From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, andrii@kernel.org
Cc: daniel@iogearbox.net, martin.lau@linux.dev, kernel-team@fb.com,
yonghong.song@linux.dev, eddyz87@gmail.com,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v1 4/8] bpf: attribute __arg_untrusted for global function parameters
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 15:42:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250702224209.3300396-5-eddyz87@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250702224209.3300396-1-eddyz87@gmail.com>
Add support for PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED global function
parameters. Anything is allowed to pass to such parameters, as these
are read-only and probe read instructions would protect against
invalid memory access.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
kernel/bpf/btf.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index b3c8a95d38fb..28cb0a2a5402 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -7646,11 +7646,12 @@ static int btf_get_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, int arg_idx,
}
enum btf_arg_tag {
- ARG_TAG_CTX = BIT_ULL(0),
- ARG_TAG_NONNULL = BIT_ULL(1),
- ARG_TAG_TRUSTED = BIT_ULL(2),
- ARG_TAG_NULLABLE = BIT_ULL(3),
- ARG_TAG_ARENA = BIT_ULL(4),
+ ARG_TAG_CTX = BIT_ULL(0),
+ ARG_TAG_NONNULL = BIT_ULL(1),
+ ARG_TAG_TRUSTED = BIT_ULL(2),
+ ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED = BIT_ULL(3),
+ ARG_TAG_NULLABLE = BIT_ULL(4),
+ ARG_TAG_ARENA = BIT_ULL(5),
};
/* Process BTF of a function to produce high-level expectation of function
@@ -7758,6 +7759,8 @@ int btf_prepare_func_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
tags |= ARG_TAG_CTX;
} else if (strcmp(tag, "trusted") == 0) {
tags |= ARG_TAG_TRUSTED;
+ } else if (strcmp(tag, "untrusted") == 0) {
+ tags |= ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED;
} else if (strcmp(tag, "nonnull") == 0) {
tags |= ARG_TAG_NONNULL;
} else if (strcmp(tag, "nullable") == 0) {
@@ -7818,6 +7821,22 @@ int btf_prepare_func_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
sub->args[i].btf_id = kern_type_id;
continue;
}
+ if (tags & ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED) {
+ int kern_type_id;
+
+ if (tags & ~ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED) {
+ bpf_log(log, "arg#%d untrusted cannot be combined with any other tags\n", i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ kern_type_id = btf_get_ptr_to_btf_id(log, i, btf, t);
+ if (kern_type_id < 0)
+ return kern_type_id;
+
+ sub->args[i].arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+ sub->args[i].btf_id = kern_type_id;
+ continue;
+ }
if (tags & ARG_TAG_ARENA) {
if (tags & ~ARG_TAG_ARENA) {
bpf_log(log, "arg#%d arena cannot be combined with any other tags\n", i);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index cd2344e50db8..dfb5a2f8e58f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -10436,6 +10436,13 @@ static int btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,
bpf_log(log, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno);
return -EINVAL;
}
+ } else if (arg->arg_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) {
+ /*
+ * Anything is allowed for untrusted arguments, as these are
+ * read-only and probe read instructions would protect against
+ * invalid memory access.
+ */
+ continue;
} else if (arg->arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_DONTCARE);
if (ret < 0)
--
2.47.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-02 22:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-02 22:42 [PATCH bpf-next v1 0/8] bpf: additional use-cases for untrusted PTR_TO_MEM Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-02 22:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 1/8] bpf: make makr_btf_ld_reg return error for unexpected reg types Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 17:20 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-02 22:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 2/8] bpf: rdonly_untrusted_mem for btf id walk pointer leafs Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 17:27 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-02 22:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 3/8] selftests/bpf: ptr_to_btf_id struct walk ending with primitive pointer Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 17:34 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-02 22:42 ` Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2025-07-03 3:18 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 4/8] bpf: attribute __arg_untrusted for global function parameters Alexei Starovoitov
2025-07-03 21:25 ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 18:17 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-07-04 18:03 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-04 18:28 ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 18:33 ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 18:50 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-04 19:07 ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 19:15 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-04 19:23 ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 20:05 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-07-04 20:20 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-04 20:34 ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 20:47 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-07-02 22:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 5/8] libbpf: __arg_untrusted in bpf_helpers.h Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 18:04 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-02 22:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 6/8] selftests/bpf: test cases for __arg_untrusted Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 18:05 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-02 22:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 7/8] bpf: support for void/primitive __arg_untrusted global func params Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-03 3:20 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-07-03 21:49 ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 18:11 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-07-04 18:09 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-02 22:42 ` [PATCH bpf-next v1 8/8] selftests/bpf: tests for __arg_untrusted void * " Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-04 18:12 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
2025-07-04 18:35 ` Eduard Zingerman
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