From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-sh@vger.k
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-7-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.
The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.
There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.
x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++----------------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 79c4869ccdd6..a59ba2578e64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,33 +16,14 @@
* Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
* Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
*/
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+ unsigned long addr = ptr;
- /*
- * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
- * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
- * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
- * important to subtract the size from the
- * limit, not add it to the address).
- */
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
- return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
- /* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
- addr += size;
- if (unlikely(addr < size))
- return true;
- return unlikely(addr > limit);
+ return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
}
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-({ \
- __chk_user_ptr(addr); \
- !__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size); \
-})
-
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() \
--
2.29.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-7-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.
The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.
There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.
x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++----------------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 79c4869ccdd6..a59ba2578e64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,33 +16,14 @@
* Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
* Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
*/
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+ unsigned long addr = ptr;
- /*
- * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
- * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
- * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
- * important to subtract the size from the
- * limit, not add it to the address).
- */
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
- return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
- /* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
- addr += size;
- if (unlikely(addr < size))
- return true;
- return unlikely(addr > limit);
+ return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
}
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-({ \
- __chk_user_ptr(addr); \
- !__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size); \
-})
-
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() \
--
2.29.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 13:13:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-7-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.
The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.
There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.
x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++----------------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 79c4869ccdd6..a59ba2578e64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,33 +16,14 @@
* Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
* Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
*/
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+ unsigned long addr = ptr;
- /*
- * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
- * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
- * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
- * important to subtract the size from the
- * limit, not add it to the address).
- */
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
- return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
- /* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
- addr += size;
- if (unlikely(addr < size))
- return true;
- return unlikely(addr > limit);
+ return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
}
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-({ \
- __chk_user_ptr(addr); \
- !__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size); \
-})
-
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() \
--
2.29.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-7-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.
The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.
There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.
x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++----------------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 79c4869ccdd6..a59ba2578e64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,33 +16,14 @@
* Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
* Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
*/
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+ unsigned long addr = ptr;
- /*
- * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
- * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
- * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
- * important to subtract the size from the
- * limit, not add it to the address).
- */
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
- return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
- /* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
- addr += size;
- if (unlikely(addr < size))
- return true;
- return unlikely(addr > limit);
+ return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
}
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-({ \
- __chk_user_ptr(addr); \
- !__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size); \
-})
-
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() \
--
2.29.2
_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-7-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.
The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.
There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.
x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++----------------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 79c4869ccdd6..a59ba2578e64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,33 +16,14 @@
* Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
* Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
*/
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+ unsigned long addr = ptr;
- /*
- * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
- * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
- * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
- * important to subtract the size from the
- * limit, not add it to the address).
- */
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
- return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
- /* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
- addr += size;
- if (unlikely(addr < size))
- return true;
- return unlikely(addr > limit);
+ return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
}
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-({ \
- __chk_user_ptr(addr); \
- !__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size); \
-})
-
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() \
--
2.29.2
_______________________________________________
linux-snps-arc mailing list
linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-snps-arc
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: openrisc@lists.librecores.org
Subject: [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-7-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.
The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.
There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.
x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++----------------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 79c4869ccdd6..a59ba2578e64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,33 +16,14 @@
* Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
* Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
*/
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+ unsigned long addr = ptr;
- /*
- * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
- * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
- * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
- * important to subtract the size from the
- * limit, not add it to the address).
- */
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
- return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
- /* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
- addr += size;
- if (unlikely(addr < size))
- return true;
- return unlikely(addr > limit);
+ return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
}
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-({ \
- __chk_user_ptr(addr); \
- !__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size); \
-})
-
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() \
--
2.29.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, dalias@libc.org,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, guoren@kernel.org,
sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, will@kernel.org,
ardb@kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
bcain@codeaurora.org, deller@gmx.de, x86@kernel.org,
linux@armlinux.org.uk, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, geert@linux-m68k.org,
linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, hca@linux.ibm.com,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
green.hu@gmail.com, shorne@gmail.com, monstr@monstr.eu,
tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
nickhu@andestech.com, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
dinguyen@kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, richard@nod.at,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
davem@davemloft.net
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-7-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
The way that access_ok() is defined on x86 is slightly different from
most other architectures, and a bit more complex.
The generic version tends to result in the best output on all
architectures, as it results in single comparison against a constant
limit for calls with a known size.
There are a few callers of __range_not_ok(), all of which use TASK_SIZE
as the limit rather than TASK_SIZE_MAX, but I could not see any reason
for picking this. Changing these to call __access_ok() instead uses the
default limit, but keeps the behavior otherwise.
x86 is the only architecture with a WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() checking
access_ok(), but it's probably best to leave that in place.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++----------------------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 79c4869ccdd6..a59ba2578e64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,33 +16,14 @@
* Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
* Returns 0 if the range is valid, nonzero otherwise.
*/
-static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline bool __access_ok(void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+ unsigned long addr = ptr;
- /*
- * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
- * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
- * it might overflow the 'addr', so it's
- * important to subtract the size from the
- * limit, not add it to the address).
