* [PATCH v4 11/16] s390x: protvirt: Move diag 308 data over SIDAD
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
For protected guests the IPIB is written/read to/from the satellite
block, so we need those accesses to go through
s390_cpu_pv_mem_read/write().
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
target/s390x/diag.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/s390x/diag.c b/target/s390x/diag.c
index aedc774695..be80c0367b 100644
--- a/target/s390x/diag.c
+++ b/target/s390x/diag.c
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int diag308_parm_check(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t addr,
void handle_diag_308(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
{
CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
+ S390CPU *cpu = S390_CPU(cs);
uint64_t addr = env->regs[r1];
uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3];
IplParameterBlock *iplb;
@@ -119,13 +120,22 @@ void handle_diag_308(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
return;
}
iplb = g_new0(IplParameterBlock, 1);
- cpu_physical_memory_read(addr, iplb, sizeof(iplb->len));
+ if (!env->pv) {
+ cpu_physical_memory_read(addr, iplb, sizeof(iplb->len));
+ } else {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_read(cpu, 0, iplb, sizeof(iplb->len));
+ }
+
if (!iplb_valid_len(iplb)) {
env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_308_RC_INVALID;
goto out;
}
- cpu_physical_memory_read(addr, iplb, be32_to_cpu(iplb->len));
+ if (!env->pv) {
+ cpu_physical_memory_read(addr, iplb, be32_to_cpu(iplb->len));
+ } else {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_read(cpu, 0, iplb, be32_to_cpu(iplb->len));
+ }
if (!iplb_valid_ccw(iplb) && !iplb_valid_fcp(iplb) &&
!(iplb_valid_pv(iplb) && s390_ipl_pv_check_components(iplb) >= 0)) {
@@ -137,7 +147,7 @@ void handle_diag_308(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_308_RC_OK;
out:
g_free(iplb);
- return;
+ break;
case DIAG308_STORE:
case DIAG308_PV_STORE:
if (diag308_parm_check(env, r1, addr, ra, true)) {
@@ -148,12 +158,18 @@ out:
} else {
iplb = s390_ipl_get_iplb();
}
- if (iplb) {
- cpu_physical_memory_write(addr, iplb, be32_to_cpu(iplb->len));
- env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_308_RC_OK;
- } else {
+ if (!iplb) {
env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF;
+ return;
}
+
+ if (!env->pv) {
+ cpu_physical_memory_write(addr, iplb, be32_to_cpu(iplb->len));
+ } else {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_write(cpu, 0, iplb, be32_to_cpu(iplb->len));
+ }
+
+ env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_308_RC_OK;
break;
case DIAG308_PV_START:
iplb = s390_ipl_get_iplb_secure();
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 04/16] s390x: protvirt: Add migration blocker
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Migration is not yet supported.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c b/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c
index aa974d294e..6fba8d9331 100644
--- a/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c
+++ b/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@
#include "hw/s390x/tod.h"
#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
#include "hw/s390x/pv.h"
+#include "migration/blocker.h"
+
+static Error *pv_mig_blocker;
S390CPU *s390_cpu_addr2state(uint16_t cpu_addr)
{
@@ -387,6 +390,7 @@ static void s390_machine_reset(MachineState *machine)
CPUState *cs, *t;
S390CPU *cpu;
S390CcwMachineState *ms = S390_CCW_MACHINE(machine);
+ static Error *local_err;
/* get the reset parameters, reset them once done */
s390_ipl_get_reset_request(&cs, &reset_type);
@@ -436,13 +440,20 @@ static void s390_machine_reset(MachineState *machine)
}
run_on_cpu(cs, s390_do_cpu_reset, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
- if (s390_machine_protect(ms)) {
+ if (!pv_mig_blocker) {
+ error_setg(&pv_mig_blocker,
+ "protected VMs are currently not migrateable.");
+ }
+ migrate_add_blocker(pv_mig_blocker, &local_err);
+ if (!local_err && s390_machine_protect(ms)) {
s390_machine_inject_pv_error(cs);
- s390_cpu_set_state(S390_CPU_STATE_OPERATING, cpu);
- return;
+ migrate_del_blocker(pv_mig_blocker);
+ goto pv_err;
}
run_on_cpu(cs, s390_do_cpu_load_normal, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
+pv_err:
+ s390_cpu_set_state(S390_CPU_STATE_OPERATING, cpu);
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 16/16] docs: Add protvirt docs
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Lets add some documentation for the Protected VM functionality.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
docs/protvirt.rst | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 docs/protvirt.rst
diff --git a/docs/protvirt.rst b/docs/protvirt.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8bfa72be01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/protvirt.rst
@@ -0,1 +1,53 @@
+Protected Virtualization on s390x
+========================
+The memory and most of the register contents of Protected Virtual
+Machines (PVMs) are inaccessible to the hypervisor, effectively
+prohibiting VM introspection when the VM is running. At rest, PVMs are
+encrypted and can only be decrypted by the firmware of specific IBM Z
+machines.
+
+
+Prerequisites
+-------------
+To run PVMs, you need to have a machine with the Protected
+Virtualization feature, which is indicated by the Ultravisor Call
+facility (stfle bit 158). This is a KVM only feature, therefore you
+need a KVM which is able to support PVMs and activate the Ultravisor
+initialization by setting "prot_virt=1" on the kernel command line.
+
+If those requirements are met, the capability "KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED"
+will indicate that KVM can support PVMs on that LPAR.
+
+
+QEMU Settings
+-------------
+To indicate to the VM that it can move into protected mode, the
+"Unpack facility" (stfle bit 161) needs to be part of the cpu model of
+the VM.
+
+All I/O devices need to use the IOMMU.
+Passthrough devices are currently not supported.
+
+Host huge page backings are not supported. The guest however can use
+huge pages as indicated by its facilities.
+
+
+Boot Process
+-----------------
+A secure guest image can be booted from disk and using the QEMU
+command line. Booting from disk is done by the unmodified s390-ccw
+BIOS. I.e., the bootmap is interpreted and a number of components is
+read into memory and control is transferred to one of the components
+(zipl stage3), which does some fixups and then transfers control to
+some program residing in guest memory, which is normally the OS
+kernel. The secure image has another component prepended (stage3a)
+which uses the new diag308 subcodes 8 and 10 to trigger the transition
+into secure mode.
+
+Booting from the command line requires that the file passed
+via -kernel has the same memory layout as would result from the disk
+boot. This memory layout includes the encrypted components (kernel,
+initrd, cmdline), the stage3a loader and metadata. In case this boot
+method is used, the command line options -initrd and -cmdline are
+ineffective. The preparation of secure guest image is done by a
+program (name tbd) of the s390-tools package.
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v3 09/37] KVM: s390: protvirt: Add initial vm and cpu lifecycle handling
From: David Hildenbrand @ 2020-02-20 13:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Borntraeger, Janosch Frank
Cc: KVM, Cornelia Huck, Thomas Huth, Ulrich Weigand, Claudio Imbrenda,
linux-s390, Michael Mueller, Vasily Gorbik, Janosch Frank
In-Reply-To: <20200220104020.5343-10-borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
> +static int kvm_s390_handle_pv(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pv_cmd *cmd)
> +{
> + int r = 0;
> + u16 dummy;
> + void __user *argp = (void __user *)cmd->data;
> +
> + switch (cmd->cmd) {
> + case KVM_PV_ENABLE: {
> + r = -EINVAL;
> + if (kvm_s390_pv_is_protected(kvm))
> + break;
> +
> + r = kvm_s390_pv_alloc_vm(kvm);
> + if (r)
> + break;
> +
> + /* FMT 4 SIE needs esca */
> + r = sca_switch_to_extended(kvm);
> + if (r) {
> + kvm_s390_pv_dealloc_vm(kvm);
> + kvm_s390_vcpu_unblock_all(kvm);
You forgot to remove that.
> + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
That's certainly wrong as well.
> + break;
> + }
> + r = kvm_s390_pv_create_vm(kvm, &cmd->rc, &cmd->rrc);
> + if (!r)
> + r = kvm_s390_cpus_to_pv(kvm, &cmd->rc, &cmd->rrc);
> + if (r)
> + kvm_s390_pv_destroy_vm(kvm, &dummy, &dummy);
Should there be a kvm_s390_pv_dealloc_vm() as well?
> +
> + break;
> + }
> + case KVM_PV_DISABLE: {
> + r = -EINVAL;
> + if (!kvm_s390_pv_is_protected(kvm))
> + break;
> +
> + kvm_s390_cpus_from_pv(kvm, &cmd->rc, &cmd->rrc);
> + r = kvm_s390_pv_destroy_vm(kvm, &cmd->rc, &cmd->rrc);
> + if (!r)
> + kvm_s390_pv_dealloc_vm(kvm);
Hm, if destroy fails, the CPUs would already have been removed.
Is there a way to make kvm_s390_pv_destroy_vm() never fail? The return
value is always ignored except here ... which looks wrong.
> + break;
> + }
[...]
> @@ -2558,10 +2724,21 @@ static void kvm_free_vcpus(struct kvm *kvm)
>
> void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> + u16 rc, rrc;
> kvm_free_vcpus(kvm);
> sca_dispose(kvm);
> - debug_unregister(kvm->arch.dbf);
> kvm_s390_gisa_destroy(kvm);
> + /*
> + * We are already at the end of life and kvm->lock is not taken.
> + * This is ok as the file descriptor is closed by now and nobody
> + * can mess with the pv state. To avoid lockdep_assert_held from
> + * complaining we do not use kvm_s390_pv_is_protected.
> + */
> + if (kvm_s390_pv_get_handle(kvm)) {
I'd prefer something like kvm_s390_pv_is_protected_unlocked(), but I
guess for these few use cases, this is fine.
> + kvm_s390_pv_destroy_vm(kvm, &rc, &rrc);
> + kvm_s390_pv_dealloc_vm(kvm);
> + }
> + debug_unregister(kvm->arch.dbf);
> free_page((unsigned long)kvm->arch.sie_page2);
> if (!kvm_is_ucontrol(kvm))
> gmap_remove(kvm->arch.gmap);
> @@ -2657,6 +2834,9 @@ static int sca_switch_to_extended(struct kvm *kvm)
> unsigned int vcpu_idx;
> u32 scaol, scaoh;
>
> + if (kvm->arch.use_esca)
> + return 0;
> +
> new_sca = alloc_pages_exact(sizeof(*new_sca), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
> if (!new_sca)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -2908,6 +3088,7 @@ static void kvm_s390_vcpu_setup_model(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> static int kvm_s390_vcpu_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> int rc = 0;
> + u16 uvrc, uvrrc;
>
> atomic_set(&vcpu->arch.sie_block->cpuflags, CPUSTAT_ZARCH |
> CPUSTAT_SM |
> @@ -2975,6 +3156,11 @@ static int kvm_s390_vcpu_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_setup(vcpu);
>
> + mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
> + if (kvm_s390_pv_is_protected(vcpu->kvm))
> + rc = kvm_s390_pv_create_cpu(vcpu, &uvrc, &uvrrc);
> + mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
Do we have to cleanup anything? (e.g., cmma page) I *think*
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() is not called when kvm_arch_vcpu_create() fails ...
> +
> return rc;
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.h b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.h
> index 83dabb18e4d9..d62de29b2d6c 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.h
> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.h
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
> #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
> #include <linux/kvm.h>
> #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
> +#include <linux/lockdep.h>
> #include <asm/facility.h>
> #include <asm/processor.h>
> #include <asm/sclp.h>
> @@ -207,6 +208,40 @@ static inline int kvm_s390_user_cpu_state_ctrl(struct kvm *kvm)
> return kvm->arch.user_cpu_state_ctrl != 0;
> }
>
> +/* implemented in pv.c */
> +void kvm_s390_pv_dealloc_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
> +int kvm_s390_pv_alloc_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
> +int kvm_s390_pv_create_vm(struct kvm *kvm, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc);
> +int kvm_s390_pv_create_cpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc);
> +int kvm_s390_pv_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc);
> +void kvm_s390_pv_destroy_cpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc);
> +int kvm_s390_pv_set_sec_parms(struct kvm *kvm, void *hdr, u64 length, u16 *rc,
> + u16 *rrc);
> +int kvm_s390_pv_unpack(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
> + unsigned long tweak, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc);
> +
> +static inline u64 kvm_s390_pv_get_handle(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + return kvm->arch.pv.handle;
> +}
> +
> +static inline u64 kvm_s390_pv_cpu_get_handle(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + return vcpu->arch.pv.handle;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool kvm_s390_pv_is_protected(struct kvm *kvm)
Could have been "kvm_s390_is_protected" or "kvm_s390_is_pv", but also
fine with me. (maybe I even suggested that one without caring about that
detail :) )
[...]
> +
> /* implemented in interrupt.c */
> int kvm_s390_handle_wait(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void kvm_s390_vcpu_wakeup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/pv.c b/arch/s390/kvm/pv.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..67ea9a18ed8f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/pv.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Hosting Secure Execution virtual machines
> + *
> + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2019
> + * Author(s): Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
I'd assume you're an author as well at this point ;)
[...]
> +
> +int kvm_s390_pv_set_sec_parms(struct kvm *kvm, void *hdr, u64 length, u16 *rc,
> + u16 *rrc)
> +{
> + struct uv_cb_ssc uvcb = {
> + .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_SET_SEC_CONF_PARAMS,
> + .header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
> + .sec_header_origin = (u64)hdr,
> + .sec_header_len = length,
> + .guest_handle = kvm_s390_pv_get_handle(kvm),
> + };
> + int cc;
> +
> + cc = uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb);
int cc = ... could be done.
