From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-arm@nongnu.org,
"Peter Maydell" <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
"Alex Bennée" <alex.bennee@linaro.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Marc-André Lureau" <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>,
qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, qemu-block@nongnu.org,
qemu-riscv@nongnu.org, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 08/28] hw/usb: mark commonly used USB devices/hosts as secure
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 12:21:06 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <au3GMul0v2BSPP5M@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <31de7814-4be9-4224-9659-854cdffe409f@redhat.com>
On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 01:05:05PM +0100, Thomas Huth wrote:
> On 29/10/2026 14.12, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> > Modern virtualized guests are expected to be deployed with the
> > XHCI controller which supports all of USB 1, 2 and 3, so should
> > be declared secure.
> >
> > The "NEC" XHCI variant is slightly non-standard, but since it is
> > a trivial sub-class of the generic XHCI, there's no reason to
> > exclude it.
> >
> > The set of devices that are expected to be used is HID (mouse,
> > tablet, keyboard), host passthrough, CCID (smartcard), hub,
> > storage and the redirect tunnelling.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > hw/usb/ccid-card-emulated.c | 1 +
> > hw/usb/ccid-card-passthru.c | 1 +
> > hw/usb/dev-hid.c | 3 +++
> > hw/usb/dev-hub.c | 1 +
> > hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c | 2 ++
> > hw/usb/dev-storage-bot.c | 1 +
> > hw/usb/dev-storage-classic.c | 1 +
> > hw/usb/hcd-xhci-nec.c | 1 +
> > hw/usb/hcd-xhci-pci.c | 1 +
> > hw/usb/hcd-xhci-sysbus.c | 3 ++-
> > hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 1 +
> > hw/usb/host-libusb.c | 1 +
> > hw/usb/redirect.c | 1 +
> > 13 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> ...
> > diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-storage-bot.c b/hw/usb/dev-storage-bot.c
> > index a7f8d80c17a..b156f1c5c9a 100644
> > --- a/hw/usb/dev-storage-bot.c
> > +++ b/hw/usb/dev-storage-bot.c
> > @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ static const TypeInfo bot_info = {
> > .name = "usb-bot",
> > .parent = TYPE_USB_STORAGE,
> > .class_init = usb_msd_class_bot_initfn,
> > + .secure = true,
> > };
> > static void register_types(void)
> > diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-storage-classic.c b/hw/usb/dev-storage-classic.c
> > index 977151c4a08..7e0699cb518 100644
> > --- a/hw/usb/dev-storage-classic.c
> > +++ b/hw/usb/dev-storage-classic.c
> > @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static const TypeInfo msd_info = {
> > .parent = TYPE_USB_STORAGE,
> > .class_init = usb_msd_class_storage_initfn,
> > .instance_init = usb_msd_instance_init,
> > + .secure = true,
> > };
> Can we exclude usb-bot and usb-storage from the secure list? I've never seen
> them really being used for real virtualization installations, and I think
> they are not that well tested?
We've shipped them as part of RHEL essentially forever so from a
downstream POV we're on the hook to support them.
I would see them as a way to provide adhoc removable storage to a
VM which doesn't require any special drivers, since everything
supports USB storage for 20+ years. We don't have a SCSI controller
beyond virtio-scsi that's declared secure, and SCSI isn't
accessible to unprivileged users, so USB is useful for desktop
virtualization use cases IMHO.
>
> With those two hunks being removed:
> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
>
With regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :|
|: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-06 12:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-29 13:12 [PATCH v2 00/28] Mark user creatable devices for secure for virt use case Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 01/28] hw: mark all virtio PCI devices as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 11:35 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 02/28] hw: mark all virtio CCW " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 11:38 ` Thomas Huth
2026-11-06 12:51 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 03/28] hw: mark all vhost devices a secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 11:39 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 04/28] hw: mark all remaining virtio object types as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 11:52 ` Thomas Huth
2026-11-06 14:35 ` Marc-André Lureau
2026-11-06 14:40 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 14:52 ` Marc-André Lureau
2026-11-06 17:33 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-12 19:01 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 05/28] hw/vfio: mark all VFIO object classes " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 11:54 ` Thomas Huth
2026-11-10 15:15 ` Cédric Le Goater
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 06/28] hw/xen: mark all Xen related object types as being secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 07/28] hw/net: mark e1000, e1000e, IGB, rtl8139 & sPAPR VLAN as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 11:57 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 08/28] hw/usb: mark commonly used USB devices/hosts " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:05 ` Thomas Huth
2026-11-06 12:21 ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 09/28] hw/watchdog: mark some watchdog devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:14 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 10/28] hw/scsi: mark spapr SCSI controller " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:15 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 11/28] hw/scsi: mark SCSI disk endpoint devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:15 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 12/28] hw/ide: mark ICH9 and ide-hd/ide-cd " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:32 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 13/28] hw: define most common PCI types " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:16 ` Thomas Huth
2026-11-06 12:19 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 14/28] hw/pci-host: mark common x86, ppc, arm and s390 PCI hosts " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:38 ` Thomas Huth
2026-11-06 12:54 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 15/28] hw/display: mark bochs, ramfb and VGA " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:20 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 16/28] hw/tpm: mark all TPM implementations " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 17/28] hw/misc: mark pvpanic, vmcoreinfo " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 18/28] hw/audio: mark Intel HDA devices & codecs " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 19/28] hw/char: mark common serial / console devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 20/28] hw/mem: mark nvdimm, pc-dimm & spapr-nvdimm " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:40 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 21/28] hw/uefi: mark the EFI vars service " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 22/28] hw/acpi: mark erst, vmclock and vmgenid devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 23/28] hw: mark KVM clock and RTC " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:30 ` Thomas Huth
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 24/28] hw: device AMD, Intel and ARM IOMMUs " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 25/28] hw/input: mark PS/2 and PC Keyboard devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 26/28] hw/i386: mark vmmouse / vmport " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 27/28] hw/display: mark cirrus and QXL " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:23 ` Thomas Huth
2026-11-06 14:32 ` Marc-André Lureau
2026-10-29 13:12 ` [PATCH v2 28/28] hw/usb: mark UHCI, OCHI & ECHI USB hosts " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-11-06 12:28 ` Thomas Huth
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