used on all platforms.

Thanks

Michal

Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek at suse.de/
Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig

Michal Suchanek (6):
  s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
  powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
  kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
  module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
  module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
    verify_appended_signature
  module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                     | 16 +++++++
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c              | 12 +++++
 arch/s390/Kconfig                        |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c    | 41 +----------------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |  1 +
 include/linux/module_signature.h         |  4 +-
 include/linux/verification.h             |  5 ++
 kernel/module-internal.h                 |  2 -
 kernel/module.c                          | 12 ++---
 kernel/module_signature.c                | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/module_signing.c                  | 34 ++++++--------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c      | 22 ++-------
 12 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)

-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Michal Suchanek]

Hello,

This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.

This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
with appended signatures in the kernel.

powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.

For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
option should be used on all platforms.

Thanks

Michal

Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek@suse.de/
Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig

Michal Suchanek (6):
  s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
  powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
  kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
  module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
  module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
    verify_appended_signature
  module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                     | 16 +++++++
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c              | 12 +++++
 arch/s390/Kconfig                        |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c    | 41 +----------------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |  1 +
 include/linux/module_signature.h         |  4 +-
 include/linux/verification.h             |  5 ++
 kernel/module-internal.h                 |  2 -
 kernel/module.c                          | 12 ++---
 kernel/module_signature.c                | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/module_signing.c                  | 34 ++++++--------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c      | 22 ++-------
 12 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)

-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Michal Suchanek]

Hello,

This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.

This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
with appended signatures in the kernel.

powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.

For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
option should be used on all platforms.

Thanks

Michal

Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek@suse.de/
Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig

Michal Suchanek (6):
  s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
  powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
  kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
  module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
  module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
    verify_appended_signature
  module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                     | 16 +++++++
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c              | 12 +++++
 arch/s390/Kconfig                        |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c    | 41 +----------------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |  1 +
 include/linux/module_signature.h         |  4 +-
 include/linux/verification.h             |  5 ++
 kernel/module-internal.h                 |  2 -
 kernel/module.c                          | 12 ++---
 kernel/module_signature.c                | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/module_signing.c                  | 34 ++++++--------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c      | 22 ++-------
 12 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)

-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 1/6] s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.

[Michal Suchanek]

Module verification already implements appeded signature check.

Reuse it for kexec_file.

The kexec_file implementation uses EKEYREJECTED error in some cases when
there is no key and the common implementation uses ENOPKG or EBADMSG
instead.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
---
v3: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
change of return value
---
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 22 +++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 8f43575a4dd3..c944d71316c7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len;
+	int ret;
 
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
 	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	if (sig_len >= kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= sig_len;
-
-	if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (ms->algo != 0 ||
-	    ms->hash != 0 ||
-	    ms->signer_len != 0 ||
-	    ms->key_id_len != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[0] != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[1] != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[2] != 0) {
-		return -EBADMSG;
-	}
+	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
 
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
 				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 1/6] s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.

[Michal Suchanek]

Module verification already implements appeded signature check.

Reuse it for kexec_file.

The kexec_file implementation uses EKEYREJECTED error in some cases when
there is no key and the common implementation uses ENOPKG or EBADMSG
instead.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
---
v3: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
change of return value
---
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 22 +++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 8f43575a4dd3..c944d71316c7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len;
+	int ret;
 
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
 	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	if (sig_len >= kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= sig_len;
-
-	if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (ms->algo != 0 ||
-	    ms->hash != 0 ||
-	    ms->signer_len != 0 ||
-	    ms->key_id_len != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[0] != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[1] != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[2] != 0) {
-		return -EBADMSG;
-	}
+	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
 
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
 				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 1/6] s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.

[Michal Suchanek]

Module verification already implements appeded signature check.

Reuse it for kexec_file.

The kexec_file implementation uses EKEYREJECTED error in some cases when
there is no key and the common implementation uses ENOPKG or EBADMSG
instead.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
---
v3: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
change of return value
---
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 22 +++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 8f43575a4dd3..c944d71316c7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len;
+	int ret;
 
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
 	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	if (sig_len >= kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= sig_len;
-
-	if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (ms->algo != 0 ||
-	    ms->hash != 0 ||
-	    ms->signer_len != 0 ||
-	    ms->key_id_len != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[0] != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[1] != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[2] != 0) {
-		return -EBADMSG;
-	}
+	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
 
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
 				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michal Suchanek]

Copy the code from s390x

Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
based patforms using PE format).

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
      explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
    - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
    - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
      in kconfig text
---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
 config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
 
+config KEXEC_SIG
+	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	help
+	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
+	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
+
+	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
+	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
+	  loaded in order for this to work.
+
+	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
+	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
+	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
+	  blacklist by hash.
+
 config RELOCATABLE
 	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
 	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+	struct module_signature *ms;
+	unsigned long sig_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   marker_len))
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	kernel_len -= marker_len;
+
+	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
+
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
+				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+				      NULL, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
+
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = {
 	.probe = kexec_elf_probe,
 	.load = elf64_load,
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+	.verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig,
+#endif
 };
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michal Suchanek]

Copy the code from s390x

Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
based patforms using PE format).

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
      explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
    - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
    - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
      in kconfig text
---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
 config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
 
+config KEXEC_SIG
+	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	help
+	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
+	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
+
+	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
+	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
+	  loaded in order for this to work.
+
+	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
+	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
+	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
+	  blacklist by hash.
+
 config RELOCATABLE
 	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
 	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+	struct module_signature *ms;
+	unsigned long sig_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   marker_len))
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	kernel_len -= marker_len;
+
+	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
+
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
+				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+				      NULL, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
+
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = {
 	.probe = kexec_elf_probe,
 	.load = elf64_load,
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+	.verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig,
+#endif
 };
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michal Suchanek]

Copy the code from s390x

Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
based patforms using PE format).

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
      explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
    - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
    - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
      in kconfig text
---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
 config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
 
+config KEXEC_SIG
+	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	help
+	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
+	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
+
+	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
+	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
+	  loaded in order for this to work.
+
+	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
+	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
+	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
+	  blacklist by hash.
+
 config RELOCATABLE
 	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
 	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+	struct module_signature *ms;
+	unsigned long sig_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   marker_len))
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	kernel_len -= marker_len;
+
+	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
+
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
+				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+				      NULL, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
+
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = {
 	.probe = kexec_elf_probe,
 	.load = elf64_load,
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+	.verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig,
+#endif
 };
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michael Ellerman]

Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> writes:
> Copy the code from s390x
>
> Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
> based patforms using PE format).
>
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
>       explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
>     - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
>     - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
>       in kconfig text
> ---
>  arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)

I haven't tested this on powerpc, but assuming you have Michal this
looks OK to me.

Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

cheers

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michael Ellerman]

Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> writes:
> Copy the code from s390x
>
> Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
> based patforms using PE format).
>
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
>       explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
>     - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
>     - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
>       in kconfig text
> ---
>  arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)

I haven't tested this on powerpc, but assuming you have Michal this
looks OK to me.

Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

cheers

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michael Ellerman]

Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> writes:
> Copy the code from s390x
>
> Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
> based patforms using PE format).
>
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
>       explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
>     - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
>     - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
>       in kconfig text
> ---
>  arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)

I haven't tested this on powerpc, but assuming you have Michal this
looks OK to me.

Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

cheers

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Paul Menzel]

Dear Michal,


Thank you for the patch.


Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:

Could you please remove the dot/period at the end of the git commit 
message summary?

> Copy the code from s390x
> 
> Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
> based patforms using PE format).

patforms ? platforms

How can this be tested?

> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
>        explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
>      - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
>      - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
>        in kconfig text
> ---
>   arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>   arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
>   config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
>   	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
>   
> +config KEXEC_SIG
> +	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> +	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> +	help
> +	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> +	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> +
> +	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
> +	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
> +	  loaded in order for this to work.
> +
> +	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
> +	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
> +	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
> +	  blacklist by hash.

So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? 
What is the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More 
overhead?

> +
>   config RELOCATABLE
>   	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
>   	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>   #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
>   #include <linux/slab.h>
>   #include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
>   
>   static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>   			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
> @@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>   	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
>   }
>   
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> +{
> +	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
> +	struct module_signature *ms;
> +	unsigned long sig_len;

Use size_t to match the signature of `verify_pkcs7_signature()`?

> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
> +		return -EKEYREJECTED;
> +
> +	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
> +		   marker_len))
> +		return -EKEYREJECTED;
> +	kernel_len -= marker_len;
> +
> +	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
> +	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
> +
> +	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
> +	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
> +
> +	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> +				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
> +				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
> +				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
> +				      NULL, NULL);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
> +
>   const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = {
>   	.probe = kexec_elf_probe,
>   	.load = elf64_load,
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> +	.verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig,
> +#endif
>   };


Kind regards,

Paul

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Paul Menzel]

Dear Michal,


Thank you for the patch.


Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:

Could you please remove the dot/period at the end of the git commit 
message summary?

> Copy the code from s390x
> 
> Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
> based patforms using PE format).

patforms → platforms

How can this be tested?

> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
>        explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
>      - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
>      - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
>        in kconfig text
> ---
>   arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>   arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
>   config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
>   	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
>   
> +config KEXEC_SIG
> +	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> +	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> +	help
> +	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> +	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> +
> +	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
> +	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
> +	  loaded in order for this to work.
> +
> +	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
> +	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
> +	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
> +	  blacklist by hash.

So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? 
What is the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More 
overhead?

> +
>   config RELOCATABLE
>   	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
>   	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>   #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
>   #include <linux/slab.h>
>   #include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
>   
>   static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>   			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
> @@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>   	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
>   }
>   
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> +{
> +	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
> +	struct module_signature *ms;
> +	unsigned long sig_len;

Use size_t to match the signature of `verify_pkcs7_signature()`?

> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
> +		return -EKEYREJECTED;
> +
> +	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
> +		   marker_len))
> +		return -EKEYREJECTED;
> +	kernel_len -= marker_len;
> +
> +	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
> +	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
> +
> +	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
> +	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
> +
> +	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> +				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
> +				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
> +				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
> +				      NULL, NULL);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
> +
>   const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = {
>   	.probe = kexec_elf_probe,
>   	.load = elf64_load,
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> +	.verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig,
> +#endif
>   };


Kind regards,

Paul

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Paul Menzel]

Dear Michal,


Thank you for the patch.


Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:

Could you please remove the dot/period at the end of the git commit 
message summary?

> Copy the code from s390x
> 
> Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
> based patforms using PE format).

patforms → platforms

How can this be tested?

> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
>        explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
>      - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
>      - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
>        in kconfig text
> ---
>   arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>   arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
>   config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
>   	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
>   
> +config KEXEC_SIG
> +	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> +	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> +	help
> +	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> +	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> +
> +	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
> +	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
> +	  loaded in order for this to work.
> +
> +	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
> +	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
> +	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
> +	  blacklist by hash.

So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? 
What is the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More 
overhead?

> +
>   config RELOCATABLE
>   	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
>   	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>   #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
>   #include <linux/slab.h>
>   #include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
>   
>   static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>   			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
> @@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>   	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
>   }
>   
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> +{
> +	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
> +	struct module_signature *ms;
> +	unsigned long sig_len;

Use size_t to match the signature of `verify_pkcs7_signature()`?

> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
> +		return -EKEYREJECTED;
> +
> +	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
> +		   marker_len))
> +		return -EKEYREJECTED;
> +	kernel_len -= marker_len;
> +
> +	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
> +	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
> +
> +	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
> +	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
> +
> +	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> +				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
> +				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
> +				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
> +				      NULL, NULL);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
> +
>   const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = {
>   	.probe = kexec_elf_probe,
>   	.load = elf64_load,
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> +	.verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig,
> +#endif
>   };


Kind regards,

Paul

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michal =?unknown-8bit?q?Such=C3=A1nek?=]

Hello,

On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 07:44:15AM +0100, Paul Menzel wrote:
> Dear Michal,
> 
> 
> Thank you for the patch.
> 
> 
> Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:
> 
> Could you please remove the dot/period at the end of the git commit message
> summary?

Sure

> > Copy the code from s390x
> > 
> > Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
> > based patforms using PE format).
> 
> patforms ? platforms

Thanks for noticing

> How can this be tested?

Apparently KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is x86 only although the use of the option is
arch neutral:

arch/x86/Kconfig:config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
kernel/kexec_file.c:            if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE))
{

Maybe it should be moved?

I used a patched kernel that enables lockdown in secure boot, and then
verified that signed kernel can be loaded by kexec and unsigned not,
with KEXEC_SIG enabled and IMA_KEXEC disabled.

The lockdown support can be enabled on any platform, and although I
can't find it documented anywhere there appears to be code in kexec_file
to take it into account:
kernel/kexec.c: result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
kernel/kexec_file.c:                security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
kernel/module.c:        return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
kernel/params.c:            security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS))
and lockdown can be enabled with a buildtime option, a kernel parameter, or a
debugfs file.