> + *rc = uvcb.header.rc;
> + *rrc = uvcb.header.rrc;
> + KVM_UV_EVENT(kvm, 3, "PROTVIRT VM SET PARMS: rc %x rrc %x",
> + *rc, *rrc);
> + if (cc)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int unpack_one(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long addr, u64 tweak[2],
> + u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)
> +{
> + struct uv_cb_unp uvcb = {
> + .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_UNPACK_IMG,
> + .header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
> + .guest_handle = kvm_s390_pv_get_handle(kvm),
> + .gaddr = addr,
> + .tweak[0] = tweak[0],
> + .tweak[1] = tweak[1],
> + };
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = gmap_make_secure(kvm->arch.gmap, addr, &uvcb);
... similarly, with ret.
> + *rc = uvcb.header.rc;
> + *rrc = uvcb.header.rrc;
> +
> + if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN)
> + KVM_UV_EVENT(kvm, 3, "PROTVIRT VM UNPACK: failed addr %llx with rc %x rrc %x",
> + uvcb.gaddr, *rc, *rrc);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +int kvm_s390_pv_unpack(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
> + unsigned long tweak, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)
> +{
> + u64 tw[2] = {tweak, 0};
I have no idea what tweaks are in this context. So I have to trust you
guys on the implementation, because I don't understand it.
Especially, why can't we simply have
s/tweak/tweak/
offset = 0;
while (offset < size) {
...
ret = unpack_one(kvm, addr, tweak, offset, rc, rrc);
^ no idea what tweak is
...
... offset += PAGE_SIZE;
}
But maybe I am missing what the whole array is about.
> + int ret = 0;
> +
> + if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK || !size || size & ~PAGE_MASK)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + KVM_UV_EVENT(kvm, 3, "PROTVIRT VM UNPACK: start addr %lx size %lx",
> + addr, size);
> +
> + while (tw[1] < size) {> + ret = unpack_one(kvm, addr, tw, rc, rrc);
> + if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
> + cond_resched();
> + if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
> + break;
> + continue;
> + }
> + if (ret)
> + break;
> + addr += PAGE_SIZE;
> + tw[1] += PAGE_SIZE;
> + }
> + if (!ret)
> + KVM_UV_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", "PROTVIRT VM UNPACK: successful");
> + return ret;
> +}
[...]
> +enum pv_cmd_id {
> + KVM_PV_ENABLE,
> + KVM_PV_DISABLE,
> + KVM_PV_VM_SET_SEC_PARMS,
> + KVM_PV_VM_UNPACK,
> + KVM_PV_VM_VERIFY,
I wonder if we should just drop "_VM" from all of these ...
[...]
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v4 09/16] s390x: protvirt: SCLP interpretation
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
SCLP for a protected guest is done over the SIDAD, so we need to use
the s390_cpu_virt_mem_* functions to access the SIDAD instead of guest
memory when reading/writing SCBs.
To not confuse the sclp emulation, we set 0x4000 as the SCCB address,
since the function that injects the sclp external interrupt would
reject a zero sccb address.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
hw/s390x/sclp.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
include/hw/s390x/sclp.h | 2 ++
target/s390x/kvm.c | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/s390x/sclp.c b/hw/s390x/sclp.c
index af0bfbc2ec..5136f5fcbe 100644
--- a/hw/s390x/sclp.c
+++ b/hw/s390x/sclp.c
@@ -193,6 +193,23 @@ static void sclp_execute(SCLPDevice *sclp, SCCB *sccb, uint32_t code)
}
}
+#define SCLP_PV_DUMMY_ADDR 0x4000
+int sclp_service_call_protected(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t sccb,
+ uint32_t code)
+{
+ SCLPDevice *sclp = get_sclp_device();
+ SCLPDeviceClass *sclp_c = SCLP_GET_CLASS(sclp);
+ SCCB work_sccb;
+ hwaddr sccb_len = sizeof(SCCB);
+
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_read(env_archcpu(env), 0, &work_sccb, sccb_len);
+ sclp_c->execute(sclp, &work_sccb, code);
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_write(env_archcpu(env), 0, &work_sccb,
+ be16_to_cpu(work_sccb.h.length));
+ sclp_c->service_interrupt(sclp, SCLP_PV_DUMMY_ADDR);
+ return 0;
+}
+
int sclp_service_call(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t sccb, uint32_t code)
{
SCLPDevice *sclp = get_sclp_device();
diff --git a/include/hw/s390x/sclp.h b/include/hw/s390x/sclp.h
index c54413b78c..c0a3faa37d 100644
--- a/include/hw/s390x/sclp.h
+++ b/include/hw/s390x/sclp.h
@@ -217,5 +217,7 @@ void s390_sclp_init(void);
void sclp_service_interrupt(uint32_t sccb);
void raise_irq_cpu_hotplug(void);
int sclp_service_call(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t sccb, uint32_t code);
+int sclp_service_call_protected(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t sccb,
+ uint32_t code);
#endif
diff --git a/target/s390x/kvm.c b/target/s390x/kvm.c
index 3a5a5146e3..31dd49729b 100644
--- a/target/s390x/kvm.c
+++ b/target/s390x/kvm.c
@@ -1224,6 +1224,11 @@ static void kvm_sclp_service_call(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run,
sccb = env->regs[ipbh0 & 0xf];
code = env->regs[(ipbh0 & 0xf0) >> 4];
+ if (run->s390_sieic.icptcode == ICPT_PV_INSTR) {
+ sclp_service_call_protected(env, sccb, code);
+ return;
+ }
+
r = sclp_service_call(env, sccb, code);
if (r < 0) {
kvm_s390_program_interrupt(cpu, -r);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 08/16] s390x: protvirt: Move STSI data over SIDAD
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
For protected guests, we need to put the STSI emulation results into
the SIDA, so SIE will write them into the guest at the next entry.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
target/s390x/kvm.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/s390x/kvm.c b/target/s390x/kvm.c
index f222836df5..3a5a5146e3 100644
--- a/target/s390x/kvm.c
+++ b/target/s390x/kvm.c
@@ -1795,11 +1795,16 @@ static int handle_tsch(S390CPU *cpu)
static void insert_stsi_3_2_2(S390CPU *cpu, __u64 addr, uint8_t ar)
{
+ CPUS390XState *env = &cpu->env;
SysIB_322 sysib;
int del;
- if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, ar, &sysib, sizeof(sysib))) {
- return;
+ if (env->pv) {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_read(cpu, 0, &sysib, sizeof(sysib));
+ } else {
+ if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, ar, &sysib, sizeof(sysib))) {
+ return;
+ }
}
/* Shift the stack of Extended Names to prepare for our own data */
memmove(&sysib.ext_names[1], &sysib.ext_names[0],
@@ -1838,7 +1843,11 @@ static void insert_stsi_3_2_2(S390CPU *cpu, __u64 addr, uint8_t ar)
/* Insert UUID */
memcpy(sysib.vm[0].uuid, &qemu_uuid, sizeof(sysib.vm[0].uuid));
- s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, ar, &sysib, sizeof(sysib));
+ if (env->pv) {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_write(cpu, 0, &sysib, sizeof(sysib));
+ } else {
+ s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, ar, &sysib, sizeof(sysib));
+ }
}
static int handle_stsi(S390CPU *cpu)
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 05/16] s390x: protvirt: Handle diag 308 subcodes 0,1,3,4
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
As we now have access to the protection state of the cpus, we can
implement special handling of diag 308 subcodes for cpus in the
protected state.
For subcodes 0 and 1 we need to unshare all pages before continuing,
so the guest doesn't accidentally expose data when dumping.
For subcode 3/4 we tear down the protected VM and reboot into
unprotected mode. We do not provide a secure reboot.
Before we can do the unshare calls, we need to mark all cpus as
stopped.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
target/s390x/diag.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c b/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c
index 6fba8d9331..48dd3170ab 100644
--- a/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c
+++ b/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c
@@ -384,6 +384,20 @@ static void s390_machine_inject_pv_error(CPUState *cs)
env->regs[r1 + 1] = 0xa02;
}
+static void s390_pv_prepare_reset(CPUS390XState *env)
+{
+ CPUState *cs;
+
+ if (!env->pv) {
+ return;
+ }
+ CPU_FOREACH(cs) {
+ s390_cpu_set_state(S390_CPU_STATE_STOPPED, S390_CPU(cs));
+ }
+ s390_pv_unshare();
+ s390_pv_perf_clear_reset();
+}
+
static void s390_machine_reset(MachineState *machine)
{
enum s390_reset reset_type;
@@ -391,6 +405,7 @@ static void s390_machine_reset(MachineState *machine)
S390CPU *cpu;
S390CcwMachineState *ms = S390_CCW_MACHINE(machine);
static Error *local_err;
+ CPUS390XState *env;
/* get the reset parameters, reset them once done */
s390_ipl_get_reset_request(&cs, &reset_type);
@@ -399,10 +414,16 @@ static void s390_machine_reset(MachineState *machine)
s390_cmma_reset();
cpu = S390_CPU(cs);
+ env = &cpu->env;
switch (reset_type) {
case S390_RESET_EXTERNAL:
case S390_RESET_REIPL:
+ if (ms->pv) {
+ s390_machine_unprotect(ms);
+ migrate_del_blocker(pv_mig_blocker);
+ }
+
qemu_devices_reset();
s390_crypto_reset();
@@ -410,21 +431,31 @@ static void s390_machine_reset(MachineState *machine)
run_on_cpu(cs, s390_do_cpu_ipl, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
break;
case S390_RESET_MODIFIED_CLEAR:
+ /*
+ * Susbsystem reset needs to be done before we unshare memory
+ * and loose access to VIRTIO structures in guest memory.
+ */
+ subsystem_reset();
+ s390_crypto_reset();
+ s390_pv_prepare_reset(env);
CPU_FOREACH(t) {
run_on_cpu(t, s390_do_cpu_full_reset, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
}
- subsystem_reset();
- s390_crypto_reset();
run_on_cpu(cs, s390_do_cpu_load_normal, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
break;
case S390_RESET_LOAD_NORMAL:
+ /*
+ * Susbsystem reset needs to be done before we unshare memory
+ * and loose access to VIRTIO structures in guest memory.
+ */
+ subsystem_reset();
+ s390_pv_prepare_reset(env);
CPU_FOREACH(t) {
if (t == cs) {
continue;
}
run_on_cpu(t, s390_do_cpu_reset, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
}
- subsystem_reset();
run_on_cpu(cs, s390_do_cpu_initial_reset, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
run_on_cpu(cs, s390_do_cpu_load_normal, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
break;
diff --git a/target/s390x/diag.c b/target/s390x/diag.c
index 5e77d85652..aedc774695 100644
--- a/target/s390x/diag.c
+++ b/target/s390x/diag.c
@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@ int handle_diag_288(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3)
static int diag308_parm_check(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t addr,
uintptr_t ra, bool write)
{
+ /* Handled by the Ultravisor */
+ if (env->pv) {
+ return 0;
+ }
if ((r1 & 1) || (addr & ~TARGET_PAGE_MASK)) {
s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_SPECIFICATION, ra);
return -1;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [arm64, debug] PTRACE_SINGLESTEP does not single-step a valid instruction
From: Mark Rutland @ 2020-02-20 13:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Will Deacon; +Cc: Luis Machado, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20200213120115.GD1405@willie-the-truck>
Hi Will, Luis,
On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 12:01:16PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> Sorry for the very slow reply. I talked to Mark about this a bit but it
> seems that we never followed up here.
>
> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 05:00:18PM -0300, Luis Machado wrote:
> > Do you have any input regarding this particular situation?
> >
> > It would be nice to get this fixed before the release of another GDB
> > version, if the fix is to live in GDB itself.
>
> Basically, I'm very nervous about fixing this in the kernel because
> whatever we do will be visible to userspace. On the other hand, this
> part of the ptrace interface is only seriously used by GDB and we should
> make sure that it works well.
>
> Does the diff below solve the problem? If so, can you confirm that it
> doesn't appear to regress anything else for GDB?
>
> Cheers,
>
> Will
>
> --->8
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h
> index 7619f473155f..d825e3585e28 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/debug-monitors.h
> @@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ void disable_debug_monitors(enum dbg_active_el el);
>
> void user_rewind_single_step(struct task_struct *task);
> void user_fastforward_single_step(struct task_struct *task);
> +void user_regs_reset_single_step(struct user_pt_regs *regs,
> + struct task_struct *task);
>
> void kernel_enable_single_step(struct pt_regs *regs);
> void kernel_disable_single_step(void);
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c
> index 48222a4760c2..7569deb1eac1 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c
> @@ -141,17 +141,20 @@ postcore_initcall(debug_monitors_init);
> /*
> * Single step API and exception handling.
> */
> -static void set_regs_spsr_ss(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +static void set_user_regs_spsr_ss(struct user_pt_regs *regs)
> {
> regs->pstate |= DBG_SPSR_SS;
> }
> -NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(set_regs_spsr_ss);
> +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(set_user_regs_spsr_ss);
>
> -static void clear_regs_spsr_ss(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +static void clear_user_regs_spsr_ss(struct user_pt_regs *regs)
> {
> regs->pstate &= ~DBG_SPSR_SS;
> }
> -NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(clear_regs_spsr_ss);
> +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(clear_user_regs_spsr_ss);
> +
> +#define set_regs_spsr_ss(r) set_user_regs_spsr_ss(&(r)->user_regs)
> +#define clear_regs_spsr_ss(r) clear_user_regs_spsr_ss(&(r)->user_regs)
>
> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(debug_hook_lock);
> static LIST_HEAD(user_step_hook);
> @@ -404,6 +407,15 @@ void user_fastforward_single_step(struct task_struct *task)
> clear_regs_spsr_ss(task_pt_regs(task));
> }
>
> +void user_regs_reset_single_step(struct user_pt_regs *regs,
> + struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> + if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SINGLESTEP))
> + set_user_regs_spsr_ss(regs);
> + else
> + clear_user_regs_spsr_ss(regs);
> +}
> +
> /* Kernel API */
> void kernel_enable_single_step(struct pt_regs *regs)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
> index cd6e5fa48b9c..d479fbcbd0d2 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -1934,8 +1934,8 @@ static int valid_native_regs(struct user_pt_regs *regs)
> */
> int valid_user_regs(struct user_pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task)
> {
> - if (!test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SINGLESTEP))
> - regs->pstate &= ~DBG_SPSR_SS;
> + /* https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191118131525.GA4180@willie-the-truck */
> + user_regs_reset_single_step(regs, task);
I think this change means we do the right thing for signal entry/return
and ptrace messing with the regs. Instruction emulation seems to do the
right thing via skip_faulting_instruction().
