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From: Sergii Dmytruk <sergii.dmytruk@3mdeb.com>
To: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
	"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Anthony PERARD" <anthony.perard@vates.tech>,
	"Michal Orzel" <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
	"Jan Beulich" <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	"Julien Grall" <julien@xen.org>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
	"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	"Nicola Vetrini" <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>,
	"Doug Goldstein" <cardoe@cardoe.com>,
	"Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>,
	"Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>,
	"Ross Philipson" <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 20/22] x86/slaunch: support EFI boot
Date: Wed, 14 May 2025 17:24:50 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aCSnskt6S2rHfUmC@MjU3Nj> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <68e5f8bb-42b2-4da8-86ba-231cb5657106@gmail.com>

On Tue, May 13, 2025 at 09:25:44PM -0400, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> On 5/13/25 1:05 PM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote:
> > When running on an EFI-enabled system, Xen needs to have access to Boot
> > Services in order to initialize itself properly and reach a state in
> > which a dom0 kernel can operate without issues.
> >
> > This means that DRTM must be started in the middle of Xen's
> > initialization process.  This effect is achieved via a callback into
> > bootloader (GRUB) which is responsible for initiating DRTM and
> > continuing Xen's initialization process.  The latter is done by
> > branching in Slaunch entry point on a flag to switch back into long mode
> > before calling the same function which Xen would execute as the next
> > step without DRTM.
>
> Depending on the bootloader for this unnecessarily ties DRTM to GRUB.
> Instead, it would be much better for Xen to be able to perform DRTM
> itself, which would allow DRTM to work without GRUB.  Pop! OS already
> uses systemd-boot and the trend seems to be from GRUB to systemd-boot.
> Furthermore, this would allow DRTM with Xen launched directly from
> the UEFI firmware.
> --
> Sincerely,
> Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)

That sentence in the commit message is worth rewording.  GRUB isn't a
requirement, any TrenchBoot-enabled bootloader (or anything that wants
to act as a bootloader) can be used.  systemd-boot could implement
Secure Launch specification [0] and start Xen/Linux/something else via
DRTM.  Usage without a real bootloader could be implemented similarly
via some EFI stub that has binaries embedded into it or that can load
them from a drive.

Mind that at least Intel and AMD DRTM implementations require a DCE [1]
binary that depends on a vendor, firmware version or a CPU generation.
So even embedding all code into every kernel-like software won't produce
self-contained DRTM-capable images.

[0]: https://trenchboot.org/specifications/Secure_Launch/
[1]: https://trenchboot.org/theory/Glossary/#dynamic-configuration-environment-dce

Regards


  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-14 14:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-13 17:05 [PATCH v2 00/22] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM (Xen) Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 01/22] x86/include/asm/intel-txt.h: constants and accessors for TXT registers and heap Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-14 14:55   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-05-14 20:09     ` Krystian Hebel
2025-05-18 18:35     ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-18 23:31       ` Rich Persaud
2025-05-19 13:43         ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-19 20:55           ` Rich Persaud
2025-05-21 15:05     ` Jan Beulich
2025-05-21 15:19   ` Jan Beulich
2025-05-23 19:51     ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-06-02  7:17       ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-02 22:00         ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-06-03  7:06           ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-03  8:50             ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-06-03  8:52               ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-03 15:20                 ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 02/22] include/xen/slr-table.h: Secure Launch Resource Table definitions Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-21 15:45   ` Jan Beulich
2025-05-21 15:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2025-05-23 22:19     ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-06-02  7:31       ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-02 22:19         ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 03/22] x86/boot: add MLE header and Secure Launch entry point Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 04/22] x86/boot/slaunch-early: implement early initialization Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 05/22] x86/boot/slaunch-early: early TXT checks and boot data retrieval Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 06/22] xen/arch/x86: reserve TXT memory during Slaunch Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 07/22] x86/mtrr: expose functions for pausing caching Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 08/22] x86/slaunch: restore boot MTRRs after Intel TXT DRTM Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 09/22] xen/lib: add implementation of SHA-1 Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-14 16:58   ` Andrew Cooper
2025-05-17 18:17     ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-18  8:34       ` Jan Beulich
2025-05-18 11:32         ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 10/22] x86/tpm.c: code for early hashing and extending PCRs (for TPM1.2) Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 11/22] x86/tpm.c: support extending PCRs of TPM2.0 Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 12/22] x86/hvm: check for VMX in SMX if Slaunch is active Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 13/22] x86/tpm.c: implement event log for TPM2.0 Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 14/22] x86/boot: choose AP stack based on APIC ID Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 15/22] x86/smpboot.c: TXT AP bringup Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 16/22] x86/slaunch: process DRTM policy Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 17/22] x86/acpi: disallow S3 on Secure Launch boot Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 18/22] x86/boot/slaunch-early: find MBI and SLRT on AMD Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 19/22] x86/slaunch: support AMD SKINIT Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 20/22] x86/slaunch: support EFI boot Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-14  1:25   ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-05-14 14:24     ` Sergii Dmytruk [this message]
2025-05-14 15:58       ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-05-14 16:12         ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2025-05-15 14:39         ` Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 21/22] x86/cpu: report SMX, TXT and SKINIT capabilities Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-13 17:05 ` [PATCH v2 22/22] MAINTAINERS: add a section for TrenchBoot Slaunch Sergii Dmytruk
2025-05-14  6:36   ` Jan Beulich

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