Still for testing lifting KEXEC_SIG_FORCE to some arch-neutral Kconfig file is
probably the simplest option.

kexec -s option should be used to select kexec_file rather than the old
style kexec which would either fail always or succeed always regardelss
of signature.

> > Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> > ---
> > v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
> >        explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
> >      - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
> >      - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
> >        in kconfig text
> > ---
> >   arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> >   arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >   2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> >   config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> >   	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > +	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > +	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > +	help
> > +	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> > +	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > +
> > +	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
> > +	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
> > +	  loaded in order for this to work.
> > +
> > +	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
> > +	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
> > +	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
> > +	  blacklist by hash.
> 
> So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? What is
> the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?

IMA_KEXEC does more than KEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big
unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.

Arguably the simpler implementation hass less potential for bugs, too.
Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.

Interestingly IMA_ARCH_POLICY depends on KEXEC_SIG rather than
IMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.

The main problem with IMA_KEXEC from my point of view is it is not portable.
To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on
all platforms. It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms
that use PE kernel signature format.

> 
> > +
> >   config RELOCATABLE
> >   	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
> >   	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> > index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> > @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
> >   #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
> >   #include <linux/slab.h>
> >   #include <linux/types.h>
> > +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
> >   static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
> >   			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
> > @@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
> >   	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
> >   }
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> > +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> > +{
> > +	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
> > +	struct module_signature *ms;
> > +	unsigned long sig_len;
> 
> Use size_t to match the signature of `verify_pkcs7_signature()`?

Nope. struct module_signature uses unsigned long, and this needs to be
matched to avoid type errors on 32bit.

Technically using size_t for in-memory buffers is misguided because
AFAICT no memory buffer can be bigger than ULONG_MAX, and size_t is
non-native type on 32bit.

Sure, the situation with ssize_t/int is different but that's not what we
are dealing with here.

Thanks

Michal

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michal Suchánek]

Hello,

On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 07:44:15AM +0100, Paul Menzel wrote:
> Dear Michal,
> 
> 
> Thank you for the patch.
> 
> 
> Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:
> 
> Could you please remove the dot/period at the end of the git commit message
> summary?

Sure

> > Copy the code from s390x
> > 
> > Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
> > based patforms using PE format).
> 
> patforms → platforms

Thanks for noticing

> How can this be tested?

Apparently KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is x86 only although the use of the option is
arch neutral:

arch/x86/Kconfig:config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
kernel/kexec_file.c:            if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE))
{

Maybe it should be moved?

I used a patched kernel that enables lockdown in secure boot, and then
verified that signed kernel can be loaded by kexec and unsigned not,
with KEXEC_SIG enabled and IMA_KEXEC disabled.

The lockdown support can be enabled on any platform, and although I
can't find it documented anywhere there appears to be code in kexec_file
to take it into account:
kernel/kexec.c: result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
kernel/kexec_file.c:                security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
kernel/module.c:        return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
kernel/params.c:            security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS))
and lockdown can be enabled with a buildtime option, a kernel parameter, or a
debugfs file.

Still for testing lifting KEXEC_SIG_FORCE to some arch-neutral Kconfig file is
probably the simplest option.

kexec -s option should be used to select kexec_file rather than the old
style kexec which would either fail always or succeed always regardelss
of signature.

> > Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> > ---
> > v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
> >        explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
> >      - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
> >      - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
> >        in kconfig text
> > ---
> >   arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> >   arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >   2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> >   config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> >   	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > +	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > +	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > +	help
> > +	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> > +	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > +
> > +	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
> > +	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
> > +	  loaded in order for this to work.
> > +
> > +	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
> > +	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
> > +	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
> > +	  blacklist by hash.
> 
> So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? What is
> the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?

IMA_KEXEC does more than KEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big
unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.

Arguably the simpler implementation hass less potential for bugs, too.
Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.

Interestingly IMA_ARCH_POLICY depends on KEXEC_SIG rather than
IMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.

The main problem with IMA_KEXEC from my point of view is it is not portable.
To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on
all platforms. It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms
that use PE kernel signature format.

> 
> > +
> >   config RELOCATABLE
> >   	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
> >   	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> > index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> > @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
> >   #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
> >   #include <linux/slab.h>
> >   #include <linux/types.h>
> > +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
> >   static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
> >   			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
> > @@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
> >   	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
> >   }
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> > +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> > +{
> > +	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
> > +	struct module_signature *ms;
> > +	unsigned long sig_len;
> 
> Use size_t to match the signature of `verify_pkcs7_signature()`?

Nope. struct module_signature uses unsigned long, and this needs to be
matched to avoid type errors on 32bit.

Technically using size_t for in-memory buffers is misguided because
AFAICT no memory buffer can be bigger than ULONG_MAX, and size_t is
non-native type on 32bit.

Sure, the situation with ssize_t/int is different but that's not what we
are dealing with here.

Thanks

Michal

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michal Suchánek]

Hello,

On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 07:44:15AM +0100, Paul Menzel wrote:
> Dear Michal,
> 
> 
> Thank you for the patch.
> 
> 
> Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:
> 
> Could you please remove the dot/period at the end of the git commit message
> summary?

Sure

> > Copy the code from s390x
> > 
> > Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI
> > based patforms using PE format).
> 
> patforms → platforms

Thanks for noticing

> How can this be tested?

Apparently KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is x86 only although the use of the option is
arch neutral:

arch/x86/Kconfig:config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
kernel/kexec_file.c:            if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE))
{

Maybe it should be moved?

I used a patched kernel that enables lockdown in secure boot, and then
verified that signed kernel can be loaded by kexec and unsigned not,
with KEXEC_SIG enabled and IMA_KEXEC disabled.

The lockdown support can be enabled on any platform, and although I
can't find it documented anywhere there appears to be code in kexec_file
to take it into account:
kernel/kexec.c: result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
kernel/kexec_file.c:                security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
kernel/module.c:        return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
kernel/params.c:            security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS))
and lockdown can be enabled with a buildtime option, a kernel parameter, or a
debugfs file.

Still for testing lifting KEXEC_SIG_FORCE to some arch-neutral Kconfig file is
probably the simplest option.

kexec -s option should be used to select kexec_file rather than the old
style kexec which would either fail always or succeed always regardelss
of signature.

> > Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> > ---
> > v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
> >        explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
> >      - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
> >      - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
> >        in kconfig text
> > ---
> >   arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> >   arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >   2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> >   config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> >   	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > +	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > +	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > +	help
> > +	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> > +	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > +
> > +	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
> > +	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
> > +	  loaded in order for this to work.
> > +
> > +	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
> > +	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
> > +	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
> > +	  blacklist by hash.
> 
> So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? What is
> the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?

IMA_KEXEC does more than KEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big
unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.

Arguably the simpler implementation hass less potential for bugs, too.
Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.

Interestingly IMA_ARCH_POLICY depends on KEXEC_SIG rather than
IMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.

The main problem with IMA_KEXEC from my point of view is it is not portable.
To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on
all platforms. It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms
that use PE kernel signature format.

> 
> > +
> >   config RELOCATABLE
> >   	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
> >   	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> > index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
> > @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
> >   #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
> >   #include <linux/slab.h>
> >   #include <linux/types.h>
> > +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
> >   static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
> >   			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
> > @@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
> >   	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
> >   }
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> > +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> > +{
> > +	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
> > +	struct module_signature *ms;
> > +	unsigned long sig_len;
> 
> Use size_t to match the signature of `verify_pkcs7_signature()`?

Nope. struct module_signature uses unsigned long, and this needs to be
matched to avoid type errors on 32bit.

Technically using size_t for in-memory buffers is misguided because
AFAICT no memory buffer can be bigger than ULONG_MAX, and size_t is
non-native type on 32bit.

Sure, the situation with ssize_t/int is different but that's not what we
are dealing with here.

Thanks

Michal

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Paul Menzel]

Dear Michal,


Am 09.02.22 um 13:01 schrieb Michal Such?nek:

> On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 07:44:15AM +0100, Paul Menzel wrote:

>> Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:

[?]

>> How can this be tested?
> 
> Apparently KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is x86 only although the use of the option is
> arch neutral:
> 
> arch/x86/Kconfig:config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
> kernel/kexec_file.c:            if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE))
> {
> 
> Maybe it should be moved?

Sounds good.

> I used a patched kernel that enables lockdown in secure boot, and then
> verified that signed kernel can be loaded by kexec and unsigned not,
> with KEXEC_SIG enabled and IMA_KEXEC disabled.
> 
> The lockdown support can be enabled on any platform, and although I
> can't find it documented anywhere there appears to be code in kexec_file
> to take it into account:
> kernel/kexec.c: result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
> kernel/kexec_file.c:                security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
> kernel/module.c:        return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
> kernel/params.c:            security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS))
> and lockdown can be enabled with a buildtime option, a kernel parameter, or a
> debugfs file.
> 
> Still for testing lifting KEXEC_SIG_FORCE to some arch-neutral Kconfig file is
> probably the simplest option.
> 
> kexec -s option should be used to select kexec_file rather than the old
> style kexec which would either fail always or succeed always regardelss
> of signature.

Thank you.

>>> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
>>> ---
>>> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
>>>         explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
>>>       - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
>>>       - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
>>>         in kconfig text
>>> ---
>>>    arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>>>    arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>    2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>>> index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>>> @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
>>>    config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
>>>    	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
>>> +config KEXEC_SIG
>>> +	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
>>> +	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
>>> +	help
>>> +	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
>>> +	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
>>> +
>>> +	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
>>> +	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
>>> +	  loaded in order for this to work.
>>> +
>>> +	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
>>> +	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
>>> +	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
>>> +	  blacklist by hash.
>>
>> So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? What is
>> the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?
> 
> IMA_KEXEC does more than KEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big
> unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.
> 
> Arguably the simpler implementation has less potential for bugs, too.
> Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.
> 
> Interestingly IMA_ARCH_POLICY depends on KEXEC_SIG rather than
> IMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.

I have not looked into that.

> The main problem with IMA_KEXEC from my point of view is it is not portable.
> To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on
> all platforms. It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms
> that use PE kernel signature format.

Could you add that to the comment please?

>>> +
>>>    config RELOCATABLE
>>>    	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
>>>    	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
>>> index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
>>> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>>>    #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
>>>    #include <linux/slab.h>
>>>    #include <linux/types.h>
>>> +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
>>>    static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>>>    			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
>>> @@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>>>    	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
>>>    }
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
>>> +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
>>> +{
>>> +	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
>>> +	struct module_signature *ms;
>>> +	unsigned long sig_len;
>>
>> Use size_t to match the signature of `verify_pkcs7_signature()`?
> 
> Nope. struct module_signature uses unsigned long, and this needs to be
> matched to avoid type errors on 32bit.

I meant for `sig_len`.

> Technically using size_t for in-memory buffers is misguided because
> AFAICT no memory buffer can be bigger than ULONG_MAX, and size_t is
> non-native type on 32bit.
> 
> Sure, the situation with ssize_t/int is different but that's not what we
> are dealing with here.
True. In my experience it prevents compiler warnings when building for 
32 bit or 64 bit. Anyway, not that important.


Kind regards,

Paul

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Paul Menzel]

Dear Michal,


Am 09.02.22 um 13:01 schrieb Michal Suchánek:

> On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 07:44:15AM +0100, Paul Menzel wrote:

>> Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:

[…]

>> How can this be tested?
> 
> Apparently KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is x86 only although the use of the option is
> arch neutral:
> 
> arch/x86/Kconfig:config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
> kernel/kexec_file.c:            if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE))
> {
> 
> Maybe it should be moved?

Sounds good.

> I used a patched kernel that enables lockdown in secure boot, and then
> verified that signed kernel can be loaded by kexec and unsigned not,
> with KEXEC_SIG enabled and IMA_KEXEC disabled.
> 
> The lockdown support can be enabled on any platform, and although I
> can't find it documented anywhere there appears to be code in kexec_file
> to take it into account:
> kernel/kexec.c: result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
> kernel/kexec_file.c:                security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
> kernel/module.c:        return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
> kernel/params.c:            security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS))
> and lockdown can be enabled with a buildtime option, a kernel parameter, or a
> debugfs file.
> 
> Still for testing lifting KEXEC_SIG_FORCE to some arch-neutral Kconfig file is
> probably the simplest option.
> 
> kexec -s option should be used to select kexec_file rather than the old
> style kexec which would either fail always or succeed always regardelss
> of signature.

Thank you.

>>> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
>>> ---
>>> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
>>>         explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
>>>       - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
>>>       - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
>>>         in kconfig text
>>> ---
>>>    arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>>>    arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>    2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>>> index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>>> @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
>>>    config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
>>>    	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
>>> +config KEXEC_SIG
>>> +	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
>>> +	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
>>> +	help
>>> +	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
>>> +	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
>>> +
>>> +	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
>>> +	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
>>> +	  loaded in order for this to work.
>>> +
>>> +	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
>>> +	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
>>> +	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
>>> +	  blacklist by hash.
>>
>> So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? What is
>> the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?
> 
> IMA_KEXEC does more than KEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big
> unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.
> 
> Arguably the simpler implementation has less potential for bugs, too.
> Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.
> 
> Interestingly IMA_ARCH_POLICY depends on KEXEC_SIG rather than
> IMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.