I think there are a few more single-step edge cases lying around (e.g.
uprobes, rseq), but it looks like those have to be fixed separately. I
fear fixing uprobes might require a largler structural change to single
step, but ignoring uprobes the changes above seem to be sound.
If userspace doesn't consume the SS value today, I wonder if we should
hide it when dumping the SPSR to userspace, so that userspace has a
consistent view regardless of whether it's being stepped.
I'll try to dig into the uprobes stuff this afternoon, just in case that
needs us to do something substantially different.
The existing logic in valid_user_regs() doesn't make sense to me, given
SPSR_EL1.SS is immaterial unless MSCDR_EL1.SS == 1. I'm not sure if that
was overzealous or I've forgotten an edge case that we cared about in
the past.
>
> if (is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(task)))
> return valid_compat_regs(regs);
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
> index 339882db5a91..bc54bdbfd760 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
> @@ -505,8 +505,12 @@ static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs,
> forget_syscall(regs);
>
> err |= !valid_user_regs(®s->user_regs, current);
> - if (err == 0)
> +
> + if (err == 0) {
> + /* Make it look like we stepped the sigreturn system call */
> + user_fastforward_single_step(current);
> err = parse_user_sigframe(&user, sf);
> + }
I don't understand this. AFAICT we don't likewise for other SVCs, so
either I'm missing that, or there's something else I'm missing.
Why do we need to step sigreturn but not SVC generally?
Thanks,
Mark.
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 1/2] drm/i915: Double check bumping after the spinlock
From: Matthew Auld @ 2020-02-20 13:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wilson, intel-gfx
In-Reply-To: <20200220123608.1666271-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
On 20/02/2020 12:36, Chris Wilson wrote:
> In preparation for making GEM execbuf parallel, we need to be prepared
> to handle very early declaration of dependencies -- even before our
> signaler has itself been submitted.
>
> References: a79ca656b648 ("drm/i915: Push the wakeref->count deferral to the backend")
> Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2 0/2] gpio: of: Add DT overlay support for GPIO hogs
From: Geert Uytterhoeven @ 2020-02-20 13:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Walleij, Bartosz Golaszewski, Pantelis Antoniou,
Frank Rowand, Rob Herring, Mark Rutland
Cc: Peter Ujfalusi, Chris Brandt, linux-gpio, devicetree,
linux-renesas-soc, linux-kernel, Geert Uytterhoeven
Hi all,
As GPIO hogs are configured at GPIO controller initialization time,
adding/removing GPIO hogs in Device Tree overlays currently does not
work. Hence this patch series adds support for that, by registering an
of_reconfig notifier, as is already done for platform, i2c, and SPI
devices.
Changes compared to v1[1]:
- Drop RFC state,
- Document that modifying existing gpio-hog nodes is not supported.
After I posted v1, Frank created a unittest[2] to demonstrate the
problem, and to verify to my series fixes it (thanks a lot!).
Thanks!
[1] "[PATCH/RFC 0/2] gpio: of: Add DT overlay support for GPIO hogs"
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191230133852.5890-1-geert+renesas@glider.be/
[2] "[RFC PATCH 0/2] of: unittest: add overlay gpio test to catch gpio hog
problem"
https://lore.kernel.org/r/1579070828-18221-1-git-send-email-frowand.list@gmail.com/
Geert Uytterhoeven (2):
gpio: of: Extract of_gpiochip_add_hog()
gpio: of: Add DT overlay support for GPIO hogs
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.h | 2 +
drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c | 14 +++-
drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h | 3 +
4 files changed, 139 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
--
2.17.1
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- geert@linux-m68k.org
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But
when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2 2/2] gpio: of: Add DT overlay support for GPIO hogs
From: Geert Uytterhoeven @ 2020-02-20 13:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Walleij, Bartosz Golaszewski, Pantelis Antoniou,
Frank Rowand, Rob Herring, Mark Rutland
Cc: Peter Ujfalusi, Chris Brandt, linux-gpio, devicetree,
linux-renesas-soc, linux-kernel, Geert Uytterhoeven
In-Reply-To: <20200220130149.26283-1-geert+renesas@glider.be>
As GPIO hogs are configured at GPIO controller initialization time,
adding/removing GPIO hogs in DT overlays does not work.
Add support for GPIO hogs described in DT overlays by registering an OF
reconfiguration notifier, to handle the addition and removal of GPIO hog
subnodes to/from a GPIO controller device node.
Note that when a GPIO hog device node is being removed, its "gpios"
properties is no longer available, so we have to keep track of which
node a hog belongs to, which is done by adding a pointer to the hog's
device node to struct gpio_desc.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
---
v2:
- Drop RFC state,
- Document that modifying existing gpio-hog nodes is not supported.
---
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.h | 2 +
drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c | 14 ++++--
drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h | 3 ++
4 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c
index 2b47f93886075294..ccc449df3792ae97 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c
@@ -628,6 +628,10 @@ static int of_gpiochip_add_hog(struct gpio_chip *chip, struct device_node *hog)
ret = gpiod_hog(desc, name, lflags, dflags);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OF_DYNAMIC
+ desc->hog = hog;
+#endif
}
return 0;
@@ -655,11 +659,97 @@ static int of_gpiochip_scan_gpios(struct gpio_chip *chip)
of_node_put(np);
return ret;
}
+
+ of_node_set_flag(np, OF_POPULATED);
}
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_OF_DYNAMIC
+/**
+ * of_gpiochip_remove_hog - Remove all hogs in a hog device node
+ * @chip: gpio chip to act on
+ * @hog: device node describing the hogs
+ */
+static void of_gpiochip_remove_hog(struct gpio_chip *chip,
+ struct device_node *hog)
+{
+ struct gpio_desc *descs = chip->gpiodev->descs;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < chip->ngpio; i++) {
+ if (test_bit(FLAG_IS_HOGGED, &descs[i].flags) &&
+ descs[i].hog == hog)
+ gpiochip_free_own_desc(&descs[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+static int of_gpiochip_match_node(struct gpio_chip *chip, void *data)
+{
+ return chip->gpiodev->dev.of_node == data;
+}
+
+static struct gpio_chip *of_find_gpiochip_by_node(struct device_node *np)
+{
+ return gpiochip_find(np, of_gpiochip_match_node);
+}
+
+static int of_gpio_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ struct of_reconfig_data *rd = arg;
+ struct gpio_chip *chip;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * This only supports adding and removing complete gpio-hog nodes.
+ * Modifying an existing gpio-hog node is not supported (except for
+ * changing its "status" property, which is treated the same as
+ * addition/removal).
+ */
+ switch (of_reconfig_get_state_change(action, arg)) {
+ case OF_RECONFIG_CHANGE_ADD:
+ if (!of_property_read_bool(rd->dn, "gpio-hog"))
+ return NOTIFY_OK; /* not for us */
+
+ if (of_node_test_and_set_flag(rd->dn, OF_POPULATED))
+ return NOTIFY_OK;
+
+ chip = of_find_gpiochip_by_node(rd->dn->parent);
+ if (chip == NULL)
+ return NOTIFY_OK; /* not for us */
+
+ ret = of_gpiochip_add_hog(chip, rd->dn);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_err("%s: failed to add hogs for %pOF\n", __func__,
+ rd->dn);
+ of_node_clear_flag(rd->dn, OF_POPULATED);
+ return notifier_from_errno(ret);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case OF_RECONFIG_CHANGE_REMOVE:
+ if (!of_node_check_flag(rd->dn, OF_POPULATED))
+ return NOTIFY_OK; /* already depopulated */
+
+ chip = of_find_gpiochip_by_node(rd->dn->parent);
+ if (chip == NULL)
+ return NOTIFY_OK; /* not for us */
+
+ of_gpiochip_remove_hog(chip, rd->dn);
+ of_node_clear_flag(rd->dn, OF_POPULATED);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NOTIFY_OK;
+}
+
+struct notifier_block gpio_of_notifier = {
+ .notifier_call = of_gpio_notify,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_OF_DYNAMIC */
+
/**
* of_gpio_simple_xlate - translate gpiospec to the GPIO number and flags
* @gc: pointer to the gpio_chip structure
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.h b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.h
index 9768831b1fe2f25b..ed26664f153782fc 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.h
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.h
@@ -35,4 +35,6 @@ static inline bool of_gpio_need_valid_mask(const struct gpio_chip *gc)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_OF_GPIO */
+extern struct notifier_block gpio_of_notifier;
+
#endif /* GPIOLIB_OF_H */
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
index 56de871060ea211e..6f312220fe80acaf 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
@@ -2925,6 +2925,9 @@ static bool gpiod_free_commit(struct gpio_desc *desc)
clear_bit(FLAG_PULL_DOWN, &desc->flags);
clear_bit(FLAG_BIAS_DISABLE, &desc->flags);
clear_bit(FLAG_IS_HOGGED, &desc->flags);
+#ifdef CONFIG_OF_DYNAMIC
+ desc->hog = NULL;
+#endif
ret = true;
}
@@ -5126,10 +5129,15 @@ static int __init gpiolib_dev_init(void)
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("gpiolib: failed to allocate char dev region\n");
bus_unregister(&gpio_bus_type);
- } else {
- gpiolib_initialized = true;
- gpiochip_setup_devs();
+ return ret;
}
+
+ gpiolib_initialized = true;
+ gpiochip_setup_devs();
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_OF_DYNAMIC))
+ WARN_ON(of_reconfig_notifier_register(&gpio_of_notifier));
+
return ret;
}
core_initcall(gpiolib_dev_init);
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h
index 3e0aab2945d82974..18c75e83fd7679ec 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h
@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ struct gpio_desc {
const char *label;
/* Name of the GPIO */
const char *name;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OF_DYNAMIC
+ struct device_node *hog;
+#endif
};
int gpiod_request(struct gpio_desc *desc, const char *label);
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 1/2] gpio: of: Extract of_gpiochip_add_hog()
From: Geert Uytterhoeven @ 2020-02-20 13:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Walleij, Bartosz Golaszewski, Pantelis Antoniou,
Frank Rowand, Rob Herring, Mark Rutland
Cc: Peter Ujfalusi, Chris Brandt, linux-gpio, devicetree,
linux-renesas-soc, linux-kernel, Geert Uytterhoeven
In-Reply-To: <20200220130149.26283-1-geert+renesas@glider.be>
Extract the code to add all GPIO hogs of a gpio-hog node into its own
function, so it can be reused.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
---
v2:
- No changes.
---
drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c
index c6d30f73df078e0b..2b47f93886075294 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-of.c
@@ -604,6 +604,35 @@ static struct gpio_desc *of_parse_own_gpio(struct device_node *np,
return desc;
}
+/**
+ * of_gpiochip_add_hog - Add all hogs in a hog device node
+ * @chip: gpio chip to act on
+ * @hog: device node describing the hogs
+ *
+ * Returns error if it fails otherwise 0 on success.
+ */
+static int of_gpiochip_add_hog(struct gpio_chip *chip, struct device_node *hog)
+{
+ enum gpiod_flags dflags;
+ struct gpio_desc *desc;
+ unsigned long lflags;
+ const char *name;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int ret;
+
+ for (i = 0;; i++) {
+ desc = of_parse_own_gpio(hog, chip, i, &name, &lflags, &dflags);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc))
+ break;
+
+ ret = gpiod_hog(desc, name, lflags, dflags);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* of_gpiochip_scan_gpios - Scan gpio-controller for gpio definitions
* @chip: gpio chip to act on
@@ -614,29 +643,17 @@ static struct gpio_desc *of_parse_own_gpio(struct device_node *np,
*/
static int of_gpiochip_scan_gpios(struct gpio_chip *chip)
{
- struct gpio_desc *desc = NULL;
struct device_node *np;
- const char *name;
- unsigned long lflags;
- enum gpiod_flags dflags;
- unsigned int i;
int ret;
for_each_available_child_of_node(chip->of_node, np) {
if (!of_property_read_bool(np, "gpio-hog"))
continue;
- for (i = 0;; i++) {
- desc = of_parse_own_gpio(np, chip, i, &name, &lflags,
- &dflags);
- if (IS_ERR(desc))
- break;
-
- ret = gpiod_hog(desc, name, lflags, dflags);
- if (ret < 0) {
- of_node_put(np);
- return ret;
- }
+ ret = of_gpiochip_add_hog(chip, np);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ of_node_put(np);
+ return ret;
}
}
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v5 03/12] ceph: add infrastructure for waiting for async create to complete
From: Jeff Layton @ 2020-02-20 13:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yan, Zheng
Cc: ceph-devel, Ilya Dryomov, Sage Weil, Zheng Yan, Patrick Donnelly,
Xiubo Li
In-Reply-To: <CAAM7YAn-bXrOHGrF4O0WY4hB7ZUj7_uCT=qy3NphbNbw15F6hA@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 2020-02-20 at 11:32 +0800, Yan, Zheng wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 19, 2020 at 9:27 PM Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> wrote:
> > When we issue an async create, we must ensure that any later on-the-wire
> > requests involving it wait for the create reply.
