From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
alex.popov@linux.com, keescook@chromium.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, will@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/13] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack()
Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 17:41:32 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YnKsvNtIlE6cZEOa@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220427173128.2603085-2-mark.rutland@arm.com>
On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 06:31:16PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> Due to some historical confusion, arm64's current_top_of_stack() isn't
> what the stackleak code expects. This could in theory result in a number
> of problems, and practically results in an unnecessary performance hit.
> We can avoid this by aligning the arm64 implementation with the x86
> implementation.
>
> The arm64 implementation of current_top_of_stack() was added
> specifically for stackleak in commit:
>
> 0b3e336601b82c6a ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
>
> This was intended to be equivalent to the x86 implementation, but the
> implementation, semantics, and performance characteristics differ
> wildly:
>
> * On x86, current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the current task's
> task stack, regardless of which stack is in active use.
>
> The implementation accesses a percpu variable which the x86 entry code
> maintains, and returns the location immediately above the pt_regs on
> the task stack (above which x86 has some padding).
>
> * On arm64 current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the stack in active
> use (i.e. the one which is currently being used).
>
> The implementation checks the SP against a number of
> potentially-accessible stacks, and will BUG() if no stack is found.
>
> The core stackleak_erase() code determines the upper bound of stack to
> erase with:
>
> | if (on_thread_stack())
> | boundary = current_stack_pointer;
> | else
> | boundary = current_top_of_stack();
>
> On arm64 stackleak_erase() is always called on a task stack, and
> on_thread_stack() should always be true. On x86, stackleak_erase() is
> mostly called on a trampoline stack, and is sometimes called on a task
> stack.
>
> Currently, this results in a lot of unnecessary code being generated for
> arm64 for the impossible !on_thread_stack() case. Some of this is
> inlined, bloating stackleak_erase(), while portions of this are left
> out-of-line and permitted to be instrumented (which would be a
> functional problem if that code were reachable).
>
> As a first step towards improving this, this patch aligns arm64's
> implementation of current_top_of_stack() with x86's, always returning
> the top of the current task's stack. With GCC 11.1.0 this results in the
> bulk of the unnecessary code being removed, including all of the
> out-of-line instrumentable code.
>
> While I don't believe there's a functional problem in practice I've
> marked this as a fix since the semantic was clearly wrong, the fix
> itself is simple, and other code might rely upon this in future.
>
> Fixes: 0b3e336601b82c6a ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
I thought this was queued already but I couldn't find it in -next. So:
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
alex.popov@linux.com, keescook@chromium.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, will@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 01/13] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack()
Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 17:41:32 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YnKsvNtIlE6cZEOa@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220427173128.2603085-2-mark.rutland@arm.com>
On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 06:31:16PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> Due to some historical confusion, arm64's current_top_of_stack() isn't
> what the stackleak code expects. This could in theory result in a number
> of problems, and practically results in an unnecessary performance hit.
> We can avoid this by aligning the arm64 implementation with the x86
> implementation.
>
> The arm64 implementation of current_top_of_stack() was added
> specifically for stackleak in commit:
>
> 0b3e336601b82c6a ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
>
> This was intended to be equivalent to the x86 implementation, but the
> implementation, semantics, and performance characteristics differ
> wildly:
>
> * On x86, current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the current task's
> task stack, regardless of which stack is in active use.
>
> The implementation accesses a percpu variable which the x86 entry code
> maintains, and returns the location immediately above the pt_regs on
> the task stack (above which x86 has some padding).
>
> * On arm64 current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the stack in active
> use (i.e. the one which is currently being used).
>
> The implementation checks the SP against a number of
> potentially-accessible stacks, and will BUG() if no stack is found.
>
> The core stackleak_erase() code determines the upper bound of stack to
> erase with:
>
> | if (on_thread_stack())
> | boundary = current_stack_pointer;
> | else
> | boundary = current_top_of_stack();
>
> On arm64 stackleak_erase() is always called on a task stack, and
> on_thread_stack() should always be true. On x86, stackleak_erase() is
> mostly called on a trampoline stack, and is sometimes called on a task
> stack.
>
> Currently, this results in a lot of unnecessary code being generated for
> arm64 for the impossible !on_thread_stack() case. Some of this is
> inlined, bloating stackleak_erase(), while portions of this are left
> out-of-line and permitted to be instrumented (which would be a
> functional problem if that code were reachable).
>
> As a first step towards improving this, this patch aligns arm64's
> implementation of current_top_of_stack() with x86's, always returning
> the top of the current task's stack. With GCC 11.1.0 this results in the
> bulk of the unnecessary code being removed, including all of the
> out-of-line instrumentable code.
>
> While I don't believe there's a functional problem in practice I've
> marked this as a fix since the semantic was clearly wrong, the fix
> itself is simple, and other code might rely upon this in future.
>
> Fixes: 0b3e336601b82c6a ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
I thought this was queued already but I couldn't find it in -next. So:
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-04 16:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-27 17:31 [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 16:41 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2022-05-04 16:41 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-04 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-04 19:55 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:55 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-05 8:25 ` Will Deacon
2022-05-05 8:25 ` Will Deacon
2022-05-08 17:24 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-08 17:24 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:36 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 11:36 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] stackleak: move skip_erasing() check earlier Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 17:44 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-08 17:44 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:40 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 11:40 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] stackleak: remove redundant check Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 18:17 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-08 18:17 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:46 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 11:46 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 3:00 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11 3:00 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11 8:02 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 8:02 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 14:44 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11 14:44 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-12 9:14 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-12 9:14 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 16:17 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-15 16:17 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-24 10:03 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-24 10:03 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-26 22:09 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-26 22:09 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] stackleak: clarify variable names Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 20:49 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-08 20:49 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 13:01 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 13:01 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 3:05 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11 3:05 ` Kees Cook
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] stackleak: rework stack high bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 21:27 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-08 21:27 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:22 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 11:22 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 16:32 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-15 16:32 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] stackleak: rework poison scanning Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-09 13:51 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-09 13:51 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 13:13 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 13:13 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 17:33 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-15 17:33 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-24 13:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-24 13:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-26 23:25 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-26 23:25 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-31 18:13 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-31 18:13 ` Kees Cook
2022-06-03 16:55 ` Alexander Popov
2022-06-03 16:55 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] lkdtm/stackleak: avoid spurious failure Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-04 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] lkdtm/stackleak: prevent unexpected stack usage Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] lkdtm/stackleak: check stack boundaries Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] stackleak: add on/off stack variants Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 16:42 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 16:42 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:16 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework Kees Cook
2022-05-04 19:16 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=YnKsvNtIlE6cZEOa@arm.com \
--to=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=alex.popov@linux.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.