All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, deller@gmx.de,
	mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com, dalias@libc.org,
	davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at, x86@kernel.org,
	jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linu
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok()
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 17:29:34 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YhdB7tNDvtsYLUzr@antec> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-14-arnd@kernel.org>

On Wed, Feb 16, 2022 at 02:13:27PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> 
> There are many different ways that access_ok() is defined across
> architectures, but in the end, they all just compare against the
> user_addr_max() value or they accept anything.
> 
> Provide one definition that works for most architectures, checking
> against TASK_SIZE_MAX for user processes or skipping the check inside
> of uaccess_kernel() sections.
> 
> For architectures without CONFIG_SET_FS(), this should be the fastest
> check, as it comes down to a single comparison of a pointer against a
> compile-time constant, while the architecture specific versions tend to
> do something more complex for historic reasons or get something wrong.
> 
> Type checking for __user annotations is handled inconsistently across
> architectures, but this is easily simplified as well by using an inline
> function that takes a 'const void __user *' argument. A handful of
> callers need an extra __user annotation for this.
> 
> Some architectures had trick to use 33-bit or 65-bit arithmetic on the
> addresses to calculate the overflow, however this simpler version uses
> fewer registers, which means it can produce better object code in the
> end despite needing a second (statically predicted) branch.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64, asm-generic]
> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> ---
...
>  arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h   | 19 +--------
...
>  include/asm-generic/access_ok.h       | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/asm-generic/uaccess.h         | 21 +---------
>  include/linux/uaccess.h               |  7 ----
>  32 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 366 deletions(-)
> 
...
> diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 120f5005461b..8f049ec99b3e 100644
> --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -45,21 +45,7 @@
>  
>  #define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs() == KERNEL_DS)
>  
> -/* Ensure that the range from addr to addr+size is all within the process'
> - * address space
> - */
> -static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	const mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
> -
> -	return size <= fs && addr <= (fs - size);
> -}
> -
> -#define access_ok(addr, size)						\
> -({ 									\
> -	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
> -	__range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size));			\
> -})
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>

I was going to ask why we are missing __chk_user_ptr in the generic version.
But this is basically now a no-op so I think its OK.

>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> @@ -268,9 +254,6 @@ clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
>  	return size;
>  }
>  
> -#define user_addr_max() \
> -	(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -
>  extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
>  
>  extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);

...
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..1aad8964d2ed
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +#define __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +
> +/*
> + * Checking whether a pointer is valid for user space access.
> + * These definitions work on most architectures, but overrides can
> + * be used where necessary.
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * architectures with compat tasks have a variable TASK_SIZE and should
> + * override this to a constant.
> + */
> +#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SET_FS
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> +#else
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(0)
> +#endif
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef user_addr_max
> +#define user_addr_max()			(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef __access_ok
> +/*
> + * 'size' is a compile-time constant for most callers, so optimize for
> + * this case to turn the check into a single comparison against a constant
> + * limit and catch all possible overflows.
> + * On architectures with separate user address space (m68k, s390, parisc,
> + * sparc64) or those without an MMU, this should always return true.
> + *
> + * This version was originally contributed by Jonas Bonn for the
> + * OpenRISC architecture, and was found to be the most efficient
> + * for constant 'size' and 'limit' values.
> + */
> +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
> +	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef access_ok
> +#define access_ok(addr, size) likely(__access_ok(addr, size))
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> index 0870fa11a7c5..ebc685dc8d74 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> @@ -114,28 +114,9 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> -#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef user_addr_max
> -#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -#endif
> -
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SET_FS */
>  
> -#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
> -
> -/*
> - * The architecture should really override this if possible, at least
> - * doing a check on the get_fs()
> - */
> -#ifndef __access_ok
> -static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	return 1;
> -}
> -#endif
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index 67e9bc94dc40..2c31667e62e0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -33,13 +33,6 @@ typedef struct {
>  	/* empty dummy */
>  } mm_segment_t;
>  
> -#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> -#endif
> -
> -#define uaccess_kernel()		(false)
> -#define user_addr_max()			(TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> -
>  static inline mm_segment_t force_uaccess_begin(void)
>  {
>  	return (mm_segment_t) { };


Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> [openrisc, asm-generic]

Thanks!