> >
> > Expand i_ceph_flags to be an unsigned long, and add a new bit that
> > MDS requests can wait on. If the bit is set in the inode when sending
> > caps, then don't send it and just return that it has been delayed.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > fs/ceph/caps.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
> > fs/ceph/dir.c | 2 +-
> > fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
> > fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 7 +++++++
> > fs/ceph/super.h | 4 +++-
> > 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c
> > index d05717397c2a..85e13aa359d2 100644
> > --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c
> > +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c
> > @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static void __cap_delay_requeue(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
> > struct ceph_inode_info *ci,
> > bool set_timeout)
> > {
> > - dout("__cap_delay_requeue %p flags %d at %lu\n", &ci->vfs_inode,
> > + dout("__cap_delay_requeue %p flags 0x%lx at %lu\n", &ci->vfs_inode,
> > ci->i_ceph_flags, ci->i_hold_caps_max);
> > if (!mdsc->stopping) {
> > spin_lock(&mdsc->cap_delay_lock);
> > @@ -1294,6 +1294,13 @@ static int __send_cap(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, struct ceph_cap *cap,
> > int delayed = 0;
> > int ret;
> >
> > + /* Don't send anything if it's still being created. Return delayed */
> > + if (ci->i_ceph_flags & CEPH_I_ASYNC_CREATE) {
> > + spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
> > + dout("%s async create in flight for %p\n", __func__, inode);
> > + return 1;
> > + }
> > +
>
> Maybe it's better to check this in ceph_check_caps(). Other callers
> of __send_cap() shouldn't encounter async creating inode
>
I've been looking, but what actually guarantees that?
Only ceph_check_caps calls it for UPDATE, but the other two callers call
it for FLUSH. I don't see what prevents the kernel from (e.g.) calling
write_inode before the create reply comes in, particularly if we just
create and then close the file.
As a side note, I still struggle with the fact thatthere seems to be no
coherent overall description of the cap protocol. What distinguishes a
FLUSH from an UPDATE, for instance? The MDS code and comments seem to
treat them somewhat interchangeably.
> > held = cap->issued | cap->implemented;
> > revoking = cap->implemented & ~cap->issued;
> > retain &= ~revoking;
> > @@ -2250,6 +2257,10 @@ int ceph_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
> > if (datasync)
> > goto out;
> >
> > + ret = ceph_wait_on_async_create(inode);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > dirty = try_flush_caps(inode, &flush_tid);
> > dout("fsync dirty caps are %s\n", ceph_cap_string(dirty));
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c
> > index a87274935a09..5b83bda57056 100644
> > --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c
> > +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c
> > @@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> > struct ceph_dentry_info *di = ceph_dentry(dentry);
> >
> > spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
> > - dout(" dir %p flags are %d\n", dir, ci->i_ceph_flags);
> > + dout(" dir %p flags are 0x%lx\n", dir, ci->i_ceph_flags);
> > if (strncmp(dentry->d_name.name,
> > fsc->mount_options->snapdir_name,
> > dentry->d_name.len) &&
> > diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> > index 94d18e643a3d..38eb9dd5062b 100644
> > --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> > +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> > @@ -2730,7 +2730,7 @@ static void kick_requests(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, int mds)
> > int ceph_mdsc_submit_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, struct inode *dir,
> > struct ceph_mds_request *req)
> > {
> > - int err;
> > + int err = 0;
> >
> > /* take CAP_PIN refs for r_inode, r_parent, r_old_dentry */
> > if (req->r_inode)
> > @@ -2743,6 +2743,24 @@ int ceph_mdsc_submit_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, struct inode *dir,
> > ceph_get_cap_refs(ceph_inode(req->r_old_dentry_dir),
> > CEPH_CAP_PIN);
> >
> > + if (req->r_inode) {
> > + err = ceph_wait_on_async_create(req->r_inode);
> > + if (err) {
> > + dout("%s: wait for async create returned: %d\n",
> > + __func__, err);
> > + return err;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + if (!err && req->r_old_inode) {
> > + err = ceph_wait_on_async_create(req->r_old_inode);
> > + if (err) {
> > + dout("%s: wait for async create returned: %d\n",
> > + __func__, err);
> > + return err;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > dout("submit_request on %p for inode %p\n", req, dir);
> > mutex_lock(&mdsc->mutex);
> > __register_request(mdsc, req, dir);
> > diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
> > index 95ac00e59e66..8043f2b439b1 100644
> > --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
> > +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.h
> > @@ -538,4 +538,11 @@ extern void ceph_mdsc_open_export_target_sessions(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
> > extern int ceph_trim_caps(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
> > struct ceph_mds_session *session,
> > int max_caps);
> > +static inline int ceph_wait_on_async_create(struct inode *inode)
> > +{
> > + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode);
> > +
> > + return wait_on_bit(&ci->i_ceph_flags, CEPH_ASYNC_CREATE_BIT,
> > + TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
> > +}
> > #endif
> > diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h
> > index 3430d7ffe8f7..bfb03adb4a08 100644
> > --- a/fs/ceph/super.h
> > +++ b/fs/ceph/super.h
> > @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ struct ceph_inode_info {
> > u64 i_inline_version;
> > u32 i_time_warp_seq;
> >
> > - unsigned i_ceph_flags;
> > + unsigned long i_ceph_flags;
> > atomic64_t i_release_count;
> > atomic64_t i_ordered_count;
> > atomic64_t i_complete_seq[2];
> > @@ -524,6 +524,8 @@ static inline struct inode *ceph_find_inode(struct super_block *sb,
> > #define CEPH_I_ERROR_WRITE (1 << 10) /* have seen write errors */
> > #define CEPH_I_ERROR_FILELOCK (1 << 11) /* have seen file lock errors */
> > #define CEPH_I_ODIRECT (1 << 12) /* inode in direct I/O mode */
> > +#define CEPH_ASYNC_CREATE_BIT (13) /* async create in flight for this */
> > +#define CEPH_I_ASYNC_CREATE (1 << CEPH_ASYNC_CREATE_BIT)
> >
> > /*
> > * Masks of ceph inode work.
> > --
> > 2.24.1
> >
--
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v4 14/16] s390x: protvirt: Handle SIGP store status correctly
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Status storing is not done by QEMU anymore, but is handled by SIE.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
---
target/s390x/helper.c | 4 ++++
target/s390x/sigp.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/target/s390x/helper.c b/target/s390x/helper.c
index a3a49164e4..3800c4b395 100644
--- a/target/s390x/helper.c
+++ b/target/s390x/helper.c
@@ -246,6 +246,10 @@ int s390_store_status(S390CPU *cpu, hwaddr addr, bool store_arch)
hwaddr len = sizeof(*sa);
int i;
+ if (cpu->env.pv) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
sa = cpu_physical_memory_map(addr, &len, 1);
if (!sa) {
return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/target/s390x/sigp.c b/target/s390x/sigp.c
index c604f17710..e1c8071464 100644
--- a/target/s390x/sigp.c
+++ b/target/s390x/sigp.c
@@ -497,6 +497,7 @@ void do_stop_interrupt(CPUS390XState *env)
if (s390_cpu_set_state(S390_CPU_STATE_STOPPED, cpu) == 0) {
qemu_system_shutdown_request(SHUTDOWN_CAUSE_GUEST_SHUTDOWN);
}
+ /* Storing will occur on next SIE entry for protected VMs */
if (cpu->env.sigp_order == SIGP_STOP_STORE_STATUS) {
s390_store_status(cpu, S390_STORE_STATUS_DEF_ADDR, true);
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 06/16] s390x: protvirt: KVM intercept changes
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Secure guests no longer intercept with code 4 for an instruction
interception. Instead they have codes 104 and 108 for secure
instruction interception and secure instruction notification
respectively.
The 104 mirrors the 4 interception.
The 108 is a notification interception to let KVM and QEMU know that
something changed and we need to update tracking information or
perform specific tasks. It's currently taken for the following
instructions:
* stpx (To inform about the changed prefix location)
* sclp (On incorrect SCCB values, so we can inject a IRQ)
* sigp (All but "stop and store status")
* diag308 (Subcodes 0/1)
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
target/s390x/kvm.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/target/s390x/kvm.c b/target/s390x/kvm.c
index 1d6fd6a27b..eec0b92479 100644
--- a/target/s390x/kvm.c
+++ b/target/s390x/kvm.c
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@
#define ICPT_CPU_STOP 0x28
#define ICPT_OPEREXC 0x2c
#define ICPT_IO 0x40
+#define ICPT_PV_INSTR 0x68
+#define ICPT_PV_INSTR_NOTIFICATION 0x6c
#define NR_LOCAL_IRQS 32
/*
@@ -1693,6 +1695,8 @@ static int handle_intercept(S390CPU *cpu)
(long)cs->kvm_run->psw_addr);
switch (icpt_code) {
case ICPT_INSTRUCTION:
+ case ICPT_PV_INSTR:
+ case ICPT_PV_INSTR_NOTIFICATION:
r = handle_instruction(cpu, run);
break;
case ICPT_PROGRAM:
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 07/16] s390x: Add SIDA memory ops
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Protected guests save the instruction control blocks in the SIDA
instead of QEMU/KVM directly accessing the guest's memory.
Let's introduce new functions to access the SIDA.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
| 2 ++
target/s390x/cpu.h | 7 ++++++-
target/s390x/kvm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
target/s390x/kvm_s390x.h | 2 ++
target/s390x/mmu_helper.c | 9 +++++++++
5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--git a/linux-headers/linux/kvm.h b/linux-headers/linux/kvm.h
index 2e647f2d9b..7ccf5988d2 100644
--- a/linux-headers/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/linux-headers/linux/kvm.h
@@ -483,6 +483,8 @@ struct kvm_s390_mem_op {
/* types for kvm_s390_mem_op->op */
#define KVM_S390_MEMOP_LOGICAL_READ 0
#define KVM_S390_MEMOP_LOGICAL_WRITE 1
+#define KVM_S390_MEMOP_SIDA_READ 2
+#define KVM_S390_MEMOP_SIDA_WRITE 3
/* flags for kvm_s390_mem_op->flags */
#define KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_CHECK_ONLY (1ULL << 0)
#define KVM_S390_MEMOP_F_INJECT_EXCEPTION (1ULL << 1)
diff --git a/target/s390x/cpu.h b/target/s390x/cpu.h
index cbc53c99cf..491d6860a8 100644
--- a/target/s390x/cpu.h
+++ b/target/s390x/cpu.h
@@ -823,7 +823,12 @@ int s390_cpu_virt_mem_rw(S390CPU *cpu, vaddr laddr, uint8_t ar, void *hostbuf,
#define s390_cpu_virt_mem_check_write(cpu, laddr, ar, len) \
s390_cpu_virt_mem_rw(cpu, laddr, ar, NULL, len, true)
void s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(S390CPU *cpu, uintptr_t ra);
-
+int s390_cpu_pv_mem_rw(S390CPU *cpu, unsigned int offset, void *hostbuf,
+ int len, bool is_write);
+#define s390_cpu_pv_mem_read(cpu, offset, dest, len) \
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_rw(cpu, offset, dest, len, false)
+#define s390_cpu_pv_mem_write(cpu, offset, dest, len) \
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_rw(cpu, offset, dest, len, true)
/* sigp.c */
int s390_cpu_restart(S390CPU *cpu);
diff --git a/target/s390x/kvm.c b/target/s390x/kvm.c
index eec0b92479..f222836df5 100644
--- a/target/s390x/kvm.c
+++ b/target/s390x/kvm.c
@@ -846,6 +846,29 @@ int kvm_s390_mem_op(S390CPU *cpu, vaddr addr, uint8_t ar, void *hostbuf,
return ret;
}
+int kvm_s390_mem_op_pv(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t offset, void *hostbuf,
+ int len, bool is_write)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct kvm_s390_mem_op mem_op = {
+ .sida_offset = offset,
+ .size = len,
+ .op = is_write ? KVM_S390_MEMOP_SIDA_WRITE
+ : KVM_S390_MEMOP_SIDA_READ,
+ .buf = (uint64_t)hostbuf,
+ };
+
+ if (!cap_mem_op) {
+ return -ENOSYS;
+ }
+
+ ret = kvm_vcpu_ioctl(CPU(cpu), KVM_S390_MEM_OP, &mem_op);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ warn_report("KVM_S390_MEM_OP failed: %s", strerror(-ret));
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Legacy layout for s390:
* Older S390 KVM requires the topmost vma of the RAM to be
diff --git a/target/s390x/kvm_s390x.h b/target/s390x/kvm_s390x.h
index 0b21789796..9c38f6ccce 100644
--- a/target/s390x/kvm_s390x.h
+++ b/target/s390x/kvm_s390x.h
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ void kvm_s390_vcpu_interrupt(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_s390_irq *irq);
void kvm_s390_access_exception(S390CPU *cpu, uint16_t code, uint64_t te_code);
int kvm_s390_mem_op(S390CPU *cpu, vaddr addr, uint8_t ar, void *hostbuf,
int len, bool is_write);
+int kvm_s390_mem_op_pv(S390CPU *cpu, vaddr addr, void *hostbuf, int len,
+ bool is_write);
void kvm_s390_program_interrupt(S390CPU *cpu, uint16_t code);
int kvm_s390_set_cpu_state(S390CPU *cpu, uint8_t cpu_state);
void kvm_s390_vcpu_interrupt_pre_save(S390CPU *cpu);
diff --git a/target/s390x/mmu_helper.c b/target/s390x/mmu_helper.c
index c9f3f34750..ad485399db 100644
