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From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
	Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
	Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 12/14] arm64: realm: Support nonsecure ITS emulation shared
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 17:46:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZmM5cpLRbxhE_bBo@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0ea597d3-6520-4ab3-8050-d967c173bc23@arm.com>

On Fri, Jun 07, 2024 at 04:45:14PM +0100, Steven Price wrote:
> On 06/06/2024 19:38, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > Anyway, we could do some hacking around gen_pool as a temporary solution
> > (maybe as a set of patches on top of this series to be easier to revert)
> > and start investigating a proper decrypted page allocator in parallel.
> > We just need to find a victim that has the page allocator fresh in mind
> > (Ryan or Alexandru ;)).
> 
> Thanks for the suggestions Catalin. I had a go at implementing something
> with gen_pool - the below (very lightly tested) hack seems to work. This
> is on top of the current series.
> 
> I *think* it should also be safe to drop the whole alignment part with
> this custom allocator, which could actually save memory. But I haven't
> quite got my head around that yet.

Thanks Steven. It doesn't look too complex and it solves the memory
wasting. We don't actually free the pages from gen_pool but I don't
think it matters much, the memory would get reused if devices are
removed and re-added.

-- 
Catalin

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
	Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
	Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 12/14] arm64: realm: Support nonsecure ITS emulation shared
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 17:46:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZmM5cpLRbxhE_bBo@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0ea597d3-6520-4ab3-8050-d967c173bc23@arm.com>

On Fri, Jun 07, 2024 at 04:45:14PM +0100, Steven Price wrote:
> On 06/06/2024 19:38, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > Anyway, we could do some hacking around gen_pool as a temporary solution
> > (maybe as a set of patches on top of this series to be easier to revert)
> > and start investigating a proper decrypted page allocator in parallel.
> > We just need to find a victim that has the page allocator fresh in mind
> > (Ryan or Alexandru ;)).
> 
> Thanks for the suggestions Catalin. I had a go at implementing something
> with gen_pool - the below (very lightly tested) hack seems to work. This
> is on top of the current series.
> 
> I *think* it should also be safe to drop the whole alignment part with
> this custom allocator, which could actually save memory. But I haven't
> quite got my head around that yet.

Thanks Steven. It doesn't look too complex and it solves the memory
wasting. We don't actually free the pages from gen_pool but I don't
think it matters much, the memory would get reused if devices are
removed and re-added.

-- 
Catalin

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-07 16:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-06-05  9:29 [PATCH v3 00/14] arm64: Support for running as a guest in Arm CCA Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  8:37 ` Itaru Kitayama
2024-06-05  8:37   ` Itaru Kitayama
2024-06-06  9:03   ` Steven Price
2024-06-06  9:03     ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] arm64: rsi: Add RSI definitions Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29   ` Steven Price
2024-06-10 14:14   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 14:14     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-05  9:29 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] arm64: Detect if in a realm and set RIPAS RAM Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29   ` Steven Price
2024-06-10 14:11   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 14:11     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 14:16     ` Steven Price
2024-06-10 14:16       ` Steven Price
2024-06-12 10:40   ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2024-06-12 10:59     ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-06-13 10:51       ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2024-06-17 10:27         ` Peter Maydell
2024-06-17 11:23           ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2024-06-26  0:12     ` Jeremy Linton
2024-06-14 18:57   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-06-05  9:29 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] arm64: realm: Query IPA size from the RMM Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29   ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] arm64: Mark all I/O as non-secure shared Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29   ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] fixmap: Allow architecture overriding set_fixmap_io Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29   ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] arm64: Override set_fixmap_io Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29   ` Steven Price
2024-06-10 17:49   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 17:49     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-27 13:56     ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] arm64: Make the PHYS_MASK_SHIFT dynamic Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:29   ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] arm64: Enforce bounce buffers for realm DMA Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30   ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30   ` Steven Price
2024-06-10 17:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 17:27     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-27 14:34     ` Steven Price
2024-06-21  9:05   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-05  9:30 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] arm64: Force device mappings to be non-secure shared Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30   ` Steven Price
2024-06-17  3:33   ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-17 14:55     ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-06-17 15:43       ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-17 15:46       ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-05  9:30 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] efi: arm64: Map Device with Prot Shared Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30   ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] arm64: realm: Support nonsecure ITS emulation shared Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30   ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 13:39   ` Marc Zyngier
2024-06-05 13:39     ` Marc Zyngier
2024-06-05 15:08     ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 15:08       ` Steven Price
2024-06-06 10:17       ` Marc Zyngier
2024-06-06 10:17         ` Marc Zyngier
2024-06-06 18:38         ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-06 18:38           ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 15:45           ` Steven Price
2024-06-07 15:45             ` Steven Price
2024-06-07 16:46             ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2024-06-07 16:46               ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 17:55           ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 17:55             ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-18 16:04             ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-21 14:24               ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-17  3:54   ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-28  9:59     ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] arm64: rsi: Interfaces to query attestation token Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30   ` Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms Steven Price
2024-06-05  9:30   ` Steven Price
2024-06-07  1:38 ` [PATCH v3 00/14] arm64: Support for running as a guest in Arm CCA Michael Kelley
2024-06-07  1:38   ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-07 15:12   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 15:12     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 16:36     ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-07 16:36       ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-10 10:34       ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 10:34         ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 17:03         ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-10 17:03           ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-10 17:46           ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 17:46             ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-17  4:06             ` Michael Kelley

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