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, deller@gmx.de,
	mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com, dalias@libc.org,
	davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at, x86@kernel.org,
	jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok()
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 17:29:34 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YhdB7tNDvtsYLUzr@antec> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-14-arnd@kernel.org>

On Wed, Feb 16, 2022 at 02:13:27PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> 
> There are many different ways that access_ok() is defined across
> architectures, but in the end, they all just compare against the
> user_addr_max() value or they accept anything.
> 
> Provide one definition that works for most architectures, checking
> against TASK_SIZE_MAX for user processes or skipping the check inside
> of uaccess_kernel() sections.
> 
> For architectures without CONFIG_SET_FS(), this should be the fastest
> check, as it comes down to a single comparison of a pointer against a
> compile-time constant, while the architecture specific versions tend to
> do something more complex for historic reasons or get something wrong.
> 
> Type checking for __user annotations is handled inconsistently across
> architectures, but this is easily simplified as well by using an inline
> function that takes a 'const void __user *' argument. A handful of
> callers need an extra __user annotation for this.
> 
> Some architectures had trick to use 33-bit or 65-bit arithmetic on the
> addresses to calculate the overflow, however this simpler version uses
> fewer registers, which means it can produce better object code in the
> end despite needing a second (statically predicted) branch.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64, asm-generic]
> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> ---
...
>  arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h   | 19 +--------
...
>  include/asm-generic/access_ok.h       | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/asm-generic/uaccess.h         | 21 +---------
>  include/linux/uaccess.h               |  7 ----
>  32 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 366 deletions(-)
> 
...
> diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 120f5005461b..8f049ec99b3e 100644
> --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -45,21 +45,7 @@
>  
>  #define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs() == KERNEL_DS)
>  
> -/* Ensure that the range from addr to addr+size is all within the process'
> - * address space
> - */
> -static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	const mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
> -
> -	return size <= fs && addr <= (fs - size);
> -}
> -
> -#define access_ok(addr, size)						\
> -({ 									\
> -	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
> -	__range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size));			\
> -})
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>

I was going to ask why we are missing __chk_user_ptr in the generic version.
But this is basically now a no-op so I think its OK.

>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> @@ -268,9 +254,6 @@ clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
>  	return size;
>  }
>  
> -#define user_addr_max() \
> -	(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -
>  extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
>  
>  extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);

...
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..1aad8964d2ed
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +#define __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +
> +/*
> + * Checking whether a pointer is valid for user space access.
> + * These definitions work on most architectures, but overrides can
> + * be used where necessary.
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * architectures with compat tasks have a variable TASK_SIZE and should
> + * override this to a constant.
> + */
> +#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SET_FS
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> +#else
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(0)
> +#endif
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef user_addr_max
> +#define user_addr_max()			(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef __access_ok
> +/*
> + * 'size' is a compile-time constant for most callers, so optimize for
> + * this case to turn the check into a single comparison against a constant
> + * limit and catch all possible overflows.
> + * On architectures with separate user address space (m68k, s390, parisc,
> + * sparc64) or those without an MMU, this should always return true.
> + *
> + * This version was originally contributed by Jonas Bonn for the
> + * OpenRISC architecture, and was found to be the most efficient
> + * for constant 'size' and 'limit' values.
> + */
> +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
> +	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef access_ok
> +#define access_ok(addr, size) likely(__access_ok(addr, size))
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> index 0870fa11a7c5..ebc685dc8d74 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> @@ -114,28 +114,9 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> -#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef user_addr_max
> -#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -#endif
> -
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SET_FS */
>  
> -#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
> -
> -/*
> - * The architecture should really override this if possible, at least
> - * doing a check on the get_fs()
> - */
> -#ifndef __access_ok
> -static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	return 1;
> -}
> -#endif
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index 67e9bc94dc40..2c31667e62e0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -33,13 +33,6 @@ typedef struct {
>  	/* empty dummy */
>  } mm_segment_t;
>  
> -#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> -#endif
> -
> -#define uaccess_kernel()		(false)
> -#define user_addr_max()			(TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> -
>  static inline mm_segment_t force_uaccess_begin(void)
>  {
>  	return (mm_segment_t) { };


Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> [openrisc, asm-generic]

Thanks!