--- a/target/s390x/mmu_helper.c
+++ b/target/s390x/mmu_helper.c
@@ -474,6 +474,15 @@ static int translate_pages(S390CPU *cpu, vaddr addr, int nr_pages,
return 0;
}
+int s390_cpu_pv_mem_rw(S390CPU *cpu, unsigned int offset, void *hostbuf,
+ int len, bool is_write)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = kvm_s390_mem_op_pv(cpu, offset, hostbuf, len, is_write);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* s390_cpu_virt_mem_rw:
* @laddr: the logical start address
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 01/16] Sync pv
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
| 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--git a/linux-headers/linux/kvm.h b/linux-headers/linux/kvm.h
index ec146bd52a..2e647f2d9b 100644
--- a/linux-headers/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/linux-headers/linux/kvm.h
@@ -474,8 +474,11 @@ struct kvm_s390_mem_op {
__u32 size; /* amount of bytes */
__u32 op; /* type of operation */
__u64 buf; /* buffer in userspace */
- __u8 ar; /* the access register number */
- __u8 reserved[31]; /* should be set to 0 */
+ union {
+ __u8 ar; /* the access register number */
+ __u32 sida_offset; /* offset into the sida */
+ __u8 reserved[32]; /* should be set to 0 */
+ };
};
/* types for kvm_s390_mem_op->op */
#define KVM_S390_MEMOP_LOGICAL_READ 0
@@ -1010,6 +1013,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
#define KVM_CAP_ARM_NISV_TO_USER 177
#define KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_DABT 178
#define KVM_CAP_S390_VCPU_RESETS 179
+#define KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED 180
#ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
@@ -1474,8 +1478,42 @@ struct kvm_enc_region {
/* Available with KVM_CAP_ARM_SVE */
#define KVM_ARM_VCPU_FINALIZE _IOW(KVMIO, 0xc2, int)
-#define KVM_S390_NORMAL_RESET _IO(KVMIO, 0xc3)
-#define KVM_S390_CLEAR_RESET _IO(KVMIO, 0xc4)
+/* Available with KVM_CAP_S390_VCPU_RESETS */
+#define KVM_S390_NORMAL_RESET _IO(KVMIO, 0xc3)
+#define KVM_S390_CLEAR_RESET _IO(KVMIO, 0xc4)
+
+struct kvm_s390_pv_sec_parm {
+ __u64 origin;
+ __u64 length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_s390_pv_unp {
+ __u64 addr;
+ __u64 size;
+ __u64 tweak;
+};
+
+enum pv_cmd_id {
+ KVM_PV_ENABLE,
+ KVM_PV_DISABLE,
+ KVM_PV_VM_SET_SEC_PARMS,
+ KVM_PV_VM_UNPACK,
+ KVM_PV_VM_VERIFY,
+ KVM_PV_VM_PREP_RESET,
+ KVM_PV_VM_UNSHARE_ALL,
+};
+
+struct kvm_pv_cmd {
+ __u32 cmd; /* Command to be executed */
+ __u16 rc; /* Ultravisor return code */
+ __u16 rrc; /* Ultravisor return reason code */
+ __u64 data; /* Data or address */
+ __u32 flags; /* flags for future extensions. Must be 0 for now */
+ __u32 reserved[3];
+};
+
+/* Available with KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED */
+#define KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xc5, struct kvm_pv_cmd)
/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization command */
enum sev_cmd_id {
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [RFC net-next v3 03/10] net: bridge: mrp: Add MRP interface used by netlink
From: Allan W. Nielsen @ 2020-02-20 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nikolay Aleksandrov
Cc: Horatiu Vultur, Andrew Lunn, linux-kernel, netdev, bridge, jiri,
ivecera, davem, roopa, anirudh.venkataramanan, olteanv,
jeffrey.t.kirsher, UNGLinuxDriver
In-Reply-To: <08c2d3f8-8d70-730c-95d5-8493e6919f3e@cumulusnetworks.com>
On 20.02.2020 11:08, Nikolay Aleksandrov wrote:
>EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe
>
>On 26/01/2020 15:28, Horatiu Vultur wrote:
>> The 01/25/2020 20:16, Allan W. Nielsen wrote:
>>> On 25.01.2020 16:20, Andrew Lunn wrote:
>>>> EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Jan 25, 2020 at 12:37:26PM +0100, Horatiu Vultur wrote:
>>>>> The 01/24/2020 18:43, Andrew Lunn wrote:
>>>>>> EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> br_mrp_flush - will flush the FDB.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How does this differ from a normal bridge flush? I assume there is a
>>>>>> way for user space to flush the bridge FDB.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>> If I seen corectly the normal bridge flush will clear the entire FDB for
>>>>> all the ports of the bridge. In this case it is require to clear FDB
>>>>> entries only for the ring ports.
>>>>
>>>> Maybe it would be better to extend the current bridge netlink call to
>>>> be able to pass an optional interface to be flushed? I'm not sure it
>>>> is a good idea to have two APIs doing very similar things.
>>> I agree.
>> I would look over this.
>>
>
>There's already a way to flush FDBs per-port - IFLA_BRPORT_FLUSH.
>
>>>
>>> And when looking at this again, I start to think that we should have
>>> extended the existing netlink interface with new commands, instead of
>>> adding a generic netlink.
>> We could do also that. The main reason why I have added a new generic
>> netlink was that I thought it would be clearer what commands are for MRP
>> configuration. But if you think that we should go forward by extending
>> existing netlink interface, that is perfectly fine for me.
>>
>>>
>>> /Allan
>>>
>>
>
>I don't mind extending the current netlink interface but the bridge already has
>a huge (the largest) set of options and each time we add a new option we have
>to adjust RTNL_MAX_TYPE. If you do decide to go this way maybe look into nesting
>all the MRP options under one master MRP element into the bridge options, example:
>[IFLA_BR_MRP]
> [IFLA_BR_MRP_X]
> [IFLA_BR_MRP_Y]
> ...
Ahh, did not see this mail before responsing to the other one.
We can make it part of the BR netlink then.
/Allan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [Bridge] [RFC net-next v3 03/10] net: bridge: mrp: Add MRP interface used by netlink
From: Allan W. Nielsen @ 2020-02-20 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nikolay Aleksandrov
Cc: ivecera, Andrew Lunn, jiri, netdev, roopa, bridge, linux-kernel,
davem, UNGLinuxDriver, anirudh.venkataramanan, jeffrey.t.kirsher,
olteanv, Horatiu Vultur
In-Reply-To: <08c2d3f8-8d70-730c-95d5-8493e6919f3e@cumulusnetworks.com>
On 20.02.2020 11:08, Nikolay Aleksandrov wrote:
>EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe
>
>On 26/01/2020 15:28, Horatiu Vultur wrote:
>> The 01/25/2020 20:16, Allan W. Nielsen wrote:
>>> On 25.01.2020 16:20, Andrew Lunn wrote:
>>>> EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Jan 25, 2020 at 12:37:26PM +0100, Horatiu Vultur wrote:
>>>>> The 01/24/2020 18:43, Andrew Lunn wrote:
>>>>>> EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click links or open attachments unless you know the content is safe
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> br_mrp_flush - will flush the FDB.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How does this differ from a normal bridge flush? I assume there is a
>>>>>> way for user space to flush the bridge FDB.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>> If I seen corectly the normal bridge flush will clear the entire FDB for
>>>>> all the ports of the bridge. In this case it is require to clear FDB
>>>>> entries only for the ring ports.
>>>>
>>>> Maybe it would be better to extend the current bridge netlink call to
>>>> be able to pass an optional interface to be flushed? I'm not sure it
>>>> is a good idea to have two APIs doing very similar things.
>>> I agree.
>> I would look over this.
>>
>
>There's already a way to flush FDBs per-port - IFLA_BRPORT_FLUSH.
>
>>>
>>> And when looking at this again, I start to think that we should have
>>> extended the existing netlink interface with new commands, instead of
>>> adding a generic netlink.
>> We could do also that. The main reason why I have added a new generic
>> netlink was that I thought it would be clearer what commands are for MRP
>> configuration. But if you think that we should go forward by extending
>> existing netlink interface, that is perfectly fine for me.
>>
>>>
>>> /Allan
>>>
>>
>
>I don't mind extending the current netlink interface but the bridge already has
>a huge (the largest) set of options and each time we add a new option we have
>to adjust RTNL_MAX_TYPE. If you do decide to go this way maybe look into nesting
>all the MRP options under one master MRP element into the bridge options, example:
>[IFLA_BR_MRP]
> [IFLA_BR_MRP_X]
> [IFLA_BR_MRP_Y]
> ...
Ahh, did not see this mail before responsing to the other one.
We can make it part of the BR netlink then.
/Allan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v7 1/5] btrfs: Introduce per-profile available space facility
From: Qu Wenruo @ 2020-02-20 12:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Nikolay Borisov, Qu Wenruo, linux-btrfs; +Cc: Josef Bacik
In-Reply-To: <329cf703-f3f2-4583-73bf-c90c9e001956@suse.com>
On 2020/2/20 下午8:49, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
> <snip>
>
>>
>> Suggested-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
>> ---
>> fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 216 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>> fs/btrfs/volumes.h | 11 +++
>> 2 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>>
>
> <snip>
>
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Return 0 if we allocated any virtual(*) chunk, and restore the size to
>> + * @allocated_size
>> + * Return -ENOSPC if we have no more space to allocate virtual chunk
>> + *
>> + * *: virtual chunk is a space holder for per-profile available space
>> + * calculator.
>> + * Such virtual chunks won't take on-disk space, thus called virtual, and
>> + * only affects per-profile available space calulation.
>> + */
>
> Document that the last parameter is an output value which contains the
> size of the allocated virtual chunk.
>
>> +static int alloc_virtual_chunk(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
>> + struct btrfs_device_info *devices_info,
>> + enum btrfs_raid_types type,
>> + u64 *allocated)
>> +{
>> + const struct btrfs_raid_attr *raid_attr = &btrfs_raid_array[type];
>> + struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_devices = fs_info->fs_devices;
>> + struct btrfs_device *device;
>> + u64 stripe_size;
>> + int i;
>> + int ndevs = 0;
>> +
>> + lockdep_assert_held(&fs_info->chunk_mutex);
>> +
>> + /* Go through devices to collect their unallocated space */
>> + list_for_each_entry(device, &fs_devices->alloc_list, dev_alloc_list) {
>> + u64 avail;
>> + if (!test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_IN_FS_METADATA,
>> + &device->dev_state) ||
>> + test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT, &device->dev_state))
>> + continue;
>> +
>> + if (device->total_bytes > device->bytes_used +
>> + device->virtual_allocated)
>> + avail = device->total_bytes - device->bytes_used -
>> + device->virtual_allocated;
>> + else
>> + avail = 0;
>> +
>> + /* And exclude the [0, 1M) reserved space */
>> + if (avail > SZ_1M)
>> + avail -= SZ_1M;
>> + else
>> + avail = 0;
>> +
>> + if (avail < fs_info->sectorsize)
>> + continue;
>> + /*
>> + * Unlike chunk allocator, we don't care about stripe or hole
>> + * size, so here we use @avail directly
>> + */
>> + devices_info[ndevs].dev_offset = 0;
>> + devices_info[ndevs].total_avail = avail;
>> + devices_info[ndevs].max_avail = avail;
>> + devices_info[ndevs].dev = device;
>> + ++ndevs;
>> + }
>> + sort(devices_info, ndevs, sizeof(struct btrfs_device_info),
>> + btrfs_cmp_device_info, NULL);
>> + ndevs -= ndevs % raid_attr->devs_increment;
>
> nit: ndevs = rounddown(ndevs, raid_attr->devs_increment);
IIRC round_down() can only be used when the alignment is power of 2.
Don't forget we have RAID1C3 now.
> makes it more clear what's going on. Since you are working with at most
> int it's not a problem for 32bits.
>
>
>> + if (ndevs < raid_attr->devs_min)
>> + return -ENOSPC;
>> + if (raid_attr->devs_max)
>> + ndevs = min(ndevs, (int)raid_attr->devs_max);
>> + else
>> + ndevs = min(ndevs, (int)BTRFS_MAX_DEVS(fs_info));
>
> Instead of casting simply use min_t(int, ndevs, BTRFS_MAX_DEVS...)
That looks the same to me...
>
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Now allocate a virtual chunk using the unallocate space of the
>
> nit: missing d after 'unallocate'
>
>> + * device with the least unallocated space.
>> + */
>> + stripe_size = round_down(devices_info[ndevs - 1].total_avail,
>> + fs_info->sectorsize);
>> + if (stripe_size == 0)
>> + return -ENOSPC;
>
> Isn't this check redundant - in the loop where you iterate the devices
> you always ensure total_avail is at least a sector size, this guarantees
> that stripe_size cannot be 0 at this point.
>
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < ndevs; i++)
>> + devices_info[i].dev->virtual_allocated += stripe_size;
>> + *allocated = stripe_size * (ndevs - raid_attr->nparity) /
>> + raid_attr->ncopies;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int calc_one_profile_avail(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
>> + enum btrfs_raid_types type,
>> + u64 *result_ret)
>> +{
>> + struct btrfs_device_info *devices_info = NULL;
>> + struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_devices = fs_info->fs_devices;
>> + struct btrfs_device *device;
>> + u64 allocated;
>> + u64 result = 0;
>> + int ret = 0;
>> +
>
> lockdep assert that chunk mutex is held since you access alloc_list.