I have not looked into that.

> The main problem with IMA_KEXEC from my point of view is it is not portable.
> To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on
> all platforms. It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms
> that use PE kernel signature format.

Could you add that to the comment please?

>>> +
>>>    config RELOCATABLE
>>>    	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
>>>    	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
>>> index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
>>> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>>>    #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
>>>    #include <linux/slab.h>
>>>    #include <linux/types.h>
>>> +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
>>>    static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>>>    			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
>>> @@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>>>    	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
>>>    }
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
>>> +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
>>> +{
>>> +	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
>>> +	struct module_signature *ms;
>>> +	unsigned long sig_len;
>>
>> Use size_t to match the signature of `verify_pkcs7_signature()`?
> 
> Nope. struct module_signature uses unsigned long, and this needs to be
> matched to avoid type errors on 32bit.

I meant for `sig_len`.

> Technically using size_t for in-memory buffers is misguided because
> AFAICT no memory buffer can be bigger than ULONG_MAX, and size_t is
> non-native type on 32bit.
> 
> Sure, the situation with ssize_t/int is different but that's not what we
> are dealing with here.
True. In my experience it prevents compiler warnings when building for 
32 bit or 64 bit. Anyway, not that important.


Kind regards,

Paul

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Paul Menzel]

Dear Michal,


Am 09.02.22 um 13:01 schrieb Michal Suchánek:

> On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 07:44:15AM +0100, Paul Menzel wrote:

>> Am 11.01.22 um 12:37 schrieb Michal Suchanek:

[…]

>> How can this be tested?
> 
> Apparently KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is x86 only although the use of the option is
> arch neutral:
> 
> arch/x86/Kconfig:config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
> kernel/kexec_file.c:            if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE))
> {
> 
> Maybe it should be moved?

Sounds good.

> I used a patched kernel that enables lockdown in secure boot, and then
> verified that signed kernel can be loaded by kexec and unsigned not,
> with KEXEC_SIG enabled and IMA_KEXEC disabled.
> 
> The lockdown support can be enabled on any platform, and although I
> can't find it documented anywhere there appears to be code in kexec_file
> to take it into account:
> kernel/kexec.c: result = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
> kernel/kexec_file.c:                security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
> kernel/module.c:        return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
> kernel/params.c:            security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS))
> and lockdown can be enabled with a buildtime option, a kernel parameter, or a
> debugfs file.
> 
> Still for testing lifting KEXEC_SIG_FORCE to some arch-neutral Kconfig file is
> probably the simplest option.
> 
> kexec -s option should be used to select kexec_file rather than the old
> style kexec which would either fail always or succeed always regardelss
> of signature.

Thank you.

>>> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
>>> ---
>>> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the comit message with
>>>         explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
>>>       - Include correct header for mod_check_sig
>>>       - Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>: Mention additional IMA features
>>>         in kconfig text
>>> ---
>>>    arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>>>    arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>    2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>>> index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>>> @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
>>>    config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
>>>    	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
>>> +config KEXEC_SIG
>>> +	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
>>> +	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
>>> +	help
>>> +	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
>>> +	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
>>> +
>>> +	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
>>> +	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
>>> +	  loaded in order for this to work.
>>> +
>>> +	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
>>> +	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
>>> +	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
>>> +	  blacklist by hash.
>>
>> So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? What is
>> the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?
> 
> IMA_KEXEC does more than KEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big
> unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.
> 
> Arguably the simpler implementation has less potential for bugs, too.
> Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.
> 
> Interestingly IMA_ARCH_POLICY depends on KEXEC_SIG rather than
> IMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.

I have not looked into that.

> The main problem with IMA_KEXEC from my point of view is it is not portable.
> To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on
> all platforms. It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms
> that use PE kernel signature format.

Could you add that to the comment please?

>>> +
>>>    config RELOCATABLE
>>>    	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
>>>    	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
>>> index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
>>> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
>>>    #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
>>>    #include <linux/slab.h>
>>>    #include <linux/types.h>
>>> +#include <linux/module_signature.h>
>>>    static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>>>    			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
>>> @@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
>>>    	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
>>>    }
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
>>> +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
>>> +{
>>> +	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
>>> +	struct module_signature *ms;
>>> +	unsigned long sig_len;
>>
>> Use size_t to match the signature of `verify_pkcs7_signature()`?
> 
> Nope. struct module_signature uses unsigned long, and this needs to be
> matched to avoid type errors on 32bit.

I meant for `sig_len`.

> Technically using size_t for in-memory buffers is misguided because
> AFAICT no memory buffer can be bigger than ULONG_MAX, and size_t is
> non-native type on 32bit.
> 
> Sure, the situation with ssize_t/int is different but that's not what we
> are dealing with here.
True. In my experience it prevents compiler warnings when building for 
32 bit or 64 bit. Anyway, not that important.


Kind regards,

Paul

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Wed, 2022-02-09 at 13:01 +0100, Michal Such?nek wrote:
> > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> > >   config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> > >     def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > > +   bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > > +   depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > > +   help
> > > +     This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> > > +     the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > > +
> > > +     In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
> > > +     verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
> > > +     loaded in order for this to work.
> > > +
> > > +     Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
> > > +     verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
> > > +     list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
> > > +     blacklist by hash.
> > 
> > So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? What is
> > the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?
> 
> IMA_KEXEC does more than KEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big
> unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.
> 
> Arguably the simpler implementation hass less potential for bugs, too.
> Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.
> 
> Interestingly IMA_ARCH_POLICY depends on KEXEC_SIG rather than
> IMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.

FYI, a soft boot doesn't clear the TPM PCRs.  To be able to verify the
IMA measurement list after a kexec against a TPM quote, requires
carrying the measurement list across kexec.

The "IMA_KEXEC" config enables carrying the IMA measurement list across
kexec.  It has nothing to do with verifying the appended signature. 
That is based on kernel module appended signature code.

> 
> The main problem with IMA_KEXEC from my point of view is it is not portable.
> To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on
> all platforms.

Measuring the kexec kernel image and extending the TPM with the
measurement is required for trusted boot.  Boot loaders extend the
TPM's BIOS measurements. Similarly, IMA does not require a TPM, but if
one is available the kexec kernel image measurement is extended into
the IMA measurement list.  Otherwise, IMA goes into "TPM by-pass" mode.

> It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms
> that use PE kernel signature format.

True.  However, a kernel image with an appended signature may be
kexec'ed, regardless of the architecture.  Because some boot loaders
don't support appended signatures, from my point of view does not make
IMA kexec support not portable.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Wed, 2022-02-09 at 13:01 +0100, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> > >   config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> > >     def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > > +   bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > > +   depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > > +   help
> > > +     This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> > > +     the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > > +
> > > +     In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
> > > +     verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
> > > +     loaded in order for this to work.
> > > +
> > > +     Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
> > > +     verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
> > > +     list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
> > > +     blacklist by hash.
> > 
> > So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? What is
> > the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?
> 
> IMA_KEXEC does more than KEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big
> unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.
> 
> Arguably the simpler implementation hass less potential for bugs, too.
> Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.
> 
> Interestingly IMA_ARCH_POLICY depends on KEXEC_SIG rather than
> IMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.

FYI, a soft boot doesn't clear the TPM PCRs.  To be able to verify the
IMA measurement list after a kexec against a TPM quote, requires
carrying the measurement list across kexec.

The "IMA_KEXEC" config enables carrying the IMA measurement list across
kexec.  It has nothing to do with verifying the appended signature. 
That is based on kernel module appended signature code.

> 
> The main problem with IMA_KEXEC from my point of view is it is not portable.
> To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on
> all platforms.

Measuring the kexec kernel image and extending the TPM with the
measurement is required for trusted boot.  Boot loaders extend the
TPM's BIOS measurements. Similarly, IMA does not require a TPM, but if
one is available the kexec kernel image measurement is extended into
the IMA measurement list.  Otherwise, IMA goes into "TPM by-pass" mode.

> It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms
> that use PE kernel signature format.

True.  However, a kernel image with an appended signature may be
kexec'ed, regardless of the architecture.  Because some boot loaders
don't support appended signatures, from my point of view does not make
IMA kexec support not portable.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Wed, 2022-02-09 at 13:01 +0100, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> > >   config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> > >     def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > > +   bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > > +   depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > > +   help
> > > +     This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> > > +     the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > > +
> > > +     In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
> > > +     verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
> > > +     loaded in order for this to work.
> > > +
> > > +     Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
> > > +     verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
> > > +     list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
> > > +     blacklist by hash.
> > 
> > So, what is the takeaway for the user? IMA_ARCH_POLICY is preferred? What is
> > the disadvantage, and two implementations(?) needed then? More overhead?
> 
> IMA_KEXEC does more than KEXEC_SIG. The overhead is probably not big
> unless you are trying to really minimize the kernel code size.
> 
> Arguably the simpler implementation hass less potential for bugs, too.
> Both in code and in user configuration required to enable the feature.
> 
> Interestingly IMA_ARCH_POLICY depends on KEXEC_SIG rather than
> IMA_KEXEC. Just mind-boggling.

FYI, a soft boot doesn't clear the TPM PCRs.  To be able to verify the
IMA measurement list after a kexec against a TPM quote, requires
carrying the measurement list across kexec.

The "IMA_KEXEC" config enables carrying the IMA measurement list across
kexec.  It has nothing to do with verifying the appended signature. 
That is based on kernel module appended signature code.

> 
> The main problem with IMA_KEXEC from my point of view is it is not portable.
> To record the measurements TPM support is requireed which is not available on
> all platforms.

Measuring the kexec kernel image and extending the TPM with the
measurement is required for trusted boot.  Boot loaders extend the
TPM's BIOS measurements. Similarly, IMA does not require a TPM, but if
one is available the kexec kernel image measurement is extended into
the IMA measurement list.  Otherwise, IMA goes into "TPM by-pass" mode.

> It does not support PE so it cannot be used on platforms
> that use PE kernel signature format.

True.  However, a kernel image with an appended signature may be
kexec'ed, regardless of the architecture.  Because some boot loaders
don't support appended signatures, from my point of view does not make
IMA kexec support not portable.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
>  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
>         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
>  
> +config KEXEC_SIG
> +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> +       help
> +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.

When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
>  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
>         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
>  
> +config KEXEC_SIG
> +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> +       help
> +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.

When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
>  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
>         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
>  
> +config KEXEC_SIG
> +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> +       help
> +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.

When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in
arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Sun, 2022-02-13 at 21:59 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> 
> On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> >  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> >         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> >  
> > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > +       help
> > +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> > +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> 
> When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
> kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
> security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in
> arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.

The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG kernel image
signature verification.  Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.

1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so
verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of
signature type - PE, appended signature.

solution: enable KEXEC_SIG  (This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA
policy changes.)

2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation,
if desired.

solution: enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY 
- Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
- EFI:   requires  secure boot to be enabled.  The IMA efi policy
doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.

3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired
and supported on the architecture.

solution: enable IMA_KEXEC

Comparison: 
- Are there any differences between IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG measuring the
kexec kernel image?

One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement
list differs.  In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement
list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash
including the appended signature.  With IMA and the 'ima-modsig'
template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined,
as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.

Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list
allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended
signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.

Other differences are already included in the Kconfig KEXEC_SIG "Notes"
section.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Sun, 2022-02-13 at 21:59 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> 
> On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> >  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> >         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> >  
> > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > +       help
> > +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> > +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> 
> When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
> kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
> security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in
> arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.

The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG kernel image
signature verification.  Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.

1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so
verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of
signature type - PE, appended signature.

solution: enable KEXEC_SIG  (This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA
policy changes.)

2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation,
if desired.

solution: enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY 
- Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
- EFI:   requires  secure boot to be enabled.  The IMA efi policy
doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.

3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired
and supported on the architecture.

solution: enable IMA_KEXEC

Comparison: 
- Are there any differences between IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG measuring the
kexec kernel image?

One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement
list differs.  In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement
list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash
including the appended signature.  With IMA and the 'ima-modsig'
template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined,
as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.

Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list
allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended
signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.

Other differences are already included in the Kconfig KEXEC_SIG "Notes"
section.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Sun, 2022-02-13 at 21:59 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> 
> On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> >  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> >         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> >  
> > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > +       help
> > +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> > +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> 
> When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
> kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
> security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in
> arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.

The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG kernel image
signature verification.  Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.

1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so
verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of
signature type - PE, appended signature.

solution: enable KEXEC_SIG  (This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA
policy changes.)

2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation,
if desired.

solution: enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY 
- Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
- EFI:   requires  secure boot to be enabled.  The IMA efi policy
doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.

3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired
and supported on the architecture.

solution: enable IMA_KEXEC

Comparison: 
- Are there any differences between IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG measuring the
kexec kernel image?

One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement
list differs.  In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement
list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash
including the appended signature.  With IMA and the 'ima-modsig'
template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined,
as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.

Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list
allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended
signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.