- */
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size))
- return unlikely(addr > limit - size);
-
- /* Arbitrary sizes? Be careful about overflow */
- addr += size;
- if (unlikely(addr < size))
- return true;
- return unlikely(addr > limit);
+ return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
}
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-({ \
- __chk_user_ptr(addr); \
- !__chk_range_not_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), size); \
-})
-
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() \
--
2.29.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-16 13:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 528+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-16 13:13 [PATCH v2 00/18] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] uaccess: fix nios2 and microblaze get_user_8() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:35 ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35 ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35 ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35 ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35 ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-25 4:28 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:28 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:28 ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:28 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:28 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:28 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:28 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:25 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 04/18] sparc64: add __{get, put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 05/18] x86: remove __range_not_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 6:28 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:28 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:28 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:28 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:28 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:28 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:28 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 7:29 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:29 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:29 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:29 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:29 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:29 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:29 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 15:45 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45 ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45 ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann [this message]
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] nios2: drop access_ok() check from __put_user() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-23 23:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30 ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-24 7:05 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 7:05 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 7:05 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 7:05 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 7:05 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 7:05 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 7:05 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
[not found] ` <20220216131332.1489939-9-arnd-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 8:55 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 8:55 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 8:55 ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 8:55 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 8:55 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 8:55 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 8:55 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] mips: use simpler access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 13:24 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24 ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 14:31 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31 ` Arnd Bergmann
[not found] ` <CAK8P3a2usZWPDDDUcscwS0aVKsY6aLXFGFPqYNkm4hcDERim9w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-21 15:21 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21 ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36 ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 20:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05 ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 7:41 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 7:41 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 7:41 ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 7:41 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 7:41 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 7:41 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 7:41 ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 9:26 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23 9:26 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23 9:26 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23 9:26 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23 9:26 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23 9:26 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23 9:26 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] m68k: fix access_ok for coldfire Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 9:00 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:00 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:00 ` [OpenRISC] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:00 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:00 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:00 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:00 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:24 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] arm64: simplify access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] uaccess: fix type mismatch warnings from access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 6:31 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:31 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:31 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:31 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:31 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:31 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:31 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-25 4:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:30 ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:30 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:52 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:52 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:52 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:52 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:52 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:52 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:52 ` Arnd Bergmann
[not found] ` <20220216131332.1489939-14-arnd-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-17 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15 ` [OpenRISC] " Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 7:16 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:16 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:16 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:16 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:16 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:16 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:16 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:30 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 9:30 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 9:30 ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-18 9:30 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 9:30 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 9:30 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 9:30 ` David Laight
2022-02-18 18:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07 ` [OpenRISC] " Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:34 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:34 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 7:23 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:23 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:23 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:23 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:23 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:23 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:23 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:04 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:04 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:04 ` [OpenRISC] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:04 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:04 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:04 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18 9:04 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-24 8:29 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:29 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:29 ` [OpenRISC] " Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:29 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:29 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:29 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:29 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:41 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 8:41 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 8:41 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 8:41 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 8:41 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 8:41 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24 8:41 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-25 4:31 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:31 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:31 ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:31 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:31 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:31 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:31 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] lib/test_lockup: fix kernel pointer check for separate address spaces Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 6:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:35 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 7:15 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:15 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:15 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:15 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:15 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:15 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:15 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] sparc64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 18:34 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34 ` [OpenRISC] " Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41 ` [OpenRISC] " Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 22:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] sh: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 6:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:36 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] ia64: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] uaccess: drop maining CONFIG_SET_FS users Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 18:44 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44 ` [OpenRISC] " Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44 ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 22:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 22:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36 ` [OpenRISC] " Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-18 6:37 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:37 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:37 ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:37 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:37 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:37 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 6:37 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18 7:10 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:10 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:10 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:10 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:10 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:10 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 7:10 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 10:18 ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18 ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18 ` [OpenRISC] " Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18 ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18 ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18 ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18 ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-24 8:45 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:45 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:45 ` [OpenRISC] " Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:45 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:45 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:45 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24 8:45 ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-25 4:33 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:33 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:33 ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:33 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:33 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:33 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25 4:33 ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-17 7:20 ` [PATCH v2 00/18] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17 7:20 ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17 7:20 ` [OpenRISC] " Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17 7:20 ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17 7:20 ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17 7:20 ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17 7:20 ` Christophe Leroy
[not found] ` <00496df2-f9f2-2547-3ca3-7989e4713d6b-2tlSp11Fh4xulxpn9UvDqw@public.gmane.org>
2022-02-17 7:49 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:49 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:49 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:49 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:49 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:49 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 7:49 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 2:21 ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 2:21 ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 2:21 ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-18 2:21 ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 2:21 ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 2:21 ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 9:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:20 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 9:20 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 1:50 ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 1:50 ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 1:50 ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-18 1:50 ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 1:50 ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 1:50 ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 10:01 ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01 ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01 ` [OpenRISC] " Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01 ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01 ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01 ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01 ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17 8:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 8:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 8:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 8:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 8:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 8:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 8:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20220216131332.1489939-7-arnd@kernel.org \
--to=arnd@kernel.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bcain@codeaurora.org \
--cc=dalias@libc.org \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=deller@gmx.de \
--cc=dinguyen@kernel.org \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=geert@linux-m68k.org \
--cc=green.hu@gmail.com \
--cc=guoren@kernel.org \
--cc=hca@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=hch@lst.de \
--cc=jcmvbkbc@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-csky@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org \
--cc=linux-mips@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-s390@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-sh@vger.k \
--cc=linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
--cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=monstr@monstr.eu \
--cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
--cc=nickhu@andestech.com \
--cc=openrisc@lists.librecores.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=richard@nod.at \
--cc=shorne@gmail.com \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=tsbogend@alpha.franken.de \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.