All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@kernel.org>
To: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: hwprobe: Avoid uninitialized read in hwprobe_get_cpus()
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 16:24:45 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dda194a3-aa0f-4284-882d-7bfd0317edb1@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMdZqKEpxT3vzE97LbaxP9grg5wi3aeArzgdyORHyGz=ZsDe0g@mail.gmail.com>

On 16/6/26 1:53 pm, Mark Harris wrote:
> Michael Ellerman wrote:
>>
>> On 12/6/26 2:55 pm, Mark Harris wrote:
>>> When cpusetsize < cpumask_size(), hwprobe_get_cpus() did not fully
>>> initialize its copy of the cpu mask, which could cause non-deterministic
>>> results from the riscv_hwprobe syscall on a system with more than 8 CPUs
>>> when the supplied cpu mask is empty.  Address this by fully initializing
>>> the cpu mask.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com>
>>> ---
>>>    arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c | 1 +
>>>    1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>>
>> This should have a fixes tag, I think it's:
>>
>> Fixes: e178bf146e4b ("RISC-V: hwprobe: Introduce which-cpus flag")
> 
> Yes, that looks correct.
> 
>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c
>>> index 1659d31fd288..caf6762427c8 100644
>>> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c
>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c
>>> @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ static int hwprobe_get_cpus(struct riscv_hwprobe __user *pairs,
>>>        if (cpusetsize > cpumask_size())
>>>                cpusetsize = cpumask_size();
>>>
>>> +     cpumask_clear(&cpus);
>>>        ret = copy_from_user(&cpus, cpus_user, cpusetsize);
>>>        if (ret)
>>>                return -EFAULT;
>>
>> cpus is on the stack, and is copied back out at the end of the function,
>> so this looks like it could be a stack info leak.
>>
>> But the copy back is also bounded by cpusetsize, so in fact there is not
>> any leak of uninitialised stack out to userspace:
>>
>>           ret = copy_to_user(cpus_user, &cpus, cpusetsize);
>>           if (ret)
>>                   return -EFAULT;
> 
> It can leak 1 bit of information from the kernel stack.  For example
> with 16 CPUs, all online, if a 1-byte 0x00 mask is supplied, the
> caller can determine whether the second (uninitialized) mask byte is
> zero or non-zero due to the cpumask_empty(&cpus) check.
Oh yep, because the caller can observe if cpus was/wasn't overwritten 
with the cpus_online_mask.

I guess that counts as an info leak, it doesn't let an attacker 
reconstruct actual values from the stack, but a zero/non-zero check 
could be useful in theory.

cheers

_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@kernel.org>
To: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: hwprobe: Avoid uninitialized read in hwprobe_get_cpus()
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 16:24:45 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dda194a3-aa0f-4284-882d-7bfd0317edb1@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMdZqKEpxT3vzE97LbaxP9grg5wi3aeArzgdyORHyGz=ZsDe0g@mail.gmail.com>

On 16/6/26 1:53 pm, Mark Harris wrote:
> Michael Ellerman wrote:
>>
>> On 12/6/26 2:55 pm, Mark Harris wrote:
>>> When cpusetsize < cpumask_size(), hwprobe_get_cpus() did not fully
>>> initialize its copy of the cpu mask, which could cause non-deterministic
>>> results from the riscv_hwprobe syscall on a system with more than 8 CPUs
>>> when the supplied cpu mask is empty.  Address this by fully initializing
>>> the cpu mask.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com>
>>> ---
>>>    arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c | 1 +
>>>    1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>>
>> This should have a fixes tag, I think it's:
>>
>> Fixes: e178bf146e4b ("RISC-V: hwprobe: Introduce which-cpus flag")
> 
> Yes, that looks correct.
> 
>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c
>>> index 1659d31fd288..caf6762427c8 100644
>>> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c
>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c
>>> @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ static int hwprobe_get_cpus(struct riscv_hwprobe __user *pairs,
>>>        if (cpusetsize > cpumask_size())
>>>                cpusetsize = cpumask_size();
>>>
>>> +     cpumask_clear(&cpus);
>>>        ret = copy_from_user(&cpus, cpus_user, cpusetsize);
>>>        if (ret)
>>>                return -EFAULT;
>>
>> cpus is on the stack, and is copied back out at the end of the function,
>> so this looks like it could be a stack info leak.
>>
>> But the copy back is also bounded by cpusetsize, so in fact there is not
>> any leak of uninitialised stack out to userspace:
>>
>>           ret = copy_to_user(cpus_user, &cpus, cpusetsize);
>>           if (ret)
>>                   return -EFAULT;
> 
> It can leak 1 bit of information from the kernel stack.  For example
> with 16 CPUs, all online, if a 1-byte 0x00 mask is supplied, the
> caller can determine whether the second (uninitialized) mask byte is
> zero or non-zero due to the cpumask_empty(&cpus) check.
Oh yep, because the caller can observe if cpus was/wasn't overwritten 
with the cpus_online_mask.

I guess that counts as an info leak, it doesn't let an attacker 
reconstruct actual values from the stack, but a zero/non-zero check 
could be useful in theory.

cheers

  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-17  6:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-12  4:55 [PATCH] riscv: hwprobe: Avoid uninitialized read in hwprobe_get_cpus() Mark Harris
2026-06-12  4:55 ` Mark Harris
2026-06-12 21:50 ` Nam Cao
2026-06-12 21:50   ` Nam Cao
2026-06-16  3:05 ` Michael Ellerman
2026-06-16  3:05   ` Michael Ellerman
2026-06-16  3:53   ` Mark Harris
2026-06-16  3:53     ` Mark Harris
2026-06-17  6:24     ` Michael Ellerman [this message]
2026-06-17  6:24       ` Michael Ellerman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=dda194a3-aa0f-4284-882d-7bfd0317edb1@kernel.org \
    --to=mpe@kernel.org \
    --cc=alex@ghiti.fr \
    --cc=aou@eecs.berkeley.edu \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=mark.hsj@gmail.com \
    --cc=palmer@dabbelt.com \
    --cc=paul.walmsley@sifive.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.