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From: Lion Ackermann <nnamrec@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH net-next] net: filter: remove dead instructions in filter code
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 10:32:09 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <525d54bc-5259-49f2-acbf-7396bab48dec@gmail.com> (raw)

It is well-known to be possible to abuse the eBPF JIT to construct
gadgets for code re-use attacks. To hinder this constant blinding was
added in "bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits". This
mitigation has one weakness though: It ignores jump instructions due to
their correct offsets not being known when constant blinding is applied.
This can be abused to construct "jump-chains" with crafted offsets so
that certain desirable instructions are generated by the JIT compiler.
F.e. two consecutive BPF_JMP | BPF_JA codes with an appropriate offset
might generate the following jumps:

    ...
    0xffffffffc000f822:    jmp    0xffffffffc00108df
    0xffffffffc000f827:    jmp    0xffffffffc0010861
    ...

If those are hit unaligned we can get two consecutive useful
instructions:

    ...
    0xffffffffc000f823:    mov    $0xe9000010,%eax
    0xffffffffc000f828:    xor    $0xe9000010,%eax
    ...

This patch adds a mitigation to prevent said chains from being
generated by re-writing any instructions which are not reachable
anyways. By preventing consecutive jumps, only a single instruction can
be encoded, which is believed to be insufficient to be useful.

No functional changes for a benign filter program are intended.

Fixes: 4f3446bb809f ("bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits")
Signed-off-by: Lion <nnamrec@gmail.com>
---
 net/core/filter.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index bc6828761a47..b8eb2fa309c6 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -970,6 +970,65 @@ static int check_load_and_stores(const struct sock_filter *filter, int flen)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/* Security:
+ *
+ * As it is possible to abuse the JIT compiler to produce instructions for
+ * code re-use, remove anything which is not reachable in a benign program
+ * anyways
+ */
+static int remove_dead_code(struct sock_filter *filter, int flen)
+{
+	int pc;
+	unsigned long *live;
+
+	if (flen == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	live = bitmap_zalloc(flen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!live)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* No back jumps and no loops, can do a single forward pass here */
+	set_bit(0, live);
+	for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
+		if (!test_bit(pc, live)) {
+			/* Dead. Some arbitrary instruction here. */
+			filter[pc].code = BPF_LD | BPF_IMM;
+			filter[pc].k = 0;
+			filter[pc].jt = 0;
+			filter[pc].jf = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		switch (filter[pc].code) {
+		case BPF_RET | BPF_K:
+		case BPF_RET | BPF_A:
+			break;
+		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JA:
+			set_bit(pc + 1 + filter[pc].k, live);
+			break;
+		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K:
+		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_X:
+		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K:
+		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_X:
+		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K:
+		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_X:
+		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K:
+		case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_X:
+			set_bit(pc + 1 + filter[pc].jt, live);
+			set_bit(pc + 1 + filter[pc].jf, live);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Continue to next instruction */
+			set_bit(pc + 1, live);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	kfree(live);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static bool chk_code_allowed(u16 code_to_probe)
 {
 	static const bool codes[] = {
@@ -1061,11 +1120,11 @@ static bool bpf_check_basics_ok(const struct sock_filter *filter,
  *
  * Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not.
  */
-static int bpf_check_classic(const struct sock_filter *filter,
+static int bpf_check_classic(struct sock_filter *filter,
 			     unsigned int flen)
 {
 	bool anc_found;
-	int pc;
+	int pc, ret;
 
 	/* Check the filter code now */
 	for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
@@ -1133,7 +1192,10 @@ static int bpf_check_classic(const struct sock_filter *filter,
 	switch (filter[flen - 1].code) {
 	case BPF_RET | BPF_K:
 	case BPF_RET | BPF_A:
-		return check_load_and_stores(filter, flen);
+		ret = check_load_and_stores(filter, flen);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+		return remove_dead_code(filter, flen);
 	}
 
 	return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.49.0



             reply	other threads:[~2025-04-10  8:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-10  8:32 Lion Ackermann [this message]
2025-04-10 15:05 ` [PATCH net-next] net: filter: remove dead instructions in filter code Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-11  6:24   ` Lion Ackermann
2025-04-11 15:20     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-04-15  8:54       ` Lion Ackermann

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