Other differences are already included in the Kconfig KEXEC_SIG "Notes"
section.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michal =?unknown-8bit?q?Such=C3=A1nek?=]

Hello,

On Mon, Feb 14, 2022 at 10:14:16AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Michal,
> 
> On Sun, 2022-02-13 at 21:59 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> 
> > 
> > On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> > >  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> > >         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > >  
> > > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > > +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > > +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > > +       help
> > > +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for

This is actually wrong. KEXEC_SIG makes it mandatory that any signature
that is appended is valid and made by a key that is part of the platform
keyiring (which is also wrong, built-in keys should be also accepted).
KEXEC_SIG_FORCE or an IMA policy makes it mandatory that the signature
is present.

> > > +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > 
> > When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
> > kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
> > security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in

I suppose you mean security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c

I also think it's misguided because KEXEC_SIG in itself does not enforce
the signature. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE does.

> > arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.

I suppose you mean arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c - see above.


Thanks for taking the time to reseach and summarize the differences.

> The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG kernel image
> signature verification.  Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.
> 
> 1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so
> verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of
> signature type - PE, appended signature.
> 
> solution: enable KEXEC_SIG  (This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA
> policy changes.)
> 
> 2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation,
> if desired.
> 
> solution: enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY 
> - Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
> - EFI:   requires  secure boot to be enabled.  The IMA efi policy
> doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.
> 
> 3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired
> and supported on the architecture.
> 
> solution: enable IMA_KEXEC
> 
> Comparison: 
> - Are there any differences between IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG measuring the
> kexec kernel image?
> 
> One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement
> list differs.  In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement
> list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash
> including the appended signature.  With IMA and the 'ima-modsig'
> template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined,
> as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.
> 
> Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list
> allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended
> signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.

I don't understand this part. Isn't the hash *with* signature always
included, and the distinguishing part about IMA is the hash *without*
signature which is the same irrespective of signature type (PE, appended
xattr) and irrespective of the keyt used for signoing?

> Other differences are already included in the Kconfig KEXEC_SIG "Notes"
> section.

Which besides what is already described above would be blacklisting
specific binaries, which is much more effective if you have hashes of
binaries without signature.

Thanks

Michal

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michal Suchánek]

Hello,

On Mon, Feb 14, 2022 at 10:14:16AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Michal,
> 
> On Sun, 2022-02-13 at 21:59 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> 
> > 
> > On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> > >  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> > >         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > >  
> > > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > > +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > > +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > > +       help
> > > +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for

This is actually wrong. KEXEC_SIG makes it mandatory that any signature
that is appended is valid and made by a key that is part of the platform
keyiring (which is also wrong, built-in keys should be also accepted).
KEXEC_SIG_FORCE or an IMA policy makes it mandatory that the signature
is present.

> > > +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > 
> > When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
> > kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
> > security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in

I suppose you mean security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c

I also think it's misguided because KEXEC_SIG in itself does not enforce
the signature. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE does.

> > arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.

I suppose you mean arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c - see above.


Thanks for taking the time to reseach and summarize the differences.

> The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG kernel image
> signature verification.  Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.
> 
> 1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so
> verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of
> signature type - PE, appended signature.
> 
> solution: enable KEXEC_SIG  (This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA
> policy changes.)
> 
> 2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation,
> if desired.
> 
> solution: enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY 
> - Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
> - EFI:   requires  secure boot to be enabled.  The IMA efi policy
> doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.
> 
> 3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired
> and supported on the architecture.
> 
> solution: enable IMA_KEXEC
> 
> Comparison: 
> - Are there any differences between IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG measuring the
> kexec kernel image?
> 
> One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement
> list differs.  In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement
> list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash
> including the appended signature.  With IMA and the 'ima-modsig'
> template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined,
> as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.
> 
> Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list
> allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended
> signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.

I don't understand this part. Isn't the hash *with* signature always
included, and the distinguishing part about IMA is the hash *without*
signature which is the same irrespective of signature type (PE, appended
xattr) and irrespective of the keyt used for signoing?

> Other differences are already included in the Kconfig KEXEC_SIG "Notes"
> section.

Which besides what is already described above would be blacklisting
specific binaries, which is much more effective if you have hashes of
binaries without signature.

Thanks

Michal

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Michal Suchánek]

Hello,

On Mon, Feb 14, 2022 at 10:14:16AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Michal,
> 
> On Sun, 2022-02-13 at 21:59 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> 
> > 
> > On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> > >  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> > >         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > >  
> > > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > > +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > > +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > > +       help
> > > +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for

This is actually wrong. KEXEC_SIG makes it mandatory that any signature
that is appended is valid and made by a key that is part of the platform
keyiring (which is also wrong, built-in keys should be also accepted).
KEXEC_SIG_FORCE or an IMA policy makes it mandatory that the signature
is present.

> > > +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > 
> > When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
> > kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
> > security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in

I suppose you mean security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c

I also think it's misguided because KEXEC_SIG in itself does not enforce
the signature. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE does.

> > arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.

I suppose you mean arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c - see above.


Thanks for taking the time to reseach and summarize the differences.

> The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG kernel image
> signature verification.  Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.
> 
> 1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so
> verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of
> signature type - PE, appended signature.
> 
> solution: enable KEXEC_SIG  (This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA
> policy changes.)
> 
> 2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation,
> if desired.
> 
> solution: enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY 
> - Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
> - EFI:   requires  secure boot to be enabled.  The IMA efi policy
> doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.
> 
> 3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired
> and supported on the architecture.
> 
> solution: enable IMA_KEXEC
> 
> Comparison: 
> - Are there any differences between IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG measuring the
> kexec kernel image?
> 
> One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement
> list differs.  In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement
> list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash
> including the appended signature.  With IMA and the 'ima-modsig'
> template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined,
> as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.
> 
> Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list
> allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended
> signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.

I don't understand this part. Isn't the hash *with* signature always
included, and the distinguishing part about IMA is the hash *without*
signature which is the same irrespective of signature type (PE, appended
xattr) and irrespective of the keyt used for signoing?

> Other differences are already included in the Kconfig KEXEC_SIG "Notes"
> section.

Which besides what is already described above would be blacklisting
specific binaries, which is much more effective if you have hashes of
binaries without signature.

Thanks

Michal

[PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

On Mon, 2022-02-14 at 16:55 +0100, Michal Such?nek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> On Mon, Feb 14, 2022 at 10:14:16AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Michal,
> > 
> > On Sun, 2022-02-13 at 21:59 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > 
> > > 
> > > On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> > > >  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> > > >         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > > >  
> > > > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > > > +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > > > +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > > > +       help
> > > > +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> 
> This is actually wrong. KEXEC_SIG makes it mandatory that any signature
> that is appended is valid and made by a key that is part of the platform
> keyiring (which is also wrong, built-in keys should be also accepted).
> KEXEC_SIG_FORCE or an IMA policy makes it mandatory that the signature
> is present.

I'm aware of MODULE_SIG_FORCE, which isn't normally enabled by distros,
but enabling MODULE_SIG allows MODULE_SIG_FORCE to be enabled on the
boot command line.  In the IMA arch policies, if MODULE_SIG is enabled,
it is then enforced, otherwise an IMA "appraise" policy rule is
defined.  This rule would prevent the module_load syscall.

I'm not aware of KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.  If there is such a Kconfig, then I
assume it could work similarly.

> 
> > > > +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > > 
> > > When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
> > > kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
> > > security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in
> 
> I suppose you mean security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c

Yes

> 
> I also think it's misguided because KEXEC_SIG in itself does not enforce
> the signature. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE does.

Right, which is why the IMA efi policy calls set_module_sig_enforced().

> 
> > > arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.
> 
> I suppose you mean arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c - see above.

Sorry, yes.  

> 
> 
> Thanks for taking the time to reseach and summarize the differences.
> 
> > The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG kernel image
> > signature verification.  Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.
> > 
> > 1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so
> > verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of
> > signature type - PE, appended signature.
> > 
> > solution: enable KEXEC_SIG  (This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA
> > policy changes.)
> > 
> > 2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation,
> > if desired.
> > 
> > solution: enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY 
> > - Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
> > - EFI:   requires  secure boot to be enabled.  The IMA efi policy
> > doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.
> > 
> > 3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired
> > and supported on the architecture.
> > 
> > solution: enable IMA_KEXEC
> > 
> > Comparison: 
> > - Are there any differences between IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG measuring the
> > kexec kernel image?
> > 
> > One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement
> > list differs.  In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement
> > list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash
> > including the appended signature.  With IMA and the 'ima-modsig'
> > template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined,
> > as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.
> > 
> > Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list
> > allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended
> > signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.
> 
> I don't understand this part. Isn't the hash *with* signature always
> included, and the distinguishing part about IMA is the hash *without*
> signature which is the same irrespective of signature type (PE, appended
> xattr) and irrespective of the keyt used for signoing?

Roberto Sassu added support for IMA templates.  These are the
definitions of 'ima-sig' and 'ima-modsig'.

{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"}

d-ng: is the file hash.  With the proposed IMA support for fs-verity
digests, the 'd-ng' field may also include the fsverity digest, based
on policy.

n-ng: is the file pathname.
sig: is the file signature stored as a 'security.ima' xattr (may be
NULL).
d-modsig: is the file hash without the appended signature (may be
NULL).

FYI, changing from "module signature" to "appended signature", might
impact the template field and name.  :)

modsig: is the appended signature (May be NULL).

I really haven't looked at PE signatures, so I can't comment on them.

> 
> > Other differences are already included in the Kconfig KEXEC_SIG "Notes"
> > section.
> 
> Which besides what is already described above would be blacklisting
> specific binaries, which is much more effective if you have hashes of
> binaries without signature.

Thanks, Nayna will be happy to hear you approve.

FYI, IMA calculates the file hash once, which is then added to the IMA
measurement list, extended into the TPM (when available), used to
verify signatures, and included in the audit log.

With the KEXEC_SIG support, assuming the IMA arch policy is enabled,
the file hash would be calculated twice - once for verifying the file
signature and again for the measurement.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

On Mon, 2022-02-14 at 16:55 +0100, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> On Mon, Feb 14, 2022 at 10:14:16AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Michal,
> > 
> > On Sun, 2022-02-13 at 21:59 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > 
> > > 
> > > On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> > > >  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> > > >         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > > >  
> > > > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > > > +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > > > +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > > > +       help
> > > > +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> 
> This is actually wrong. KEXEC_SIG makes it mandatory that any signature
> that is appended is valid and made by a key that is part of the platform
> keyiring (which is also wrong, built-in keys should be also accepted).
> KEXEC_SIG_FORCE or an IMA policy makes it mandatory that the signature
> is present.

I'm aware of MODULE_SIG_FORCE, which isn't normally enabled by distros,
but enabling MODULE_SIG allows MODULE_SIG_FORCE to be enabled on the
boot command line.  In the IMA arch policies, if MODULE_SIG is enabled,
it is then enforced, otherwise an IMA "appraise" policy rule is
defined.  This rule would prevent the module_load syscall.

I'm not aware of KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.  If there is such a Kconfig, then I
assume it could work similarly.

> 
> > > > +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > > 
> > > When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
> > > kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
> > > security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in
> 
> I suppose you mean security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c

Yes

> 
> I also think it's misguided because KEXEC_SIG in itself does not enforce
> the signature. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE does.

Right, which is why the IMA efi policy calls set_module_sig_enforced().

> 
> > > arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.
> 
> I suppose you mean arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c - see above.

Sorry, yes.  

> 
> 
> Thanks for taking the time to reseach and summarize the differences.
> 
> > The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG kernel image
> > signature verification.  Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.
> > 
> > 1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so
> > verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of
> > signature type - PE, appended signature.
> > 
> > solution: enable KEXEC_SIG  (This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA
> > policy changes.)
> > 
> > 2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation,
> > if desired.
> > 
> > solution: enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY 
> > - Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
> > - EFI:   requires  secure boot to be enabled.  The IMA efi policy
> > doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.
> > 
> > 3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired
> > and supported on the architecture.
> > 
> > solution: enable IMA_KEXEC
> > 
> > Comparison: 
> > - Are there any differences between IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG measuring the
> > kexec kernel image?
> > 
> > One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement
> > list differs.  In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement
> > list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash
> > including the appended signature.  With IMA and the 'ima-modsig'
> > template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined,
> > as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.
> > 
> > Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list
> > allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended
> > signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.
> 
> I don't understand this part. Isn't the hash *with* signature always
> included, and the distinguishing part about IMA is the hash *without*
> signature which is the same irrespective of signature type (PE, appended
> xattr) and irrespective of the keyt used for signoing?

Roberto Sassu added support for IMA templates.  These are the
definitions of 'ima-sig' and 'ima-modsig'.

{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"}

d-ng: is the file hash.  With the proposed IMA support for fs-verity
digests, the 'd-ng' field may also include the fsverity digest, based
on policy.

n-ng: is the file pathname.
sig: is the file signature stored as a 'security.ima' xattr (may be
NULL).
d-modsig: is the file hash without the appended signature (may be
NULL).