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, deller@gmx.de,
	mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com, dalias@libc.org,
	davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at, x86@kernel.org,
	jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok()
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 08:29:34 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YhdB7tNDvtsYLUzr@antec> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-14-arnd@kernel.org>

On Wed, Feb 16, 2022 at 02:13:27PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> 
> There are many different ways that access_ok() is defined across
> architectures, but in the end, they all just compare against the
> user_addr_max() value or they accept anything.
> 
> Provide one definition that works for most architectures, checking
> against TASK_SIZE_MAX for user processes or skipping the check inside
> of uaccess_kernel() sections.
> 
> For architectures without CONFIG_SET_FS(), this should be the fastest
> check, as it comes down to a single comparison of a pointer against a
> compile-time constant, while the architecture specific versions tend to
> do something more complex for historic reasons or get something wrong.
> 
> Type checking for __user annotations is handled inconsistently across
> architectures, but this is easily simplified as well by using an inline
> function that takes a 'const void __user *' argument. A handful of
> callers need an extra __user annotation for this.
> 
> Some architectures had trick to use 33-bit or 65-bit arithmetic on the
> addresses to calculate the overflow, however this simpler version uses
> fewer registers, which means it can produce better object code in the
> end despite needing a second (statically predicted) branch.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64, asm-generic]
> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> ---
...
>  arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h   | 19 +--------
...
>  include/asm-generic/access_ok.h       | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/asm-generic/uaccess.h         | 21 +---------
>  include/linux/uaccess.h               |  7 ----
>  32 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 366 deletions(-)
> 
...
> diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 120f5005461b..8f049ec99b3e 100644
> --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -45,21 +45,7 @@
>  
>  #define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs() = KERNEL_DS)
>  
> -/* Ensure that the range from addr to addr+size is all within the process'
> - * address space
> - */
> -static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	const mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
> -
> -	return size <= fs && addr <= (fs - size);
> -}
> -
> -#define access_ok(addr, size)						\
> -({ 									\
> -	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
> -	__range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size));			\
> -})
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>

I was going to ask why we are missing __chk_user_ptr in the generic version.
But this is basically now a no-op so I think its OK.

>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> @@ -268,9 +254,6 @@ clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
>  	return size;
>  }
>  
> -#define user_addr_max() \
> -	(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -
>  extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
>  
>  extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);

...
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..1aad8964d2ed
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +#define __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +
> +/*
> + * Checking whether a pointer is valid for user space access.
> + * These definitions work on most architectures, but overrides can
> + * be used where necessary.
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * architectures with compat tasks have a variable TASK_SIZE and should
> + * override this to a constant.
> + */
> +#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SET_FS
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(get_fs().seg = KERNEL_DS.seg)
> +#else
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(0)
> +#endif
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef user_addr_max
> +#define user_addr_max()			(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef __access_ok
> +/*
> + * 'size' is a compile-time constant for most callers, so optimize for
> + * this case to turn the check into a single comparison against a constant
> + * limit and catch all possible overflows.
> + * On architectures with separate user address space (m68k, s390, parisc,
> + * sparc64) or those without an MMU, this should always return true.
> + *
> + * This version was originally contributed by Jonas Bonn for the
> + * OpenRISC architecture, and was found to be the most efficient
> + * for constant 'size' and 'limit' values.
> + */
> +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
> +	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef access_ok
> +#define access_ok(addr, size) likely(__access_ok(addr, size))
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> index 0870fa11a7c5..ebc685dc8d74 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> @@ -114,28 +114,9 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> -#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg = KERNEL_DS.seg)
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef user_addr_max
> -#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -#endif
> -
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SET_FS */
>  
> -#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
> -
> -/*
> - * The architecture should really override this if possible, at least
> - * doing a check on the get_fs()
> - */
> -#ifndef __access_ok
> -static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	return 1;
> -}
> -#endif
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index 67e9bc94dc40..2c31667e62e0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -33,13 +33,6 @@ typedef struct {
>  	/* empty dummy */
>  } mm_segment_t;
>  
> -#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> -#endif
> -
> -#define uaccess_kernel()		(false)
> -#define user_addr_max()			(TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> -
>  static inline mm_segment_t force_uaccess_begin(void)
>  {
>  	return (mm_segment_t) { };


Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> [openrisc, asm-generic]

Thanks!

