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From: Alejandro Colomar <alx+linux-man@kernel.org>
To: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
	linux-man@vger.kernel.org,
	 Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	 Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/8] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 02:13:40 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <avz6f7OyIVCKusQ3@devuan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261103202211.13820-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com>

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Hi Günther,

> Date: 2026-11-03 21:22:06+0100
> From: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
>
> Reword the description of SCM_SECURITY to not be specific to SELinux.
> 
> The security context is populated in scm_passec() in linux.git
> net/core/scm.c, through the security_secid_to_secctx() LSM hook, which
> is currently implemented by SELinux, Smack and AppArmor.
> 
> As clarified in [1], the returned security context is in the general
> case a byte buffer, not a null-terminated string.  The only LSM that
> returns a buffer with trailing null byte is SELinux, but even that is
> not guaranteed in case that the message is truncated.
> 
> Link: [1] <https://lore.kernel.org/all/auZcwYWv0NeiIR8d@google.com/>
> Fixes: ffad6a017f91 (2018-07-28; "unix.7: Document SCM_SECURITY ancillary data")
> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
> Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> ---
> 
> Notes:
>     This feature is also available in other LSMs.  Unfortunately, they
>     implemented it inconsistently and that complicates the description of
>     how string boundaries are handled.  Linux does indeed neither
>     guarantee that this terminates with a NUL byte, nor that NAME_MAX is
>     large enough to hold it.
>     
>     After confirmation from Kuniyuki Iwashima, this documents it as
>     returning a byte buffer.
>     
>     I prefer this variant over the previous longer one, also because it
>     refers to the individual LSMs for the exact format.  A reader of the
>     security context will require LSM-specific documentation anyway to
>     interpret the security context.
>     
>     This patch is still LLM-assisted, but at this point, since everything
>     is rewritten now, the only LLM-assisted part is the discovery that
>     this part of the documentation could be improved.

You may use 'Reported-by: LLM' for distinguishing such cases.

> 
>  man/man7/unix.7 | 19 +++++++++++--------
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/man/man7/unix.7 b/man/man7/unix.7
> index 61f06a74359b..c0e2bdbacdd8 100644
> --- a/man/man7/unix.7
> +++ b/man/man7/unix.7
> @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ .SS Socket options
>  is an integer boolean flag.
>  .TP
>  .B SO_PASSSEC
> -Enables receiving of the SELinux security label of the peer socket
> +Enables receiving of the security label of the peer socket
>  in an ancillary message of type
>  .B SCM_SECURITY
>  (see below).
> @@ -538,13 +538,16 @@ .SS Ancillary messages
>  option must be enabled on the socket.
>  .TP
>  .B SCM_SECURITY
> -Receive the SELinux security context (the security label)
> -of the peer socket.
> -The received ancillary data is a null-terminated string containing
> -the security context.
> -The receiver should allocate at least
> -.B NAME_MAX
> -bytes in the data portion of the ancillary message for this data.
> +Receive the security context (the security label)
> +of the peer socket,
> +as provided by the active Linux Security Module (LSM).
> +The received ancillary data is a byte buffer.
> +.IP
> +The exact format of the security context buffer
> +is defined by the active major LSM.
> +For example,
> +SELinux returns a SELinux label as a string
> +(including a terminating null byte).

Considering that the interface doesn't promise to respect the null byte
written by SELinux, I think I'd entirely remove this example, and
instead focus on disclaiming that regardless of the format, the buffer
is truncated in a way that destroys the format.

I'm not an expert of this feature (actually, never used it at all), so
maybe some silly question:

How is a user supposed to know how much space to provide to prevent this
problematic truncation?  Is there a buffer size that will guarantee no
truncation?  If so, we should instruct programmers to use it.  And if
there's no possible size that fits all, we should probably warn about
it.


Have a lovely night!
Alex

>  .IP
>  To receive the security context, the
>  .B SO_PASSSEC
> -- 
> 2.56.0
> 
> 

-- 
<https://www.alejandro-colomar.es>

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18  1:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-03 20:22 [PATCH v2 0/8] unix.7: Socket Options and SCM_* fixes Günther Noack
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] man/man7/unix.7: ERRORS: ETOOMANYREFS: Fix the conditions Günther Noack
2026-11-06 13:00   ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] man/man7/unix.7: Multiple same-typed SCM_* messages may be sent in one message Günther Noack
2026-11-16  0:52   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-18  0:59     ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] man/man7/unix.7: Autobind: Clarify when it happens, and mention SO_PASSPIDFD Günther Noack
2026-11-16  0:53   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-18  1:06     ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] man/man7/unix.7: SCM_SECURITY: Generalize to other LSMs, not just SELinux Günther Noack
2026-11-16  0:55   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-16  7:35     ` Günther Noack
2026-11-18  1:15       ` Alejandro Colomar
2026-11-18  1:13   ` Alejandro Colomar [this message]
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] man/man7/unix.7: SO_PASSSEC: wfix Günther Noack
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSPIDFD, SO_PEERPIDFD, and SCM_PIDFD Günther Noack
2026-11-16  1:03   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] man/man7/unix.7: Document SO_PASSRIGHTS Günther Noack
2026-11-16  1:02   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-11-03 20:22 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] man/man7/unix.7: Remove mentions of "namespace" in the general sense Günther Noack
2026-11-16  0:59   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima

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