FYI, changing from "module signature" to "appended signature", might
impact the template field and name.  :)

modsig: is the appended signature (May be NULL).

I really haven't looked at PE signatures, so I can't comment on them.

> 
> > Other differences are already included in the Kconfig KEXEC_SIG "Notes"
> > section.
> 
> Which besides what is already described above would be blacklisting
> specific binaries, which is much more effective if you have hashes of
> binaries without signature.

Thanks, Nayna will be happy to hear you approve.

FYI, IMA calculates the file hash once, which is then added to the IMA
measurement list, extended into the TPM (when available), used to
verify signatures, and included in the audit log.

With the KEXEC_SIG support, assuming the IMA arch policy is enabled,
the file hash would be calculated twice - once for verifying the file
signature and again for the measurement.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 2/6] powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

[Mimi Zohar]

On Mon, 2022-02-14 at 16:55 +0100, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> On Mon, Feb 14, 2022 at 10:14:16AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Michal,
> > 
> > On Sun, 2022-02-13 at 21:59 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > 
> > > 
> > > On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > > index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
> > > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> > > > @@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
> > > >  config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
> > > >         def_bool KEXEC_FILE
> > > >  
> > > > +config KEXEC_SIG
> > > > +       bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
> > > > +       depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
> > > > +       help
> > > > +         This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
> 
> This is actually wrong. KEXEC_SIG makes it mandatory that any signature
> that is appended is valid and made by a key that is part of the platform
> keyiring (which is also wrong, built-in keys should be also accepted).
> KEXEC_SIG_FORCE or an IMA policy makes it mandatory that the signature
> is present.

I'm aware of MODULE_SIG_FORCE, which isn't normally enabled by distros,
but enabling MODULE_SIG allows MODULE_SIG_FORCE to be enabled on the
boot command line.  In the IMA arch policies, if MODULE_SIG is enabled,
it is then enforced, otherwise an IMA "appraise" policy rule is
defined.  This rule would prevent the module_load syscall.

I'm not aware of KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.  If there is such a Kconfig, then I
assume it could work similarly.

> 
> > > > +         the kexec_file_load() syscall.
> > > 
> > > When KEXEC_SIG is enabled on other architectures, IMA does not define a
> > > kexec 'appraise' policy rule.  Refer to the policy rules in
> > > security/ima/ima_efi.c.  Similarly the kexec 'appraise' policy rule in
> 
> I suppose you mean security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c

Yes

> 
> I also think it's misguided because KEXEC_SIG in itself does not enforce
> the signature. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE does.

Right, which is why the IMA efi policy calls set_module_sig_enforced().

> 
> > > arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_policy.c should not be defined.
> 
> I suppose you mean arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c - see above.

Sorry, yes.  

> 
> 
> Thanks for taking the time to reseach and summarize the differences.
> 
> > The discussion shouldn't only be about IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG kernel image
> > signature verification.  Let's try and reframe the problem a bit.
> > 
> > 1. Unify and simply the existing kexec signature verification so
> > verifying the KEXEC kernel image signature works irrespective of
> > signature type - PE, appended signature.
> > 
> > solution: enable KEXEC_SIG  (This patch set, with the above powerpc IMA
> > policy changes.)
> > 
> > 2. Measure and include the kexec kernel image in a log for attestation,
> > if desired.
> > 
> > solution: enable IMA_ARCH_POLICY 
> > - Powerpc: requires trusted boot to be enabled.
> > - EFI:   requires  secure boot to be enabled.  The IMA efi policy
> > doesn't differentiate between secure and trusted boot.
> > 
> > 3. Carry the kexec kernel image measurement across kexec, if desired
> > and supported on the architecture.
> > 
> > solution: enable IMA_KEXEC
> > 
> > Comparison: 
> > - Are there any differences between IMA vs. KEXEC_SIG measuring the
> > kexec kernel image?
> > 
> > One of the main differences is "what" is included in the measurement
> > list differs.  In both cases, the 'd-ng' field of the IMA measurement
> > list template (e.g. ima-ng, ima-sig, ima-modsig) is the full file hash
> > including the appended signature.  With IMA and the 'ima-modsig'
> > template, an additional hash without the appended signature is defined,
> > as well as including the appended signature in the 'sig' field.
> > 
> > Including the file hash and appended signature in the measurement list
> > allows an attestation server, for example, to verify the appended
> > signature without having to know the file hash without the signature.
> 
> I don't understand this part. Isn't the hash *with* signature always
> included, and the distinguishing part about IMA is the hash *without*
> signature which is the same irrespective of signature type (PE, appended
> xattr) and irrespective of the keyt used for signoing?

Roberto Sassu added support for IMA templates.  These are the
definitions of 'ima-sig' and 'ima-modsig'.

{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"}

d-ng: is the file hash.  With the proposed IMA support for fs-verity
digests, the 'd-ng' field may also include the fsverity digest, based
on policy.

n-ng: is the file pathname.
sig: is the file signature stored as a 'security.ima' xattr (may be
NULL).
d-modsig: is the file hash without the appended signature (may be
NULL).

FYI, changing from "module signature" to "appended signature", might
impact the template field and name.  :)

modsig: is the appended signature (May be NULL).

I really haven't looked at PE signatures, so I can't comment on them.

> 
> > Other differences are already included in the Kconfig KEXEC_SIG "Notes"
> > section.
> 
> Which besides what is already described above would be blacklisting
> specific binaries, which is much more effective if you have hashes of
> binaries without signature.

Thanks, Nayna will be happy to hear you approve.

FYI, IMA calculates the file hash once, which is then added to the IMA
measurement list, extended into the TPM (when available), used to
verify signatures, and included in the audit log.

With the KEXEC_SIG support, assuming the IMA arch policy is enabled,
the file hash would be calculated twice - once for verifying the file
signature and again for the measurement.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

[PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

[Michal Suchanek]

Module verification already implements appeded signature verification.

Reuse it for kexec_file.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the dependency on
      MODULE_SIG_FORMAT to MODULE_SIG
    - Include linux/verification.h - previously added in earlier patch
v4: - kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>: Use unsigned long rather than size_t for data length
    - Update the code in kernel/module_signing.c to use pointer rather
      than memcpy as the kexec and IMA code does
---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                  |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c           | 19 +++------------
 arch/s390/Kconfig                     |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 18 ++------------
 include/linux/verification.h          |  3 +++
 kernel/module-internal.h              |  2 --
 kernel/module.c                       |  4 +++-
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 34 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 8 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index 1cde9b6c5987..4092187474ff 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 98d1cb5135b4..64cd314cce0d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
@@ -156,9 +157,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -168,19 +166,8 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
-	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
-				      NULL, NULL);
+	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					 "kexec_file");
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 2a5bb4f29cfe..cece7152ea35 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index c944d71316c7..345f2eab6e04 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,19 +42,8 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
-	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
-				      NULL, NULL);
+	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					"kexec_file");
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
 #endif
 
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
+			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
index 33783abc377b..80461e14bf29 100644
--- a/kernel/module-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
@@ -27,5 +27,3 @@ struct load_info {
 		unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu;
 	} index;
 };
-
-extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info);
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 84a9141a5e15..8481933dfa92 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
 #include <linux/dynamic_debug.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/module.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
@@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
 		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
 		info->len -= markerlen;
-		err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
+		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
+						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
 		if (!err) {
 			info->sig_ok = true;
 			return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -14,32 +14,38 @@
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
-/*
- * Verify the signature on a module.
+/**
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
+ * signature marker stripped.
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
+ * @what: Informational string for log messages
  */
-int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
+			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
 {
-	struct module_signature ms;
-	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+	struct module_signature *ms;
+	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
-	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
-	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
 
-	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
-	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
-	info->len = modlen;
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(*ms);
+	*len = modlen;
 
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+				      trusted_keys,
 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

[Michal Suchanek]

Module verification already implements appeded signature verification.

Reuse it for kexec_file.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the dependency on
      MODULE_SIG_FORMAT to MODULE_SIG
    - Include linux/verification.h - previously added in earlier patch
v4: - kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>: Use unsigned long rather than size_t for data length
    - Update the code in kernel/module_signing.c to use pointer rather
      than memcpy as the kexec and IMA code does
---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                  |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c           | 19 +++------------
 arch/s390/Kconfig                     |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 18 ++------------
 include/linux/verification.h          |  3 +++
 kernel/module-internal.h              |  2 --
 kernel/module.c                       |  4 +++-
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 34 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 8 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index 1cde9b6c5987..4092187474ff 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 98d1cb5135b4..64cd314cce0d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
@@ -156,9 +157,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -168,19 +166,8 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
-	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
-				      NULL, NULL);
+	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					 "kexec_file");
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 2a5bb4f29cfe..cece7152ea35 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index c944d71316c7..345f2eab6e04 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,19 +42,8 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
-	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
-				      NULL, NULL);
+	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					"kexec_file");
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
 #endif
 
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
+			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
index 33783abc377b..80461e14bf29 100644
--- a/kernel/module-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
@@ -27,5 +27,3 @@ struct load_info {
 		unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu;
 	} index;
 };
-
-extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info);
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 84a9141a5e15..8481933dfa92 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
 #include <linux/dynamic_debug.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/module.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
@@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
 		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
 		info->len -= markerlen;
-		err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
+		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
+						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
 		if (!err) {
 			info->sig_ok = true;
 			return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -14,32 +14,38 @@
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
-/*
- * Verify the signature on a module.
+/**
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
+ * signature marker stripped.
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
+ * @what: Informational string for log messages
  */
-int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
+			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
 {
-	struct module_signature ms;
-	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+	struct module_signature *ms;
+	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
-	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
-	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
 
-	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
-	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
-	info->len = modlen;
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(*ms);
+	*len = modlen;
 
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+				      trusted_keys,
 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

[Michal Suchanek]

Module verification already implements appeded signature verification.

Reuse it for kexec_file.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the dependency on
      MODULE_SIG_FORMAT to MODULE_SIG
    - Include linux/verification.h - previously added in earlier patch
v4: - kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>: Use unsigned long rather than size_t for data length
    - Update the code in kernel/module_signing.c to use pointer rather
      than memcpy as the kexec and IMA code does
---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                  |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c           | 19 +++------------
 arch/s390/Kconfig                     |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 18 ++------------
 include/linux/verification.h          |  3 +++
 kernel/module-internal.h              |  2 --
 kernel/module.c                       |  4 +++-
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 34 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 8 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index 1cde9b6c5987..4092187474ff 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 98d1cb5135b4..64cd314cce0d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
@@ -156,9 +157,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -168,19 +166,8 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
-	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
-				      NULL, NULL);
+	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					 "kexec_file");
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 2a5bb4f29cfe..cece7152ea35 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index c944d71316c7..345f2eab6e04 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,19 +42,8 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
-	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
-				      NULL, NULL);
+	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					"kexec_file");
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
 #endif
 
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
+			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
index 33783abc377b..80461e14bf29 100644
--- a/kernel/module-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
@@ -27,5 +27,3 @@ struct load_info {
 		unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu;
 	} index;
 };
-
-extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info);
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 84a9141a5e15..8481933dfa92 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
 #include <linux/dynamic_debug.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/module.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
@@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
 		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
 		info->len -= markerlen;
-		err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
+		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
+						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
 		if (!err) {
 			info->sig_ok = true;
 			return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -14,32 +14,38 @@
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
-/*
- * Verify the signature on a module.
+/**
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
+ * signature marker stripped.
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
+ * @what: Informational string for log messages
  */
-int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
+			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
 {
-	struct module_signature ms;
-	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+	struct module_signature *ms;
+	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
-	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
-	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
 
-	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
-	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
-	info->len = modlen;
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(*ms);
+	*len = modlen;
 
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+				      trusted_keys,
 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:45PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
> index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/verification.h
> +++ b/include/linux/verification.h
> @@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
>  				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
>  #endif
>  
> +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
> +

Looks very non-module specific.

> diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
> index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
> --- a/kernel/module_signing.c
> +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
> @@ -14,32 +14,38 @@
>  #include <crypto/public_key.h>
>  #include "module-internal.h"
>  
> -/*
> - * Verify the signature on a module.
> +/**
> + * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
> + * signature marker stripped.
> + * @data: The data to be verified
> + * @len: Size of @data.
> + * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
> + * @what: Informational string for log messages
>   */
> -int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
> +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
>  {
> -	struct module_signature ms;
> -	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
> +	struct module_signature *ms;

There goes the abstraction, so why not make this clear where we re-use
the struct module_signature for various things and call it as it is,
verify_mod_appended_signature() or some such?

David? Any preference?

Other than that:

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:45PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
> index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/verification.h
> +++ b/include/linux/verification.h
> @@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
>  				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
>  #endif
>  
> +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
> +

Looks very non-module specific.

> diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
> index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
> --- a/kernel/module_signing.c
> +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
> @@ -14,32 +14,38 @@
>  #include <crypto/public_key.h>
>  #include "module-internal.h"
>  
> -/*
> - * Verify the signature on a module.
> +/**
> + * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
> + * signature marker stripped.
> + * @data: The data to be verified
> + * @len: Size of @data.
> + * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
> + * @what: Informational string for log messages
>   */
> -int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
> +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
>  {
> -	struct module_signature ms;
> -	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
> +	struct module_signature *ms;

There goes the abstraction, so why not make this clear where we re-use
the struct module_signature for various things and call it as it is,
verify_mod_appended_signature() or some such?