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, deller@gmx.de,
	mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com, dalias@libc.org,
	davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at, x86@kernel.org,
	jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok()
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 17:29:34 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YhdB7tNDvtsYLUzr@antec> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-14-arnd@kernel.org>

On Wed, Feb 16, 2022 at 02:13:27PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> 
> There are many different ways that access_ok() is defined across
> architectures, but in the end, they all just compare against the
> user_addr_max() value or they accept anything.
> 
> Provide one definition that works for most architectures, checking
> against TASK_SIZE_MAX for user processes or skipping the check inside
> of uaccess_kernel() sections.
> 
> For architectures without CONFIG_SET_FS(), this should be the fastest
> check, as it comes down to a single comparison of a pointer against a
> compile-time constant, while the architecture specific versions tend to
> do something more complex for historic reasons or get something wrong.
> 
> Type checking for __user annotations is handled inconsistently across
> architectures, but this is easily simplified as well by using an inline
> function that takes a 'const void __user *' argument. A handful of
> callers need an extra __user annotation for this.
> 
> Some architectures had trick to use 33-bit or 65-bit arithmetic on the
> addresses to calculate the overflow, however this simpler version uses
> fewer registers, which means it can produce better object code in the
> end despite needing a second (statically predicted) branch.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64, asm-generic]
> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> ---
...
>  arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h   | 19 +--------
...
>  include/asm-generic/access_ok.h       | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/asm-generic/uaccess.h         | 21 +---------
>  include/linux/uaccess.h               |  7 ----
>  32 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 366 deletions(-)
> 
...
> diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 120f5005461b..8f049ec99b3e 100644
> --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -45,21 +45,7 @@
>  
>  #define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs() == KERNEL_DS)
>  
> -/* Ensure that the range from addr to addr+size is all within the process'
> - * address space
> - */
> -static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	const mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
> -
> -	return size <= fs && addr <= (fs - size);
> -}
> -
> -#define access_ok(addr, size)						\
> -({ 									\
> -	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
> -	__range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size));			\
> -})
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>

I was going to ask why we are missing __chk_user_ptr in the generic version.
But this is basically now a no-op so I think its OK.

>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> @@ -268,9 +254,6 @@ clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
>  	return size;
>  }
>  
> -#define user_addr_max() \
> -	(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -
>  extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
>  
>  extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);

...
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..1aad8964d2ed
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +#define __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +
> +/*
> + * Checking whether a pointer is valid for user space access.
> + * These definitions work on most architectures, but overrides can
> + * be used where necessary.
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * architectures with compat tasks have a variable TASK_SIZE and should
> + * override this to a constant.
> + */
> +#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SET_FS
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> +#else
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(0)
> +#endif
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef user_addr_max
> +#define user_addr_max()			(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef __access_ok
> +/*
> + * 'size' is a compile-time constant for most callers, so optimize for
> + * this case to turn the check into a single comparison against a constant
> + * limit and catch all possible overflows.
> + * On architectures with separate user address space (m68k, s390, parisc,
> + * sparc64) or those without an MMU, this should always return true.
> + *
> + * This version was originally contributed by Jonas Bonn for the
> + * OpenRISC architecture, and was found to be the most efficient
> + * for constant 'size' and 'limit' values.
> + */
> +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
> +	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef access_ok
> +#define access_ok(addr, size) likely(__access_ok(addr, size))
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> index 0870fa11a7c5..ebc685dc8d74 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> @@ -114,28 +114,9 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> -#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef user_addr_max
> -#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -#endif
> -
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SET_FS */
>  
> -#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
> -
> -/*
> - * The architecture should really override this if possible, at least
> - * doing a check on the get_fs()
> - */
> -#ifndef __access_ok
> -static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	return 1;
> -}
> -#endif
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index 67e9bc94dc40..2c31667e62e0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -33,13 +33,6 @@ typedef struct {
>  	/* empty dummy */
>  } mm_segment_t;
>  
> -#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> -#endif
> -
> -#define uaccess_kernel()		(false)
> -#define user_addr_max()			(TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> -
>  static inline mm_segment_t force_uaccess_begin(void)
>  {
>  	return (mm_segment_t) { };


Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> [openrisc, asm-generic]

Thanks!

