From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 06/14] arm64: Override set_fixmap_io
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 18:49:59 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zmc8x3Xvs8uu9zHp@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240605093006.145492-7-steven.price@arm.com>
On Wed, Jun 05, 2024 at 10:29:58AM +0100, Steven Price wrote:
> +void set_fixmap_io(enum fixed_addresses idx, phys_addr_t phys)
> +{
> + pgprot_t prot = FIXMAP_PAGE_IO;
> +
> + /*
> + * For now we consider all I/O as non-secure. For future
> + * filter the I/O base for setting appropriate permissions.
> + */
> + prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) | PROT_NS_SHARED);
> +
> + return __set_fixmap(idx, phys, prot);
> +}
In v2, Suzuki said that we want to keep this as a function rather than
just adding PROT_NS_SHARED to FIXMAP_PAGE_IO in case we want to change
this function in the future to allow protected MMIO.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/6ba1fd72-3bad-44ca-810d-572b70050772@arm.com/
What I don't understand is that all the other MMIO cases just statically
assume unprotected/shard MMIO. Should we drop this patch here as well,
adjust FIXMAP_PAGE_IO and think about protected MMIO later when we
actually have to do device assignment?
--
Catalin
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 06/14] arm64: Override set_fixmap_io
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 18:49:59 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Zmc8x3Xvs8uu9zHp@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240605093006.145492-7-steven.price@arm.com>
On Wed, Jun 05, 2024 at 10:29:58AM +0100, Steven Price wrote:
> +void set_fixmap_io(enum fixed_addresses idx, phys_addr_t phys)
> +{
> + pgprot_t prot = FIXMAP_PAGE_IO;
> +
> + /*
> + * For now we consider all I/O as non-secure. For future
> + * filter the I/O base for setting appropriate permissions.
> + */
> + prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) | PROT_NS_SHARED);
> +
> + return __set_fixmap(idx, phys, prot);
> +}
In v2, Suzuki said that we want to keep this as a function rather than
just adding PROT_NS_SHARED to FIXMAP_PAGE_IO in case we want to change
this function in the future to allow protected MMIO.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/6ba1fd72-3bad-44ca-810d-572b70050772@arm.com/
What I don't understand is that all the other MMIO cases just statically
assume unprotected/shard MMIO. Should we drop this patch here as well,
adjust FIXMAP_PAGE_IO and think about protected MMIO later when we
actually have to do device assignment?
--
Catalin
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-10 17:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-05 9:29 [PATCH v3 00/14] arm64: Support for running as a guest in Arm CCA Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 8:37 ` Itaru Kitayama
2024-06-05 8:37 ` Itaru Kitayama
2024-06-06 9:03 ` Steven Price
2024-06-06 9:03 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] arm64: rsi: Add RSI definitions Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` Steven Price
2024-06-10 14:14 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 14:14 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-05 9:29 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] arm64: Detect if in a realm and set RIPAS RAM Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` Steven Price
2024-06-10 14:11 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 14:11 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 14:16 ` Steven Price
2024-06-10 14:16 ` Steven Price
2024-06-12 10:40 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2024-06-12 10:59 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-06-13 10:51 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2024-06-17 10:27 ` Peter Maydell
2024-06-17 11:23 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2024-06-26 0:12 ` Jeremy Linton
2024-06-14 18:57 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-06-05 9:29 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] arm64: realm: Query IPA size from the RMM Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] arm64: Mark all I/O as non-secure shared Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] fixmap: Allow architecture overriding set_fixmap_io Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] arm64: Override set_fixmap_io Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` Steven Price
2024-06-10 17:49 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2024-06-10 17:49 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-27 13:56 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] arm64: Make the PHYS_MASK_SHIFT dynamic Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:29 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] arm64: Enforce bounce buffers for realm DMA Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` Steven Price
2024-06-10 17:27 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 17:27 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-27 14:34 ` Steven Price
2024-06-21 9:05 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-05 9:30 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] arm64: Force device mappings to be non-secure shared Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` Steven Price
2024-06-17 3:33 ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-17 14:55 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-06-17 15:43 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-17 15:46 ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-05 9:30 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] efi: arm64: Map Device with Prot Shared Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] arm64: realm: Support nonsecure ITS emulation shared Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 13:39 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-06-05 13:39 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-06-05 15:08 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 15:08 ` Steven Price
2024-06-06 10:17 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-06-06 10:17 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-06-06 18:38 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-06 18:38 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 15:45 ` Steven Price
2024-06-07 15:45 ` Steven Price
2024-06-07 16:46 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 16:46 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 17:55 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 17:55 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-18 16:04 ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-21 14:24 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-17 3:54 ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-28 9:59 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] arm64: rsi: Interfaces to query attestation token Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms Steven Price
2024-06-05 9:30 ` Steven Price
2024-06-07 1:38 ` [PATCH v3 00/14] arm64: Support for running as a guest in Arm CCA Michael Kelley
2024-06-07 1:38 ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-07 15:12 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 15:12 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-07 16:36 ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-07 16:36 ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-10 10:34 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 10:34 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 17:03 ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-10 17:03 ` Michael Kelley
2024-06-10 17:46 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-10 17:46 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-06-17 4:06 ` Michael Kelley
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=Zmc8x3Xvs8uu9zHp@arm.com \
--to=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=alexandru.elisei@arm.com \
--cc=christoffer.dall@arm.com \
--cc=gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com \
--cc=james.morse@arm.com \
--cc=joey.gouly@arm.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=kvmarm@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=oliver.upton@linux.dev \
--cc=steven.price@arm.com \
--cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
--cc=tabba@google.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=yuzenghui@huawei.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.