David? Any preference?

Other than that:

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:45PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
> index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/verification.h
> +++ b/include/linux/verification.h
> @@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
>  				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
>  #endif
>  
> +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
> +

Looks very non-module specific.

> diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
> index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
> --- a/kernel/module_signing.c
> +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
> @@ -14,32 +14,38 @@
>  #include <crypto/public_key.h>
>  #include "module-internal.h"
>  
> -/*
> - * Verify the signature on a module.
> +/**
> + * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
> + * signature marker stripped.
> + * @data: The data to be verified
> + * @len: Size of @data.
> + * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
> + * @what: Informational string for log messages
>   */
> -int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
> +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
>  {
> -	struct module_signature ms;
> -	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
> +	struct module_signature *ms;

There goes the abstraction, so why not make this clear where we re-use
the struct module_signature for various things and call it as it is,
verify_mod_appended_signature() or some such?

David? Any preference?

Other than that:

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

[PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

[Michal =?unknown-8bit?q?Such=C3=A1nek?=]

Hello,

thanks for the review.

On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 12:15:56PM -0800, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:45PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
> > index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/verification.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/verification.h
> > @@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
> >  				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
> >  #endif
> >  
> > +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> > +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
> > +
> 
> Looks very non-module specific.

Which it is now that the same signature format is used for kernels.

> 
> > diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
> > index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
> > --- a/kernel/module_signing.c
> > +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
> > @@ -14,32 +14,38 @@
> >  #include <crypto/public_key.h>
> >  #include "module-internal.h"
> >  
> > -/*
> > - * Verify the signature on a module.
> > +/**
> > + * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
> > + * signature marker stripped.
> > + * @data: The data to be verified
> > + * @len: Size of @data.
> > + * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
> > + * @what: Informational string for log messages
> >   */
> > -int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
> > +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> > +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
> >  {
> > -	struct module_signature ms;
> > -	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
> > +	struct module_signature *ms;
> 
> There goes the abstraction, so why not make this clear where we re-use
> the struct module_signature for various things and call it as it is,
> verify_mod_appended_signature() or some such?

It sounds like the abstraction is actually improved by callers no longer
dealing with struct module_signature when verifying signature on a
kernel. That is the structure is misnamed but it is now hidden behind
an abstraction.

Or am I missing something?

Thanks

Michal

Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

[Michal Suchánek]

Hello,

thanks for the review.

On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 12:15:56PM -0800, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:45PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
> > index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/verification.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/verification.h
> > @@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
> >  				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
> >  #endif
> >  
> > +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> > +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
> > +
> 
> Looks very non-module specific.

Which it is now that the same signature format is used for kernels.

> 
> > diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
> > index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
> > --- a/kernel/module_signing.c
> > +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
> > @@ -14,32 +14,38 @@
> >  #include <crypto/public_key.h>
> >  #include "module-internal.h"
> >  
> > -/*
> > - * Verify the signature on a module.
> > +/**
> > + * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
> > + * signature marker stripped.
> > + * @data: The data to be verified
> > + * @len: Size of @data.
> > + * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
> > + * @what: Informational string for log messages
> >   */
> > -int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
> > +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> > +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
> >  {
> > -	struct module_signature ms;
> > -	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
> > +	struct module_signature *ms;
> 
> There goes the abstraction, so why not make this clear where we re-use
> the struct module_signature for various things and call it as it is,
> verify_mod_appended_signature() or some such?

It sounds like the abstraction is actually improved by callers no longer
dealing with struct module_signature when verifying signature on a
kernel. That is the structure is misnamed but it is now hidden behind
an abstraction.

Or am I missing something?

Thanks

Michal

Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

[Michal Suchánek]

Hello,

thanks for the review.

On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 12:15:56PM -0800, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:45PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> > diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
> > index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/verification.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/verification.h
> > @@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
> >  				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
> >  #endif
> >  
> > +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> > +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
> > +
> 
> Looks very non-module specific.

Which it is now that the same signature format is used for kernels.

> 
> > diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
> > index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
> > --- a/kernel/module_signing.c
> > +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
> > @@ -14,32 +14,38 @@
> >  #include <crypto/public_key.h>
> >  #include "module-internal.h"
> >  
> > -/*
> > - * Verify the signature on a module.
> > +/**
> > + * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
> > + * signature marker stripped.
> > + * @data: The data to be verified
> > + * @len: Size of @data.
> > + * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
> > + * @what: Informational string for log messages
> >   */
> > -int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
> > +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
> > +			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
> >  {
> > -	struct module_signature ms;
> > -	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
> > +	struct module_signature *ms;
> 
> There goes the abstraction, so why not make this clear where we re-use
> the struct module_signature for various things and call it as it is,
> verify_mod_appended_signature() or some such?

It sounds like the abstraction is actually improved by callers no longer
dealing with struct module_signature when verifying signature on a
kernel. That is the structure is misnamed but it is now hidden behind
an abstraction.

Or am I missing something?

Thanks

Michal

[PATCH v5 4/6] module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.

[Michal Suchanek]

It is stripped by each caller separately.

Note: this changes the error for kexec_file from EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA
when the signature marker is missing.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
      change of raturn value
    - the module_signature.h is now no longer needed for kexec_file
---
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c           | 11 -----------
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 11 -----------
 kernel/module.c                       |  7 +------
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 12 ++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 64cd314cce0d..6dec8151ef73 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -156,16 +155,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-
-	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   marker_len))
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= marker_len;
-
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
 					 "kexec_file");
 }
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 345f2eab6e04..c3deccf1da83 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
 #include <linux/elf.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <asm/boot_data.h>
@@ -28,20 +27,10 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   marker_len))
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= marker_len;
-
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
 					"kexec_file");
 }
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 8481933dfa92..d91ca0f93a40 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2882,7 +2882,6 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
 static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	int err = -ENODATA;
-	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	const char *reason;
 	const void *mod = info->hdr;
 
@@ -2890,11 +2889,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	 * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
 	 * removed is no longer the module that was signed
 	 */
-	if (flags == 0 &&
-	    info->len > markerlen &&
-	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
-		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
-		info->len -= markerlen;
+	if (flags == 0) {
 		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
 						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
 		if (!err) {
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 30149969f21f..39a6dd7c6dd2 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
 /**
- * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
- * signature marker stripped.
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module
  * @data: The data to be verified
  * @len: Size of @data.
  * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
@@ -25,12 +24,21 @@
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
 {
+	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
 	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
+	if (markerlen > modlen)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	if (memcmp(data + modlen - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   markerlen))
+		return -ENODATA;
+	modlen -= markerlen;
+
 	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 4/6] module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.

[Michal Suchanek]

It is stripped by each caller separately.

Note: this changes the error for kexec_file from EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA
when the signature marker is missing.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
      change of raturn value
    - the module_signature.h is now no longer needed for kexec_file
---
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c           | 11 -----------
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 11 -----------
 kernel/module.c                       |  7 +------
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 12 ++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 64cd314cce0d..6dec8151ef73 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -156,16 +155,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-
-	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   marker_len))
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= marker_len;
-
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
 					 "kexec_file");
 }
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 345f2eab6e04..c3deccf1da83 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
 #include <linux/elf.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <asm/boot_data.h>
@@ -28,20 +27,10 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   marker_len))
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= marker_len;
-
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
 					"kexec_file");
 }
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 8481933dfa92..d91ca0f93a40 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2882,7 +2882,6 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
 static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	int err = -ENODATA;
-	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	const char *reason;
 	const void *mod = info->hdr;
 
@@ -2890,11 +2889,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	 * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
 	 * removed is no longer the module that was signed
 	 */
-	if (flags == 0 &&
-	    info->len > markerlen &&
-	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
-		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
-		info->len -= markerlen;
+	if (flags == 0) {
 		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
 						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
 		if (!err) {
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 30149969f21f..39a6dd7c6dd2 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
 /**
- * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
- * signature marker stripped.
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module
  * @data: The data to be verified
  * @len: Size of @data.
  * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
@@ -25,12 +24,21 @@
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
 {
+	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
 	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
+	if (markerlen > modlen)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	if (memcmp(data + modlen - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   markerlen))
+		return -ENODATA;
+	modlen -= markerlen;
+
 	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 4/6] module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.

[Michal Suchanek]

It is stripped by each caller separately.

Note: this changes the error for kexec_file from EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA
when the signature marker is missing.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
      change of raturn value
    - the module_signature.h is now no longer needed for kexec_file
---
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c           | 11 -----------
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 11 -----------
 kernel/module.c                       |  7 +------
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 12 ++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 64cd314cce0d..6dec8151ef73 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -156,16 +155,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-
-	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   marker_len))
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= marker_len;
-
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
 					 "kexec_file");
 }
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 345f2eab6e04..c3deccf1da83 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
 #include <linux/elf.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <asm/boot_data.h>
@@ -28,20 +27,10 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   marker_len))
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= marker_len;
-
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
 					"kexec_file");
 }
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 8481933dfa92..d91ca0f93a40 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2882,7 +2882,6 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
 static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	int err = -ENODATA;
-	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	const char *reason;
 	const void *mod = info->hdr;
 
@@ -2890,11 +2889,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	 * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
 	 * removed is no longer the module that was signed
 	 */
-	if (flags == 0 &&
-	    info->len > markerlen &&
-	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
-		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
-		info->len -= markerlen;
+	if (flags == 0) {
 		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
 						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
 		if (!err) {
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 30149969f21f..39a6dd7c6dd2 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
 /**
- * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
- * signature marker stripped.
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module
  * @data: The data to be verified
  * @len: Size of @data.
  * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
@@ -25,12 +24,21 @@
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
 {
+	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
 	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
+	if (markerlen > modlen)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	if (memcmp(data + modlen - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   markerlen))
+		return -ENODATA;
+	modlen -= markerlen;
+
 	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 4/6] module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:46PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> It is stripped by each caller separately.
> 
> Note: this changes the error for kexec_file from EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA
> when the signature marker is missing.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
>       change of raturn value
>     - the module_signature.h is now no longer needed for kexec_file

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:46PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> It is stripped by each caller separately.
> 
> Note: this changes the error for kexec_file from EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA
> when the signature marker is missing.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
>       change of raturn value
>     - the module_signature.h is now no longer needed for kexec_file

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:46PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> It is stripped by each caller separately.
> 
> Note: this changes the error for kexec_file from EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA
> when the signature marker is missing.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> ---
> v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
>       change of raturn value
>     - the module_signature.h is now no longer needed for kexec_file

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

[PATCH v5 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature

[Michal Suchanek]

Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for
enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log
messages about the signature.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c              |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c    |  2 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |  1 +
 include/linux/verification.h             |  4 +++-
 kernel/module.c                          |  3 ++-
 kernel/module_signing.c                  | 11 ++++++-----
 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 6dec8151ef73..c50869195d51 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					 "kexec_file");
+					 VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index c3deccf1da83..63eec38e3137 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return 0;
 
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					"kexec_file");
+					VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index ad8af3d70ac0..6fd20eec3882 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
 	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE]		= "kexec PE sig",
 	[VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE]		= "key sig",
 	[VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE]		= "key self sig",
+	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE]	= "kexec appended sig",
 	[VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE]	= "unspec sig",
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index 32db9287a7b0..f92c49443b4f 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for {
 	VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+	VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
 	NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
 };
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 #endif
 
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
-			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+			      struct key *trusted_keys,
+			      enum key_being_used_for purpose);
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index d91ca0f93a40..0a359dc6b690 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	 */
 	if (flags == 0) {
 		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
-						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
+						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+						VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
 		if (!err) {
 			info->sig_ok = true;
 			return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 39a6dd7c6dd2..20857d2a15ca 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -19,17 +19,18 @@
  * @data: The data to be verified
  * @len: Size of @data.
  * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
- * @what: Informational string for log messages
+ * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put
  */
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
-			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
+			      struct key *trusted_keys,
+			      enum key_being_used_for purpose)
 {
 	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
 
 	if (markerlen > modlen)
 		return -ENODATA;
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 
 	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
 
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
 				      trusted_keys,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+				      purpose,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature

[Michal Suchanek]

Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for
enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log
messages about the signature.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c              |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c    |  2 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |  1 +
 include/linux/verification.h             |  4 +++-
 kernel/module.c                          |  3 ++-
 kernel/module_signing.c                  | 11 ++++++-----
 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 6dec8151ef73..c50869195d51 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					 "kexec_file");
+					 VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index c3deccf1da83..63eec38e3137 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return 0;
 
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					"kexec_file");
+					VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index ad8af3d70ac0..6fd20eec3882 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
 	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE]		= "kexec PE sig",
 	[VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE]		= "key sig",
 	[VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE]		= "key self sig",
+	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE]	= "kexec appended sig",
 	[VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE]	= "unspec sig",
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index 32db9287a7b0..f92c49443b4f 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for {
 	VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+	VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
 	NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
 };
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 #endif
 