_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, deller@gmx.de,
	mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com, dalias@libc.org,
	davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at, x86@kernel.org,
	jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok()
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 17:29:34 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YhdB7tNDvtsYLUzr@antec> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-14-arnd@kernel.org>

On Wed, Feb 16, 2022 at 02:13:27PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> 
> There are many different ways that access_ok() is defined across
> architectures, but in the end, they all just compare against the
> user_addr_max() value or they accept anything.
> 
> Provide one definition that works for most architectures, checking
> against TASK_SIZE_MAX for user processes or skipping the check inside
> of uaccess_kernel() sections.
> 
> For architectures without CONFIG_SET_FS(), this should be the fastest
> check, as it comes down to a single comparison of a pointer against a
> compile-time constant, while the architecture specific versions tend to
> do something more complex for historic reasons or get something wrong.
> 
> Type checking for __user annotations is handled inconsistently across
> architectures, but this is easily simplified as well by using an inline
> function that takes a 'const void __user *' argument. A handful of
> callers need an extra __user annotation for this.
> 
> Some architectures had trick to use 33-bit or 65-bit arithmetic on the
> addresses to calculate the overflow, however this simpler version uses
> fewer registers, which means it can produce better object code in the
> end despite needing a second (statically predicted) branch.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64, asm-generic]
> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> ---
...
>  arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h   | 19 +--------
...
>  include/asm-generic/access_ok.h       | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/asm-generic/uaccess.h         | 21 +---------
>  include/linux/uaccess.h               |  7 ----
>  32 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 366 deletions(-)
> 
...
> diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 120f5005461b..8f049ec99b3e 100644
> --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -45,21 +45,7 @@
>  
>  #define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs() == KERNEL_DS)
>  
> -/* Ensure that the range from addr to addr+size is all within the process'
> - * address space
> - */
> -static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	const mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
> -
> -	return size <= fs && addr <= (fs - size);
> -}
> -
> -#define access_ok(addr, size)						\
> -({ 									\
> -	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
> -	__range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size));			\
> -})
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>

I was going to ask why we are missing __chk_user_ptr in the generic version.
But this is basically now a no-op so I think its OK.

>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> @@ -268,9 +254,6 @@ clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
>  	return size;
>  }
>  
> -#define user_addr_max() \
> -	(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -
>  extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
>  
>  extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);

...
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..1aad8964d2ed
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +#define __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +
> +/*
> + * Checking whether a pointer is valid for user space access.
> + * These definitions work on most architectures, but overrides can
> + * be used where necessary.
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * architectures with compat tasks have a variable TASK_SIZE and should
> + * override this to a constant.
> + */
> +#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SET_FS
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> +#else
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(0)
> +#endif
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef user_addr_max
> +#define user_addr_max()			(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef __access_ok
> +/*
> + * 'size' is a compile-time constant for most callers, so optimize for
> + * this case to turn the check into a single comparison against a constant
> + * limit and catch all possible overflows.
> + * On architectures with separate user address space (m68k, s390, parisc,
> + * sparc64) or those without an MMU, this should always return true.
> + *
> + * This version was originally contributed by Jonas Bonn for the
> + * OpenRISC architecture, and was found to be the most efficient
> + * for constant 'size' and 'limit' values.
> + */
> +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
> +	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef access_ok
> +#define access_ok(addr, size) likely(__access_ok(addr, size))
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> index 0870fa11a7c5..ebc685dc8d74 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> @@ -114,28 +114,9 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> -#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef user_addr_max
> -#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -#endif
> -
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SET_FS */
>  
> -#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
> -
> -/*
> - * The architecture should really override this if possible, at least
> - * doing a check on the get_fs()
> - */
> -#ifndef __access_ok
> -static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	return 1;
> -}
> -#endif
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index 67e9bc94dc40..2c31667e62e0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -33,13 +33,6 @@ typedef struct {
>  	/* empty dummy */
>  } mm_segment_t;
>  
> -#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> -#endif
> -
> -#define uaccess_kernel()		(false)
> -#define user_addr_max()			(TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> -
>  static inline mm_segment_t force_uaccess_begin(void)
>  {
>  	return (mm_segment_t) { };


Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> [openrisc, asm-generic]

Thanks!