>
>> + ASSERT(type >= 0 && type < BTRFS_NR_RAID_TYPES);
>> +
>> + /* Not enough devices, quick exit, just update the result */
>> + if (fs_devices->rw_devices < btrfs_raid_array[type].devs_min)
>> + goto out;
>
> You can directly return.
>
>> +
>> + devices_info = kcalloc(fs_devices->rw_devices, sizeof(*devices_info),
>> + GFP_NOFS);
>> + if (!devices_info) {
>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto out;
>
> Same here.
>
>> + }
>> + /* Clear virtual chunk used space for each device */
>> + list_for_each_entry(device, &fs_devices->alloc_list, dev_alloc_list)
>> + device->virtual_allocated = 0;
>> + while (ret == 0) {
>> + ret = alloc_virtual_chunk(fs_info, devices_info, type,
>> + &allocated);
> The 'allocated' variable is used only in this loop so declare it in the
> loop. Ideally we want variables to have the shortest possible lifecycle.
>
>> + if (ret == 0)
>> + result += allocated;
>> + }
>
> Why do you need to call this in a loop calling alloc_virtual_chunk once
> simply calculate the available space for the given raid type.
For this case, we must go several loops:
Dev1: 10G
Dev2: 5G
Dev3: 5G
Type: RAID1.
The first loop will use 5G from dev1, 5G from dev2.
Then the 2nd loop will use the remaining 5G from dev1, 5G from dev3.
And that's the core problem per-profile available space system want to
address.
>
>> + list_for_each_entry(device, &fs_devices->alloc_list, dev_alloc_list)
>> + device->virtual_allocated = 0;
>> +out:
>> + kfree(devices_info);
>> + if (ret < 0 && ret != -ENOSPC)
>> + return ret;
>> + *result_ret = result;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>
> <snip>
>
>> @@ -259,6 +266,10 @@ struct btrfs_fs_devices {
>> struct kobject fsid_kobj;
>> struct kobject *devices_kobj;
>> struct completion kobj_unregister;
>> +
>> + /* Records per-type available space */
>> + spinlock_t per_profile_lock;
>> + u64 per_profile_avail[BTRFS_NR_RAID_TYPES];
>
> Since every avail quantity is independent of any other, can you turn
> this into an array of atomic64 values and get rid of the spinlock? My
> head spins how many locks we have in btrfs.
OK, that won't hurt, since they are updated separately, there is indeed
no need for a spinlock.
Thanks,
Qu
>
>> };
>>
>> #define BTRFS_BIO_INLINE_CSUM_SIZE 64
>>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v4 13/16] s390x: protvirt: Move IO control structures over SIDA
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
For protected guests, we need to put the IO emulation results into the
SIDA, so SIE will write them into the guest at the next entry.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
target/s390x/ioinst.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/s390x/ioinst.c b/target/s390x/ioinst.c
index e4102430aa..330b04d79a 100644
--- a/target/s390x/ioinst.c
+++ b/target/s390x/ioinst.c
@@ -129,9 +129,13 @@ void ioinst_handle_msch(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t reg1, uint32_t ipb, uintptr_t ra)
s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_SPECIFICATION, ra);
return;
}
- if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, ar, &schib, sizeof(schib))) {
- s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
- return;
+ if (env->pv) {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_read(cpu, addr, &schib, sizeof(schib));
+ } else {
+ if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, ar, &schib, sizeof(schib))) {
+ s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+ return;
+ }
}
if (ioinst_disassemble_sch_ident(reg1, &m, &cssid, &ssid, &schid) ||
!ioinst_schib_valid(&schib)) {
@@ -186,9 +190,13 @@ void ioinst_handle_ssch(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t reg1, uint32_t ipb, uintptr_t ra)
s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_SPECIFICATION, ra);
return;
}
- if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, ar, &orig_orb, sizeof(orb))) {
- s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
- return;
+ if (env->pv) {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_read(cpu, addr, &orig_orb, sizeof(orb));
+ } else {
+ if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, ar, &orig_orb, sizeof(orb))) {
+ s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+ return;
+ }
}
copy_orb_from_guest(&orb, &orig_orb);
if (ioinst_disassemble_sch_ident(reg1, &m, &cssid, &ssid, &schid) ||
@@ -222,14 +230,19 @@ void ioinst_handle_stcrw(S390CPU *cpu, uint32_t ipb, uintptr_t ra)
cc = css_do_stcrw(&crw);
/* 0 - crw stored, 1 - zeroes stored */
- if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, ar, &crw, sizeof(crw)) == 0) {
+ if (env->pv) {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_write(cpu, addr, &crw, sizeof(crw));
setcc(cpu, cc);
} else {
- if (cc == 0) {
- /* Write failed: requeue CRW since STCRW is suppressing */
- css_undo_stcrw(&crw);
+ if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, ar, &crw, sizeof(crw)) == 0) {
+ setcc(cpu, cc);
+ } else {
+ if (cc == 0) {
+ /* Write failed: requeue CRW since STCRW is suppressing */
+ css_undo_stcrw(&crw);
+ }
+ s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
}
- s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
}
}
@@ -251,6 +264,9 @@ void ioinst_handle_stsch(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t reg1, uint32_t ipb,
}
if (ioinst_disassemble_sch_ident(reg1, &m, &cssid, &ssid, &schid)) {
+ if (env->pv) {
+ return;
+ }
/*
* As operand exceptions have a lower priority than access exceptions,
* we check whether the memory area is writeable (injecting the
@@ -283,14 +299,19 @@ void ioinst_handle_stsch(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t reg1, uint32_t ipb,
}
}
if (cc != 3) {
- if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, ar, &schib,
- sizeof(schib)) != 0) {
- s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
- return;
+ if (env->pv) {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_write(cpu, addr, &schib, sizeof(schib));
+ } else {
+ if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, ar, &schib,
+ sizeof(schib)) != 0) {
+ s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+ return;
+ }
}
} else {
/* Access exceptions have a higher priority than cc3 */
- if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_check_write(cpu, addr, ar, sizeof(schib)) != 0) {
+ if (!env->pv &&
+ s390_cpu_virt_mem_check_write(cpu, addr, ar, sizeof(schib)) != 0) {
s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
return;
}
@@ -327,15 +348,20 @@ int ioinst_handle_tsch(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t reg1, uint32_t ipb, uintptr_t ra)
}
/* 0 - status pending, 1 - not status pending, 3 - not operational */
if (cc != 3) {
- if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, ar, &irb, irb_len) != 0) {
- s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
- return -EFAULT;
+ if (env->pv) {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_write(cpu, addr, &irb, irb_len);
+ } else {
+ if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, ar, &irb, irb_len) != 0) {
+ s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
}
css_do_tsch_update_subch(sch);
} else {
irb_len = sizeof(irb) - sizeof(irb.emw);
/* Access exceptions have a higher priority than cc3 */
- if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_check_write(cpu, addr, ar, irb_len) != 0) {
+ if (!env->pv &&
+ s390_cpu_virt_mem_check_write(cpu, addr, ar, irb_len) != 0) {
s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
return -EFAULT;
}
@@ -633,9 +659,13 @@ void ioinst_handle_chsc(S390CPU *cpu, uint32_t ipb, uintptr_t ra)
* present CHSC sub-handlers ... if we ever need more, we should take
* care of req->len here first.
*/
- if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, reg, buf, sizeof(ChscReq))) {
- s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
- return;
+ if (env->pv) {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_read(cpu, addr, buf, sizeof(ChscReq));
+ } else {
+ if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, reg, buf, sizeof(ChscReq))) {
+ s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+ return;
+ }
}
req = (ChscReq *)buf;
len = be16_to_cpu(req->len);
@@ -666,11 +696,16 @@ void ioinst_handle_chsc(S390CPU *cpu, uint32_t ipb, uintptr_t ra)
break;
}
- if (!s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr + len, reg, res,
- be16_to_cpu(res->len))) {
+ if (env->pv) {
+ s390_cpu_pv_mem_write(cpu, addr + len, res, be16_to_cpu(res->len));
setcc(cpu, 0); /* Command execution complete */
} else {
- s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+ if (!s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr + len, reg, res,
+ be16_to_cpu(res->len))) {
+ setcc(cpu, 0); /* Command execution complete */
+ } else {
+ s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+ }
}
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH] drm/exynos: hdmi: don't leak enable HDMI_EN regulator if probe fails
From: Marek Szyprowski @ 2020-02-20 12:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dri-devel, linux-samsung-soc
Cc: Andrzej Hajda, Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz, Seung-Woo Kim,
Marek Szyprowski
In-Reply-To: <CGME20200220125900eucas1p11f6e56f11c8fcf25acf28b082107c89d@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
Move enabling and disabling HDMI_EN optional regulator to probe() function
to keep track on the regulator status. This fixes following warning if
probe() fails (for example when I2C DDC adapter cannot be yet gathered
due to the missing driver). This fixes following warning observed on
Arndale5250 board with multi_v7_defconfig:
[drm] Failed to get ddc i2c adapter by node
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 214 at drivers/regulator/core.c:2051 _regulator_put+0x16c/0x184
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 0 PID: 214 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-next-20200219-00040-g38af1dfafdbb #7570
Hardware name: Samsung Exynos (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c0312258>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c030cc10>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c030cc10>] (show_stack) from [<c0f0d3a0>] (dump_stack+0xcc/0xe0)
[<c0f0d3a0>] (dump_stack) from [<c0346a58>] (__warn+0xe0/0xf8)
[<c0346a58>] (__warn) from [<c0346b20>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xb0/0xb8)
[<c0346b20>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0893f58>] (_regulator_put+0x16c/0x184)
[<c0893f58>] (_regulator_put) from [<c0893f8c>] (regulator_put+0x1c/0x2c)
[<c0893f8c>] (regulator_put) from [<c09b2664>] (release_nodes+0x17c/0x200)
[<c09b2664>] (release_nodes) from [<c09aebe8>] (really_probe+0x10c/0x350)
[<c09aebe8>] (really_probe) from [<c09aefa8>] (driver_probe_device+0x60/0x1a0)
[<c09aefa8>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c09af288>] (device_driver_attach+0x58/0x60)
[<c09af288>] (device_driver_attach) from [<c09af310>] (__driver_attach+0x80/0xbc)
[<c09af310>] (__driver_attach) from [<c09ace34>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xb4)
[<c09ace34>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c09ae00c>] (bus_add_driver+0x130/0x1e8)
[<c09ae00c>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c09afd98>] (driver_register+0x78/0x110)
[<c09afd98>] (driver_register) from [<bf139558>] (exynos_drm_init+0xe8/0x11c [exynosdrm])
[<bf139558>] (exynos_drm_init [exynosdrm]) from [<c0302fa8>] (do_one_initcall+0x50/0x220)
[<c0302fa8>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c03dc02c>] (do_init_module+0x60/0x210)
[<c03dc02c>] (do_init_module) from [<c03daf44>] (load_module+0x1c0c/0x2310)
[<c03daf44>] (load_module) from [<c03db85c>] (sys_finit_module+0xac/0xbc)
[<c03db85c>] (sys_finit_module) from [<c0301000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54)
Exception stack(0xecca3fa8 to 0xecca3ff0)
...
---[ end trace 276c91214635905c ]---
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c
index 9ff921f43a93..f141916eade6 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c
@@ -1805,18 +1805,10 @@ static int hdmi_resources_init(struct hdmi_context *hdata)
hdata->reg_hdmi_en = devm_regulator_get_optional(dev, "hdmi-en");
- if (PTR_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en) != -ENODEV) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en) != -ENODEV)
if (IS_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en))
return PTR_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en);
- ret = regulator_enable(hdata->reg_hdmi_en);
- if (ret) {
- DRM_DEV_ERROR(dev,
- "failed to enable hdmi-en regulator\n");
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
return hdmi_bridge_init(hdata);
}
@@ -2023,6 +2015,15 @@ static int hdmi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
}
}
+ if (!IS_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en)) {
+ ret = regulator_enable(hdata->reg_hdmi_en);
+ if (ret) {
+ DRM_DEV_ERROR(dev,
+ "failed to enable hdmi-en regulator\n");
+ goto err_hdmiphy;
+ }
+ }
+
pm_runtime_enable(dev);
audio_infoframe = &hdata->audio.infoframe;
@@ -2047,7 +2048,8 @@ static int hdmi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
err_rpm_disable:
pm_runtime_disable(dev);
-
+ if (!IS_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en))
+ regulator_disable(hdata->reg_hdmi_en);
err_hdmiphy:
if (hdata->hdmiphy_port)
put_device(&hdata->hdmiphy_port->dev);
--
2.17.1
_______________________________________________
dri-devel mailing list
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 03/16] s390x: protvirt: Support unpack facility
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
When a guest has saved a ipib of type 5 and calls diagnose308 with
subcode 10, we have to setup the protected processing environment via
Ultravisor calls. The calls are done by KVM and are exposed via an
API.