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
-			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+			      struct key *trusted_keys,
+			      enum key_being_used_for purpose);
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index d91ca0f93a40..0a359dc6b690 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	 */
 	if (flags == 0) {
 		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
-						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
+						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+						VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
 		if (!err) {
 			info->sig_ok = true;
 			return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 39a6dd7c6dd2..20857d2a15ca 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -19,17 +19,18 @@
  * @data: The data to be verified
  * @len: Size of @data.
  * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
- * @what: Informational string for log messages
+ * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put
  */
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
-			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
+			      struct key *trusted_keys,
+			      enum key_being_used_for purpose)
 {
 	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
 
 	if (markerlen > modlen)
 		return -ENODATA;
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 
 	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
 
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
 				      trusted_keys,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+				      purpose,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature

[Michal Suchanek]

Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for
enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log
messages about the signature.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c              |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c    |  2 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |  1 +
 include/linux/verification.h             |  4 +++-
 kernel/module.c                          |  3 ++-
 kernel/module_signing.c                  | 11 ++++++-----
 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 6dec8151ef73..c50869195d51 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					 "kexec_file");
+					 VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index c3deccf1da83..63eec38e3137 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return 0;
 
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					"kexec_file");
+					VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index ad8af3d70ac0..6fd20eec3882 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
 	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE]		= "kexec PE sig",
 	[VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE]		= "key sig",
 	[VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE]		= "key self sig",
+	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE]	= "kexec appended sig",
 	[VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE]	= "unspec sig",
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index 32db9287a7b0..f92c49443b4f 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for {
 	VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+	VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
 	NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
 };
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 #endif
 
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
-			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+			      struct key *trusted_keys,
+			      enum key_being_used_for purpose);
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index d91ca0f93a40..0a359dc6b690 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	 */
 	if (flags == 0) {
 		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
-						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
+						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+						VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
 		if (!err) {
 			info->sig_ok = true;
 			return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 39a6dd7c6dd2..20857d2a15ca 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -19,17 +19,18 @@
  * @data: The data to be verified
  * @len: Size of @data.
  * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
- * @what: Informational string for log messages
+ * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put
  */
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
-			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
+			      struct key *trusted_keys,
+			      enum key_being_used_for purpose)
 {
 	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
 
 	if (markerlen > modlen)
 		return -ENODATA;
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 
 	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
 
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
 				      trusted_keys,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+				      purpose,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:47PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for
> enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log
> messages about the signature.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>

Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:47PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for
> enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log
> messages about the signature.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>

Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 5/6] module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:47PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for
> enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log
> messages about the signature.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>

Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

[PATCH v5 6/6] module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

[Michal Suchanek]

Multiple users of mod_check_sig check for the marker, then call
mod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.

Put this code in one place together with mod_check_sig.

This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for ima_read_modsig in the
case the signature marker is missing.

This also changes the buffer length in ima_read_modsig from size_t to
unsigned long. This reduces the possible value range on 32bit but the
length refers to kernel in-memory buffer which cannot be longer than
ULONG_MAX.

Also change mod_check_sig to unsigned long while at it.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
      change of raturn value
    - Preserve the EBADMSG error code while moving code araound
v4: - remove unused variable ms in module_signing.c
    - note about buffer length
v5: - also change the functions in module_signature.c to unsigned long
---
 include/linux/module_signature.h    |  4 +-
 kernel/module_signature.c           | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/module_signing.c             | 27 ++------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 22 ++---------
 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/module_signature.h b/include/linux/module_signature.h
index 7eb4b00381ac..e5fb157c085c 100644
--- a/include/linux/module_signature.h
+++ b/include/linux/module_signature.h
@@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ struct module_signature {
 	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */
 };
 
-int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, unsigned long file_len,
+		  const char *name);
+int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, unsigned long *len, unsigned long *sig_len,
 		  const char *name);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module_signature.c b/kernel/module_signature.c
index 00132d12487c..4a36405ecd08 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signature.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signature.c
@@ -8,17 +8,39 @@
 
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 
+/**
+ * mod_check_sig_marker - check that the given data has signature marker at the end
+ *
+ * @data:	Data with appended signature
+ * @len:	Length of data. Signature marker length is subtracted on success.
+ */
+static inline int mod_check_sig_marker(const void *data, unsigned long *len)
+{
+	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+
+	if (markerlen > *len)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	if (memcmp(data + *len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   markerlen))
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	*len -= markerlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * mod_check_sig - check that the given signature is sane
  *
  * @ms:		Signature to check.
- * @file_len:	Size of the file to which @ms is appended.
+ * @file_len:	Size of the file to which @ms is appended (without the marker).
  * @name:	What is being checked. Used for error messages.
  */
-int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, unsigned long file_len,
 		  const char *name)
 {
 	if (be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len) >= file_len - sizeof(*ms))
@@ -44,3 +66,35 @@ int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
 
 	return 0;
 }
+
+/**
+ * mod_parse_sig - check that the given signature is sane and determine signature length
+ *
+ * @data:	Data with appended signature.
+ * @len:	Length of data. Signature and marker length is subtracted on success.
+ * @sig_len:	Length of signature. Filled on success.
+ * @name:	What is being checked. Used for error messages.
+ */
+int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, unsigned long *len, unsigned long *sig_len, const char *name)
+{
+	const struct module_signature *sig;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = mod_check_sig_marker(data, len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (*len < sizeof(*sig))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	sig = data + (*len - sizeof(*sig));
+
+	rc = mod_check_sig(sig, *len, name);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
+	*len -= *sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 20857d2a15ca..1d4cb03cce21 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -25,35 +25,16 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 			      struct key *trusted_keys,
 			      enum key_being_used_for purpose)
 {
-	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
+	unsigned long sig_len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], *len);
 
-	if (markerlen > modlen)
-		return -ENODATA;
-
-	if (memcmp(data + modlen - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   markerlen))
-		return -ENODATA;
-	modlen -= markerlen;
-
-	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
-		return -EBADMSG;
-
-	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
-
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
+	ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(*ms);
-	*len = modlen;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, *len, data + *len, sig_len,
 				      trusted_keys,
 				      purpose,
 				      NULL, NULL);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index fb25723c65bc..b40c8fdf6139 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -37,33 +37,17 @@ struct modsig {
  *
  * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise.
  */
-int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t len,
 		    struct modsig **modsig)
 {
-	const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
-	const struct module_signature *sig;
 	struct modsig *hdr;
-	size_t sig_len;
-	const void *p;
+	unsigned long sig_len, buf_len = len;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (buf_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	p = buf + buf_len - marker_len;
-	if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	buf_len -= marker_len;
-	sig = (const struct module_signature *)(p - sizeof(*sig));
-
-	rc = mod_check_sig(sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]);
+	rc = mod_parse_sig(buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
-	buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
-
 	/* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */
 	hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!hdr)
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 6/6] module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

[Michal Suchanek]

Multiple users of mod_check_sig check for the marker, then call
mod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.

Put this code in one place together with mod_check_sig.

This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for ima_read_modsig in the
case the signature marker is missing.

This also changes the buffer length in ima_read_modsig from size_t to
unsigned long. This reduces the possible value range on 32bit but the
length refers to kernel in-memory buffer which cannot be longer than
ULONG_MAX.

Also change mod_check_sig to unsigned long while at it.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
      change of raturn value
    - Preserve the EBADMSG error code while moving code araound
v4: - remove unused variable ms in module_signing.c
    - note about buffer length
v5: - also change the functions in module_signature.c to unsigned long
---
 include/linux/module_signature.h    |  4 +-
 kernel/module_signature.c           | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/module_signing.c             | 27 ++------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 22 ++---------
 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/module_signature.h b/include/linux/module_signature.h
index 7eb4b00381ac..e5fb157c085c 100644
--- a/include/linux/module_signature.h
+++ b/include/linux/module_signature.h
@@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ struct module_signature {
 	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */
 };
 
-int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, unsigned long file_len,
+		  const char *name);
+int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, unsigned long *len, unsigned long *sig_len,
 		  const char *name);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module_signature.c b/kernel/module_signature.c
index 00132d12487c..4a36405ecd08 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signature.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signature.c
@@ -8,17 +8,39 @@
 
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 
+/**
+ * mod_check_sig_marker - check that the given data has signature marker at the end
+ *
+ * @data:	Data with appended signature
+ * @len:	Length of data. Signature marker length is subtracted on success.
+ */
+static inline int mod_check_sig_marker(const void *data, unsigned long *len)
+{
+	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+
+	if (markerlen > *len)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	if (memcmp(data + *len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   markerlen))
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	*len -= markerlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * mod_check_sig - check that the given signature is sane
  *
  * @ms:		Signature to check.
- * @file_len:	Size of the file to which @ms is appended.
+ * @file_len:	Size of the file to which @ms is appended (without the marker).
  * @name:	What is being checked. Used for error messages.
  */
-int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, unsigned long file_len,
 		  const char *name)
 {
 	if (be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len) >= file_len - sizeof(*ms))
@@ -44,3 +66,35 @@ int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
 
 	return 0;
 }
+
+/**
+ * mod_parse_sig - check that the given signature is sane and determine signature length
+ *
+ * @data:	Data with appended signature.
+ * @len:	Length of data. Signature and marker length is subtracted on success.
+ * @sig_len:	Length of signature. Filled on success.
+ * @name:	What is being checked. Used for error messages.
+ */
+int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, unsigned long *len, unsigned long *sig_len, const char *name)
+{
+	const struct module_signature *sig;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = mod_check_sig_marker(data, len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (*len < sizeof(*sig))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	sig = data + (*len - sizeof(*sig));
+
+	rc = mod_check_sig(sig, *len, name);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
+	*len -= *sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 20857d2a15ca..1d4cb03cce21 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -25,35 +25,16 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 			      struct key *trusted_keys,
 			      enum key_being_used_for purpose)
 {
-	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
+	unsigned long sig_len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], *len);
 
-	if (markerlen > modlen)
-		return -ENODATA;
-
-	if (memcmp(data + modlen - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   markerlen))
-		return -ENODATA;
-	modlen -= markerlen;
-
-	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
-		return -EBADMSG;
-
-	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
-
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
+	ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(*ms);
-	*len = modlen;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, *len, data + *len, sig_len,
 				      trusted_keys,
 				      purpose,
 				      NULL, NULL);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index fb25723c65bc..b40c8fdf6139 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -37,33 +37,17 @@ struct modsig {
  *
  * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise.
  */
-int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t len,
 		    struct modsig **modsig)
 {
-	const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
-	const struct module_signature *sig;
 	struct modsig *hdr;
-	size_t sig_len;
-	const void *p;
+	unsigned long sig_len, buf_len = len;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (buf_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	p = buf + buf_len - marker_len;
-	if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	buf_len -= marker_len;
-	sig = (const struct module_signature *)(p - sizeof(*sig));
-
-	rc = mod_check_sig(sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]);
+	rc = mod_parse_sig(buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
-	buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
-
 	/* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */
 	hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!hdr)
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 6/6] module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

[Michal Suchanek]

Multiple users of mod_check_sig check for the marker, then call
mod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.

Put this code in one place together with mod_check_sig.

This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for ima_read_modsig in the
case the signature marker is missing.

This also changes the buffer length in ima_read_modsig from size_t to
unsigned long. This reduces the possible value range on 32bit but the
length refers to kernel in-memory buffer which cannot be longer than
ULONG_MAX.