_______________________________________________
linux-snps-arc mailing list
linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-snps-arc

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
To: openrisc@lists.librecores.org
Subject: [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok()
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 17:29:34 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YhdB7tNDvtsYLUzr@antec> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-14-arnd@kernel.org>

On Wed, Feb 16, 2022 at 02:13:27PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> 
> There are many different ways that access_ok() is defined across
> architectures, but in the end, they all just compare against the
> user_addr_max() value or they accept anything.
> 
> Provide one definition that works for most architectures, checking
> against TASK_SIZE_MAX for user processes or skipping the check inside
> of uaccess_kernel() sections.
> 
> For architectures without CONFIG_SET_FS(), this should be the fastest
> check, as it comes down to a single comparison of a pointer against a
> compile-time constant, while the architecture specific versions tend to
> do something more complex for historic reasons or get something wrong.
> 
> Type checking for __user annotations is handled inconsistently across
> architectures, but this is easily simplified as well by using an inline
> function that takes a 'const void __user *' argument. A handful of
> callers need an extra __user annotation for this.
> 
> Some architectures had trick to use 33-bit or 65-bit arithmetic on the
> addresses to calculate the overflow, however this simpler version uses
> fewer registers, which means it can produce better object code in the
> end despite needing a second (statically predicted) branch.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64, asm-generic]
> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> ---
...
>  arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h   | 19 +--------
...
>  include/asm-generic/access_ok.h       | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/asm-generic/uaccess.h         | 21 +---------
>  include/linux/uaccess.h               |  7 ----
>  32 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 366 deletions(-)
> 
...
> diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 120f5005461b..8f049ec99b3e 100644
> --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -45,21 +45,7 @@
>  
>  #define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs() == KERNEL_DS)
>  
> -/* Ensure that the range from addr to addr+size is all within the process'
> - * address space
> - */
> -static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	const mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
> -
> -	return size <= fs && addr <= (fs - size);
> -}
> -
> -#define access_ok(addr, size)						\
> -({ 									\
> -	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
> -	__range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size));			\
> -})
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>

I was going to ask why we are missing __chk_user_ptr in the generic version.
But this is basically now a no-op so I think its OK.

>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> @@ -268,9 +254,6 @@ clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
>  	return size;
>  }
>  
> -#define user_addr_max() \
> -	(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -
>  extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
>  
>  extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);

...
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..1aad8964d2ed
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +#define __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +
> +/*
> + * Checking whether a pointer is valid for user space access.
> + * These definitions work on most architectures, but overrides can
> + * be used where necessary.
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * architectures with compat tasks have a variable TASK_SIZE and should
> + * override this to a constant.
> + */
> +#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SET_FS
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> +#else
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(0)
> +#endif
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef user_addr_max
> +#define user_addr_max()			(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef __access_ok
> +/*
> + * 'size' is a compile-time constant for most callers, so optimize for
> + * this case to turn the check into a single comparison against a constant
> + * limit and catch all possible overflows.
> + * On architectures with separate user address space (m68k, s390, parisc,
> + * sparc64) or those without an MMU, this should always return true.
> + *
> + * This version was originally contributed by Jonas Bonn for the
> + * OpenRISC architecture, and was found to be the most efficient
> + * for constant 'size' and 'limit' values.
> + */
> +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
> +	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef access_ok
> +#define access_ok(addr, size) likely(__access_ok(addr, size))
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> index 0870fa11a7c5..ebc685dc8d74 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> @@ -114,28 +114,9 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> -#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef user_addr_max
> -#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -#endif
> -
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SET_FS */
>  
> -#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
> -
> -/*
> - * The architecture should really override this if possible, at least
> - * doing a check on the get_fs()
> - */
> -#ifndef __access_ok
> -static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	return 1;
> -}
> -#endif
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index 67e9bc94dc40..2c31667e62e0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -33,13 +33,6 @@ typedef struct {
>  	/* empty dummy */
>  } mm_segment_t;
>  
> -#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> -#endif
> -
> -#define uaccess_kernel()		(false)
> -#define user_addr_max()			(TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> -
>  static inline mm_segment_t force_uaccess_begin(void)
>  {
>  	return (mm_segment_t) { };


Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> [openrisc, asm-generic]

Thanks!