The following steps are necessary:
1. Create a VM (register it with the Ultravisor)
2. Create secure CPUs for all of our current cpus
3. Forward the secure header to the Ultravisor (has all information on
how to decrypt the image and VM information)
4. Protect image pages from the host and decrypt them
5. Verify the image integrity
Only after step 5 a protected VM is allowed to run.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [Changes
to machine]
---
hw/s390x/Makefile.objs | 1 +
hw/s390x/ipl.c | 33 +++++++++
hw/s390x/ipl.h | 2 +
hw/s390x/pv.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
hw/s390x/pv.h | 34 +++++++++
hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++
include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h | 1 +
target/s390x/cpu.c | 4 ++
target/s390x/cpu.h | 1 +
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.inc.h | 1 +
10 files changed, 270 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 hw/s390x/pv.c
create mode 100644 hw/s390x/pv.h
diff --git a/hw/s390x/Makefile.objs b/hw/s390x/Makefile.objs
index e02ed80b68..a46a1c7894 100644
--- a/hw/s390x/Makefile.objs
+++ b/hw/s390x/Makefile.objs
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ obj-y += tod-qemu.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += tod-kvm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += s390-skeys-kvm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += s390-stattrib-kvm.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += pv.o
obj-y += s390-ccw.o
obj-y += ap-device.o
obj-y += ap-bridge.o
diff --git a/hw/s390x/ipl.c b/hw/s390x/ipl.c
index e92d989813..7c27f50e13 100644
--- a/hw/s390x/ipl.c
+++ b/hw/s390x/ipl.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include "qemu/cutils.h"
#include "qemu/option.h"
#include "exec/exec-all.h"
+#include "pv.h"
#define KERN_IMAGE_START 0x010000UL
#define LINUX_MAGIC_ADDR 0x010008UL
@@ -677,6 +678,38 @@ static void s390_ipl_prepare_qipl(S390CPU *cpu)
cpu_physical_memory_unmap(addr, len, 1, len);
}
+int s390_ipl_prepare_pv_header(void)
+{
+ S390IPLState *ipl = get_ipl_device();
+ IPLBlockPV *ipib_pv = &ipl->iplb_pv.pv;
+ void *hdr = g_malloc(ipib_pv->pv_header_len);
+ int rc;
+
+ cpu_physical_memory_read(ipib_pv->pv_header_addr, hdr,
+ ipib_pv->pv_header_len);
+ rc = s390_pv_set_sec_parms((uint64_t)hdr,
+ ipib_pv->pv_header_len);
+ g_free(hdr);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int s390_ipl_pv_unpack(void)
+{
+ int i, rc = 0;
+ S390IPLState *ipl = get_ipl_device();
+ IPLBlockPV *ipib_pv = &ipl->iplb_pv.pv;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ipib_pv->num_comp; i++) {
+ rc = s390_pv_unpack(ipib_pv->components[i].addr,
+ TARGET_PAGE_ALIGN(ipib_pv->components[i].size),
+ ipib_pv->components[i].tweak_pref);
+ if (rc) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu)
{
S390IPLState *ipl = get_ipl_device();
diff --git a/hw/s390x/ipl.h b/hw/s390x/ipl.h
index 3c4bb66eda..92467738a7 100644
--- a/hw/s390x/ipl.h
+++ b/hw/s390x/ipl.h
@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ typedef union IplParameterBlock IplParameterBlock;
int s390_ipl_set_loadparm(uint8_t *loadparm);
int s390_ipl_pv_check_components(IplParameterBlock *iplb);
void s390_ipl_update_diag308(IplParameterBlock *iplb);
+int s390_ipl_prepare_pv_header(void);
+int s390_ipl_pv_unpack(void);
void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu);
IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb(void);
IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb_secure(void);
diff --git a/hw/s390x/pv.c b/hw/s390x/pv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8ae20f31c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hw/s390x/pv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * Secure execution functions
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
+ * Author(s):
+ * Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or (at
+ * your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the top-level
+ * directory.
+ */
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#include <linux/kvm.h>
+
+#include "qemu/error-report.h"
+#include "sysemu/kvm.h"
+#include "pv.h"
+
+const char *cmd_names[] = {
+ "VM_CREATE",
+ "VM_DESTROY",
+ "VM_SET_SEC_PARAMS",
+ "VM_UNPACK",
+ "VM_VERIFY",
+ "VM_PREP_RESET",
+ "VM_UNSHARE_ALL",
+ NULL
+};
+
+static int s390_pv_cmd(uint32_t cmd, void *data)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct kvm_pv_cmd pv_cmd = {
+ .cmd = cmd,
+ .data = (uint64_t)data,
+ };
+
+ rc = kvm_vm_ioctl(kvm_state, KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND, &pv_cmd);
+ if (rc) {
+ error_report("KVM PV command %d (%s) failed: header rc %x rrc %x "
+ "IOCTL rc: %d", cmd, cmd_names[cmd], pv_cmd.rc, pv_cmd.rrc,
+ rc);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void s390_pv_cmd_exit(uint32_t cmd, void *data)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = s390_pv_cmd(cmd, data);
+ if (rc) {
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
+int s390_pv_vm_create(void)
+{
+ return s390_pv_cmd(KVM_PV_ENABLE, NULL);
+}
+
+void s390_pv_vm_destroy(void)
+{
+ s390_pv_cmd_exit(KVM_PV_DISABLE, NULL);
+}
+
+int s390_pv_set_sec_parms(uint64_t origin, uint64_t length)
+{
+ struct kvm_s390_pv_sec_parm args = {
+ .origin = origin,
+ .length = length,
+ };
+
+ return s390_pv_cmd(KVM_PV_VM_SET_SEC_PARMS, &args);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called for each component in the SE type IPL parameter block 0.
+ */
+int s390_pv_unpack(uint64_t addr, uint64_t size, uint64_t tweak)
+{
+ struct kvm_s390_pv_unp args = {
+ .addr = addr,
+ .size = size,
+ .tweak = tweak,
+ };
+
+ return s390_pv_cmd(KVM_PV_VM_UNPACK, &args);
+}
+
+void s390_pv_perf_clear_reset(void)
+{
+ s390_pv_cmd_exit(KVM_PV_VM_PREP_RESET, NULL);
+}
+
+int s390_pv_verify(void)
+{
+ return s390_pv_cmd(KVM_PV_VM_VERIFY, NULL);
+}
+
+void s390_pv_unshare(void)
+{
+ s390_pv_cmd_exit(KVM_PV_VM_UNSHARE_ALL, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/hw/s390x/pv.h b/hw/s390x/pv.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be949d6825
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hw/s390x/pv.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * Protected Virtualization header
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2020
+ * Author(s):
+ * Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or (at
+ * your option) any later version. See the COPYING file in the top-level
+ * directory.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HW_S390_PV_H
+#define HW_S390_PV_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM
+int s390_pv_vm_create(void);
+void s390_pv_vm_destroy(void);
+int s390_pv_set_sec_parms(uint64_t origin, uint64_t length);
+int s390_pv_unpack(uint64_t addr, uint64_t size, uint64_t tweak);
+void s390_pv_perf_clear_reset(void);
+int s390_pv_verify(void);
+void s390_pv_unshare(void);
+#else
+int s390_pv_vm_create(void) { return 0; }
+void s390_pv_vm_destroy(void) {}
+int s390_pv_set_sec_parms(uint64_t origin, uint64_t length) { return 0; }
+int s390_pv_unpack(uint64_t addr, uint64_t size, uint64_t tweak) { return 0; }
+void s390_pv_perf_clear_reset(void) {}
+int s390_pv_verify(void) { return 0; }
+void s390_pv_unshare(void) {}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HW_S390_PV_H */
diff --git a/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c b/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c
index e759eb5f83..aa974d294e 100644
--- a/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c
+++ b/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include "hw/qdev-properties.h"
#include "hw/s390x/tod.h"
#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
+#include "hw/s390x/pv.h"
S390CPU *s390_cpu_addr2state(uint16_t cpu_addr)
{
@@ -240,9 +241,11 @@ static void s390_create_sclpconsole(const char *type, Chardev *chardev)
static void ccw_init(MachineState *machine)
{
int ret;
+ S390CcwMachineState *ms = S390_CCW_MACHINE(machine);
VirtualCssBus *css_bus;
DeviceState *dev;
+ ms->pv = false;
s390_sclp_init();
/* init memory + setup max page size. Required for the CPU model */
s390_memory_init(machine->ram_size);
@@ -318,10 +321,72 @@ static inline void s390_do_cpu_ipl(CPUState *cs, run_on_cpu_data arg)
s390_cpu_set_state(S390_CPU_STATE_OPERATING, cpu);
}
+static void s390_machine_unprotect(S390CcwMachineState *ms)
+{
+ CPUState *t;
+
+ s390_pv_vm_destroy();
+ CPU_FOREACH(t) {
+ S390_CPU(t)->env.pv = false;
+ }
+ ms->pv = false;
+}
+
+static int s390_machine_protect(S390CcwMachineState *ms)
+{
+ CPUState *t;
+ int rc;
+
+ /* Create SE VM */
+ rc = s390_pv_vm_create();
+ if (rc) {
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ CPU_FOREACH(t) {
+ S390_CPU(t)->env.pv = true;
+ }
+ ms->pv = true;
+
+ /* Set SE header and unpack */
+ rc = s390_ipl_prepare_pv_header();
+ if (rc) {
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Decrypt image */
+ rc = s390_ipl_pv_unpack();
+ if (rc) {
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify integrity */
+ rc = s390_pv_verify();
+ if (rc) {
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ return rc;
+
+out_err:
+ s390_machine_unprotect(ms);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void s390_machine_inject_pv_error(CPUState *cs)
+{
+ int r1 = (cs->kvm_run->s390_sieic.ipa & 0x00f0) >> 4;
+ CPUS390XState *env = &S390_CPU(cs)->env;
+
+ /* Report that we are unable to enter protected mode */
+ env->regs[r1 + 1] = 0xa02;
+}
+
static void s390_machine_reset(MachineState *machine)
{
enum s390_reset reset_type;
CPUState *cs, *t;
+ S390CPU *cpu;
+ S390CcwMachineState *ms = S390_CCW_MACHINE(machine);
/* get the reset parameters, reset them once done */
s390_ipl_get_reset_request(&cs, &reset_type);
@@ -329,6 +394,8 @@ static void s390_machine_reset(MachineState *machine)
/* all CPUs are paused and synchronized at this point */
s390_cmma_reset();
+ cpu = S390_CPU(cs);
+
switch (reset_type) {
case S390_RESET_EXTERNAL:
case S390_RESET_REIPL:
@@ -355,6 +422,26 @@ static void s390_machine_reset(MachineState *machine)
}
subsystem_reset();
run_on_cpu(cs, s390_do_cpu_initial_reset, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
+ run_on_cpu(cs, s390_do_cpu_load_normal, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
+ break;
+ case S390_RESET_PV: /* Subcode 10 */
+ subsystem_reset();
+ s390_crypto_reset();
+
+ CPU_FOREACH(t) {
+ if (t == cs) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ run_on_cpu(t, s390_do_cpu_full_reset, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
+ }
+ run_on_cpu(cs, s390_do_cpu_reset, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
+
+ if (s390_machine_protect(ms)) {
+ s390_machine_inject_pv_error(cs);
+ s390_cpu_set_state(S390_CPU_STATE_OPERATING, cpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
run_on_cpu(cs, s390_do_cpu_load_normal, RUN_ON_CPU_NULL);
break;
default:
diff --git a/include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h b/include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h
index 8aa27199c9..cd1dccc6e3 100644
--- a/include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h
+++ b/include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ typedef struct S390CcwMachineState {
/*< public >*/
bool aes_key_wrap;
bool dea_key_wrap;
+ bool pv;
uint8_t loadparm[8];
} S390CcwMachineState;
diff --git a/target/s390x/cpu.c b/target/s390x/cpu.c
index 8da1905485..1dbd84b9d7 100644
--- a/target/s390x/cpu.c
+++ b/target/s390x/cpu.c
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
#include "sysemu/hw_accel.h"
#include "hw/qdev-properties.h"
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
+#include "hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h"
+#include "hw/s390x/pv.h"
#include "hw/boards.h"
#include "sysemu/arch_init.h"
#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
@@ -191,6 +193,7 @@ static void s390_cpu_realizefn(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY)
MachineState *ms = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine());
+ S390CcwMachineState *ccw = S390_CCW_MACHINE(ms);
unsigned int max_cpus = ms->smp.max_cpus;
if (cpu->env.core_id >= max_cpus) {
error_setg(&err, "Unable to add CPU with core-id: %" PRIu32
@@ -205,6 +208,7 @@ static void s390_cpu_realizefn(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
goto out;
}
+ cpu->env.pv = ccw->pv;
/* sync cs->cpu_index and env->core_id. The latter is needed for TCG. */
cs->cpu_index = cpu->env.core_id;
#endif
diff --git a/target/s390x/cpu.h b/target/s390x/cpu.h
index 8a557fd8d1..cbc53c99cf 100644
--- a/target/s390x/cpu.h
+++ b/target/s390x/cpu.h
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ struct CPUS390XState {
/* Fields up to this point are cleared by a CPU reset */
struct {} end_reset_fields;
+ bool pv; /* protected virtualization */
#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY)
uint32_t core_id; /* PoP "CPU address", same as cpu_index */
diff --git a/target/s390x/cpu_features_def.inc.h b/target/s390x/cpu_features_def.inc.h
index 31dff0d84e..60db28351d 100644
--- a/target/s390x/cpu_features_def.inc.h
+++ b/target/s390x/cpu_features_def.inc.h
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(DEFLATE_BASE, "deflate-base", STFL, 151, "Deflate-conversion facility (
DEF_FEAT(VECTOR_PACKED_DECIMAL_ENH, "vxpdeh", STFL, 152, "Vector-Packed-Decimal-Enhancement Facility")
DEF_FEAT(MSA_EXT_9, "msa9-base", STFL, 155, "Message-security-assist-extension-9 facility (excluding subfunctions)")
DEF_FEAT(ETOKEN, "etoken", STFL, 156, "Etoken facility")
+DEF_FEAT(UNPACK, "unpack", STFL, 161, "Unpack facility")
/* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Byte 80 - 98 (bit numbers relative to byte-80) */
DEF_FEAT(SIE_GSLS, "gsls", SCLP_CONF_CHAR, 40, "SIE: Guest-storage-limit-suppression facility")
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH] drm/exynos: hdmi: don't leak enable HDMI_EN regulator if probe fails
From: Marek Szyprowski @ 2020-02-20 12:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dri-devel, linux-samsung-soc
Cc: Marek Szyprowski, Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz, Seung-Woo Kim,
Inki Dae, Andrzej Hajda
In-Reply-To: <CGME20200220125900eucas1p11f6e56f11c8fcf25acf28b082107c89d@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
Move enabling and disabling HDMI_EN optional regulator to probe() function
to keep track on the regulator status. This fixes following warning if
probe() fails (for example when I2C DDC adapter cannot be yet gathered
due to the missing driver). This fixes following warning observed on
Arndale5250 board with multi_v7_defconfig:
[drm] Failed to get ddc i2c adapter by node
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 214 at drivers/regulator/core.c:2051 _regulator_put+0x16c/0x184
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 0 PID: 214 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-next-20200219-00040-g38af1dfafdbb #7570
Hardware name: Samsung Exynos (Flattened Device Tree)
[<c0312258>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c030cc10>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c030cc10>] (show_stack) from [<c0f0d3a0>] (dump_stack+0xcc/0xe0)
[<c0f0d3a0>] (dump_stack) from [<c0346a58>] (__warn+0xe0/0xf8)
[<c0346a58>] (__warn) from [<c0346b20>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xb0/0xb8)
[<c0346b20>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0893f58>] (_regulator_put+0x16c/0x184)
[<c0893f58>] (_regulator_put) from [<c0893f8c>] (regulator_put+0x1c/0x2c)
[<c0893f8c>] (regulator_put) from [<c09b2664>] (release_nodes+0x17c/0x200)
[<c09b2664>] (release_nodes) from [<c09aebe8>] (really_probe+0x10c/0x350)
[<c09aebe8>] (really_probe) from [<c09aefa8>] (driver_probe_device+0x60/0x1a0)
[<c09aefa8>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c09af288>] (device_driver_attach+0x58/0x60)
[<c09af288>] (device_driver_attach) from [<c09af310>] (__driver_attach+0x80/0xbc)
[<c09af310>] (__driver_attach) from [<c09ace34>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xb4)
[<c09ace34>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c09ae00c>] (bus_add_driver+0x130/0x1e8)
[<c09ae00c>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c09afd98>] (driver_register+0x78/0x110)
[<c09afd98>] (driver_register) from [<bf139558>] (exynos_drm_init+0xe8/0x11c [exynosdrm])
[<bf139558>] (exynos_drm_init [exynosdrm]) from [<c0302fa8>] (do_one_initcall+0x50/0x220)
[<c0302fa8>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c03dc02c>] (do_init_module+0x60/0x210)
[<c03dc02c>] (do_init_module) from [<c03daf44>] (load_module+0x1c0c/0x2310)
[<c03daf44>] (load_module) from [<c03db85c>] (sys_finit_module+0xac/0xbc)
[<c03db85c>] (sys_finit_module) from [<c0301000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54)
Exception stack(0xecca3fa8 to 0xecca3ff0)
...