Also change mod_check_sig to unsigned long while at it.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>: Update the commit with note about
      change of raturn value
    - Preserve the EBADMSG error code while moving code araound
v4: - remove unused variable ms in module_signing.c
    - note about buffer length
v5: - also change the functions in module_signature.c to unsigned long
---
 include/linux/module_signature.h    |  4 +-
 kernel/module_signature.c           | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/module_signing.c             | 27 ++------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 22 ++---------
 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/module_signature.h b/include/linux/module_signature.h
index 7eb4b00381ac..e5fb157c085c 100644
--- a/include/linux/module_signature.h
+++ b/include/linux/module_signature.h
@@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ struct module_signature {
 	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */
 };
 
-int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, unsigned long file_len,
+		  const char *name);
+int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, unsigned long *len, unsigned long *sig_len,
 		  const char *name);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module_signature.c b/kernel/module_signature.c
index 00132d12487c..4a36405ecd08 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signature.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signature.c
@@ -8,17 +8,39 @@
 
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 
+/**
+ * mod_check_sig_marker - check that the given data has signature marker at the end
+ *
+ * @data:	Data with appended signature
+ * @len:	Length of data. Signature marker length is subtracted on success.
+ */
+static inline int mod_check_sig_marker(const void *data, unsigned long *len)
+{
+	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+
+	if (markerlen > *len)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	if (memcmp(data + *len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   markerlen))
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	*len -= markerlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * mod_check_sig - check that the given signature is sane
  *
  * @ms:		Signature to check.
- * @file_len:	Size of the file to which @ms is appended.
+ * @file_len:	Size of the file to which @ms is appended (without the marker).
  * @name:	What is being checked. Used for error messages.
  */
-int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
+int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, unsigned long file_len,
 		  const char *name)
 {
 	if (be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len) >= file_len - sizeof(*ms))
@@ -44,3 +66,35 @@ int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
 
 	return 0;
 }
+
+/**
+ * mod_parse_sig - check that the given signature is sane and determine signature length
+ *
+ * @data:	Data with appended signature.
+ * @len:	Length of data. Signature and marker length is subtracted on success.
+ * @sig_len:	Length of signature. Filled on success.
+ * @name:	What is being checked. Used for error messages.
+ */
+int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, unsigned long *len, unsigned long *sig_len, const char *name)
+{
+	const struct module_signature *sig;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = mod_check_sig_marker(data, len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (*len < sizeof(*sig))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	sig = data + (*len - sizeof(*sig));
+
+	rc = mod_check_sig(sig, *len, name);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
+	*len -= *sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 20857d2a15ca..1d4cb03cce21 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -25,35 +25,16 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 			      struct key *trusted_keys,
 			      enum key_being_used_for purpose)
 {
-	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
+	unsigned long sig_len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], *len);
 
-	if (markerlen > modlen)
-		return -ENODATA;
-
-	if (memcmp(data + modlen - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   markerlen))
-		return -ENODATA;
-	modlen -= markerlen;
-
-	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
-		return -EBADMSG;
-
-	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
-
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
+	ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(*ms);
-	*len = modlen;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, *len, data + *len, sig_len,
 				      trusted_keys,
 				      purpose,
 				      NULL, NULL);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index fb25723c65bc..b40c8fdf6139 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -37,33 +37,17 @@ struct modsig {
  *
  * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise.
  */
-int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t len,
 		    struct modsig **modsig)
 {
-	const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
-	const struct module_signature *sig;
 	struct modsig *hdr;
-	size_t sig_len;
-	const void *p;
+	unsigned long sig_len, buf_len = len;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (buf_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	p = buf + buf_len - marker_len;
-	if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	buf_len -= marker_len;
-	sig = (const struct module_signature *)(p - sizeof(*sig));
-
-	rc = mod_check_sig(sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]);
+	rc = mod_parse_sig(buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
-	buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
-
 	/* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */
 	hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!hdr)
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 6/6] module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:48PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Multiple users of mod_check_sig check for the marker, then call
> mod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.
> 
> Put this code in one place together with mod_check_sig.
> 
> This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for ima_read_modsig in the
> case the signature marker is missing.
> 
> This also changes the buffer length in ima_read_modsig from size_t to
> unsigned long. This reduces the possible value range on 32bit but the
> length refers to kernel in-memory buffer which cannot be longer than
> ULONG_MAX.
> 
> Also change mod_check_sig to unsigned long while at it.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 6/6] module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:48PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Multiple users of mod_check_sig check for the marker, then call
> mod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.
> 
> Put this code in one place together with mod_check_sig.
> 
> This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for ima_read_modsig in the
> case the signature marker is missing.
> 
> This also changes the buffer length in ima_read_modsig from size_t to
> unsigned long. This reduces the possible value range on 32bit but the
> length refers to kernel in-memory buffer which cannot be longer than
> ULONG_MAX.
> 
> Also change mod_check_sig to unsigned long while at it.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 6/6] module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:48PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Multiple users of mod_check_sig check for the marker, then call
> mod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.
> 
> Put this code in one place together with mod_check_sig.
> 
> This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for ima_read_modsig in the
> case the signature marker is missing.
> 
> This also changes the buffer length in ima_read_modsig from size_t to
> unsigned long. This reduces the possible value range on 32bit but the
> length refers to kernel in-memory buffer which cannot be longer than
> ULONG_MAX.
> 
> Also change mod_check_sig to unsigned long while at it.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

  Luis

[PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:42PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
> 
> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> with appended signatures in the kernel.
> 
> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
> 
> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
> option should be used on all platforms.
> 
> Thanks
> 
> Michal
> 
> Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek at suse.de/
> Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
> 
> Michal Suchanek (6):
>   s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
>   powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
>   kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
>   module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
>   module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
>     verify_appended_signature
>   module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules
tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his
code refactoring of kernel/module*.c to kernel/module/

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:42PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
> 
> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> with appended signatures in the kernel.
> 
> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
> 
> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
> option should be used on all platforms.
> 
> Thanks
> 
> Michal
> 
> Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek@suse.de/
> Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
> 
> Michal Suchanek (6):
>   s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
>   powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
>   kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
>   module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
>   module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
>     verify_appended_signature
>   module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules
tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his
code refactoring of kernel/module*.c to kernel/module/

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:42PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
> 
> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> with appended signatures in the kernel.
> 
> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
> 
> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
> option should be used on all platforms.
> 
> Thanks
> 
> Michal
> 
> Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek@suse.de/
> Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
> 
> Michal Suchanek (6):
>   s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
>   powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
>   kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
>   module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
>   module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
>     verify_appended_signature
>   module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules
tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his
code refactoring of kernel/module*.c to kernel/module/

  Luis

[PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Michael Ellerman]

Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> writes:
> On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:42PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
>> Hello,
>> 
>> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
>> 
>> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
>> with appended signatures in the kernel.
>> 
>> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
>> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
>> 
>> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
>> option should be used on all platforms.
>> 
>> Thanks
>> 
>> Michal
>> 
>> Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek at suse.de/
>> Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
>> 
>> Michal Suchanek (6):
>>   s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
>>   powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
>>   kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
>>   module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
>>   module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
>>     verify_appended_signature
>>   module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
>
> What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules
> tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his
> code refactoring of kernel/module*.c to kernel/module/

Yeah that's fine by me, the arch changes are pretty minimal and unlikely
to conflict much.

cheers

Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Michael Ellerman]

Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> writes:
> On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:42PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
>> Hello,
>> 
>> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
>> 
>> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
>> with appended signatures in the kernel.
>> 
>> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
>> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
>> 
>> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
>> option should be used on all platforms.
>> 
>> Thanks
>> 
>> Michal
>> 
>> Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek@suse.de/
>> Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
>> 
>> Michal Suchanek (6):
>>   s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
>>   powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
>>   kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
>>   module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
>>   module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
>>     verify_appended_signature
>>   module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
>
> What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules
> tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his
> code refactoring of kernel/module*.c to kernel/module/

Yeah that's fine by me, the arch changes are pretty minimal and unlikely
to conflict much.

cheers

Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Michael Ellerman]

Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> writes:
> On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:42PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
>> Hello,
>> 
>> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
>> 
>> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
>> with appended signatures in the kernel.
>> 
>> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
>> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
>> 
>> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
>> option should be used on all platforms.
>> 
>> Thanks
>> 
>> Michal
>> 
>> Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek@suse.de/
>> Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
>> 
>> Michal Suchanek (6):
>>   s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
>>   powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
>>   kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
>>   module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
>>   module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
>>     verify_appended_signature
>>   module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
>
> What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules
> tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his
> code refactoring of kernel/module*.c to kernel/module/

Yeah that's fine by me, the arch changes are pretty minimal and unlikely
to conflict much.

cheers

[PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 03:46:05PM +1100, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> writes:
> > On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:42PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> >> Hello,
> >> 
> >> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
> >> 
> >> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> >> with appended signatures in the kernel.
> >> 
> >> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
> >> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
> >> 
> >> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
> >> option should be used on all platforms.
> >> 
> >> Thanks
> >> 
> >> Michal
> >> 
> >> Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek at suse.de/
> >> Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
> >> 
> >> Michal Suchanek (6):
> >>   s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
> >>   powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
> >>   kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
> >>   module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
> >>   module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
> >>     verify_appended_signature
> >>   module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
> >
> > What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules
> > tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his
> > code refactoring of kernel/module*.c to kernel/module/
> 
> Yeah that's fine by me, the arch changes are pretty minimal and unlikely
> to conflict much.

Ok sounds good thanks.

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 03:46:05PM +1100, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> writes:
> > On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:42PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> >> Hello,
> >> 
> >> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
> >> 
> >> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> >> with appended signatures in the kernel.
> >> 
> >> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
> >> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
> >> 
> >> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
> >> option should be used on all platforms.
> >> 
> >> Thanks
> >> 
> >> Michal
> >> 
> >> Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek@suse.de/
> >> Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
> >> 
> >> Michal Suchanek (6):
> >>   s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
> >>   powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
> >>   kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
> >>   module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
> >>   module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
> >>     verify_appended_signature
> >>   module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
> >
> > What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules
> > tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his
> > code refactoring of kernel/module*.c to kernel/module/
> 
> Yeah that's fine by me, the arch changes are pretty minimal and unlikely
> to conflict much.

Ok sounds good thanks.

  Luis

Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Luis Chamberlain]

On Wed, Feb 09, 2022 at 03:46:05PM +1100, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> writes:
> > On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 12:37:42PM +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> >> Hello,
> >> 
> >> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
> >> 
> >> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> >> with appended signatures in the kernel.
> >> 
> >> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
> >> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
> >> 
> >> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
> >> option should be used on all platforms.
> >> 
> >> Thanks
> >> 
> >> Michal
> >> 
> >> Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek@suse.de/
> >> Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
> >> 
> >> Michal Suchanek (6):
> >>   s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
> >>   powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
> >>   kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
> >>   module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
> >>   module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
> >>     verify_appended_signature
> >>   module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
> >
> > What tree should this go through? I'd prefer if over through modules
> > tree as it can give a chance for Aaron Tomlin to work with this for his
> > code refactoring of kernel/module*.c to kernel/module/
> 
> Yeah that's fine by me, the arch changes are pretty minimal and unlikely
> to conflict much.

Ok sounds good thanks.

  Luis

[PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.

> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> with appended signatures in the kernel.
> 
> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.

This Kconfig carries the IMA measurement list across kexec.  This has
nothing to do with appended signatures.

config IMA_KEXEC
        bool "Enable carrying the IMA measurement list across a soft
boot"
        depends on IMA && TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC

In addition to powerpc, arm64 sets HAVE_IMA_KEXEC.

Even prior to the kexec appended signature support, like all other
files, the kexec kernel image signature could be stored in
security.ima.

> 
> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
> option should be used on all platforms.

The kexec kernel image measurement will not be included in the BIOS
event log.  Even if the measurement is included in the IMA measurement
list, without the IMA_KEXEC Kconfig the measurement list will not be
carried across kexec.  For those not interested in "trusted boot" or
those who do not need it for compliance, the simplification should be
fine.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.

> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> with appended signatures in the kernel.
> 
> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.

This Kconfig carries the IMA measurement list across kexec.  This has
nothing to do with appended signatures.

config IMA_KEXEC
        bool "Enable carrying the IMA measurement list across a soft
boot"
        depends on IMA && TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC

In addition to powerpc, arm64 sets HAVE_IMA_KEXEC.

Even prior to the kexec appended signature support, like all other
files, the kexec kernel image signature could be stored in
security.ima.

> 
> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
> option should be used on all platforms.

The kexec kernel image measurement will not be included in the BIOS
event log.  Even if the measurement is included in the IMA measurement
list, without the IMA_KEXEC Kconfig the measurement list will not be
carried across kexec.  For those not interested in "trusted boot" or
those who do not need it for compliance, the simplification should be
fine.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Mimi Zohar]

Hi Michal,

On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.

> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> with appended signatures in the kernel.
> 
> powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm.
> On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.

This Kconfig carries the IMA measurement list across kexec.  This has
nothing to do with appended signatures.

config IMA_KEXEC
        bool "Enable carrying the IMA measurement list across a soft
boot"
        depends on IMA && TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC

In addition to powerpc, arm64 sets HAVE_IMA_KEXEC.

Even prior to the kexec appended signature support, like all other
files, the kexec kernel image signature could be stored in
security.ima.

> 
> For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one
> option should be used on all platforms.

The kexec kernel image measurement will not be included in the BIOS
event log.  Even if the measurement is included in the IMA measurement
list, without the IMA_KEXEC Kconfig the measurement list will not be
carried across kexec.  For those not interested in "trusted boot" or
those who do not need it for compliance, the simplification should be
fine.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

[PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Mimi Zohar]

[Cc'ing  Nageswara R Sastry]

Hi Michal,

On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
> 
> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> with appended signatures in the kernel.

tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh probably needs to
be updated to reflect the new Kconfig support.

FYI, commit 65e38e32a959 ("selftests/kexec: Enable secureboot tests for
PowerPC") recently was upstreamed.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Mimi Zohar]

[Cc'ing  Nageswara R Sastry]

Hi Michal,

On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
> 
> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> with appended signatures in the kernel.

tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh probably needs to
be updated to reflect the new Kconfig support.

FYI, commit 65e38e32a959 ("selftests/kexec: Enable secureboot tests for
PowerPC") recently was upstreamed.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

[Mimi Zohar]

[Cc'ing  Nageswara R Sastry]

Hi Michal,

On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 12:37 +0100, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
> 
> This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing
> with appended signatures in the kernel.

tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh probably needs to
be updated to reflect the new Kconfig support.

FYI, commit 65e38e32a959 ("selftests/kexec: Enable secureboot tests for
PowerPC") recently was upstreamed.

-- 
thanks,

Mimi