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, dalias@libc.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, will@kernel.org,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, deller@gmx.de, x86@kernel.org,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	ardb@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, geert@linux-m68k.org,
	linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, arnd@arndb.de, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	openrisc@lists.librecores.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	monstr@monstr.eu, tsbogend@alpha.franken.de,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, nickhu@andestech.com,
	jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dinguyen@kernel.org,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, richard@nod.at, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	davem@davemloft.net, green.hu@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok()
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 17:29:34 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YhdB7tNDvtsYLUzr@antec> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-14-arnd@kernel.org>

On Wed, Feb 16, 2022 at 02:13:27PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> 
> There are many different ways that access_ok() is defined across
> architectures, but in the end, they all just compare against the
> user_addr_max() value or they accept anything.
> 
> Provide one definition that works for most architectures, checking
> against TASK_SIZE_MAX for user processes or skipping the check inside
> of uaccess_kernel() sections.
> 
> For architectures without CONFIG_SET_FS(), this should be the fastest
> check, as it comes down to a single comparison of a pointer against a
> compile-time constant, while the architecture specific versions tend to
> do something more complex for historic reasons or get something wrong.
> 
> Type checking for __user annotations is handled inconsistently across
> architectures, but this is easily simplified as well by using an inline
> function that takes a 'const void __user *' argument. A handful of
> callers need an extra __user annotation for this.
> 
> Some architectures had trick to use 33-bit or 65-bit arithmetic on the
> addresses to calculate the overflow, however this simpler version uses
> fewer registers, which means it can produce better object code in the
> end despite needing a second (statically predicted) branch.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64, asm-generic]
> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> ---
...
>  arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h   | 19 +--------
...
>  include/asm-generic/access_ok.h       | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/asm-generic/uaccess.h         | 21 +---------
>  include/linux/uaccess.h               |  7 ----
>  32 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 366 deletions(-)
> 
...
> diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 120f5005461b..8f049ec99b3e 100644
> --- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -45,21 +45,7 @@
>  
>  #define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs() == KERNEL_DS)
>  
> -/* Ensure that the range from addr to addr+size is all within the process'
> - * address space
> - */
> -static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	const mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
> -
> -	return size <= fs && addr <= (fs - size);
> -}
> -
> -#define access_ok(addr, size)						\
> -({ 									\
> -	__chk_user_ptr(addr);						\
> -	__range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), (size));			\
> -})
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>

I was going to ask why we are missing __chk_user_ptr in the generic version.
But this is basically now a no-op so I think its OK.

>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> @@ -268,9 +254,6 @@ clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
>  	return size;
>  }
>  
> -#define user_addr_max() \
> -	(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -
>  extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
>  
>  extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);

...
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..1aad8964d2ed
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/access_ok.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +#define __ASM_GENERIC_ACCESS_OK_H__
> +
> +/*
> + * Checking whether a pointer is valid for user space access.
> + * These definitions work on most architectures, but overrides can
> + * be used where necessary.
> + */
> +
> +/*
> + * architectures with compat tasks have a variable TASK_SIZE and should
> + * override this to a constant.
> + */
> +#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SET_FS
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> +#else
> +#define uaccess_kernel()		(0)
> +#endif
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef user_addr_max
> +#define user_addr_max()			(uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef __access_ok
> +/*
> + * 'size' is a compile-time constant for most callers, so optimize for
> + * this case to turn the check into a single comparison against a constant
> + * limit and catch all possible overflows.
> + * On architectures with separate user address space (m68k, s390, parisc,
> + * sparc64) or those without an MMU, this should always return true.
> + *
> + * This version was originally contributed by Jonas Bonn for the
> + * OpenRISC architecture, and was found to be the most efficient
> + * for constant 'size' and 'limit' values.
> + */
> +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
> +	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
> +
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef access_ok
> +#define access_ok(addr, size) likely(__access_ok(addr, size))
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> index 0870fa11a7c5..ebc685dc8d74 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/uaccess.h
> @@ -114,28 +114,9 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> -#ifndef uaccess_kernel
> -#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
> -#endif
> -
> -#ifndef user_addr_max
> -#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
> -#endif
> -
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SET_FS */
>  
> -#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
> -
> -/*
> - * The architecture should really override this if possible, at least
> - * doing a check on the get_fs()
> - */
> -#ifndef __access_ok
> -static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> -{
> -	return 1;
> -}
> -#endif
> +#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * These are the main single-value transfer routines.  They automatically
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index 67e9bc94dc40..2c31667e62e0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -33,13 +33,6 @@ typedef struct {
>  	/* empty dummy */
>  } mm_segment_t;
>  
> -#ifndef TASK_SIZE_MAX
> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX			TASK_SIZE
> -#endif
> -
> -#define uaccess_kernel()		(false)
> -#define user_addr_max()			(TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> -
>  static inline mm_segment_t force_uaccess_begin(void)
>  {
>  	return (mm_segment_t) { };


Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> [openrisc, asm-generic]

Thanks!

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-24  8:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 528+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-16 13:13 [PATCH v2 00/18] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] uaccess: fix nios2 and microblaze get_user_8() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:35   ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35     ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35     ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35     ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35     ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35     ` David Laight
2022-02-18  6:25   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-25  4:28   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:25   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 04/18] sparc64: add __{get, put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [PATCH v2 04/18] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 05/18] x86: remove __range_not_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:28   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:29     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 15:45     ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45       ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45       ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45       ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45       ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45       ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:29   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] nios2: drop access_ok() check from __put_user() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:29   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-23 23:30   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-24  7:05     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
     [not found]   ` <20220216131332.1489939-9-arnd-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30       ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30       ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  8:55   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] mips: use simpler access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 13:24   ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 14:31     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` Arnd Bergmann
     [not found]       ` <CAK8P3a2usZWPDDDUcscwS0aVKsY6aLXFGFPqYNkm4hcDERim9w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-21 15:21         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21           ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21           ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21           ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21           ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21           ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21           ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36       ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 20:05     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23  7:41   ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  9:26     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] m68k: fix access_ok for coldfire Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:30   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  9:00   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` [OpenRISC] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:24     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] arm64: simplify access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] uaccess: fix type mismatch warnings from access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:31   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-25  4:30   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` Arnd Bergmann
     [not found]   ` <20220216131332.1489939-14-arnd-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-17 19:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15       ` [OpenRISC] " Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18  7:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16         ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30         ` David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30         ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30         ` David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30         ` David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30         ` David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30         ` David Laight
2022-02-18 18:07         ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07           ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07           ` [OpenRISC] " Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07           ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07           ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07           ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07           ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18  6:34   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:23     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:04   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` [OpenRISC] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-24  8:29   ` Stafford Horne [this message]
2022-02-24  8:29     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` [OpenRISC] " Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:41     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-25  4:31   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] lib/test_lockup: fix kernel pointer check for separate address spaces Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:35   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:15     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] sparc64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 18:34   ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` [OpenRISC] " Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` [OpenRISC] " Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 22:01       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] sh: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:36   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] ia64: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] uaccess: drop maining CONFIG_SET_FS users Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 18:44   ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` [OpenRISC] " Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 22:02     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 22:36   ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` [OpenRISC] " Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-18  6:37   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:10     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 10:18   ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` [OpenRISC] " Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-24  8:45   ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` [OpenRISC] " Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-25  4:33   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-17  7:20 ` [PATCH v2 00/18] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` [OpenRISC] " Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` Christophe Leroy
     [not found]   ` <00496df2-f9f2-2547-3ca3-7989e4713d6b-2tlSp11Fh4xulxpn9UvDqw@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-17  7:49     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  2:21       ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  2:21         ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  2:21         ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-18  2:21         ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  2:21         ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  2:21         ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  9:20         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20           ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  1:50   ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  1:50     ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  1:50     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-18  1:50     ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  1:50     ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  1:50     ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 10:01     ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` [OpenRISC] " Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  8:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` Arnd Bergmann

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=YhdB7tNDvtsYLUzr@antec \
    --to=shorne@gmail.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=arnd@kernel.org \
    --cc=bcain@codeaurora.org \
    --cc=dalias@libc.org \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=deller@gmx.de \
    --cc=dinguyen@kernel.org \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=geert@linux-m68k.org \
    --cc=green.hu@gmail.com \
    --cc=guoren@kernel.org \
    --cc=hca@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=hch@lst.de \
    --cc=jcmvbkbc@gmail.com \
    --cc=linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-csky@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-m68k@lists.linu \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=monstr@monstr.eu \
    --cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
    --cc=nickhu@andestech.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=richard@nod.at \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=tsbogend@alpha.franken.de \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.