---[ end trace 276c91214635905c ]---
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c
index 9ff921f43a93..f141916eade6 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_hdmi.c
@@ -1805,18 +1805,10 @@ static int hdmi_resources_init(struct hdmi_context *hdata)
hdata->reg_hdmi_en = devm_regulator_get_optional(dev, "hdmi-en");
- if (PTR_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en) != -ENODEV) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en) != -ENODEV)
if (IS_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en))
return PTR_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en);
- ret = regulator_enable(hdata->reg_hdmi_en);
- if (ret) {
- DRM_DEV_ERROR(dev,
- "failed to enable hdmi-en regulator\n");
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
return hdmi_bridge_init(hdata);
}
@@ -2023,6 +2015,15 @@ static int hdmi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
}
}
+ if (!IS_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en)) {
+ ret = regulator_enable(hdata->reg_hdmi_en);
+ if (ret) {
+ DRM_DEV_ERROR(dev,
+ "failed to enable hdmi-en regulator\n");
+ goto err_hdmiphy;
+ }
+ }
+
pm_runtime_enable(dev);
audio_infoframe = &hdata->audio.infoframe;
@@ -2047,7 +2048,8 @@ static int hdmi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
err_rpm_disable:
pm_runtime_disable(dev);
-
+ if (!IS_ERR(hdata->reg_hdmi_en))
+ regulator_disable(hdata->reg_hdmi_en);
err_hdmiphy:
if (hdata->hdmiphy_port)
put_device(&hdata->hdmiphy_port->dev);
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 02/16] s390x: protvirt: Add diag308 subcodes 8 - 10
From: Janosch Frank @ 2020-02-20 12:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel; +Cc: qemu-s390x, mihajlov, david, cohuck
In-Reply-To: <20200220125638.7241-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
For diag308 subcodes 8 - 10 we have a new ipib of type 5. The ipib
holds the address and length of the secure execution header, as well
as a list of guest components.
Each component is a block of memory, for example kernel or initrd,
which needs to be decrypted by the Ultravisor in order to run a
protected VM. The secure execution header instructs the Ultravisor on
how to handle the protected VM and its components.
Subcodes 8 and 9 are similiar to 5 and 6 and subcode 10 will finally
start the protected guest.
Subcodes 8-10 are not valid in protected mode, we have to do a subcode
3 and then the 8 and 10 combination for a protected reboot.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
hw/s390x/ipl.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
hw/s390x/ipl.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
target/s390x/diag.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/s390x/ipl.c b/hw/s390x/ipl.c
index 7773499d7f..e92d989813 100644
--- a/hw/s390x/ipl.c
+++ b/hw/s390x/ipl.c
@@ -538,15 +538,56 @@ static bool is_virtio_scsi_device(IplParameterBlock *iplb)
return is_virtio_ccw_device_of_type(iplb, VIRTIO_ID_SCSI);
}
+int s390_ipl_pv_check_components(IplParameterBlock *iplb)
+{
+ int i;
+ IPLBlockPV *ipib_pv = &iplb->pv;
+
+ if (ipib_pv->num_comp == 0) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ipib_pv->num_comp; i++) {
+
+ /* Addr must be 4k aligned */
+ if (ipib_pv->components[i].addr & ~TARGET_PAGE_MASK) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Tweak prefix is monotonously increasing with each component */
+ if (i < ipib_pv->num_comp - 1 &&
+ ipib_pv->components[i].tweak_pref >
+ ipib_pv->components[i + 1].tweak_pref) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
void s390_ipl_update_diag308(IplParameterBlock *iplb)
{
S390IPLState *ipl = get_ipl_device();
- ipl->iplb = *iplb;
- ipl->iplb_valid = true;
+ if (iplb->pbt == S390_IPL_TYPE_PV) {
+ ipl->iplb_pv = *iplb;
+ ipl->iplb_valid_pv = true;
+ } else {
+ ipl->iplb = *iplb;
+ ipl->iplb_valid = true;
+ }
ipl->netboot = is_virtio_net_device(iplb);
}
+IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb_secure(void)
+{
+ S390IPLState *ipl = get_ipl_device();
+
+ if (!ipl->iplb_valid_pv) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return &ipl->iplb_pv;
+}
+
IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb(void)
{
S390IPLState *ipl = get_ipl_device();
@@ -561,7 +602,8 @@ void s390_ipl_reset_request(CPUState *cs, enum s390_reset reset_type)
{
S390IPLState *ipl = get_ipl_device();
- if (reset_type == S390_RESET_EXTERNAL || reset_type == S390_RESET_REIPL) {
+ if (reset_type == S390_RESET_EXTERNAL || reset_type == S390_RESET_REIPL ||
+ reset_type == S390_RESET_PV) {
/* use CPU 0 for full resets */
ipl->reset_cpu_index = 0;
} else {
diff --git a/hw/s390x/ipl.h b/hw/s390x/ipl.h
index d4813105db..3c4bb66eda 100644
--- a/hw/s390x/ipl.h
+++ b/hw/s390x/ipl.h
@@ -15,6 +15,23 @@
#include "cpu.h"
#include "hw/qdev-core.h"
+struct IPLBlockPVComp {
+ uint64_t tweak_pref;
+ uint64_t addr;
+ uint64_t size;
+} QEMU_PACKED;
+typedef struct IPLBlockPVComp IPLBlockPVComp;
+
+struct IPLBlockPV {
+ uint8_t reserved[87];
+ uint8_t version;
+ uint32_t num_comp;
+ uint64_t pv_header_addr;
+ uint64_t pv_header_len;
+ struct IPLBlockPVComp components[];
+} QEMU_PACKED;
+typedef struct IPLBlockPV IPLBlockPV;
+
struct IplBlockCcw {
uint8_t reserved0[85];
uint8_t ssid;
@@ -71,6 +88,7 @@ union IplParameterBlock {
union {
IplBlockCcw ccw;
IplBlockFcp fcp;
+ IPLBlockPV pv;
IplBlockQemuScsi scsi;
};
} QEMU_PACKED;
@@ -84,9 +102,11 @@ union IplParameterBlock {
typedef union IplParameterBlock IplParameterBlock;
int s390_ipl_set_loadparm(uint8_t *loadparm);
+int s390_ipl_pv_check_components(IplParameterBlock *iplb);
void s390_ipl_update_diag308(IplParameterBlock *iplb);
void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu);
IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb(void);
+IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb_secure(void);
enum s390_reset {
/* default is a reset not triggered by a CPU e.g. issued by QMP */
@@ -94,6 +114,7 @@ enum s390_reset {
S390_RESET_REIPL,
S390_RESET_MODIFIED_CLEAR,
S390_RESET_LOAD_NORMAL,
+ S390_RESET_PV,
};
void s390_ipl_reset_request(CPUState *cs, enum s390_reset reset_type);
void s390_ipl_get_reset_request(CPUState **cs, enum s390_reset *reset_type);
@@ -133,6 +154,7 @@ struct S390IPLState {
/*< private >*/
DeviceState parent_obj;
IplParameterBlock iplb;
+ IplParameterBlock iplb_pv;
QemuIplParameters qipl;
uint64_t start_addr;
uint64_t compat_start_addr;
@@ -140,6 +162,7 @@ struct S390IPLState {
uint64_t compat_bios_start_addr;
bool enforce_bios;
bool iplb_valid;
+ bool iplb_valid_pv;
bool netboot;
/* reset related properties don't have to be migrated or reset */
enum s390_reset reset_type;
@@ -161,9 +184,11 @@ QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong");
#define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00
#define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02
+#define S390_IPL_TYPE_PV 0x05
#define S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI 0xff
#define S390_IPLB_HEADER_LEN 8
+#define S390_IPLB_MIN_PV_LEN 148
#define S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN 200
#define S390_IPLB_MIN_FCP_LEN 384
#define S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN 200
@@ -185,4 +210,10 @@ static inline bool iplb_valid_fcp(IplParameterBlock *iplb)
iplb->pbt == S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP;
}
+static inline bool iplb_valid_pv(IplParameterBlock *iplb)
+{
+ return be32_to_cpu(iplb->len) >= S390_IPLB_MIN_PV_LEN &&
+ iplb->pbt == S390_IPL_TYPE_PV;
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/target/s390x/diag.c b/target/s390x/diag.c
index b5aec06d6b..5e77d85652 100644
--- a/target/s390x/diag.c
+++ b/target/s390x/diag.c
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ int handle_diag_288(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3)
#define DIAG_308_RC_OK 0x0001
#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF 0x0102
#define DIAG_308_RC_INVALID 0x0402
+#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF 0x0a02
+#define DIAG_308_RC_INVAL_FOR_PV 0x0b02
#define DIAG308_RESET_MOD_CLR 0
#define DIAG308_RESET_LOAD_NORM 1
@@ -59,6 +61,9 @@ int handle_diag_288(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3)
#define DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP 4
#define DIAG308_SET 5
#define DIAG308_STORE 6
+#define DIAG308_PV_SET 8
+#define DIAG308_PV_STORE 9
+#define DIAG308_PV_START 10
static int diag308_parm_check(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t addr,
uintptr_t ra, bool write)
@@ -105,6 +110,7 @@ void handle_diag_308(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
s390_ipl_reset_request(cs, S390_RESET_REIPL);
break;
case DIAG308_SET:
+ case DIAG308_PV_SET:
if (diag308_parm_check(env, r1, addr, ra, false)) {
return;
}
@@ -117,7 +123,8 @@ void handle_diag_308(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
cpu_physical_memory_read(addr, iplb, be32_to_cpu(iplb->len));
- if (!iplb_valid_ccw(iplb) && !iplb_valid_fcp(iplb)) {
+ if (!iplb_valid_ccw(iplb) && !iplb_valid_fcp(iplb) &&
+ !(iplb_valid_pv(iplb) && s390_ipl_pv_check_components(iplb) >= 0)) {
env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_308_RC_INVALID;
goto out;
}
@@ -128,17 +135,31 @@ out:
g_free(iplb);
return;
case DIAG308_STORE:
+ case DIAG308_PV_STORE:
if (diag308_parm_check(env, r1, addr, ra, true)) {
return;
}
- iplb = s390_ipl_get_iplb();
+ if (subcode == DIAG308_PV_STORE) {
+ iplb = s390_ipl_get_iplb_secure();
+ } else {
+ iplb = s390_ipl_get_iplb();
+ }
if (iplb) {
cpu_physical_memory_write(addr, iplb, be32_to_cpu(iplb->len));
env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_308_RC_OK;
} else {
env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF;
}
- return;
+ break;
+ case DIAG308_PV_START:
+ iplb = s390_ipl_get_iplb_secure();
+ if (!iplb || !iplb_valid_pv(iplb)) {
+ env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ s390_ipl_reset_request(cs, S390_RESET_PV);
+ break;
default:
s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_SPECIFICATION, ra);
break;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related
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