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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
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	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17] exec: Fix dead-lock in de_thread with ptrace_attach
Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2025 19:32:21 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aSNTNZxiQ0txISJx@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <GV2PPF74270EBEE6F59267B0E9F28F536D0E4C9A@GV2PPF74270EBEE.EURP195.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>

Hi Bernd,

sorry for delay, I am on PTO, didn't read emails this week...

On 11/17, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
>
> On 11/17/25 16:01, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > On 11/17, Bernd Edlinger wrote:
> >>
> >> On 11/11/25 10:21, Christian Brauner wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Nov 05, 2025 at 03:32:10PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> >>
> >>>> But this is minor. Why do we need "bool unsafe_execve_in_progress" ?
> >>>> If this patch is correct, de_thread() can drop/reacquire cred_guard_mutex
> >>>> unconditionally.
> >>>>
> >>
> >> I would not like to drop the mutex when no absolutely necessary for performance reasons.
> >
> > OK, I won't insist... But I don't really understand how this can help to
> > improve the performance. If nothing else, this adds another for_other_threads()
> > loop.
> >
>
> If no dead-lock is possible it is better to complete the de_thread without
> releasing the mutex.  For the debugger it is also the better experience,
> no matter when the ptrace_attack happens it will succeed rather quickly either
> before the execve or after the execve.

I still disagree, I still don't understand the "performance reasons", but since I can't
convince you I won't really argue.

> >>>>> +	if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {
> >>>>> +		spin_unlock_irq(lock);
> >>>>> +		sig->exec_bprm = bprm;
> >>>>> +		mutex_unlock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
> >>>>> +		spin_lock_irq(lock);
> >>>>
> >>>> I don't think spin_unlock_irq() + spin_lock_irq() makes any sense...
> >>>>
> >>
> >> Since the spin lock was acquired while holding the mutex, both should be
> >> unlocked in reverse sequence and the spin lock re-acquired after releasing
> >> the mutex.
> >
> > Why?
> >
>
> It is generally more safe when each thread acquires its mutexes in order and
> releases them in reverse order.
> Consider this:
> Thread A:
> holds spin_lock_irq(siglock);
> does mutes_unlock(cred_guard_mutex); with irq disabled.
> task switch happens to Thread B which has irq enabled.
> and is waiting for cred_guard_mutex.
> Thrad B:
> does mutex_lock(cred_guard_mutex);
> but is interrupted this point and the interrupt handler I executes
> now iterrupt handler I wants to take siglock and is blocked,
> because the system one single CPU core.

I don't follow. Do you mean PREEMPT_RT ?

If yes. In this case spin_lock_irq() is rt_spin_lock() which doesn't disable irqs,
it does rt_lock_lock() (takes rt_mutex) + migrate_disable().

I do think that spin/mutex/whatever_unlock() is always safe. In any order, and
regardless of RT.

> > And just in case... Lets look at this code
> >
> > 	+                               rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, bprm->cred);
> > 	+                               task->mm = bprm->mm;
> > 	+                               retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
> > 	+                               rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, old_cred);
> > 	+                               task->mm = old_mm;
> >
> > again.
> >
> > This is mostly theoretical, but what if begin_new_exec() fails after de_thread()
> > and before exec_mmap() and/or commit_creds(bprm->cred) ? In this case the execing
> > thread will report SIGSEGV to debugger which can (say) read old_mm.
> >
> > No?
> >
>
> Yes, and that is the reason why the debugger has to prove the possession of access rights
> to the process before the execve which are necessary in case exeve fails, yes the debugger
> may inspect the result, and as well the debugger's access rights must be also sufficient
> to ptrace the process after execve succeeds, moreover the debugged process shall stop
> right at the first instruction where the new process starts.

Not sure I understand... OK, I see that you sent V18, and in this version ptrace_attach()
calls __ptrace_may_access() twice, so IIUC ptrace_attach() can only succeed if the debugger
has rights to trace the execing thread both before and after exec...

Oleg.


  reply	other threads:[~2025-11-23 18:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-17 12:23 [PATCH v10] exec: Fix dead-lock in de_thread with ptrace_attach Bernd Edlinger
2021-07-11 17:43 ` [PATCH v11] " Bernd Edlinger
2023-10-30  5:20   ` [PATCH v12] " Bernd Edlinger
2023-10-30  9:00     ` kernel test robot
2023-11-06  6:41     ` [PATCH v13] " Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-15 19:22       ` [PATCH v14] " Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-15 19:37         ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-01-17  9:51           ` Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-16 15:22         ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-01-17 15:07           ` Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-17 16:38             ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-01-22 13:24               ` Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-22 13:44                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2024-01-22 21:30                 ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23 18:30                   ` Bernd Edlinger
2024-01-24  0:09                     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-22 18:31         ` [PATCH v15] " Bernd Edlinger
2025-08-18  6:04           ` Jain, Ayush
2025-08-18 20:53           ` [PATCH v16] " Bernd Edlinger
2025-08-19  4:36             ` Kees Cook
2025-08-19 18:53               ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-08-21 17:34             ` [PATCH v17] " Bernd Edlinger
2025-10-27  6:26               ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-10-27 12:06               ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-11-02 16:17               ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-05 14:32               ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-11  9:21                 ` Christian Brauner
2025-11-11 11:07                   ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-11 13:12                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-11 13:45                       ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-12  9:52                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-17  6:31                   ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-17 15:01                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-17 20:08                       ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-23 18:32                         ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2025-11-29 15:06                           ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-12-01 15:13                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-09 17:14               ` [RFC PATCH 0/3] mt-exec: fix deadlock with ptrace_attach() Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-09 17:14                 ` [RFC PATCH 1/3] exec: make setup_new_exec() return int Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-09 17:15                 ` [RFC PATCH 2/3] exec: don't wait for zombie threads with cred_guard_mutex held Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-10 10:58                   ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2025-11-10 15:09                     ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-10 21:49                       ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2025-11-11 14:09                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-09 17:16                 ` [RFC PATCH 3/3] ptrace: ensure PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT won't stop if the tracee is killed by exec Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-10  5:28                 ` [RFC PATCH 0/3] mt-exec: fix deadlock with ptrace_attach() Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-10 14:47                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-18 18:13               ` [PATCH v18] exec: Fix dead-lock in de_thread with ptrace_attach Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-20 15:15                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-20 17:29                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-20 20:57                     ` [RFC][PATCH] exec: Move cred computation under exec_update_lock Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-20 23:50                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-21  2:59                         ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-21  7:18                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-21  9:35                             ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-21 11:26                               ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-21 19:19                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-21 23:06                                   ` Ryan Lee
2025-11-23 18:52                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-11-23 23:22                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-11-25 16:19                           ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-11-25 11:55                       ` Roberto Sassu
2025-12-01 16:06                         ` Are setuid shell scripts safe? (Implied by security_bprm_creds_for_exec) Eric W. Biederman
2025-12-01 16:49                           ` Roberto Sassu
2025-12-01 18:53                             ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-12-01 21:39                               ` David Laight
2025-12-03 13:16                               ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-12-04  5:49                                 ` Al Viro
2025-12-04  9:32                                   ` David Laight
2025-12-04 13:03                                   ` Bernd Edlinger
2025-12-09 12:28                                     ` Jan Kara
2025-12-04 15:43                           ` Stephen Smalley
2025-11-22 17:10                     ` [PATCH v18] exec: Fix dead-lock in de_thread with ptrace_attach Bernd Edlinger
2025-12-19  8:15                 ` [PATCH v19] " Bernd Edlinger

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